# Hamilton v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, W.D. New York · March 23, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10361968

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 23, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10361968

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that an ALJ may discount a treating physician’s opinion that a claimant is greatly restricted based on that claimant’s activities of daily living
- recognizing that the severity determination is meant “to screen out de minimis claims”
- stating that substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla”
- holding that the ALJ’s failure to find two impairments “severe” at step two was harmless, because the ALJ considered them later in the evaluation process

## Opinion text

W ESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

RANDELL EARL HAMILTON,

Plaintiff,
v.
18-CV-6782
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to have the
undersigned conduct any and all further proceedings in this case, including entry of final
judgment. Dkt. No. 17. Randell Earl Hamilton (“Plaintiff”), who is represented by counsel,
brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (“the Act”) seeking review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying his
application for benefits. This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties’ competing motions for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. Nos. 9, 16.
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. No. 9) is denied, and the Commissioner’s
motion (Dkt. No. 16) is granted.

BACKGROUND
On April 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”),
alleging disability beginning on June 5, 2013, due to a learning disorder, depression, a
was denied at the initial level and he requested review. Tr. at 48-58, 60-71, 72-74.
Administrative Law Judge John Costello (“the ALJ”) conducted a hearing on September
25, 2017, at which Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert testified. Tr. at 26-46.
Plaintiff was assisted by a non-attorney representative. Id. On November 20, 2017, the
ALJ issued a decision in which he found that Plaintiff was not disabled and therefore, not
eligible for benefits. Tr. at 10-21. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for
review, making the ALJ’s determination the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. at 1-6.
Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action seeking review of the Commissioner’s decision.
Dkt. No. 1.

LEGAL STANDARD
Disability Determination
An ALJ must follow a five-step process to determine whether an individual is
disabled under the Act. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-142 (1987). At step
one, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work
activity. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ
proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or
combination of impairments, that is “severe,” meaning that it imposes significant
restrictions on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of

1Citations to “Tr. __” refer to the pages of the administrative transcript, which appears at Docket
No. 8.

2
the ALJ continues to step three.

At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant’s impairment meets or
medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of
Regulation No. 4 (the “Listings”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or
medically equals a Listings criterion and meets the durational requirement (20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1509), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities
on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for collective impairments. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(e)-(f).

The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant’s
RFC permits him or her to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not
disabled. If not, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts
to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant “retains a residual functional
capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy” in light of the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. See Rosa v.
Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1560(c).

3
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) authorizes a district court “to enter, upon the pleadings
and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2007). Section 405(g) limits the scope of the Court’s review to two
inquiries: whether the Commissioner’s conclusions were based upon an erroneous legal
standard, and whether the Commissioner’s findings were supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole. See Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-106
(2d Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla.” Moran v. Astrue, 569
F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009). “It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (emphasis added and citation
omitted). The substantial evidence standard of review is a very deferential standard, even
more so than the “clearly erroneous” standard. Brault v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 683 F.3d
443, 447-48 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153 (1999)).

When determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by
substantial evidence, the Court’s task is “‘to examine the entire record, including
contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be drawn.’”
Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d
1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). If there is substantial evidence for the ALJ’s

determination, the decision must be upheld, even if there is also substantial evidence for
the Plaintiff’s position. See Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1996); Conlin ex
rel. N.T.C.B. v. Colvin, 111 F. Supp. 3d 376, 384 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). Likewise, where the

4
conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ analyzed Plaintiff’s claims using the familiar five-step process
described above. Lynch v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-249, 2008 WL 3413899, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 8, 2008) (detailing the five steps). At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since his application date. Tr. at 12. At step two, he
found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: a learning disorder, post-

traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, obesity, and
status post fixation of the left ulna. Tr. at 12-13.2 The ALJ noted that Plaintiff reported that
he suffered back pain for over five years but “no objective testing establish[ed] the
presence of any impairment,” and Plaintiff “was undergoing no treatment and was
prescribed no medication for back pain.” Tr. at 13.

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did not, either
individually or in combination, meet or equal the Listings, giving special consideration to
Listing 1.02 (Major Dysfunction of a Joint (Due to Any Cause)), 12.04 (Depressive, Bipolar
and Related Disorders), 12.05 (Intellectual Disorder), 12.06 (Anxiety and Obsessive-

Compulsive Disorders), 12.15 (Trauma and Stressor Related Disorders). Tr. at 13-14.

2 This Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with Plaintiff’s medical history, which is summarized at
length in the papers.
5
C.F.R. § 416.967(b), except “the claimant has sufficient attention and concentration to
understand, remember[,] and follow simple instructions; [he can perform] low stress work
defined as work involving only occasional decision making and occasional changes in work
setting; no interaction with the public; occasional interaction (coordination) with coworkers;
but has no limitations on proximity to co-workers.” Tr. at 14-15.

Continuing to the fourth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant
work. Tr. at 19. Based on Plaintiff’s age (32 years old on his application date), limited
education, and with the aforementioned RFC, the ALJ found that he could perform work

that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, specifically, the jobs of
photocopy machine operator (DOT No. 207.685-014), and laundry sorter (DOT No.
361.687-014). Tr. at 19. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a
disability during the relevant period. Tr. at 20.

Judgment on the Pleadings
As noted above, the parties have cross-moved for judgment on the
pleadings. Dkt. Nos. 9, 16. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to find that that he had
the severe mental impairment of intellectual disability at step two, resulting in a faulty
analysis of the cognitive evidence at step three; erroneously considered Plaintiff’s arm

fracture under Listing 1.02 (Major Dysfunction of a Joint) rather than the more appropriate
Listing 1.07 (Fracture of an Upper Extremity); and improperly declined to afford significant
weight to any medical opinions or to cite to any alternative evidence in support of the RFC.
Dkt. No. 9-1, pp. 16-30. The Commissioner contends that Plaintiff did not meet all of the
6
Plaintiff’s fracture failed to heal as required to meet or medically equal Listing 1.07
(Fracture of an Upper Extremity); and the ALJ “identified the evidence that supported the
limitations included in the RFC, including the treatment records that showed improvement
and the records that showed moderate limitations generally” (Dkt. No. 16-1, pp. 16-30).
Having reviewed the record, this Court finds that the ALJ did not err and that the RFC was
substantially supported.

Intellectual Disorder/Listing 12.05
Step two of the disability evaluation, the severity determination, is intended to

“identify[ ] at an early stage those claimants whose medical impairments are so slight that
it is unlikely they would be found to be disabled.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153
(1987); Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the severity
determination is meant “to screen out de minimis claims”). As set forth in the regulations,
“[i]f you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly
limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will find that you do not
have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),
416.920(c). Basic work activities are defined as “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to
do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b). “An individual shall not be
considered to be under a disability unless he [or she] furnishes such medical and other

evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social Security may require.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 148; see also Taylor v. Astrue, 32 F. Supp. 3d
253, 265 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that “[t]he claimant bears the burden of presenting
evidence establishing severity”).
7
a person has been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment’ is not, by itself,
sufficient to render a condition severe.” Taylor, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 265 (internal citations
omitted). Consistent with this reasoning, “if the medical evidence establishes only a ‘slight
abnormality’ which would have ‘no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to
work[,]’” the ALJ should not find a severe condition. Rosario v. Apfel, No. 97 CV 5759,
1999 WL 294727, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1999) (quoting SSR 85-28, 1985 WL 56856, at
*3).

When a claimant allegedly suffers mental impairments, the ALJ is required to

follow a “special technique” at each level of the administrative review process to determine
whether the claimant has any severe mental impairments and whether the impairments
meet or equal the Listings. Kohler, 546 F.3d at 265; 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App’x.
1; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. Specifically, the ALJ must assess the claimant’s degree of
functional limitation resulting from a mental impairment in four broad functional areas
identified in Paragraph B of the adult mental disorders listings. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3). Effective January 17, 2017, the four functional areas
include: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) interacting with
others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing
oneself. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(3).

In assessing the functional areas, an ALJ must apply the degree of
limitations using a five-point scale consisting of “none, mild, moderate, marked, and
extreme.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(4). An “extreme” limitation of one or a “marked”
8
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P. App’x, § 12.05B. If the degree of the limitations is “none” or
“mild,” an ALJ will generally find the impairments non-severe; however, if they are severe,
an ALJ must determine if the disorder meets or equals a listing. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920a(d)(1-2). “The ALJ’s written decision must ‘reflect application of the technique,
and ... include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the [four] functional
areas.’” Kennerson v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-6591 (MAT), 2012 WL 3204055, at *14
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2012) (citing Kohler, 546 F.3d at 266); Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
203 F. Supp. 3d 282, 295-97 (W.D.N.Y. 2016).

“Courts have held that error at step two in determining the severity of
impairments is harmless if the ALJ finds that at least one other severe impairment and
continues through the sequence of the disability analysis.” Howard, 203 F. Supp. 3d at
297 (citing cases). This is “because the non-severe impairments can later be considered
at the RFC stage.” Id.; Reices-Colon v. Astrue, 523 F. App’x 796, 798 (2d Cir. 2013)
(holding that the ALJ’s failure to find two impairments “severe” at step two was harmless,
because the ALJ considered them later in the evaluation process). While this harmless
error doctrine does not always apply in relation to mental impairments, Howard, 203 F.
Supp. 3d at 297-98, uncertainty as to whether an ALJ applied the special technique during
the severity stage will not, “standing alone, warrant remand or reversal if the ALJ’s other

findings show that the proper legal standards were applied and that all of [the claimant’s]
impairments were properly considered at all of the subsequent steps.” Booker v. Astrue,
No. 1:07-CV-646 GLS, 2011 WL 3735808, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2011).

9
or “intellectual disorder” as one of Plaintiff’s severe impairments during his severity
analysis (step two), this error was harmless as he considered Plaintiff’s diminished
intellectual abilities in deciding whether his impairments met or equaled the Listings (step
three) and in formulating his RFC (step four). Relatedly, this Court finds that Plaintiff has
not met his burden to show that he suffers from an intellectual disability or
borderline intellectual functioning as opposed to a learning disorder as the ALJ
determined.

As an initial matter, it was more appropriate for the ALJ to evaluate Plaintiff’s

cognitive deficits in the context of a “learning disorder.” This was the impairment that both
Plaintiff and his representative identified as disabling (Tr. at 30, 130, 174, 206, 210) as well
as the diagnosis given by the acceptable medical sources who evaluated Plaintiff. For
example, Dr. Adam Brownfield diagnosed Plaintiff with specific learning disorders in
reading, math, and written expression, but did not diagnose Plaintiff with an intellectual
disability. Tr. at 252. Christina Caldwell, Psy.D., administered cognitive testing on May
19, 2011, resulting in the following standard scores: Verbal Comprehension IQ – 72,
Perceptual Reasoning IQ – 75, Working Memory IQ – 69, Processing Speed IQ – 81, and
Full-Scale IQ – 70. Tr. at 650. Although she acknowledged that “the claimant’s full scale
IQ falls within the mild mental retardation range[,]” “[his] processing index[,] which provides

an indication of one’s ability to quickly and correctly scan sequence or discriminate simple
visual information and helps measure short-term visual memory, attention, and visual
motor coordination[,] was significantly higher than his work memory index[,] which provides
an indication of his ability to temporarily retain information and memory, perform some
10
Caldwell did not diagnose Plaintiff with any intellectual disability. Tr. at 649. Instead, she
noted only a “previous diagnosis of a learning disability.” Tr. at 650.

Thus, it was appropriate for the ALJ to find “learning disorder” to be the
severe impairment, rather than “intellectual disability.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.921 (holding
that “a physical or mental impairment must be established by objective medical evidence
from an acceptable medical source”). Of particular importance here, the ALJ explicitly
considered at step three whether Plaintiff’s mental impairment met Listing 12.05
(Intellectual Disorder), 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, and concluded that it did

not.3 Tr. at 14. The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet the Paragraph B criteria because
he did not have an extreme limitation of one, or a marked limitation of two of the relevant
areas of functioning. Rather, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had: (1) a moderate limitation in
understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) a moderate limitation in
interacting with others; (3) a moderate limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining

3 Listing 12.05 (Intellectual Disorder) was historically referred to as “mental retardation.”
20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00B4. This Listing is:
B. Satisfied by 1, 2, and 3 (see 12.00H):
1. Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning evidenced by a or b:
a. A full scale (or comparable) IQ score of 70 or below on an individually administered
standardized test of general intelligence; or
b. A full scale (or comparable) IQ score of 71-75 accompanied by a verbal or
performance IQ score (or comparable part score) of 70 or below on an individually
administered standardized test of general intelligence; and
2. Significant deficits in adaptive functioning currently manifested by extreme limitation of one,
or marked limitation of two, of the following areas of mental functioning:
a. Understand, remember, or apply information (see 12.00E1); or
b. Interact with others (see 12.00E2); or
c. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace (see 12.00E3); or
d. Adapt or manage oneself (see 12.00E4); and
3. The evidence about your current intellectual and adaptive functioning and about the history
of your disorder demonstrates or supports the conclusion that the disorder began prior to
your attainment of age 22.
11
findings, the ALJ relied upon Dr. Brownfield’s June 9, 2015 report stating that Plaintiff was
able to recall 3 out of 3 objects immediately and with a delay; and was able to count, but
was unable to do simple calculations or serial 3s correctly. Tr. at 13, 249-252. The ALJ
also cited Plaintiff’s statements that he was raising his daughter, was able to dress, bathe,
and groom himself, cook meals and clean, but that his mother needed to help him manage
his money. Tr. at 13-14, 251.

Because the evidence did not satisfy Paragraph B, Plaintiff’s mental
impairment could not as a legal matter meet the criteria for Listing 12.05. Sullivan v.

Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990) (“For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a
listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only
some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify.”). Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ should have ordered additional IQ testing as he requested. This Court does not
agree. Dr. Caldwell administered a full standardized IQ assessment in May of 2011, when
Plaintiff was 28 years old. Tr. at 648-49. Dr. Brownfield tested Plaintiff’s attention and
concentration, recent and remote memory skills, and cognitive functioning in June of 2015.
Tr. at 251. This testing was timely and complete enough for the ALJ to determine whether
Plaintiff’s mental impairments rendered him unable to work.

Listing 1.07
The record shows that Plaintiff sustained a left arm injury following a motor
vehicle accident on or about September 13, 2015, resulting in displaced radius and ulnar
shaft fractures. Tr. at 280, 300-05, 323-25, 329-30, 429-36. Plaintiff underwent surgery of
12
September 14, 2015. Tr. at 304. Plaintiff contends that he demonstrated nonunion or
incomplete union of his ulnar and radius fractures for more than 12 months after surgery
and thus, the ALJ erred in not examining his limitations under Listing 1.07 (Fracture of an
Upper Extremity). This Court does not agree.

Listing 1.07 defines “Fracture of an Upper Extremity” as follows:
Fracture of an upper extremity with nonunion of a fracture of the shaft of the
humerus, radius, or ulna, under continuing surgical management, as defined
in 1.00M, directed toward restoration of functional use of the extremity, and
such function was not restored or expected to be restored within 12 months
of onset.

20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.07. “Continuing surgical management” refers to
“surgical procedures and any other associated treatments related to the efforts directed
toward the salvage or restoration of functional use of the affected part.” 20 C.F.R. § Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.00M. According to Section 1.00N, Section 1.07 can only be
satisfied if “[a]fter maximum benefit from therapy has been achieved in situations involving
fractures of an upper extremity,” “there have been no significant changes in physical
findings or on appropriate medically acceptable imaging for any 6-month period after the
last definitive surgical procedure or other medical intervention . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404,
Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.00N. Put another way, it is not enough for Plaintiff to show nonunion
of his fractures. There must also be evidence that the fracture failed to heal or was not
expected to heal within 12 months of his surgery, and that he did not have functional use
of his arm after all medical intervention had been used and maximum medical
improvement had been reached. See Laine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 09 CIV. 1251
RO, 2013 WL 2896968, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2013) (holding that Plaintiff did not meet
13
Plaintiff's right elbow had failed to heal . . . .”).

The evidence in Plaintiff’s case does not meet these criteria. For example,
Plaintiff’s doctor, Sendhan Rajamanickam, explicitly stated on August 23, 2016 (11 months
after Plaintiff’s surgery) that a CT scan of his left forearm revealed “no evidence of
nonunion.” Tr. at 517. At that time, Dr. Rajamanickam noted that Plaintiff had a “delayed
union of his . . . bone forearm fracture likely from his smoking. This has been reiterated to
the patient. He has been asked to stop smoking again. He is not going to occupational
therapy and does not want to go.” Tr. at 517. Dr. Rajamanickam advised Plaintiff to

refrain from “his weight lifting in the gym.” Tr. at 518. This indicates that Plaintiff had
functional use of his arm and that there were additional treatment measures that he was
not pursuing, including smoking cessation and occupational therapy.

In fact, the record shows that Plaintiff had very few limitations relating to his
fracture, and that it improved steadily within weeks of his corrective surgery. For example,
on February 10, 2016, only three and a half months after his surgery, Plaintiff reported that
he had only mild pain in his left arm and that he was taking ibuprophen to manage it with
“moderate effect.” Tr. at 515. Dr. Rajamanickam noted that Plaintiff’s motor function and
sensation were “grossly intact and equal bilaterally to the median ulnar and radial nerve

distributions[,]” that “range of motion of the wrist was about half the normal side in
extension and nearly full in flexion with full pronation[,] supination[,] and slightly restricted
ulnar deviation[,]” and that x-rays taken of the left forearm revealed “good position of the
fracture with excellent alignment.” Tr. at 515. By March 2016, four months post-surgical,
14
previously noted, scans showed no evidence of nonunion in August of 2016, and by
December of 2016, the fracture line was “pretty near nonexistent.” Tr. at 518. Given this
evidence, it cannot be said that there were no significant changes in the physical findings
or imaging within 6 months of Plaintiff’s surgery or that Plaintiff’s function was not restored
or expected to be restored within 12 months of his injury. 20 C.F.R. § Pt 404, Subpt. P.
App. 1, §§ 1.00N, 1.07. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in failing to evaluate Plaintiff’s
limitations under Listing 1.07 (Fracture of an Upper Extremity) instead of Listing 1.02
(Major Dysfunction of a Joint (Due to Any Cause)).

Substantial Evidence Supports the RFC
The ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform a full range of light work, but
limited him to “low stress work involving only occasional decision making and occasional
changes in the work setting” appropriate for a person with “sufficient attention and
concentration to understand, remember[,] and follow [only] simple instructions.” Tr. at 14.
Plaintiff argues that the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence because all of the
medical opinions related to Plaintiff’s mental abilities were more restrictive than the RFC,
and because no medical source had opined on Plaintiff’s physical abilities since he injured
his wrist. Dkt. No. 9-1, p. 23-28. This is not correct.

It is well established that an RFC need not correspond perfectly to a medical
opinion. Trepanier v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 752 F. App’x 75, 79 (2d Cir. 2018).
Rather, the ALJ is entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make a residual

15
Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 504 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is for the SSA, and not this court, to weigh the
conflicting evidence in the record.”). Second, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, Dr.
Brownfield, Dr. Caldwell, and V. Reddy, Ph.D. all opined that Plaintiff was only mildly to
moderately restricted mentally in his ability to perform simple tasks. For example, Dr.
Brownfield stated that Plaintiff showed “[n]o evidence of limitation in following and
understanding simple directions and instructions and performing simple tasks
independently.” Tr. at 251. Dr. Brownfield found that Plaintiff “is mildly limited in making
appropriate decisions and relating adequately with others[,]” and “[is] moderately limited in
maintaining attention and concentration, maintaining a regular schedule, and learning new

tasks . . . .” Tr. at 251. Dr. Caldwell opined that Plaintiff can “follow and understand simple
directions and instructions, perform simple tasks independently, and maintain attention and
concentration, [has a] limited ability to maintain a regular schedule, [but is] unable to
perform complex tasks independently, [has a] limited ability to make appropriate decisions,
. . . and [is] unable to appropriately deal with stress at times.” Tr. at 645. Finally, V.
Reddy, the State agency medical consultant, opined that Plaintiff had only mild restrictions
in activities of daily living, no difficulties in maintaining social functioning, and moderate
difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace, and that he retained the
ability to perform simple work. Tr. at 53, 56.

The ALJ assigned varying weight to these opinions (Dr. Brownfield – partial
weight; Dr. Caldwell – limited weight; and Dr. Reddy – some weight). He also crafted an
RFC designating “low stress work” involving “simple instructions,” and “only occasional
decision making” and “changes in work setting,” “no interaction with the public,” and only
16
consistent with the opinions of Drs. Brownfield, Caldwell, and Reddy.

Plaintiff is correct that Dr. Victoria Briggs opined that Plaintiff was more
seriously limited than the other doctors concluded. Tr. at 640-42. However, even Dr.
Briggs did not conclude that Plaintiff was unable to work. Rather, she found Plaintiff was
“unlimited or very good” in two of 20 mental ability measures, “limited but satisfactory” in
10 of the 20, “seriously limited, but not precluded” in seven of the 20; and “unable to meet
competitive standards” on only one measure, specifically, the ability to “carry out detailed
instructions.” Tr. at 641. The ALJ gave Dr. Briggs’ opinion only “partial weight,” and

contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, gave good reasons for doing so. Specially, the ALJ
reasoned that the opinion was not supported by an explanation,” and that Dr. Briggs’
treatment records showed improvement with counseling and reflected no more than
moderate mental limitations generally. Tr. at 18. Indeed, Dr. Briggs’ September 15, 2017
Medical Source Opinion explicitly states that Plaintiff’s prognosis is “good,” that he “has
responded well to treatment,” and that “his symptoms have improved since admission” into
the counseling program. Tr. at 640, 42. These were proper regulatory factors for the ALJ
to consider in evaluating Dr. Briggs’ opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3) (stating that
opinions supported by relevant evidence and a better explanation will be given more
weight); 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(4) (stating that the ALJ will consider the consistency of the

opinion with the record as a whole in weighing the opinion). Given the inconsistency of Dr.
Briggs’ opinion with the record as a whole, the ALJ reasonably concluded that there was
little evidence to support her opinion that Plaintiff would miss two days of work each month
due to his mental health conditions or treatment. Tr. at 18.
17
not as mentally limited as he claimed. For example, Plaintiff reported in April of 2016 that
he was “doing fine mentally.” Tr. at 17, 345. In September of 2016, Plaintiff told his
counselor that his life was “good and better than it has ever been,” and that he was able to
“effectively manage [his] symptoms of PTSD.” Tr. at 17, 378. The ALJ also noted that:
Plaintiff had sole custody of his daughter and was able to do extensive activities of daily
living such as cooking and cleaning (Tr. at 17); he told his counselor in April of 2016 that
he found himself going out more because of his daughter’s desire to go out (Tr. at 17); and
he had enrolled in REOC for GED classes and was interested in finding a job (Tr. at 575,
614). It was permissible for the ALJ to consider these activities of daily living in assessing

Plaintiff’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929; see Cruz v. Colvin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 694,
699 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (holding that an ALJ may discount a treating physician’s opinion that
a claimant is greatly restricted based on that claimant’s activities of daily living); Poupore v.
Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the ALJ correctly found that
Poupore was not disabled because he was able to care for his one-year-old child, change
diapers, vacuum, wash dishes, occasionally drive, watch television, read, and use the
computer).

Finally, with respect to the ALJ’s physical RFC, this Court finds that it was
substantially supported. Dr. Balderman opined in July of 2015 that Plaintiff had no

physical limitations and he had full grip strength. Tr. at 19, 277. The ALJ noted that
although Plaintiff broke his arm, he testified that he retained the ability to lift 30 to 40
pounds with both hands. Tr. at 37-39. As previously noted herein, Plaintiff regained
functionality of his arm within months of the accident. Tr. at 515-16. Accordingly, the ALJ
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20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).

In the view of this Court, the evidence cited by the ALJ is more than
sufficient to support his conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled. Moran, 569 F.3d at 112
(stating that substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla”). Plaintiff’s RFC is wholly
consistent with the medical and psychological records, as well as Plaintiff’s own testimony.
The restriction that Plaintiff can perform only “low stress work” involving only “simple
instructions” and “occasional decision making and occasional changes in work setting”

accommodates his mental limitations as determined by Drs. Brownfield, Caldwell, and
Reddy, and to a lesser extent, Dr. Briggs. Plaintiff’s belief that he is more cognitively
limited than the ALJ determined is not a legally sufficient reason to disturb the ALJ’s
decision. The substantial evidence standard is so deferential that “there could be two
contrary rulings on the same record and both may be affirmed as supported by substantial
evidence.” Cage v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2012). That is, “once
an ALJ finds the facts, [a reviewing court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable
factfinder would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault, 683 F.3d at 448 (emphasis
added). This case does not present such a situation. For all of the foregoing reasons, this
Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and is supported by substantial

evidence.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Dkt. No. 9) is hereby DENIED, and the Commissioner’s motion for
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to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Buffalo, New York
March 23, 2020

s/ H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr.
H. KENNETH SCHROEDER, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10361968. Public record. Not legal advice.