# McGowan v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, W.D. New York · March 17, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10361933

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 17, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10361933

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding a reviewing court does not try a benefits case de novo

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MYIA S. MCGOWAN,

Plaintiff,

DECISION AND ORDER
-vs-

18-CV-6608-MJP
ANDREW SAUL,
Commissioner of Social Security ,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Myia S. McGowan (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to
Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3)
seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for a period of disability
and disability insurance benefits. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) the parties
have consented to the disposition of this case by a United States magistrate
judge. (Consent to Proceed, Nov. 15, 2019, ECF No. 14.)
Presently before the Court are cross-motions for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Pl.’s
Mot. for Jud. on the Pleadings, Apr. 5, 2019, ECF No. 10; Comm’r’s Mot. for
Jud. on the Pleadings, Jun. 4, 2019, ECF No. 12.) For the reasons set forth
below, this matter must be remanded for a rehearing.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 3, 2015, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a
period of disability and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability due to
both physical and mental impairments. (R.1 176, 197.) Plaintiff alleges that her
disability began on July 7, 2015. (R. 176.) The Social Security Administration

denied Plaintiff’s claim on December 23, 2015. (R. 97–101.) On March 16, 2017,
a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“A.L.J.”) Hortensia
Haaversen in Falls Church, Virginia. (R. 43, 45.) Plaintiff participated in the
hearing and was represented by counsel. (R. 45.) A vocational expert also
testified at the hearing. (R. 45.)
The A.L.J. issued an unfavorable decision on July 6, 2017, finding that

Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “affective disorder and
degenerative disc disease.” (R. 18.) Nevertheless, the A.L.J. determined that
Plaintiff was able to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except she
should avoid concentrated exposure to extremes in temperature,
fumes, odors, presence of toxic substances, dust, and poor
ventilation. The claimant can follow and understand simple
directions and instructions, perform simple tasks independently,
maintain a regular schedule, and learn new tasks. She is limited
to low stress jobs defined as only occasionally decisionmaking [sic]
and occasional interaction with the public.
(R. 21–22.)

1 “R __” refers to the page in the Administrative Record filed by the
Commissioner of Social Security on February 4, 2019. (ECF No. 8.)
Plaintiff appealed to the Social Security Administration’s Appeals
Council and that body denied her request for review on June 22, 2018, making
the A.L.J.’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. (R. 1–6.) Plaintiff filed

this lawsuit on August 20, 2018.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) grants jurisdiction to district courts to hear
claims based on the denial of Social Security benefits. Section 405(g) provides
that the District Court “shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and
transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2007). It directs that when

considering a claim, the Court must accept the findings of fact made by the
Commissioner, provided that such findings are supported by substantial
evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as “‘more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938));
see also Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 149 (1997).

To determine whether substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s findings, the Court must “examine the entire record, including
contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be
drawn.” Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mongeur v.
Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). Section 405(g) limits
the scope of the Court’s review to two inquiries: whether the Commissioner’s
findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record, and whether
the Commissioner’s conclusions are based upon an erroneous legal standard.

Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2003); see also
Mongeur, 722 F.2d at 1038 (finding a reviewing court does not try a benefits
case de novo).
A person is disabled for the purposes of SSI and disability benefits if he
or she is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected

to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) & 1382c(a)(3)(A).
In assessing whether a claimant is disabled, the A.L.J. must employ a five-step
sequential analysis. See Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982)
(per curiam). The five steps are:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial
gainful activity;
(2) if not, whether the claimant has any “severe impairment”
that “significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities”;
(3) if so, whether any of the claimant’s severe impairments
meets or equals one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 of
Subpart P of Part 404 of the relevant regulations;
(4) if not, whether despite the claimant’s severe impairments,
the claimant retains the residual functional capacity [(“RFC”)] to
perform his past work; and
(5) if not, whether the claimant retains the [RFC] to perform
any other work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v) & 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v); Berry v. Schweiker, 675
F.2d at 467. “The claimant bears the burden of proving his or her case at steps
one through four[;] . . . [a]t step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
‘show there is other gainful work in the national economy [which] the claimant
could perform.’” Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Balsamo v. Chater, 142 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1998)).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises two issues for the Court’s review. First, Plaintiff asserts
that the A.L.J.’s physical RFC determination was erroneous because she failed
to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s physical impairments and failed to form a

supported physical RFC determination. (Pl.’s Mem. of Law at 1, Apr. 5, 2019,
ECF No. 10-1.) Second, Plaintiff contends that the A.L.J.’s mental RFC
determination was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. For the reasons
discussed below, this matter must be remanded for a rehearing.
The A.L.J.’s Physical RFC was Not Supported by Substantial Evidence.
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the A.L.J. erred in assessing
Plaintiff’s physical RFC. (Pl.’s Mem. of Law at 16–19.) “An A.L.J. is not a
medical professional, and is not qualified to assess a claimant’s RFC on the
basis of bare medical findings.” Benman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 350 F. Supp.

3d 252, 257 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (citations omitted). In other words, the A.L.J. may
not interpret raw medical data in functional terms. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 337 F. Supp. 3d 216, 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (citations omitted); Rodriguez
v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-07607, 2015 WL 1903146, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015)
(“An A.L.J. may not . . . reject an examining source’s conclusions based on the

A.L.J.’s own interpretation of the medical evidence, because . . . an A.L.J. may
not substitute his own opinion of the medical evidence for that of a medical
professional . . . [i]n determining that [the consultative doctor’s] findings did
not support her conclusions that Plaintiff suffered from significant limitations,
the A.L.J. did not rely on the opinion of any medical other professional, but
instead appears to have relied on his own interpretation of the evidence”).

Accordingly, it is error for an A.L.J. to make an RFC determination without
opinions from medical professionals concerning the impact of the objective
medical evidence on a plaintiff’s RFC. Dennis v. Colvin, 195 F. Supp. 3d 469,
474 (W.D.N.Y. 2016).
In determining Plaintiff’s physical RFC, the A.L.J. considered the
opinions of consultative examiner Rita Figueroa, M.D., and employability
assessments for the Monroe County Department of Human Services. (R. 28.)

After conducting an examination of Plaintiff, Dr. Figueroa opined only that
Plaintiff “should avoid exposure to smoke, dust, and any respiratory irritants.”
(R. 315.) In addition, Plaintiff underwent three physical assessments for
determination of employability with the Monroe County Department of
Human Services. (R. 363–66; 371–76; 380–83.)
The A.L.J. accorded “partial weight” to Dr. Figueroa’s opinion, finding
that the doctor’s opinion that Plaintiff should avoid exposure to smoke, dust,
and any respiratory irritants was too limited. (R. 28.) The A.L.J. concluded that

Plaintiff “can have some exposure to these respiratory irritants, just not
concentrated exposure” because Plaintiff’s physical examination showed
“grossly normal respiratory and cardiovascular findings.” (Id.)
The A.L.J. did “not accord great weight” to the employability
assessments conducted by the Monroe County Department of Human Services.
(R. 28.) The A.L.J. provided several reasons for essentially rejecting the

assessments, including, but not limited to, the fact that any determination
regarding disability is reserved to the Commissioner. (R. 28.) Moreover, despite
indicating in her decision that she considered these opinions when assessing
Plaintiff’s RFC, she also states “[h]owever, the opinions are too inconsistent
internally and with the medical evidence of record to receive significant
weight.” (R. 28–29.) Given these statements it is unclear whether the A.L.J.
actually did consider the employability assessments when determining the

RFC.
Importantly, based upon the forgoing, the A.L.J.’s physical RFC
determination that Plaintiff can perform “light work” could not have been
based upon substantial evidence. First, Dr. Figueroa’s opinion solely dealt with
Plaintiff’s respiratory issues and did not address any physical functional
limitations beyond that. The only remaining opinions regarding Plaintiff’s
functional limitations were from the employability assessments conducted by
the Monroe County Department of Human Services, which the A.L.J. rejected.
See Solomon v. Barnhart, 01-CV-5856, 2006 WL 3794292, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

(A.L.J. “rejected” the medical conclusions of two treating doctors where he “did
not accord great weight” to their opinions). In other words, there was no
medical opinion evidence upon which the A.L.J. could have based Plaintiff’s
physical RFC. The A.L.J. provides no explanation for how Dr. Figueroa’s
opinion and the Monroe County Department of Human Services employability
assessments supported a finding of “light work.” This is reversible error.

Moreover, in effectively rejecting the opinions in the record relating to
Plaintiff’s physical impairments, the A.L.J. did not rely on any opinion
evidence from an acceptable medical source when making her RFC
determination. The A.L.J., therefore, determined Plaintiff's RFC based on her
own interpretation of the medical record, which is not permissible.
The forgoing errors require reversal and remand. Since remand is
required, the Court need not address the other argument advanced by Plaintiff

in support of her motion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the
pleadings (ECF No. 10) is granted and the Commissioner’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 12) is denied. The case is remanded
pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for an expedited hearing.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff
and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 17, 2020
Rochester, New York
/s/ Mark W. Pedersen
MARK W. PEDERSEN
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10361933. Public record. Not legal advice.