# Sanders v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, W.D. New York · January 17, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10361641

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, W.D. New York
- **Decided:** January 17, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10361641

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla”
- holding that the ALJ’s failure to find two impairments “severe” at step two was harmless, because the ALJ considered them later in the evaluation process
- holding that “[t]he claimant bears the burden of presenting evidence establishing severity”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________

JADAASHA SANDERS,

Plaintiff,

-v-
18-CV-753

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.
___________________________________

DECISION AND ORDER

As set forth in the Standing Order of the Court regarding Social Security
Cases subject to the May 21, 2018 Memorandum of Understanding, the parties have
consented to the assignment of this case to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings,
including the entry of final judgment, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Dkt. No. 15.
Plaintiff Jadaasha Sanders (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g)
and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security (the “Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”) under the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Both parties have
moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion (Dkt. No. 8) is denied, and
defendant’s motion (Dkt. No. 13) is granted.
BACKGROUND1
On April 28, 2014, plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSI, alleging
disability due to a learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), anger
issues, and lead exposure. Tr. at 46, 137-42, 171.2 Her claim was denied at the initial
level and she requested a hearing. Tr. at 56-61, 68. On February 8, 2017,
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Timothy M. McGuan held a hearing at which plaintiff
appeared with counsel and testified. Tr. at 26-45. An impartial vocational expert also

testified. Tr. at 26, 212-14. The ALJ issued a decision unfavorable to Plaintiff on April
25, 2017 (Tr. at 9-25), and the Appeals Council subsequently denied review (Tr. at 1-6).
This timely action followed. Dkt. No. 1.

DISCUSSION
Scope of Judicial Review
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is very deferential.
Under the Act, the Commissioner’s factual determinations “shall be conclusive” so long
as they are “supported by substantial evidence,” 42 U.S.C. §405(g), that is, supported by

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the]
conclusion,” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). “The substantial evidence test applies not only to findings on basic
evidentiary facts, but also to inferences and conclusions drawn from the facts.” Smith v.
Colvin, 17 F. Supp. 3d 260, 264 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). “Where the Commissioner’s decision

1 The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with plaintiff’s medical and educational history, which
is summarized at length in their moving papers.
2 Citations to “Tr.__” refer to the pages of the administrative transcript, which appears at Docket
No. 5.
rests on adequate findings supported by evidence having rational probative force,” the
Court may “not substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Veino v. Barnhart,
312 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, the Court’s task is to ask “‘whether the record,
read as a whole, yields such evidence as would allow a reasonable mind to accept the
conclusions reached’ by the Commissioner.” Silvers v. Colvin, 67 F. Supp. 3d 570, 574
(W.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982)).

“Two related rules follow from the Act’s standard of review.” Wilcox v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 16-CV-726-MJR, 2018 WL 4090328, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 28,
2018). The first is that “[i]t is the function of the [Commissioner], not [the Court], to
resolve evidentiary conflicts and to appraise the credibility of witnesses, including the
claimant.” Carroll v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 1983)
(abrogation on other grounds. The second rule is that “[g]enuine conflicts in the medical
evidence are for the Commissioner to resolve.” Veino, 312 F.3d at 588. While the
applicable standard of review is deferential, this does not mean that the Commissioner’s
decision is presumptively correct. The Commissioner’s decision is subject to remand or

reversal if the factual conclusions on which it is based are not supported by substantial
evidence. Further, the Commissioner must apply the correct legal standard to his or her
factual conclusions. Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008). Failure to apply
the correct legal standard constitutes reversible error. Id.

Standards for Determining “Disability” Under the Act
A “disability” is an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death[,] or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The
Commissioner may find the claimant disabled “only if his physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy

exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A). The Commissioner must make these determinations based on “objective
medical facts, diagnoses or medical opinions based on these facts, subjective evidence
of pain or disability, and . . . [the claimant’s] educational background, age, and work
experience.” Dumas v. Schweiker, 712 F.2d 1545, 1550 (2d Cir. 1983) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981)).

To guide the assessment of whether a claimant is disabled, the
Commissioner has promulgated a “five-step sequential evaluation process.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4). First, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is “working”
and whether that work “is substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If the
claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant is “not disabled regardless
of [his or her] medical condition or . . . age, education, and work experience.” Id.
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner
asks whether the claimant has a “severe impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). To
make this determination, the Commissioner asks whether the claimant has “any
impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.” Id. As with the first step, if the claimant does
not have a severe impairment, he or she is not disabled regardless of any other factors or
considerations. Id. Third, if the claimant does have a severe impairment, the
Commissioner asks two additional questions: first, whether that severe impairment
meets the Act’s duration requirement, and second, whether the severe impairment is
either listed in Appendix 1 of the Commissioner’s regulations or is “equal to” an
impairment listed in Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the claimant satisfies both

requirements of step three, the Commissioner will find that he or she is disabled without
regard to his or her age, education, and work experience. Id.

If the claimant does not have the severe impairment required by step three,
the Commissioner’s analysis proceeds to steps four and five. Before doing so, the
Commissioner must “assess and make a finding about [the claimant’s] residual functional
capacity [“RFC”] based on all the relevant medical and other evidence” in the record. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). RFC “is the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her]
limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The Commissioner’s assessment of the

claimant’s RFC is then applied at steps four and five. At step four, the Commissioner
“compare[s] [the] residual functional capacity assessment . . . with the physical and
mental demands of [the claimant’s] past relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If,
based on that comparison, the claimant is able to perform his or her past relevant work,
the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
Id. Finally, if the claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work or does not have
any past relevant work, then at the fifth step the Commissioner considers whether, based
on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, the claimant “can make an
adjustment to other work.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g)(1). If the claimant can adjust to
other work, he or she is not disabled. Id. If, however, the claimant cannot adjust to other
work, he or she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. Id.

The burden through steps one through four described above rests on the
claimant. If the claimant carries their burden through the first four steps, “the burden then
shifts to the [Commissioner] to show there is other gainful work in the national economy

which the claimant could perform.” Carroll, 705 F.2d at 642.

The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ followed the requisite five-step analysis for evaluating Plaintiff’s
claim. Under step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since the application date, April 28, 2014. Tr. at 14. At step two, the ALJ found
that plaintiff had the severe impairments of learning disorder and obesity. Tr. at 14. At
step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the listed
impairments, particularly, Listing 12.11 (neurodevelopmental disorders). Tr. at 14-16.

The ALJ then found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, but with the following non-exertional
limitations: she can occasionally understand, remember, and carry out complex and
detailed tasks; she can engage in simple repetitive work but cannot read as part of the
job, and must, rather, learn by demonstration. Tr. at 16. Proceeding to step four, the ALJ
found that plaintiff could perform other work that exists in substantial numbers in the
national economy, including the jobs of garment folder and garnisher. Tr. at 19-20.
Accordingly, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not been under a disability within the
meaning of the Act. Tr. at 20.

Plaintiff’s Challenges
Plaintiff raises three interrelated arguments in favor of remand: (1) the
ALJ erroneously failed at step two to find intellectual disability or borderline intellectual
functioning as one of Plaintiff’s severe impairments; (2) the ALJ failed to properly follow

the special technique for evaluating mental impairments; and (3) Plaintiff’s RFC is not
supported by substantial evidence. Dkt. No. 8-1, pp. 8-21.

Step two of the disability evaluation, the severity determination, is
intended to “identify[ ] at an early stage those claimants whose medical impairments are
so slight that it is unlikely they would be found to be disabled.” Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 153 (1987); Dixon v. Shalala, 54 F.3d 1019, 1030 (2d Cir.1995) (recognizing
that the severity determination is meant “to screen out de minimis claims”). As set forth
in the regulations, “[i]f you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments

which significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will
find that you do not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled.” 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). Basic work activities are defined as “the abilities and
aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b). “An
individual shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he [or she] furnishes
such medical and other evidence of the existence thereof as the Commissioner of Social
Security may require.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); Bowen, 482 U.S. at 148; see also
Taylor v. Astrue, 32 F. Supp. 3d 253, 265 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (holding that “[t]he claimant
bears the burden of presenting evidence establishing severity”).

Notably, “the mere presence of a disease or impairment, or establishing
that a person has been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment’ is not, by itself,
sufficient to render a condition severe.” Taylor, 32 F. Supp. 3d at 265 (internal citations
omitted). Consistent with this reasoning, “if the medical evidence establishes only a

‘slight abnormality’ which would have ‘no more than a minimal effect on an individual's
ability to work[,]’” the ALJ should not find a severe condition. Rosario v. Apfel, No. 97 CV
5759, 1999 WL 294727, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1999) (quoting SSR 85-28, 1985 WL
56856, at *3).

When a claimant allegedly suffers mental impairments, the ALJ is required
to follow a “special technique” at each level of the administrative review process to
determine whether the claimant has any severe mental impairments and whether the
impairments meet or equal the listings. Kohler, 546 F.3d at 265; 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpt. P, App’x. 1; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. Specifically, the ALJ must assess the
claimant’s degree of functional limitation resulting from a mental impairment in four broad
functional areas identified in Paragraph B of the adult mental disorders listings. See 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3). Effective January 17, 2017, the four
functional areas include: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)
interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4)
adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(3). 3 In assessing the functional
areas, an ALJ must apply the degree of limitations using a five-point scale consisting of
“none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(4). An “extreme”
limitation of one or a “marked” limitation of two of these areas indicates “significant
deficits in adaptive functioning.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P. App’x, § 12.05B. If the
degree of the limitations is “none” or “mild,” an ALJ will generally find the impairments
non-severe; however, if they are severe, an ALJ must determine if the disorder meets or

equals a listing. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(d)(1-2). “The ALJ’s written decision must ‘reflect
application of the technique, and . . . include a specific finding as to the degree of
limitation in each of the [four] functional areas.’” Kennerson v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-6591
(MAT), 2012 WL 3204055, at *14 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2012) (citing Kohler, 546 F.3d at
266); Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F. Supp. 3d 282, 295-97 (W.D.N.Y. 2016).

“Courts have held that error at step two in determining the severity of
impairments is harmless if the ALJ finds that at least one other severe impairment and
continues through the sequence of the disability analysis because the non-severe

impairments can later be considered at the RFC stage.” Howard, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 297
(citing cases); Reices-Colon v. Astrue, 523 F. App’x 796, 798 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that
the ALJ’s failure to find two impairments “severe” at step two was harmless, because the
ALJ considered them later in the evaluation process). While this harmless error doctrine
does not always apply in relation to mental impairments, Howard, 203 F. Supp. 3d at
297-98, uncertainty as to whether an ALJ applied the special technique during the

3 At the time of Plaintiff’s consultative evaluation, the four functional domains were activities of daily
living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation.
severity stage will not, “standing alone, warrant remand or reversal if the ALJ’s other
findings show that the proper legal standards were applied and that all of [the claimant’s]
impairments were properly considered at all of the subsequent steps.” Booker v. Astrue,
No. 1:07-CV-646 GLS, 2011 WL 3735808, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2011).

This Court also finds that although the ALJ did not employ the special
technique and did not find intellectual disability and/or borderline intellectual functioning

as severe disorder(s) during his severity analysis (step two), this error was harmless as
he considered Plaintiff’s diminished intellectual abilities in deciding whether her
impairments met or equaled the listings (step three) and in formulating her RFC (step
four). Relatedly, this Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden to show that she
suffers from an intellectual disability or borderline intellectual functioning as opposed to a
learning disorder as the ALJ determined.

Plaintiff argues that the “ALJ failed to acknowledge or evaluate the objective
medical evidence showing deficient intelligence[,]” including an 8/26/2014 “intelligence

evaluation” conducted by consulting examiner Gregory Fabiano, PhD (Tr. at 313-17).
Dkt. No. 8-1, pp. 9-10. However, a review of the decision shows that the ALJ discussed
Dr. Fabiano’s report at length, citing to it in his analysis of Plaintiff’s degree of functional
limitation in the four relevant functional areas (Tr. at 15-16) and giving the doctor’s
opinion “significant weight” in formulating Plaintiff’s RFC (Tr. at 17-18). Dr. Fabiano’s
report contains Plaintiff’s cognitive test results in the areas of reading/decoding, verbal
comprehension, working memory, perceptual reasoning, processing speed, as well as
her full-scale IQ. Tr. at 314-16. Despite Plaintiff’s objectively low scores on all of these
measures, Dr. Fabiano’s report does not compel a finding that Plaintiff has a severe
impairment(s) of intellectual disability and/or borderline intellectual functioning. Dr.
Fabiano himself acknowledged that Plaintiff’s full-scale IQ (70) fell within the borderline
range of functioning, her processing speed was within the low-average range, her
nonverbal reasoning abilities were within the borderline range, and her verbal
comprehension and working memory were in the extremely low range. Tr. at 325-16.
But he explicitly rejected a diagnosis of intellectual disability, reasoning that “in spite of

these potential limitations in cognitive abilities, the claimant appears to be in general
exhibiting adaptive functioning in most major life domains.” Tr. at 316 (stating
“[t]herefore, a diagnosis of intellectual disability is not provided at this time”).

Consistent with Dr. Fabiano’s opinion, the ALJ declined to find that Plaintiff
was intellectually disabled or had borderline intellectual functioning, but rather, that she
had a learning disorder which affected her ability to read. Tr. at 14, 316. After making
the finding at step two that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairment of a learning
disability, the ALJ included in the RFC a limitation that Plaintiff could not read as part of

the job, but rather must be taught by demonstration. Tr. at 16. At step three, the ALJ
considered whether Plaintiff’s mental impairment met Listing 12.11 (relating to
neurodevelopmental disorders such as learning disorders, borderline intellectual
functioning, and tic disorders), 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, and concluded that
it did not. Of particular importance, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not meet the
Paragraph B criteria because she did not have an extreme limitation of one, or marked
limitation of two of the relevant areas of functioning. Rather, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
had: (1) mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2) mild
limitations in interacting with others; (3) moderate limitations in concentrating, persisting,
or maintaining pace; and (4) mild limitations in adapting or managing oneself. Tr. at 15.
In making this finding, the ALJ relied upon Dr. Fabiano’s report, Plaintiff’s educational
records, her work history as a home health care aide, her activities of daily living, and her
testimony that cleaning the house was “easy.” Tr. at 15-16.

Plaintiff argues that because the four functional domains were revised

between the time that Dr. Fabiano examined Plaintiff and the time that the ALJ rendered
his decision, her case should be remanded for a medical opinion addressing the “new”
functional areas. 4 This Court is not persuaded. Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 17-2,
upon which Plaintiff relies, applies only to the determination of whether a claimant’s
impairment medically equals a listed impairment, not whether it actually meets the
requirements of a listed impairment. In Plaintiff’s case, the ALJ considered whether
claimant’s impairment actually met Listing 12.11 (neurodevelopmental disorder). Tr. at
14-16. Accordingly, SSR 17-2P does not appear to apply to Plaintiff’s case.

Even if it did apply, SSR 17-2P does not compel remand in Plaintiff’s case
because she has offered no evidence, other than the cognitive test scores in
Dr. Fabiano’s report, which would suggest that Plaintiff is intellectually disabled
(historically, mentally retarded). As previously noted, Dr. Fabiano explicitly rejected such
a diagnosis because Plaintiff was “exhibiting adaptive functioning in most major life

4 A person has a “marked limitation” in any category if “functioning in this area independently,
appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited” and an “extreme limitation”
when he or she is unable “to function in this area independently, appropriately, effectively, and on
a sustained basis.” 20 C.F.R. part 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 12.00F(2).
domains.” Tr. at 316. Earlier medical records from Rucheet Patel, MD, from May 13,
2013, indicate that Plaintiff, by her own report, earned “A’s and B’s” in school and
sometimes “C’s,” and that she had no abnormalities. Tr. at 258. Plaintiff was 17 at that
time. Moreover, Plaintiff’s school records show that although she was classified with a
“Learning Disability” and struggled with reading, Plaintiff had “strong listening
comprehension,” could write simple sentences, participated in same State and district
wide assessment of student achievement administered to general education students,

demonstrated talent in baking and hairstyling, was a “kind, polite, [and] mature young
lady” with “many friends” who planned to attend cosmetology school and live
independently. Tr. at 222, 229. After dropping out of high school because she had a
baby, Plaintiff reported that she took care of her baby daily, cooked, cleaned, and
shopped, and was not receiving any psychological or psychiatric treatment. Tr. at 305-
308.

SSR 17-2P explicitly states that when an ALJ “believes that the evidence
does not reasonably support a finding that the individual’s impairment(s) medically equals

a listed impairment, we do not require the adjudicator to obtain [medical expert] evidence
or medical support staff input prior to making a step 3 finding that the individual’s
impairment(s) does not medically equal a listed impairment.” SSR 17-2p, 2017 WL
3928306, at *4 (S.S.A. 2017); De Gonzalez v. Berryhill, No. 16-CV-06723 (JMA), 2018
WL 6834474, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2018). The record in Plaintiff’s case does not
support a finding that her impairments medically equaled intellectual disability (mental
retardation) or borderline intellectual functioning. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by not
getting another medical opinion addressing the “new” functional domains.
That the ALJ did not explicitly consider Listing 12.05 (relating to intellectual
disability, historically called mental retardation) does not require this Court to remand
Plaintiff’s case. To meet this particular listing, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App’x 1, §
12.05B, Plaintiff would have to meet the same Paragraph B criteria which the ALJ already
determined she did not meet. This Court finds that the ALJ’s reasoning in finding only
mild or moderate limitations in the four areas of functioning was well reasoned and
supported. For this reason, Plaintiff cannot show that the ALJ’s failure to consider

whether her diminished intellectual capacity met Listing 12.05 was anything other than
harmless error. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to remand on this basis is denied.

Finally, this Court finds that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial
evidence. As previously noted herein, the substantial evidence standard of review is a
very deferential standard, even more so than the “clearly erroneous” standard. Brault v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 683 F.3d 443, 447-48 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Dickinson v. Zurko, 527
U.S. 150, 153 (1999)). When determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are
supported by substantial evidence, the Court’s task is “‘to examine the entire record,

including contradictory evidence and evidence from which conflicting inferences can be
drawn.’” Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Mongeur v. Heckler, 722
F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam)). If there is substantial evidence for the
ALJ’s determination, the decision must be upheld, even if there is also substantial
evidence for the Plaintiff’s position. See Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46-47 (2d Cir.
1996); Conlin ex rel. N.T.C.B. v. Colvin, 111 F. Supp. 3d 376, 384 (W.D.N.Y. 2015).
Likewise, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the
Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60,
62 (2d Cir. 1982).

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels, but with the primary non-exertional limitation of learning by
demonstration rather than reading. Tr. at 16. The ALJ predicated his decision on the
record evidence including: Dr. Fabiano’s opinion that while Plaintiff had cognitive deficits,

she appeared to have no limitations in her ability to maintain a regular schedule or make
appropriate decisions, and only mild limitations in her ability to follow and understand
simple directions and instructions, perform simple tasks independently, relate adequately
with others, and appropriately deal with stress; John Schwab, D.O.’s opinion that Plaintiff
had no restrictions; educational records relating that Plaintiff was qualified as learning
disabled in school, attended general education classes until she was 16 years old, got
along well with her peers and had many school friends, and benefited from small group
instruction; and Plaintiff’s testimony that she works part-time as a home health care aide
and interacts frequently with clients who direct her how to help them, cares for her infant

son and older sister who has cerebral palsy, finds cleaning the house to be easy, and
bathes and grooms herself, cooks and prepares food, does laundry, shops, manages her
money and takes public transportation but has difficulty understanding what she reads
and can be forgetful. Tr. at 16-18.

In the view of this Court, this evidence is more than sufficient to support the
ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled. Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d
Cir. 2009) (stating that substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla”). Plaintiff’s
RFC is wholly consistent with the medical, educational, and psychological records, as
well as Plaintiff’s own testimony. The restriction that Plaintiff cannot read as part of her
job but must learn through demonstration accommodates her stated limitation that she
cannot understand what she reads. Plaintiff’s belief that she is more cognitively limited
than the ALJ determined is not a legally sufficient reason to disturb the ALJ’s decision.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, this Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is free
from legal error and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 8) is hereby DENIED, and the Commissioner’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 13) is hereby GRANTED. The Clerk of
the Court is directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Buffalo, New York
January 17, 2020

s/ H. Kenneth Schroeder, Jr.
H. KENNETH SCHROEDER, JR.
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10361641. Public record. Not legal advice.