# Brown v. Montefiore Medical Center

> District Court, S.D. New York · March 31, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10359553

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 31, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10359553

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming summary judgment of hostile work environment claim where the evidence cited by plaintiff, which included a declarant’s inadmissible hearsay statement that someone else informed them that Defendant was racist, did not raise an inference of discrimination

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
KAREEM BROWN,
Plaintiff,
19-cv-11474 (ALC)
-against-
OPINION & ORDER
MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant.
ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Kareem Brown filed this action against Montefiore Medical Center
(“Montefiore”), alleging racial discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as well as New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”),
Executive Law § 296 et seq. and the Administrative Code of the City of New York
(“NYCHRL”), § 8- 101 et seq. Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, at ¶ 2.
. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No.
78, is hereby GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
I. Statement of Facts
The following allegations are derived from Plaintiff’s complaint, the Parties’ 56.1
statements, and documents relied upon therein.
Plaintiff, an African American man, was employed by Montefiore Medical Center for
seventeen years. Compl. at ¶ 20. In 2015, Plaintiff was promoted to Chief Technologist in the
Radiology Department, which Plaintiff credits as the reason his problems began. Id. at 19. As
Chief Technologist, Plaintiff supervised over twenty employees, nearly all of whom were
members of 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers East (hereinafter the “Union”). Def. 56.1 ¶ 5;
Ex. G. Plaintiff was not in the Union. Def. 56.1 ¶ 5; Ex. G. One of Plaintiff’s subordinates was
Laima Masone, an Ultrasound Technologist who Plaintiff alleges harassed and discriminated
against him because he was a Black man. Compl. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff’s direct reports included eight

African-American individuals, three Hispanic individuals, nine Caucasian individuals (including
Masone who identified herself as “Albanian”), and two Asian individuals. Def. 56.1 ¶ 5; Ex. C.
Plaintiff alleges that Montefiore’s management, human resources, and labor relations,
discriminated, retaliated, and harassed Plaintiff by failing to enforce Montefiore’s policies and
procedures. Compl. at ¶ 22.
A. Plaintiff’s Discipline of Masone
Plaintiff was expected to follow Montefiore’s policy of “progressive discipline” when
disciplining a Union member, which was first to issue a verbal warning, then written warning,
then suspension without pay, and finally dismissal. Def. 56.1 ¶ 9; Ex. F. Plaintiff disciplined
Masone on several occasions.

On December 14, 2015, Plaintiff issued Masone a Memorandum to File for being
disrespectful towards him when she replied “so what” after Plaintiff told Masone that she should
not return late from lunch because patients were waiting. Def. 56.1 ¶ 11, Ex. G.
On April 6, 2016, Plaintiff issued Masone a second Memorandum to File for failure to follow
instructions and for being disrespectful towards him when she stated “why do I need to tell you
everything” after Plaintiff asked Masone why she failed to tell Plaintiff she was unable to
remove radiology images. Def. 56.1 ¶ 12, Ex. G. On or around May 6, 2016, Plaintiff issued
Masone a Verbal Warning for being rude and disrespectful towards Plaintiff when Plaintiff tried
to conduct Masone’s evaluation because Masone repeatedly stated “I do not need to be here for
this.” Id. On June 23, 2016, Plaintiff sent a coaching email to Masone and directed her to change
her workplace behavior with respect to how she interacted with her co-worker Matthew
Glasheen including instructing Plaintiff not to hang up on Glasheen. Id. Matthew Glasheen is
Caucasian. Id.

On April 27, 2017, Plaintiff issued Masone a third Memorandum to File for not wearing a
surgical mask during influenza season and for walking away from him when he was giving her
direction. Id. at ¶ 13. On June 16, 2017, Plaintiff counseled Masone for not following his
direction about permitting patients’ children to accompany them to their radiology appointment.
Id. On October 13, 2017, Plaintiff issued Masone a fourth Memorandum to File for failing to
utilize Tech Aides to transport patients and not following Plaintiff’s direction in using Tech
Aides. Id. On October 24, 2017, and October 26, 2017, Plaintiff coached Masone about not
following the directions of three doctors, Dr. Cohen, Dr. Fidvi and Dr. Anthony Ruvo. Id. Dr.
Cohen and Ruvo are both Caucasian. Id.
On January 22, 2018, Plaintiff issued Masone a fifth Memorandum to File for failing to send

a request for time off to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 14. On June 11, 2018 Plaintiff issued Masone a
Written Warning for submitting a complaint to a doctor at Montefiore and Emergency
Department rather than to him and for making clinical assessments of patients outside her job
scope. Id.
On or around January 25, 2019, Plaintiff sent Masone to an effective communication class as
part of a performance improvement plan. Id. at ¶ 15. In February 2019, Plaintiff suspended
Masone. Id. Masone grieved her suspension. Id. Plaintiff’s suspension read:
Violation of MMC’s Policy VII01 Medical Center Rules and Regulations – Failure to follow
instructions, Rude and Inappropriate Behavior. On 10/11/18, Laima was informed that she was
responsible for informing me when supplies were needed. On 11/28/18 & 12/6/18, Laima told
Jae Kim upon arriving for work to inform me of the supplies that were needed. On 12/27/18,
Laima was instructed to inform me if her patient was ready for their exam. When asked why she
did not inform me, she said twice in front of the patient in the room because you can see in EPIC.
On 9/27/18 & 12/31/18, Laima was instructed to inform me whenever she has a concern about
another associate. On 1/8/19, Laima sent Jae Kim an email instructing Jae to leave the ultrasound
room the way he found it. On 1/4/19, Laima told me you do not need the log book you just need
to answer my questions. (Haigh Decl. Ex. G, D000227-28.) 16. After Plaintiff suspended
Masone in February 2019 the next discipline, pursuant to Montefiore’s progressive discipline
policy for union employees, would be termination.

B. Union Comments About Masone and Montefiore’s Response
During Plaintiff’s employment, Masone’s Union, 1199SEIU United Healthcare Workers
East, made two comments to Plaintiff to suggest that Masone held racial animus against him. Id.
at ¶ 23. First, on April 6, 2016, Masone’s Union Representative, Maurice De Palo told Plaintiff
that Masone is “a racist,” and that Masone told him, during his representation of her, that she
liked the hospital better before Montefiore acquired it because “they did not hire people like
Kareem [Plaintiff].” Id. at ¶ 24. De Palo never told anyone besides Plaintiff about this comment
from Masone. Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff did not report De Palo’s comment to anyone at Montefiore
until the following year when the Union made a second comment to him about Masone. Id. at ¶
26.
The second comment from the Union occurred on August 17, 2017, when Union’s
Executive Vice President Estella Vazquez told Plaintiff that the reason he was having issues with
Masone was because Masone was not used to having someone of Plaintiff’s color as her
manager. Id. at ¶ 28. Plaintiff did not have any other conversation with Vazquez after this
conversation. Id. Plaintiff told his supervisor, Melanie Danisi about Vazquez’s comment and
Danisi instructed Plaintiff to tell Todd Austin in Labor Relations. Id. at ¶ 29, Ex. N.
On August 18, 2017, Plaintiff spoke to Austin and told him about the conversation he had
with Vazquez the day before. Id. at ¶ 30, Ex. O. Later that same day, Austin sent an email to
Plaintiff, which stated “my understanding from our conversation earlier today is that Estella
Vazquez had a conversation with you after the grievance meeting yesterday and made a
comment that you found offensive.” Id. Austin asked Plaintiff to provide him with the details of
the comment and told Plaintiff he would address Plaintiff’s concern with the Union. Id. Plaintiff

responded to Austin and told him that Vazquez told Plaintiff that Masone’s “problem was is (sic)
she never saw or had a black man or person with color as a supervisor before." Id. at ¶ 31, Ex. O.
Although Plaintiff’s email to Austin did not mention the 2016 De Palo comment, Plaintiff
testified that during his phone call with Austin he told Austin about the 2016 comment. Id. On
August 21, 2017, Austin forwarded Plaintiff’s email to Vazquez. Id. at ¶ 32, Ex. P. In his email
to Vazquez, Austin said that Plaintiff had expressed a concern about Masone and how there may
be some racial bias toward him that Montefiore was not aware of, and asked Vazquez to review
Plaintiff’s email and respond. Id. On November 15, 2017, Plaintiff sent an email to Austin
following up on their August 2017 discussion about the Union comments and Plaintiff asked if
Austin had ever received a response from the Union. Id. at ¶ 33. Austin told Plaintiff that the

Union did not respond, and he did not expect to receive a response. Id., Ex. O.
C. Plaintiff’s Subordinates’ Complaints and Montefiore’s Response
On June 4, 2018, Masone sent complaints to Montefiore that Plaintiff had been
“harassing” her for two years and disciplining her for “frivolous and petty misunderstandings.”
Id. at ¶ 40, Ex. Q. On July 13, 2018, Masone submitted another complaint on Montefiore’s
online complaint platform, Ethics Point. Id. at ¶ 41. On September 18, 2018, John O’Donnell,
one of Plaintiff’s subordinates, submitted a complaint alleging that Plaintiff was mistreating
several employees and creating a “hostile, unproductive and fearful work environment.” Id. at ¶
42, Ex. RR. Plaintiff believes O’Donnell’s relevance to his claims is that “Laima [Masone]
started to recruit John [O’Donnell], I guess for support” and because O’Donnell filed a complaint
about Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 43. On September 29, 2018, Bohong Wen, one of Plaintiff’s subordinates,
submitted a complaint about Plaintiff on Ethics Point. Id. at ¶ 44, Ex. Q. Plaintiff believes
Masone also “recruited” Bohong Wen to plot against him. Id. at ¶ 45. On December 28, 2018,

Masone sent an email to Montefiore Human Resources complaining about Plaintiff’s poor
management and stated that Plaintiff and her co-worker Matthew Glasheen were “working on
isolating me from everybody.” Id. at ¶ 46, Ex. Q.
On January 7, 2019, Masone complained that Plaintiff’s discipline of her because of her
dispute with her co-worker, Jae Kim, showed Plaintiff’s “bias management.” Id. at ¶ 47, Ex. Q.
Plaintiff admits he disciplined Masone more than any other employee in his department. Id. at ¶
48. Georgia Colquhoun-Pryce, Senior Employee and Labor Relations Manager, investigated the
complaints from Masone, which mentioned discrimination, harassment and retaliation and
intimidation related to Plaintiff’s management. Id. at ¶ 50. When Colquhoun-Pryce interviewed
Masone, Masone said she felt Plaintiff treated her differently because she is a white woman and

because of where she came from (Albania). Id. at ¶ 51. Colquhoun-Pryce also investigated a
complaint from John O’Donnell about Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 52. Colquhoun-Pryce attempted to meet
with O’Donnell as part of her investigation, but he did not respond to her requests to meet. Id.
Colquhoun-Pryce interviewed Teresa Mandarino, Senior Director of Ambulatory
Services, as part of her investigation. Id. at ¶ 53. Mandarino told Colquhoun-Pryce that Plaintiff
was not aggressive or speaking down to Masone during the times Mandarino was present for
their interactions, and that Masone behaved the same way towards her previous manager Coyne
as she did towards Plaintiff. Id. Mandarino testified at her deposition that Masone was
“disrespectful to most people in authority, including me.” Id. at ¶ 54. Mandarino recalls one
occasion when she walked through the department, and it was flu season and she asked Masone
to put on her mask and Masone ignored her and walked away. Id. Mandarino also recalls Masone
being rude to physicians and physician assistants and often questioned their diagnosis. Id.
Mandarino never witnessed Masone make any “bigoted” comments about Plaintiff. Id.

Colquhoun-Pryce met with Plaintiff as part of her investigation, where Plaintiff denied
the allegations made by Masone, O’Donnell and Wen, and voiced concerns about the status of
his own investigation. Id. at ¶ 55. In response, Colquhoun-Pryce told Plaintiff that Michelle
Emmons would investigate his concerns about his subordinates. Id. at ¶ 56. In late January 2019,
when Colquhoun-Pryce concluded her investigation, she met with Masone and told her that she
was not able to substantiate Masone’s complaints. Id. at ¶ 57. Colquhoun-Pryce did not
determine that Ms. Masone made a false complaint about Plaintiff, but rather that Masone’s
perception was wrong and Masone needed coaching so she could understand that Plaintiff was
following policy when he disciplined her and was not treating her unfairly. Id. at ¶ 58.
Colquhoun-Pryce did not recommend any discipline or action as a result of her investigation into

the complaints from Plaintiff’s subordinates about Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 61. Plaintiff’s supervisor,
Bradley Clemente, understood that none of the accusations from Masone about Plaintiff were
substantiated. Id. at ¶ 62.
D. Plaintiff’s 2019 Complaints About Masone and Montefiore’s Response
Michelle Emmons, a Senior Director for Human Resources at Montefiore, visited Plaintiff’s
location and spoke with Plaintiff’s subordinates in order to engage in a climate survey due to the
number of complaints within Plaintiff’s department, including from Plaintiff himself. Id. at ¶ 67-
68. On or around February 14, 2019, Emmons told Colquhoun-Pryce that she was going to visit
Plaintiff’s department again the following week and planned to close out her investigation of
Plaintiff’s complaints after that. Id. at ¶ 73. Emmons concluded that she had no reason to believe
that Masone harbored racist attitudes towards Plaintiff because he was African American. Id. at ¶
74.
On March 29, 2019, Plaintiff spoke with De Palo, the Union Representative who had made

the comment to Plaintiff in 2016 about Masone, and secretly recorded the conversation. Id. at ¶
77, Ex. S. During the conversation with De Palo, Plaintiff complained that Masone “was trying
to say reverse racism” against him. De Palo told Plaintiff that he would tell Michelle Emmons
“everything” but that he is afraid. Plaintiff told De Palo he understood that De Palo represents
the Union and Union Members. Id. at ¶ 78. On April 9, 2019, Plaintiff had a conversation with
Emmons which he secretly recorded. Id. at ¶ 74, Ex. T. During the conversation, Emmons told
Plaintiff that she met with O’Donnell and the Union and O’Donnell apologized and wants to
work with Plaintiff. Id. Emmons advised Plaintiff that Masone is the issue in the workplace and
that Plaintiff should let her be a “loaner.” Id. Emmons told Plaintiff to be careful when dealing
with Masone because Masone had a very negative opinion of Plaintiff and wanted him out and

Emmons recommended Plaintiff have a witness when disciplining Masone. Id.
On April 11, 2019, Plaintiff had a conversation with Clemente which he secretly recorded.
Id. at ¶ 80, Ex. U. Plaintiff told Clemente that Emmons had met with Masone with the Union
present two weeks earlier and that Emmons had told Masone that “she just needs to respect me
[Plaintiff] as her manager, that I am her manager, and I am not going anywhere.” Emmons also
told Masone that she does not have to “like” Plaintiff but must respect him. Id.
On April 29, 2019, Plaintiff met with Clemente and secretly recorded their conversation.
Plaintiff told Clemente that Masone only needed one more discipline and Plaintiff could
terminate her employment. Id. at ¶ 81, Ex. V. Emmons stated that there is nothing that can be
done about Masone except follow progressive discipline and “hold her accountable.” Emmons
advised Plaintiff to stop responding to Masone and stop going back and forth with her over email
and simply document when Masone is rude to support a termination decision. Id.
E. Plaintiff’s Resignation and Masone’s Termination

On July 3, 2019, Plaintiff took vacation days and then time off. Plaintiff never returned to his
employment at Montefiore after July 3, 2019, and eventually resigned on September 18, 2019.
Id. at ¶ 92, 100, Ex. AA.
On September 12, 2019, Dr. Robert Sable, reported that Masone had been insubordinate
and contradicted his medical advice to a patient. Id. at ¶ 101, Ex. BB. Josè Martinez, the
supervisor who took over Plaintiff’s duties after Plaintiff resigned, made the decision to
terminate Masone. Id. at ¶ 101-104.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 16, 2019, Brown filed his Complaint alleging racial discrimination, hostile
work environment, and retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as well as NYSHRL and

NYCHRL. ECF No. 1, at ¶ 2. On February 12, 2020, Montefiore subsequently moved to dismiss
the complaint, and on March 25, 2021, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part.
Brown v. Montefiore Medical Center, No. 19-CV-11474 (ALC) (JLC), 2021 WL 1163797, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021). Specifically, the Court dismissed all of Brown’s claims except for the
hostile work environment claims under Section 1981, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL. Id. at *12. On
February 9, 2022, Magistrate Judge Cott denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint. ECF
No. 32. Defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on June 30, 2023. ECF No. 78.
Plaintiff filed his opposition brief on August 25, 2023. ECF No. 84. Defendant filed its reply
brief on September 18, 2023. ECF No. 86. The Court considers the motion fully briefed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). There is no issue of material fact where the facts are irrelevant to
the disposition of the matter. Speculation, conclusory allegations and mere denials are not
enough to raise genuine issues of fact. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Walton
Ins. Ltd., 696 F. Supp. 897, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, a party must “do
more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, courts must construe the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chemical Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). Courts

may not assess credibility, nor may they decide between conflicting versions of events because
those matters are reserved for the jury. Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553-54 (2d
Cir. 2005). However, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). At summary judgment, the moving party
has the burden “to demonstrate that no genuine issue respecting any material fact exists.” Gallo
v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’Ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994).
II. Hostile Work Environment Standard
Summary judgment may be proper even in workplace discrimination cases, which tend to
be very fact-intensive, because “the salutary purposes of summary judgment—avoiding
protracted, expensive and harassing trials—apply no less to discrimination cases than to other
areas of litigation.” Caban v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2012 WL 5992088, at

*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (quoting Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.
1985)). Courts must distinguish between evidence that allows for a reasonable inference of
discrimination and evidence that gives rise to mere speculation and conjecture as even in the
discrimination context, a plaintiff must provide more than conclusory allegations of
discrimination to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Caban, 2012 WL 5992088, at *2
(quoting Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 448 (2d Cir. 1999); Schwapp v. Town of
Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997).
"[T]o survive summary judgment on a claim of hostile work environment harassment, a
plaintiff must produce evidence that 'the workplace is permeated with "discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions

of the victim's employment.’” Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 570 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295
(1993)), superseded on other grounds by, N.Y.C. Local L. No. 85. See also Rivera v. Rochester
Genesee Reg'l Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 20 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014) ("The same standards apply to
the plaintiffs' hostile [work] environment claims arising under the NYSHRL and to their claims
arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981." (internal citations omitted)). The Court may consider five non-
exclusive factors in determining the existence of a hostile work environment: "(1) the frequency
of the discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether the conduct was physically
threatening or humiliating, or a 'mere offensive utterance'; (4) whether the conduct unreasonably
interfered with plaintiff's work; and (5) what psychological harm, if any, resulted." Aulicino v.
N.Y.C. Dep't of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Richardson v. N.Y.
State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 437 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated on other
grounds, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 165 L. Ed. 2d

345 (2006)). "Our case law treats the first two of these factors—the frequency and the severity of
the misconduct—as the principal focus of the analysis; the last three factors are specific
considerations within the severity inquiry. Core hostile work environment cases involve
misconduct that is both frequent and severe, for example, when a supervisor utters blatant racial
epithets on a regular if not constant basis and behaves in a physically threatening
manner." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Second Circuit has explained that an employer's motion for summary judgment must
be denied "if the conduct there is either so severe or so pervasive as to alter the working
conditions of a reasonable employee." Richardson, 180 F.3d at 440. In addition, although
"[i]solated incidents usually will not suffice to establish a hostile work environment, . . . we have

often noted that even a single episode of harassment can establish a hostile work environment if
the incident is sufficiently severe." Redd v. N.Y. Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 175-76 (2d Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also Rasmy v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,
952 F.3d 379, 388 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Our case law is clear that when the same individuals engage
in some harassment that is explicitly discriminatory and some that is not, the entire course of
conduct is relevant to a hostile work environment claim.”).
"This standard has both objective and subjective components: the conduct complained of
must be severe or pervasive enough that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive, and
the victim must subjectively perceive the work environment to be abusive." Raspardo v.
Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 114 (2d Cir. 2014). A plaintiff must also establish that the defendant
created the hostile work environment "because" of the plaintiff's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Bell v. McRoberts Protective Agency, Inc., No. 15 Civ. 963 (JPO), 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 171466, 2016 WL 7192083, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2016).

A plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment must bring forth more than a mere
scintilla of evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment. The NYSHRL and the
NYCHRL have a similar lower standard for showing hostile work environment. See Mondelo
v.Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, No. 21-CV-02512 (CM), 2022 WL 524551, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2022). Under the NYCHRL, “[t]o prevail on liability, the plaintiff need only
show differential treatment—that []he is treated ‘less well’—because of a discriminatory intent.
Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Hostile Work Environment Claims Under Section 1981 and
NYSHRL Must Be Dismissed.

Section 1981 states that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a). "This section thus outlaws discrimination with respect to the enjoyment of
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of a contractual relationship, such as employment . . .
." Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 224 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Whidbee, 223 F.3d at
69 ("Section 1981 provides a cause of action for race-based employment discrimination based on
a hostile work environment."). The NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
on the basis of "race, creed, color, [or] national origin." See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296. Hostile work
environment claims under the NYSHRL are "governed by the same standards" as claims under
federal law. Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc., 445 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 2006).
Courts are "cautioned to consider the totality of the circumstances, and to evaluate the
'quantity, frequency, and severity' of the incidents," and must consider those factors
"'cumulatively,' so that we may 'obtain a realistic view of the work environment.'" Williams v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 61 F.4th 55, 60 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal citations omitted). When

considering the totality of the circumstances and drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, there
are no genuine issues of material fact such that a reasonable jury could infer discrimination from
either Masone or Montefiore’s conduct. Rasmy v. Marriott Int'l Inc., 952 F.3d 379, 388.
Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim hinges on evidence that Masone subjected him to
a racially discriminatory and pervasively hostile work environment involving every aspect of her
dealings with him: her verbal and non-verbal conduct, her written communications, her
complaints about him to management, and her recruiting other employees to complain about him
to management. While there exists sufficient evidence to conclude that Masone’s conduct was
pervasively hostile, rude, and insubordinate, Plaintiff points to no admissible evidence that
would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Masone’s insubordination was motivated by

racial animus.
In assessing motions for summary judgment, courts may consider only evidence that would
be admissible at trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B), (2). "Because a party 'cannot rely on
inadmissible hearsay' in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, 'the
Court must, as a preliminary matter, determine the likely admissibility of the hearsay evidence'
offered by" a party. Wilkinson v. Nord Anglia Educ. Ltd., No. 17 Civ. 7421 (PAE), 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 126863, 2019 WL 3430662, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2019) (internal citations
omitted). Similarly, inadmissible hearsay is insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact, "absent
a showing that admissible evidence will be available at trial." Burlington Coat Factory
Warehouse Corp. v. Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 924 (2d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that two comments he heard from representatives of Masone’s Union,
1199SEIU, evidenced that Masone’s harassment was motivated by racial animus. (Def. 56.1 ¶¶

23-36). In April 2016, Masone’s Union Representative Maurice De Palo told Plaintiff that he
thought Masone was “racist” because Masone allegedly told him she liked the hospital better
before Montefiore took over because they did not hire people like Plaintiff. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 24). In
2017, Union Vice President Estella Vazquez allegedly told Plaintiff in private that she believed
the reason Plaintiff was having issues with Masone was because Masone was “not used to having
someone of your color as her manager.” (Def. 56.1 ¶ 28).
De Palo’s 2016 comment is hearsay that would be inadmissible at trial. See Tolbert v. Smith,
790 F.3d 427, 437 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming summary judgment of hostile work environment
claim where the evidence cited by plaintiff, which included a declarant’s inadmissible hearsay
statement that someone else informed them that Defendant was racist, did not raise an inference

of discrimination); see also Finnegan v. Bd. of Educ., 30 F.3d 273, 274 (2d Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (explaining that "double hearsay" cannot "create a genuine issue to be tried"); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). In addition, Vazquez’s 2017 comment is a third-party out-of-court
opinion that cannot be used to prove Masone’s purported animus. See Aulicino, 580 F.3d 73
(asking for clarification regarding the district court’s consideration of inadmissible third-party
statements as evidence of hostile work environment); see Saraf v. West Publ’g Corp., No. 16-
CV-1425 (VSB), 2018 WL 7107266, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2018) (out-of-court statements
from third parties are “almost certainly hearsay and thus inadmissible for the truth of the
statements" and as such, "they are insufficient to establish an inference of discriminatory animus
against [p]laintiff.”).
Even assuming the truth, relevance, and admissibility of the Union representatives’
statements, Plaintiff still cannot identify a question of fact regarding his hostile work

environment claims nor can he demonstrate that Masone’s insubordination was because of his
race. While "the incidents comprising a hostile work environment claim need not make reference
to any trait or condition on the basis of which the discrimination has occurred" they must occur
under circumstances in which "the incidents can reasonably be interpreted as having taken place
on the basis of that trait or condition." Svenningsen v. Coll. of Staten Island, No. 01-CV-7550,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25816, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2003) (citing Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d
687, 694—95 (2d Cir. 2001)). "Everyone can be characterized by . . . race . . . and many bosses
are harsh, unjust, and rude. It is therefore important in hostile work environment cases to exclude
from consideration personnel decisions that lack a linkage or correlation to the claimed ground of
discrimination." Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 2002). Facially neutral incidents

may be sufficient to establish a hostile work environment claim "so long as a reasonable fact
finder could conclude that they were, in fact, based on [race]. But this requires some
circumstantial or other basis for inferring that incidents [race]-neutral on their face were in fact
discriminatory." Id. at 378.
Plaintiff alleges that Masone and O’Donnell falsely accused him of reverse racism, and
Plaintiff alleges pattern of behavior that may have contributed to a hostile work environment.
Standing alone, these allegations do not suggest racially motivated harassment. Even when
coupled with allegations that two Union representatives informed Plaintiff that the reason for
Masone’s behavior was because of racial antipathy, these facts do not rise to the level of severe
or pervasive discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult necessary to prove a prima facie
case of a hostile work environment claim. That Plaintiff’s Caucasian supervisors (Danisi,
Clemente, Mandarino) agreed that Masone was “insubordinate;” “was more difficult to manage
than any other employee;” and that they were involved in “more disciplinary matters involving

Masone than any other employee” casts doubt on the inference that Masone’s behavior was
because of Plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. Moreover, Masone’s termination after
being insubordinate to Dr. Robert Sable (a Caucasian doctor) and contradicting his medical
advice to a patient further demonstrates her unwillingness to follow orders, irrespective of race.
(Def. 56.1 ¶ 101-104). Cornelius v. Walmart, No. 21-CV-511JLS(F), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
129108, at *30 (W.D.N.Y. July 20, 2022) (recommending dismissal of complaint where
Plaintiff’s vague reference to being "spoken to in an abrasive manner by subordinates and
management," failed to connect any abrasive statements to Plaintiff's membership in a protected
class as required), dismissed in part, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2605 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2023).
Assuming, arguendo, that Plaintiff has established that Masone possessed racial animus,

Plaintiff’s claim still fails because he cannot establish that Masone’s discriminatory misbehavior
was severe or pervasive. See Fleming v. MaxMara USA, Inc., 371 Fed. Appx. 115, 119 (2d Cir.
2010) (concluding that no hostile work environment existed even though "defendants wrongly
excluded [the plaintiff] from meetings, excessively criticized her work, refused to answer work-
related questions, arbitrarily imposed duties outside of her responsibilities, threw books, and sent
rude emails to her"); Davis-Molinia v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93868,
2011 WL 4000997, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2011) (finding "diminished [job] responsibilities,"
"exclu[sion] from staff meetings," deliberate "avoid[ance]," "yell[ing] and talk[ing] down to,"
and an increased workload of menial tasks, among other factors, was not enough to show that
defendants' conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive), aff'd, 488 Fed. Appx. 530 (2d Cir.
2012).

II. Plaintiff’s Hostile Work Environment Claim Under NYCHRL Must Be
Dismissed.
“To establish a ... discrimination claim under the NYCHRL, the plaintiff need only
demonstrate ‘by a preponderance of the evidence that [he] has been treated less well than other
employees because of [a protected characteristic].’” Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N.
Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013). As described above, Plaintiff has not provided
sufficient evidence of Masone’s racial animus nor has he shown that he was treated “less well”
by Defendant due to discriminatory intent. Id. at 110. Plaintiff’s complaint that his subordinate
was challenging, rude, and insubordinate, are simply not actionable under NYCHRL. Wilson v.
N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc., No. 05-CV-10355, 2009 WL 873206, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2009)
(dismissing hostile work environment claim under the NYCHRL because although the conduct
alleged was “offensive,” “no reasonable fact finder could conclude that the alleged conduct

amounts to more than such petty slights and inconveniences”), aff’d sub nom. Watson v. N.Y.
Pressman's Union No. 2, 444 F. App’x 500 (2d Cir. 2011).
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 78, is
hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is DENIED as moot. Plaintiff’s
Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The Clerk of the Court
is respectfully directed to close the open motions at ECF No. 78 and 82.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 30, 2024 [Arado J (de
New York, New York
HON. ANDREW L. CARTER, JR.
United States District Judge

19

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10359553. Public record. Not legal advice.