# Giles v. City of Mount Vernon

> District Court, S.D. New York · January 11, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10357248

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** January 11, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10357248

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that summary judgment is appropriate when “the law so favors the moving party that entry of judgment in favor of the movant dismissing the complaint is proper”
- explaining “that summary judgment is appropriate only when . . . law supports the moving party”
- recognizing that the existence of factual disputes regarding whether defendants falsified a felony complaint and supporting deposition precluded a finding of qualified immunity

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MICHAEL GILES,
Plaintiff,
-against-
CITY of MT. VERNON, CAMILO
ANTONINI, Individually, COUNTY OF OPINION AND ORDER
WESTCHESTER, JEFFREY SLOTOROFF,
Individually, JOSEPH KRAUS, Individually, 20-CV-05119 (PMH)
JAMES GREER, Individually, MICHAEL
HUFFMAN, Individually, DAVID SANCHEZ,
Individually, STEGAN GOGGIN, Individually,
and JOHN and JANE DOE 1 through 10,
Individually.
Defendants.
PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge:
Michael Giles (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the filing
of a Complaint on July 3, 2020. (Doc. 1, “Compl.”).1 Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights
were violated in connection with his July 19, 2018 arrest and the ensuing criminal proceedings
commenced against him. (See Compl.). Following the November 17, 2022 conference in this
matter, the remaining defendants are Camilo Antonini (“Antonini”), Jeffrey Slotoroff
(“Slotoroff”), Joseph Kraus (“Kraus”), the City of Mount Vernon, and the County of Westchester
(collectively, “Defendants”).2 Plaintiff’s remaining claims for relief are: (i) false arrest and false

1 Citations to the Complaint correspond to the pagination generated by ECF.

2 At the November 17, 2022 conference, Plaintiff agreed to dismiss from the action defendants Michael
Huffman, David Sanchez, Stefan Goggin, James Greer, and John and Jane Doe 1 through 10, and the Court
dismissed those individuals from the action with prejudice. (Doc. 74; Doc. 85, “Nov. 17 Conf. Tr.” at 3:13-
18).
imprisonment under § 1983; (ii) malicious prosecution under § 1983 and New York State law; (iii)
violation of a right to fair trial under § 1983; and (iv) failure to intervene under § 1983.3
On January 5, 2023, in accordance with the briefing schedule set by the Court, Defendants
served their joint motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff. (Doc. 86; Doc. 87; Doc. 88, “Carey

Decl.”; Doc. 89, “Def. Br.”; Doc. 97). After receiving an extension of time from the Court, Plaintiff
served his opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on March 21, 2023. (Doc. 90;
Doc. 91, “Green-Stark Decl.”; Doc. 92, “Pl. Br.”). Defendants’ motion was fully submitted on
April 21, 2023, upon the filing of its motion papers, Plaintiff’s opposition, and its reply brief (Doc.
93, “Reply”). On October 26, 2023, in response to the Court’s directives, the parties filed a revised
joint Rule 56.1 Statement. (Doc. 95).4
For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
The Court recites the facts herein only to the extent necessary to adjudicate the extant
motion for summary judgment and draws them from: (1) the Complaint; (2) the parties’ joint Rule
56.1 Statement; (3) the Carey Declaration in support of the Motion and the exhibits annexed

thereto; and (4) the Green-Stark Declaration in opposition to the Motion and the exhibits annexed
thereto. Unless otherwise indicated, the following facts are undisputed.

3 At the November 17, 2022 conference, Plaintiff withdrew his Fifth (supervisory liability under § 1983),
Sixth (municipal liability under § 1983), Eighth (negligent screening, hiring, and retention under New York
State law), and Ninth (negligent training and supervision under New York State law) claims for relief, and
the Court dismissed those claims with prejudice. (Doc. 74; Nov. 17 Conf. Tr. at 3:9-12, 13:1-6).
4 The parties’ combined their respective Rule 56.1 Statements into one document. (Doc. 95). For the sake
of clarity, the Court notes that Defendants set forth their fifty paragraph “Rule 56.1 Statement” and then
Plaintiff began his “Counter Statement” setting forth additional facts in numbered paragraphs beginning
again at number one. The Court hereafter refers to the first section of the document as “56.1 Stmt.” (Doc.
95 at 1-14) and the second section as “Pl.’s CntrStmt.” (id. at 14-21).
I. Plaintiff’s July 19, 2018 Arrest
On July 19, 2018, officers from several law enforcement agencies—including the
Westchester County Police Department (“WCPD”) and the Mount Vernon Police Department
(“MVPD”)—performed an inspection of the Volunteers of America Shelter (the “VOA Shelter”),

located at 25 Operations Drive, Valhalla, New York, seeking evidence of narcotics sales occurring
within the shelter. (56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 1-2). Plaintiff was a resident of the VOA Shelter at the time. (Id.
¶ 3).
During the search, Antonini encountered Plaintiff taking a shower inside a shower stall in
the second-floor publicly shared bathroom. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 2). Another individual
was standing by the entrance to the bathroom at the time of the encounter. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8; Pl.’s
CntrStmt. ¶ 2; Green-Stark Decl. Ex. 6 at 16:3-15). Antonini spoke to Plaintiff in the shower and,
during the conversation, visually inspected Plaintiff’s clothes and the shower’s interior. (56.1 Stmt.
¶¶ 9-10). Antonini then left Plaintiff to finish his shower, which lasted somewhere between a few
minutes and less than a minute. (56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 10-12; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 4). Thereafter, Plaintiff got

dressed and exited the bathroom alone. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 12; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 5). He returned to his
room where the officers were conducting a search of his belongings on account of his parole status.
(Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶¶ 7-8).
Antonini visually inspected the shower drain at some point after Plaintiff exited the
bathroom, although the precise timing of that inspection is contested. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13). Antonini
testified that inside the drain he found a folded piece of toilet paper or napkin. (Id. ¶ 15). The
parties dispute whether Antonini would have been able to view the paper in the drain during his
previous visual inspection (while Plaintiff showered). (Id. ¶¶ 10, 16). Antonini used a clothes
hanger to remove the item from the drain and discovered that it was a clear plastic bag containing
17 small, clear, plastic knotted twists consisting of a chunky, off-white material, which was later
identified as crack cocaine. (Id. ¶¶ 17-20).
Thereafter, Antonini handcuffed Plaintiff near the door to his room, taking him into
custody. (Id. ¶ 21; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 10). While Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff was

“eventually” arrested, Plaintiff specifically contends that he was handcuffed approximately 10-15
minutes after he had finished showering and returned to his room. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 21; Pl.’s CntrStmt.
¶ 9). Antonini then conveyed to Slotoroff that Plaintiff had been in the bathroom in possession of
17 bags of crack cocaine, and turned over custody of Plaintiff and the drugs to Slotoroff. (56.1
Stmt. ¶¶ 22-23; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 12).
II. Criminal Proceedings Against Plaintiff
Slotoroff, based on information provided by Antonini, drafted and swore out two felony
complaints against Plaintiff in the hours after the arrest: one for criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the third degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 220.16 (1)), a class B felony; and one for criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 220.06 (5)), a class D

felony. (56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 24-25; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 14). Both felony complaints identified the controlled
substance as a “substance believed to be crack cocaine.” (Green-Stark Decl. Ex. 10). A lab report
dated August 1, 2018 confirmed the presence of cocaine in the substance. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 30).
On July 20, 2018, Plaintiff was arraigned in Mount Pleasant Justice Court and remanded
to the Westchester County Jail. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 26). A parole warrant was also sworn out against
Plaintiff on that day. (Id. at ¶ 27). On July 23, 2018, Plaintiff was formally charged with two counts
of violating his parole, with both counts related to his VOA Shelter arrest. (Id. at ¶ 28). On July
25, 2018, in the Mount Pleasant Justice Court action, Plaintiff was released on his own
recognizance—although he was not released from Westchester County Jail as a result of his then-
pending parole hold. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 29). On August 2, 2018, Antonini testified at a preliminary
parole revocation hearing regarding his search of the shower drain at the VOA Shelter. (Pl.’s
CntrStmt. ¶ 15; Green-Stark Decl. Ex. 6). The parties dispute the veracity of Antonini’s testimony
at this hearing. (Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 15). On September 9, 2018, Kraus swore out a superseding

misdemeanor information (“SMI”) against Plaintiff, alleging violation of Criminal Possession of
a Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 220.03), a class A misdemeanor.
(56.1 Stmt. ¶ 31; Green-Stark Decl. Ex. 11). Kraus learned information about Plaintiff’s arrest on
the date of the arrest and did not have direct knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged possession. (56.1
Stmt. ¶ 32; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 17).
Thereafter, Plaintiff’s attorney for the criminal matter in Mount Pleasant Justice Court gave
ADA Littman a copy of a handwritten letter written by an individual named Andre Coverdale
(“Coverdale”), and resident of the VOA Shelter on July 19, 2018, indicating that Coverdale wished
to “exonerate” Plaintiff and that the drugs found in the second-floor bathroom of the VOA Shelter
on July 19, 2018 were his drugs and that he put them there. (56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 34-36; Green-Stark

Decl. Ex. 9; Carey Decl. Ex. Q). Plaintiff moved to dismiss the accusatory instrument for facial
insufficiency on March 20, 2019. (56.1 Stmt. ¶ 37). On April 4, 2019, after ADA Littman informed
the Mount Pleasant Justice Court that he was unable to obtain a second Superseding Misdemeanor
Information from Antonini, the court granted from the bench Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. (56.1
Stmt. ¶¶ 42-43; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 18).
Plaintiff appeared at a final parole revocation hearing on April 24, 2019 without counsel.
There, he pled guilty to an added charge as a “legal fiction” and his parole was revoked and
immediately restored. (56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 44-45; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 21). On May 6, 2019, Plaintiff’s
parole warrant was formally lifted and he was released from Westchester County Jail. (56.1 Stmt.
¶¶ 46-47).
This litigation followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a “court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is ‘material’ if it ‘might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law,’ and is genuinely in dispute ‘if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Liverpool v. Davis, 442 F.
Supp. 3d 714, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)).5 “‘Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary’ are not material and thus cannot
preclude summary judgment.” Sood v. Rampersaud, No. 12-CV-05486, 2013 WL 1681261, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2013) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The Court’s duty, when
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, “is not to resolve disputed issues of fact

but to assess whether there are any factual issues to be tried.” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Nw. Mut. Ins.
Co., 625 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 2010)). Indeed, the Court’s function is not to determine the truth or
weigh the evidence; the task is material issue spotting, not material issue determining. Therefore,
“where there is an absence of sufficient proof as to one essential element of a claim, any factual
disputes with respect to other elements of the claim are immaterial. . . .” Bellotto v. Cty. of Orange,
248 F. App’x 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 281 (2d Cir.
2006)). Claims simply cannot proceed in the absence of sufficient proof as to an essential element.

5 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, and
alterations.
“It is the movant’s burden to show that no genuine factual dispute exists,” Vermont Teddy
Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)), and a court must “resolve all ambiguities and draw all
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor.” Id. (citing Giannullo v. City of New York, 322

F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003)). Once the movant has met its burden, the non-movant “must come
forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liverpool, 442 F. Supp.
3d at 722 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
The non-movant cannot defeat a summary judgment motion by relying on “mere speculation or
conjecture as to the true nature of the facts. . . .” Id. (quoting Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d
9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986)). However, “[i]f there is any evidence from which a reasonable inference
could be drawn in favor of the opposing party on the issue on which summary judgment is sought,
summary judgment is improper.” Sood, 2013 WL 1681261, at *2 (citing Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford
v. Old Dominion Freight Line Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Should there be no genuine issue of material fact, the movant must establish also its

“entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” In re Davis New York Venture Fund Fee Litig., 805
F. App’x 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting FIH, LLC v. Found. Capital Partners LLC, 920 F.3d 134,
140 (2d Cir. 2019)). Stated simply, the movant must establish that the law favors the judgment
sought. Gonzalez v. Rutherford Corp., 881 F. Supp. 829, 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining “that
summary judgment is appropriate only when . . . law supports the moving party”); Linares v. City
of White Plains, 773 F. Supp. 559, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (explaining that summary judgment is
appropriate when “the law so favors the moving party that entry of judgment in favor of the movant
dismissing the complaint is proper”).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s four remaining claims for relief proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (i) false arrest
and false imprisonment; (ii) malicious prosecution; (iii) violation of a right to fair trial; and (iv)
failure to intervene.

Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]very person who, under color of any
statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[T]his language does not create substantive rights; rather,
it creates a mechanism by which individuals can vindicate the violation of rights secured
elsewhere.” Santucci v. Levine, No. 17-CV-10204, 2021 WL 76337, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2021).
I. First Claim for Relief: False Arrest and False Imprisonment
Plaintiff asserts in his first claim for relief that Antonini and Slotoroff are liable for false
arrest.6 (Pl. Br. at 13-22). To prove a false arrest claim, a plaintiff is required to show that “the
defendant intentionally confined him without his consent and without justification.” Weyant v.

Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d
Cir. 2007). Probable cause “is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439
F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2006).
a. Probable Cause
“Probable cause to arrest . . . exists when the officer has knowledge or reasonably
trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of
reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a

6 Plaintiff, by way of opposition, voluntarily discontinued his false arrest claim asserted against Kraus. (Pl.
Br. at 20). Accordingly, the First Claim for Relief is hereby dismissed with prejudice as to Kraus.
crime.” Wierzbic v. Howard, 836 Fed. App’x 31, 34-35 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This standard is an objective one and evaluates “the reasonable conclusion to be drawn
from the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,
152 (2004). This standard requires that a court consider “the totality of the circumstances and . . .

be aware that probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”
Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
question of whether or not probable cause existed may be determinable as a matter of law if there
is no dispute as to the pertinent events and the knowledge of the officers . . . .” Weyant, 101 F.3d
at 852.
i. Antonini
Defendants argue that probable cause, or at least arguable probable cause, existed for
Antonini to arrest Plaintiff for criminal possession of a controlled substance based on a theory of
constructive possession of the narcotics found in the shower drain. (Def. Br. at 12). “In analyzing

§ 1983 claims for unconstitutional false arrest,” courts “look[] to the law of the state in which the
arrest occurred.” Jaegly, 439 F.3d at 151. “Under New York law, a person constructively possesses
tangible property when he or she exercises dominion and control over the property with a sufficient
level of control over the area in which the contraband is found.” Content v. Curran, No. 20-CV-
05444, 2022 WL 2905158, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2022) (quoting Smith v. DeGirolamo, No. 17-
CV-05532, 2020 WL 5752226, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2020)). “Constructive possession may
be shown by direct or circumstantial evidence, and possession of the item need not be exclusive.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Albarran, 943 F.3d 106, 118 (2d Cir. 2019)). “Mere presence [at the
location of the contraband] is insufficient,” but “presence under a particular set of circumstances
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant constructively possessed
contraband” is sufficient to establish constructive possession. United States v. Willis, 14 F.4th 170,
181 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Facen, 812 F.3d 280, 287 (2d Cir. 2016)). “For
example, documents pertaining to a defendant found in the same location as narcotics, possession

of a key to the location where drugs are found, or whether the drugs are in plain view, are factors
relevant to constructive possession.” Id. (citing Facen, 812 F.3d at 287).
Here, the undisputed evidence shows that drugs were found in the same bathroom that
Plaintiff had previously showered in. Plaintiff contends, based on the fact that the bathroom is
publicly accessible and at least one other resident was present near the bathroom that day, that
anyone could have accessed the bathroom to conceal the drugs before he entered the bathroom or
after he finished showering. (Pl. Br. at 15). Defendants rely primarily on the “immediate[]”
discovery of the drugs after Plaintiff left the bathroom to support that Plaintiff had constructive
possession. (Def. Br. at 14). However, the timing of Antonini’s discovery of the drugs—namely,
whether there was a gap in time (and the length of any such gap) between Plaintiff exiting the

shower and Antonini searching the drain—is a disputed issue. Defendants assert, based on
Antonini’s testimony at the preliminary parole revocation hearing, that the search occurred
“immediately” after Plaintiff left the bathroom. (Def. Br. at 10-11, 13-14, 17; 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13;
Green-Stark Decl. Ex. 1 at 13:16-18 (“Not even like, 30 to 45 seconds later, the shower stopped. I
immediately responded back to the same shower stall . . . .”)). Plaintiff argues that the search could
not have been “immediate” given that he testified that Antonini was not present in the bathroom
at the time he exited the shower. (Rule 56.1 Statement ¶ 13; Pl. Br. at 17-18; Green-Stark Decl.
Ex. 4 “Giles Dep. Tr.” at 9:9-10:9).7
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and considering the totality of
the circumstances, the Court cannot, on these facts, conclude as a matter of law that Antonini had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for constructive possession of the drugs in the publicly shared
bathroom. See i.e. Haskins v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-02016, 2017 WL 3669612, at *8-11
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017) (denying summary judgment as to false arrest claim where “genuine
disputes as to issues of material fact exist as to whether [Defendant] had probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff for constructive possession of the recovered narcotics.”).
ii. Slotoroff
Defendants further argue that—pursuant to the collective knowledge doctrine and
irrespective of the Court’s determination as to Antonini—Slotoroff had probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff. (Def. Br. at 18-19). The collective knowledge doctrine (or fellow officer rule) “permits
courts to assess probable cause to arrest by looking at the collective knowledge of the police force,

and does not require that the arresting officer know the precise facts justifying police action.”
Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 133 F. Supp. 3d 563, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing United States
v. Valez, 796 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1986)). “If one officer in a police department has knowledge of
facts that establish probable cause to arrest a suspect, the suspect suffers no constitutional
deprivation if he is arrested by a different officer who lacks such knowledge.” Crawford v. City of
New York, 477 F. App’x 777, 779 (2d Cir. 2012). Plaintiff argues that “since [he] has called

7 Defendants argue in reply that there is “no evidence that Antonini did not inspect the drain right after
plaintiff exited the shower.” (Reply at 8). But Plaintiff’s testimony that Antonini was not present in the
bathroom at the time he exited the shower is at least some evidence that Antonini did not conduct an
immediate inspection of the drain.
probable cause into question, the fellow officer rule does not insulate Slotoroff from liability for
his role in plaintiff’s arrest.” (Pl. Br. at 20-21). The Court agrees.
There is no dispute that Slotoroff’s arrest of Plaintiff was predicated on information
provided by Antonini, but the parties dispute exactly what details were conveyed to Slotoroff and

whether Slotoroff had reason to doubt Antonini’s truthfulness. (56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 23-25). Jackson v.
City of New York, 939 F. Supp. 2d 235, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The ‘fellow officer’ rule is typically
invoked in cases where the record is clear as to what the officer seeking backup reported.”).
Because the Court has already determined that an issue of material fact exists as to whether
Antonini had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, the Court likewise declines to make a determination
on this record as to whether Slotoroff had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. See i.e. Bacote v.
Riverbay Corp., No. 16-CV-01599, 2017 WL 11567934, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2017) (“On the
present record, the disputed issues of fact underlying the determination of probable cause precludes
the entry of summary judgment in favor of any Defendants on the false arrest claim.”)).
b. Qualified Immunity

Defendants further argue that Antonini and Slotoroff are entitled to qualified immunity on
Plaintiff’s false arrest claim. (Def. Br. at 14-20). “Under federal law, a police officer is entitled to
qualified immunity where (1) his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or (2) it was objectively
reasonable for him to believe that his actions were lawful at the time of the challenged act.”
Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 87. An officer’s decision to arrest “is objectively reasonable if there was
‘arguable’ probable cause at the time of arrest—that is, if ‘officers of reasonable competence could
disagree on whether the probable cause test was met.’” Id. Moreover, “where probable cause is
lacking, an officer who participates in the arrest is nonetheless immune from suit in his or her
individual capacity under the doctrine of qualified immunity if it was objectively reasonable for
him to rely on a fellow officer’s report indicating the existence of probable cause.” Micalizzi v.
Ciamarra, 206 F. Supp. 2d 564, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Here, the right to be free from arrest without probable cause was clearly established at the

time of Plaintiff’s arrest. Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 87 (2d Cir. 2007). Additionally, the law was clearly
established that constructive possession could not be established by mere presence at the location
where contraband is found. Willis, 14 F.4th at 181. However, as discussed supra, there is an issue
of material fact as to whether Antonini had probable cause (or arguable probable cause) to arrest
Plaintiff on a theory of constructive possession. Additionally, with respect to Slotoroff whose
arrest of Plaintiff was predicated on information provided by Antonini, the record is not clear
regarding exactly what information was conveyed to Slotoroff and when. (56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 21-25).
The Court cannot determine on this record whether Antonini’s probable cause determination or
Slotoroff’s reliance on Antonini’s information was objectively reasonable. See Bacote, 2017 WL
11567934 at *12; see also Nazario v. Thibeault, No. 22-1657, 2023 WL 7147386, at *2 (2d Cir.

Oct. 31, 2023) (open material issues of fact preclude finding of qualified immunity); Zwick v. Town
of Cheektowaga, No. 17-CV-00727, 2021 WL 4895106, at *6 n.7 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2021)
(“[G]iven the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the Court will not address the viability
of any qualified-immunity defense.”).
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the first claim for relief and
the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is DENIED as to Antonini and Slotoroff.
II. Second and Seventh Claims for Relief: Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff’s second and seventh claims for relief for malicious prosecution under federal and
state law are asserted against all Defendants. “In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state
actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth
Amendment and must establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law.”
Frost v. New York City Police Dep’t, 980 F.3d 231, 242 (2d Cir. 2020) (citing Manganiello v. City
of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2010)). Under New York and federal law, a plaintiff

must allege: “(1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant
against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence
of probable cause for the criminal proceeding and (4) actual malice.” Franco v. Gunsalus, No. 22-
339, 2023 WL 3590102, at *4 (2d Cir. May 23, 2023) (quoting Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th
150, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2021)). “To demonstrate a favorable termination of a criminal prosecution
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff
need only show that his prosecution ended without a conviction.” Thompson v. Clark, 142 S.Ct.
1332, 1335 (2022). However, when pressing a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, the
plaintiff must show also “that there was (5) a sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint to
implicate [her] Fourth Amendment rights.” Rohman v. New York City Transit Auth., 215 F.3d 208,

215 (2d Cir. 2000).
Defendants challenge the first (initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding), third
(lack of probable cause), and fourth (actual malice) elements of Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution
claims. (Def. Br. at 22-29). The Court herein analyzes only the contested elements.
a. Commencement or Continuation of a Criminal Proceeding
Defendants challenge this first element only with respect to Plaintiff’s claim against Kraus.
(Def. Br. at 26-27). Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against Kraus is based on allegations
that he swore out an accusatory instrument and put false information into the record. (Pl. Br. at 25-
26). “In general, courts presume the prosecutor exercises independent judgment in deciding
whether to initiate or continue a criminal proceeding.” Ventillo v. Falco, No. 19-CV-03664, 2020
WL 7496294, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020). “Where the defendant in a malicious prosecution
action is a police officer, courts have found a triable issue of fact as to the initiation element where
the defendant-officer brought formal charges and had the person arraigned, filled out complaining

and corroborating affidavits, swore to and signed a felony complaint, or created false information
and forwarded it to prosecutors.” Alcantara v. City of New York, 646 F. Supp. 2d 449, 457–58
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Here, Kraus’s swearing to the SMI is sufficient to meet the first element. See Berry v.
Marchinkowski, 137 F. Supp. 3d 495, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Moreover, the record reflects that the
SMI contained misrepresentations. The substance referred to in the SMI is “a white powdery
substance believed to be cocaine.” (Carey Decl. Ex. N at 2). But the substance allegedly possessed
by Plaintiff was crack cocaine, not powdered cocaine. (56.1 Stmt. at ¶ 32). The SMI also indicates
that Kraus had “direct knowledge” of Plaintiff’s alleged possession of the drugs, when it is
undisputed that Kraus did not have direct knowledge at the time. (Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 17).

Accordingly, viewing the facts in favor of Plaintiff, summary judgment is inappropriate as to Kraus
on this ground.
b. Lack of Probable Cause
Defendants argue with respect to the third element that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution
claim fails because Antonini, Slotoroff, and Kraus had probable cause (or at least arguable
probable cause) to arrest and prosecute Plaintiff. (Def. Br. at 23-26). “Like a false arrest claim, the
existence of probable cause is a complete defense to a claim of malicious prosecution in New
York.” Johnson v. City of New York, No. 18-CV-06256, 2020 WL 2732068, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May
26, 2020) (internal quotation removed). However, “[o]nce probable cause to arrest has been
established, claims of malicious prosecution survive only if, between the arrest and the initiation
of the prosecution, the groundless nature of the charges is made apparent by the discovery of some
intervening fact.” Smith v. Tobon, 529 F. App’x 36, 38 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation removed).
With respect to Antonini, as discussed supra, there exists an issue of material fact as to whether

he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Both Slotoroff and Kraus relied on Antonini’s information
in drafting their respective accusatory instruments. (56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 32, 49-50; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶¶ 12-
17). While Slotoroff and Kraus may ultimately be found to have probable cause based on the
collective knowledge doctrine, the Court cannot conclude on this record that probable cause was
imputed to Slotoroff or Kraus. See Bacote, 2017 WL 11567934, at *10 (“[p]robable cause cannot
be imputed from officers who do not have probable cause to begin with.”).
c. Lack of Actual Malice
Lastly, Defendants argue that Antonini lacked actual malice. (Def. Br. at 24-25). Based on
the Court’s earlier finding that there is an issue of material fact as to Antonini’s determination of
probable cause, the element of malice is also an open issue of material fact. See Boyd v. City of

New York, 336 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Once we find an issue of material fact as to probable
cause, the element of malice also becomes an issue of material fact as well.”).
d. Qualified Immunity
Defendants reiterate their arguments as to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claims. As discussed supra, given that disputed issues of fact remain as to
probable cause, the Court cannot determine qualified immunity. See Walker v. Carrozzo, No. 21-
CV-02975, 2023 WL 2664610, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2023) (“the material factual disputes
underpinning the probable cause determination . . . make a granting of qualified immunity on the
false arrest and malicious prosecution claims inappropriate here as such facts are material to a
determination of reasonableness.”); see also Fincher v. Cnty. of Westchester, 979 F. Supp. 989,
1001 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (recognizing that the existence of factual disputes regarding whether
defendants falsified a felony complaint and supporting deposition precluded a finding of qualified
immunity).

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s
malicious prosecution claims and the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is DENIED as to
all Defendants.8
III. Third Claim for Relief: Violation of Right to Fair Trial
Plaintiff, in his opposition, argues the third claim for relief for violation of a right to fair
trial only applies to Antonini and Kraus. The Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant’s
right to a fair trial.” Frost, 980 F.3d at 244. “This right is violated ‘[w]hen a police officer creates
false information likely to influence a jury’s decision and forwards that information to
prosecutors.’” Id. (quoting Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997)). To
establish a fair trial claim based on fabrication of evidence, a plaintiff must show that “an (1)

investigating official (2) fabricates information (3) that is likely to influence a jury’s verdict, (4)
forwards that information to prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff suffers a deprivation of life, liberty,
or property as a result.” Ganek v. Leibowitz, 874 F.3d 73, 90 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Garnett v.
Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d 265, 279 (2d Cir. 2016)). “[U]nlike a malicious prosecution
claim, ‘a Section 1983 claim for the denial of a right to a fair trial based on an officer’s provision

8 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim asserted against the City of Mount Vernon
and the County of Westchester under the state law theory of liability respondeat superior fails as a matter
of law. (Def. Br. at 25, 29). “[M]unicipalities may be liable for the common law torts, like false arrest and
malicious prosecution, committed by their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” Mesa v.
City of N.Y., 09-CV-10464, 2013 WL 31002, at *34 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2013). However, “[i]f summary
judgment is inappropriate on a state law tort, then it is inappropriate on the related respondeat superior
claim.” See Sankar v. City of New York, 867 F. Supp. 2d 297, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). Summary judgment is
therefore inappropriate as to the municipal defendants.
of false information to prosecutors can stand even if the officer had probable cause to arrest the
Section 1983 plaintiff.’” Frost, 980 F.3d at 244 (quoting Garnett, 838 F.3d at 277-78)).
With respect to Antonini, Plaintiff’s violation of a right to fair trial claim is based on
arguments that he: (i) provided false information to Slotoroff—namely, that Plaintiff had been

found in physical possession of narcotics; and (ii) provided false testimony at Plaintiff’s parole
hearing concerning the sequence of events. (Pl. Br. at 28-29). Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s
claim is “purely speculative.” (Def. Br. at 30-31). Here, it is undisputed that Antonini conveyed to
Slotoroff that Plaintiff had been in the bathroom in possession of crack cocaine. (Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶
12). Slotoroff then used that information in drafting his case report and felony complaints. (Green-
Stark Decl. Exs. 17-18; Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 12). The parties dispute whether Antonini’s
representations to Slotoroff falsely represented physical, as opposed to constructive, possession.
(Pl.’s CntrStmt. ¶ 14). Therefore, an issue of fact exists as to whether Antonini’s representations
constitute false information. Additionally, with respect to Antonini’s statements at the parole
hearing, the Court has already found that an issue of fact exists as to the timing of Antonini’s

discovery of the drugs, which is pertinent to ascertaining the truth or falsity of Antonini’s
statements.
With respect to Kraus, Plaintiff’s claim for violation of a right to fair trial is based on his
signing of the SMI “knowing it contained material falsities.” (Pl. Br. at 29). The Court has already
concluded that two of the representations contained in the SMI were inaccurate. Accordingly,
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and drawing all reasonable
inferences in his favor, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that Kraus did not knowingly
supply false information to the prosecutor.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the third claim for relief is
DENIED as to Antonini and Krause.
IV. Fourth Claim for Relief: Failure to Intervene
Plaintiff asserts his fourth claim for relief for failure to intervene against Antonini,

Slotoroff, and Kraus. (Pl. Br. at 30-31). “A law enforcement officer has an affirmative duty to
intercede on the behalf of a citizen whose constitutional rights are being violated in his presence
by other officers.” O’Neill v. Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1988). While Defendants cannot
be held liable for both the constitutional violation and failure to intervene in that violation, Plaintiff
may assert his failure to intervene claims in the alternative. See Marshall v. Port Auth. of New York
& New Jersey, No. 19-CV-02168, 2020 WL 5633155, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020) (“Although
[Defendants] cannot be held directly liable for these violations and for failure to intervene and stop
those alleged violations, [Plaintiffs] may proceed with these claims in the alternative.”). Given that
Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and violation of right to fair trial are
proceeding to trial, a reasonable jury may, after viewing the evidence at trial, find that Antonini,

Slotoroff, or Kraus, knew of but failed to intervene in violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the fourth claim for relief is DENIED
as to Antonini, Slotoroff, and Kraus.
V. Damage Limitation
In light of the issues of material fact that exist and the claims proceeding to trial, the Court
declines to impose any limitation on Plaintiff’s damages at this stage.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The
following claims will proceed to trial: (i) false arrest and false imprisonment asserted against
Antonini and Slotoroff; (11) malicious prosecution asserted against Antonini, Slotoroff, Kraus, City
of Mount Vernon, and County of Westchester; (i11) violation of a right to fair trial asserted against
Antonini and Kraus; and (iv) failure to intervene asserted against Antonini, Slotoroff, Kraus.
The parties are directed to meet and confer and comply with Rules 6(A) and 6(B) of the
Court’s Individual Practices (rev. June 23, 2023) by filing the documents required therein, which
include a joint pretrial order, proposed joint voir dire questions, joint requests to charge, joint
verdict form, and any motions in /imine, on or before February 9, 2024. Opposition to any motions
in limine is due February 23, 2024.
A pretrial conference has been scheduled for April 4, 2024 at 12:00 p.m. to be held in
Courtroom 520 of the White Plains courthouse.
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion sequences pending
at Doc. 86 and Doc. 97.

SO ORDERED:
Dated: White Plains, New York
January 10, 2024 ( | V/
PHILIP M. HALPERN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10357248. Public record. Not legal advice.