# Cope v. Coleman County

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · June 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10347994

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** June 26, 2024
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Nature of suit:** Civil Rights
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10347994

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating one exception to the law of the case doctrine is when “the evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different”
- holding that two officers were not deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s medical needs where one went out of his way to get her inhaler and the other informed booking personnel that she had asthma
- stating that the court “must reach the question of whether [the officer] was a policymaking official for [the county]” in order to assess municipal liability, regardless of the fact that the officer had qualified immunity

## Opinion text

Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________
FILED
June 26, 2024
No. 23-10414
____________ Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Patsy K. Cope; Alex Isbell, as Dependent Administrator
of, and on behalf of, the Estate of Derrek Quinton
Gene Monroe and his heirs at law

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

Coleman County,

Defendant—Appellee.
______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:18-CV-15
______________________________

Before Smith, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
This is the second appeal in this case, which concerns Derrek
Monroe’s suicide at the Coleman County Jail in 2017. In the first appeal, we
held that the individual defendants—Coleman County Sheriff Leslie Cogdill,
Jail Administrator Mary Jo Brixey, and Jailer Jessie Laws—were entitled to

_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

qualified immunity. Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Cope
I”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2573 (2022). Plaintiffs now return to this court to
appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment on their municipal
liability claims against Coleman County. For the reasons below, the district
court’s judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ episodic-acts-or-omissions claim is
AFFIRMED, but the judgment is VACATED and REMANDED for
further proceedings regarding whether Plaintiffs have raised a genuine
dispute of material fact as to their conditions-of-confinement claim.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
On September 29, 2017, Monroe was arrested and booked at the
Coleman County Jail. A medical screening form completed during intake
indicated Monroe was thinking about killing himself, “wished [he] had a way
to do it,” and had attempted suicide two weeks earlier. The form also
indicated Monroe had previously been diagnosed with “some sort of
schizophrenia” and received mental health treatment. During booking,
Monroe told Coleman County Sheriff’s Deputy Ryan Tucker, “I want you
to shoot me!” Tucker notified Sheriff Cogdill about the incident, and Cogdill
helped Tucker finish the booking process.
Coleman County Jail has a “Mental Disabilities and Suicide
Prevention Plan” (“Suicide Plan”), which establishes methods of
supervision for suicidal detainees at various risk levels. According to that
policy, people classified as low risk are checked every thirty minutes, people
classified as moderate risk are checked every fifteen minutes, and people
classified as high risk “receive [c]ontinuous or at least [five] minute
observation.” When Monroe was first incarcerated at the jail, he was
observed every thirty minutes, which suggests the jail initially categorized
him as low risk.

2
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

After Monroe’s intake, an officer at the jail contacted Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Services (“MHMR”). But Monroe had a seizure on
his way to meet with the MHMR worker and was subsequently taken to the
hospital. The hospital released him on the following day. Monroe was
returned to the jail and placed in a cell with at least one other person. Shortly
after returning, Monroe unsuccessfully attempted to hang himself using a
bed sheet in his cell. 1 Laws observed Monroe’s suicide attempt and called
for backup. Cogdill, Tucker, and Laws then moved Monroe into a cell by
himself and dressed him in a safety smock. 2 Monroe’s new cell contained a
telephone with a cord that was approximately two and a half feet long.
Later that afternoon, a MHMR crisis worker named Susan Quintana
evaluated Monroe and recommended the jail place him on “highest suicide
watch.” Quintana told Brixey and Laws about Monroe’s risk factors and
suggested that Monroe be observed 100% of the time, particularly because he
did not have a padded cell. She also talked with the sheriff about her
recommendation. At the time, the jail allegedly did not have the capacity to
constantly monitor a detainee. Monroe was observed every fifteen minutes
that night, which aligns with the moderate risk category in the Suicide Plan.
The following day (Sunday, October 1, 2017), Laws started his shift at
7 A.M. Laws was the only officer at the jail that day, in accordance with an
alleged Coleman County policy under which only one jailer is staffed at the
jail during nights and on weekends. A witness who was also incarcerated in
the jail that morning testified that he could hear Monroe saying for an hour,

_____________________
1
There is some evidence in the record that Monroe first tried to strangle himself
with a blanket before attempting to hang himself.
2
To decrease the risk of using a belt or other item of clothing for self-harm, the jail
dressed people at risk of suicide in “safety smocks,” also known as “suicide smocks.”
Laws testified that Cogdill made the decision to put Monroe in a safety smock.

3
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

“I’m going to kill myself. I’m going to kill myself. Please help me.” The
witness also heard Laws try to “talk [Monroe] down” and tell him everything
was going to be alright.
At approximately 8:30 A.M., Monroe asked Laws for permission to
shower. 3 Laws called Brixey, who told Laws to let Monroe shower and to get
him a clean smock. Monroe went to the shower and back to his cell without
incident, but he then became increasingly agitated. Laws reported that
Monroe began to overflow his toilet, so Laws shut off the water to the cell
and went to get a mop. Monroe began beating a plunger on his cell, and then
beating the phone receiver against the phone. After sitting down
momentarily, Monroe got up again, walked to the phone, and wrapped the
phone cord around his neck. Jail surveillance video does not clearly show
Monroe at that point, but his body appears to slump over. Meanwhile, Laws
continued to mop while watching Monroe from outside the cell.
Laws reported that he “tried to talk [Monroe] down” and then
notified Cogdill, Tucker, and Brixey. While waiting for backup, Laws did not
enter Monroe’s cell, obtain a rescue breathing device, or call emergency
medical services (“EMS”). 4 Laws later testified that his decision not to
enter the cell alone aligned with his training and Coleman County Jail policy.
Specifically, the Suicide Plan states that, if a suicide attempt is in progress,
“[t]he correctional officer will enter the cell and attempt appropriate life
saving techniques after backup-personnel have arrived.”

_____________________
3
These events are recorded in reports and also captured on a silent jail surveillance
video taken from a camera outside Monroe’s cell.
4
The Suicide Plan states that, during a suicide attempt, “the correctional officer
or jailer will . . . call the Emergency Medical Service.” Laws later testified that he “d[idn’t]
know” why he did not call EMS but he would not do anything differently if given the
opportunity.

4
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

Approximately ten minutes after Monroe wrapped the cord around
his neck, Brixey arrived at the jail. Brixey and Laws then entered Monroe’s
cell together. Laws removed the cord from Monroe’s neck. Brixey called
EMS and requested an ambulance, during which time Laws found Monroe’s
pulse. Monroe did not appear to be breathing, so Brixey retrieved a breathing
mask, which Laws began using on Monroe.
The paramedics arrived approximately five minutes after Brixey
called EMS. Cogdill arrived around the same time. The paramedics took
over administering emergency aid on Monroe and subsequently transported
him to the hospital. Monroe died the following day. The plaintiffs’ expert
opined that if the cord had been removed in “less than at least 5 minutes,”
the damage to Monroe’s brain would have been “lessened and more likely
reversible.”
Two years before Monroe’s suicide, the Texas Commission on Jail
Standards (“TCJS”) issued a Technical Assistance Memorandum to all
sheriffs and jail administrators in Texas, which reported that “four . . . suicide
hanging deaths involving the use of telephone cords” had occurred in Texas
jails over the previous eleven months (“Phone Cord Memorandum”). TCJS
thus recommended that “ALL phone cords be no more than twelve (12)
inches in length.” A former Coleman County sheriff testified that the
Coleman County Jail’s policy manual was based on recommendations from
TCJS and that TCJS approved the manual. But Cogdill testified that he had
not seen the Phone Cord Memorandum before Monroe’s suicide. Cogdill
also testified that, after being elected sheriff in 2016, he did not find any folder
or computer containing previously issued TCJS memoranda.
B. Procedural History
Patsy Cope, who is Monroe’s mother, filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 on behalf of herself and Monroe’s estate (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)

5
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

against Cogdill, Brixey, Laws, and Coleman County (“County”). On a
previous interlocutory appeal, we held that Cogdill, Brixey, and Laws
(collectively, “Individual Defendants”) were entitled to qualified immunity,
reversing the district court’s contrary decision. See Cope I, 3 F.4th at 202.
The Supreme Court denied review. See Cope v. Cogdill, 142 S. Ct. 2573
(2022).
Plaintiffs’ claims against Coleman County then proceeded in the
district court. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which made additional
allegations regarding their municipal liability claims and attempted to clarify
that they were relying on both conditions of confinement and episodic acts or
omissions as alternative theories of relief. Discovery ensued. The County
then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that our grant of qualified
immunity to the Individual Defendants in Cope I was fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims
against the County. The district court granted the County’s motion.
Plaintiffs filed a Motion for New Trial, or Alternatively, Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment, which the district court construed as a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e) motion and denied.
Plaintiffs timely appealed both the initial grant of summary judgment
and the district court’s denial of the reconsideration motion.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1343. We have jurisdiction over the district court’s grant of
summary judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review grants of summary judgment de novo. Wisznia Co. v. Gen.
Star Indem. Co., 759 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2014). In conducting this review,
we “view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all
reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.” Id. Summary judgment is
proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

6
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
III. Municipal Liability and Cope I
A municipality may be held liable for a constitutional violation “when
execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
694 (1978). But “without an underlying constitutional violation, an essential
element of municipal liability is missing.” Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cnty.
Sch. Dist. ex rel. Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 866–67 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(alteration adopted) (quotation omitted). For example, in City of Los Angeles
v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that a county could not be liable under
§ 1983 based on the actions of one of its police officers because a jury had
already concluded that the police officer did not inflict any constitutional
harm. 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam); see also Bustos v. Martini Club
Inc., 599 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2010) (rejecting municipal liability in a
similar situation).
The County argues—and the district court agreed—that Cope I
concluded none of the Individual Defendants violated the Constitution, so
Heller and its progeny resolve this case. 5 The law of the case doctrine
ordinarily mandates that “an issue of fact or law decided on appeal may not
be reexamined either by the district court on remand or by the appellate court
on subsequent appeal.” United States v. Lee, 358 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir.
2004) (quotation omitted). Thus, according to the County, we are bound to
conclude that the Individual Defendants did not cause any constitutional

_____________________
5
The County later conceded that Cope I did hold that Laws’s failure to call EMS
violated the Constitution.

7
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

injury to Monroe, meaning the County cannot be liable under § 1983 based
on the actions of the Individual Defendants. See Heller, 475 U.S. at 799.
The problem for the County is that it misreads Cope I. In order to
overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant
violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and (2) “the right at issue was
clearly established at the time of [the] defendant’s alleged misconduct.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The Supreme Court has made clear that courts may assess
only the second prong if that resolves the issue, meaning we need not reach
the question of constitutionality if we conclude there has been no violation of
clearly established law. See id. at 236–37.
In Cope I, we reached the question of constitutionality only on the
issue of Laws’s failure to call EMS. See 3 F.4th at 209 (“[W]e now make
clear that promptly failing to call for emergency assistance when a detainee
faces a known, serious medical emergency—e.g., suffering from a suicide
attempt—constitutes unconstitutional conduct.”). On every other alleged
constitutional violation for each Individual Defendant, we held only that the
defendant had not violated clearly established law. See id. at 208 (“We
conclude that Laws’s decision to wait for Brixey before entering the cell did
not violate any clearly established constitutional right.”); id. at 211 (“We
therefore conclude . . . that Brixey’s and Cogdill’s holding of Monroe in a cell
containing a phone cord did not violate a clearly established constitutional
right.”); id. (“Thus . . . no clearly established precedent suggested that
Brixey and Cogdill could be liable under an episodic-acts theory for staffing
the jail in line with Coleman County’s budget and policies.”). Accordingly,
with the exception of Laws’s failure to call EMS, we have never before

8
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

decided the constitutionality of the Individual Defendants’ actions in this
case, which distinguishes this case from Heller and its progeny. 6
The district court therefore erred in holding that Cope I was fatal to
Plaintiffs’ Monell claims. Nevertheless, we “may affirm on any ground raised
below and supported by the record, even if the district court did not reach
it.” Williams v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 826 F.3d 806, 810 (5th Cir. 2016).
Accordingly, we turn next to the question of whether Plaintiffs have
otherwise raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to their claims.
IV. Plaintiffs’ Claims against Coleman County
When determining the appropriate standard for analyzing an alleged
violation of a pretrial detainee’s constitutional rights, “we must first classify
the challenge as an attack on a ‘condition of confinement’ or as an ‘episodic
act or omission.’” Flores v. County of Hardeman, 124 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir.
1997) (quotation omitted). In this case, Plaintiffs assert both theories in the
alternative, so we address each in turn. See Sanchez v. Young County, 866
F.3d 274, 279 n.3 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Sanchez I”) (per curiam) (stating
“plaintiffs can bring a pretrial detainee case . . . under alternative theories of
episodic acts and omissions by individual defendants or unconstitutional
conditions of confinement”).
A. Episodic Claim
To overcome summary judgment on their episodic claim against the
County, Plaintiffs must raise a fact dispute as to whether (1) “County

_____________________
6
Both the County and the district court also relied on Brown v. Lyford—but in that
case, we rejected the same logically flawed argument that the County makes here. See 243
F.3d 185, 191 n.18 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that the court “must reach the question of
whether [the officer] was a policymaking official for [the county]” in order to assess
municipal liability, regardless of the fact that the officer had qualified immunity).

9
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

officials, acting with subjective deliberate indifference, violated [Monroe’s]
constitutional rights,” 7 and (2) “the County employees’ acts resulted from
a municipal policy or custom adopted with objective indifference to
[Monroe’s] constitutional rights.” See id. at 280. To exhibit subjective
deliberate indifference, a County employee must have “had subjective
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm” and “responded to that risk
with deliberate indifference.” See Cope I, 3 F.4th at 207 (quotation omitted).
“Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet but can be
satisfied by a wanton disregard for an inmate’s serious medical needs.” Id.
(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiffs assert that Cogdill, Brixey, and Laws violated Monroe’s
constitutional rights, and those violations resulted from County policy.8
Thus, the question of the County’s liability under an episodic-acts-or-
omissions theory turns on the subjective deliberate indifference of the same
officials granted qualified immunity in Cope I. 9 Under the law of the case
doctrine, we generally cannot reexamine any issue of fact or law decided in

_____________________
7
Plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576
U.S. 389 (2015), requires us to apply an objective deliberate indifference standard here.
However, after Kingsley, this circuit has continued to apply a subjective deliberate
indifference standard in non-excessive-force actions alleging a violation of a pretrial
detainee’s constitutional rights based on episodic acts or omissions. See, e.g., Alderson v.
Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 419 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Cope I
followed that precedent when applying a subjective deliberate indifference standard to
Plaintiffs’ claims against the Individual Defendants. See 3 F.4th at 207 & n.7. Under the
law of the case doctrine, the district court also correctly applied the subjective standard,
and we must do so as well.
8
Plaintiffs also mention Tucker, who has never been a defendant in this case. But,
with the exception of failing to call EMS, Plaintiffs do not specify how Tucker allegedly
violated Monroe’s constitutional rights. Accordingly, he is not included in this analysis.
9
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, Cope I “express[ed] no view as to the viability”
of Plaintiffs’ Monell claims. Cope I, 3 F.4th at 211 n.13.

10
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

Cope I. See Lee, 358 F.3d at 320. But, as discussed previously, Cope I did not
reach the ultimate conclusion of whether the Individual Defendants violated
Monroe’s constitutional rights, with the exception of Laws’s failure to call
EMS. Plaintiffs also supplemented the record after Cope I with additional
evidence regarding subjective deliberate indifference, which we must
consider. Cf. Gene & Gene, L.L.C. v. BioPay, L.L.C., 624 F.3d 698, 702 (5th
Cir. 2010) (stating one exception to the law of the case doctrine is when “the
evidence on a subsequent trial was substantially different”). Still, Cope I’s
analysis remains highly relevant.
We turn to an assessment of whether any County employee exhibited
subjective deliberate indifference to Monroe’s safety, analyzing the actions
of Cogdill, Brixey, and Laws in turn.
i. Sheriff Cogdill
Cogdill knew that Monroe had attempted suicide on Saturday. There
is also evidence that Cogdill knew about Monroe’s risk of suicide based on
conversations with Deputy Tucker and the MHMR crisis worker.
Accordingly, we conclude that Plaintiffs have raised a fact dispute regarding
Cogdill’s subjective knowledge of Monroe’s risk of suicide. But that does
not end the inquiry.
Another key question in this and the prior appeal is whether Cogdill
knew about the risk that long telephone cords pose to detainees at risk of
suicide. In Cope I, we concluded that the existence of the Phone Cord
Memorandum, by itself, was insufficient to create a fact dispute as to
Cogdill’s subjective knowledge of the risk posed by the cord in Monroe’s cell.
3 F.4th at 210 n.11. Specifically, we noted:
[T]he Supreme Court has approved reliance on circumstantial
evidence if the relevant risk “was longstanding, pervasive,
well-documented, or expressly noted by jail officials in the past,
and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being

11
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and
thus ‘must have known’ about it.” [Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 842–43 (1994)] (internal quotation marks omitted).
There is nothing like that here and certainly no evidence
that . . . Cogdill ever received or reviewed the [Phone Cord
Memorandum] prior to Monroe’s suicide.
Further, even at the summary judgment stage, it would go too
far to infer that . . . Cogdill [was] aware of the Commission’s
recommendations simply due to [his] employment in the Texas
jail system at the time the memorandum was written—just
because information is available to a defendant does not mean
[]he has been exposed to it.
Id. (alteration adopted).
There is still no record evidence that Cogdill had actual knowledge of
the risk of the cord in Monroe’s cell. To the contrary, Cogdill testified that
he did not see the Phone Cord Memorandum until after Monroe’s suicide.
He also testified that he never paid attention to the cord in the cell or thought
that it would be a safety risk before Monroe’s suicide. Nor is there evidence
in the record that anyone in the Coleman County Jail had ever previously
attempted suicide by strangulation with a telephone cord. See id. at 210.
After Cope I, Plaintiffs supplemented the record with additional
evidence that they argue raises a fact dispute regarding whether Cogdill
“must have known” about the substantial risk posed by the phone cord. See
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842–43. This evidence—which was not before the Cope
I panel—includes: (1) testimony from Sheriff Wade Turner, Cogdill’s
predecessor, that the County’s policies were based on TCJS
recommendations; (2) TCJS’s written testimony that it sent the Phone Cord
Memorandum to all sheriffs and county jail administrators in Texas; (3) a
MHMR crisis worker’s testimony that the cord was an “obvious danger”
and an objectionable “potential ligature”; and (4) a variety of public sources

12
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

that Plaintiffs argue demonstrate the risk of placing a suicidal detainee in a
cell with a long cord was obvious.
Plaintiffs must raise a fact dispute under a heavy burden, and the new
evidence, even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, does not
sufficiently demonstrate Cogdill’s knowledge. TCJS may have distributed
the Phone Cord Memorandum to all county sheriffs in 2015, but Cogdill was
not sheriff at that time. Furthermore, Turner, who was sheriff in 2015,
testified that he was not aware of the Phone Cord Memorandum. Although
Turner testified that the Coleman County Jail’s policy manual was based on
TCJS recommendations, there is no evidence that it included any limits on
phone cords in cells. Cogdill also testified that he did not find any files or
folders with TCJS memorandum when he became sheriff. Critically, then,
there is no evidence—circumstantial or otherwise—that the Phone Cord
Memorandum ever reached Cogdill.
Nor have Plaintiffs succeeded in demonstrating that the phone cord
was such an obvious risk that Cogdill must have known about it. Many of the
public documents submitted by Plaintiffs highlight isolated incidents of
violence involving electronic cords occurring in places far from Coleman
County, Texas. A subset of the documents pertains to suicides in Texas jails,
but those reports are not numerous enough or otherwise so pervasive and
relevant as to show that Cogdill must have known about the risk of the phone
cord in Monroe’s cell. As we said in Cope I, “just because information is
available to a defendant does not mean []he has been exposed to it.” 3 F.4th
at 210 n.11.
Lastly, we cannot conclude that Cogdill’s actions clearly demonstrate
a wanton disregard for Monroe’s safety. Cogdill placed Monroe on suicide
watch after intake, and Monroe remained on suicide watch while incarcerated
at the jail. After Monroe’s first suicide attempt, Cogdill moved him into a

13
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

new cell without bedsheets, removed his clothing, and placed him in a safety
smock. Cogdill was also available by phone on Sunday and arrived at the jail
within sixteen minutes of receiving Laws’s phone call. These reasonable
responses to Monroe’s risk of suicide, along with Cogdill’s belief—albeit
unsound—that Monroe’s new cell contained no obvious ligatures, preclude
a finding that Cogdill exhibited subjective deliberate indifference. See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 844.
ii. Jail Administrator Brixey
Like Cogdill, Brixey did not have subjective knowledge about the risk
of the phone cord, so she cannot have been subjectively deliberately
indifferent to that risk. Brixey did have subjective knowledge about
Monroe’s risk of suicide, as evidenced by her conversations with the intake
officer and the MHMR crisis worker. But Brixey took reasonable steps to
address that risk. After Monroe’s intake, Brixey placed him on suicide watch
and ensured that the intake officer contacted MHMR and the magistrate. On
Sunday morning, Brixey answered both of Laws’s phone calls and arrived at
the jail within approximately seven minutes of learning about Monroe’s
suicide attempt, which was approximately ten minutes after Monroe first
wrapped the cord around his neck. After entering Monroe’s cell, Brixey
immediately called EMS. We conclude that Brixey’s actions were reasonable
responses to her knowledge of Monroe’s risk of suicide and do not clearly
show a wanton disregard for Monroe’s safety. Cf. Olabisiomotosho v. City of
Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that two officers were not
deliberately indifferent to a detainee’s medical needs where one went out of
his way to get her inhaler and the other informed booking personnel that she
had asthma).
iii. Jailer Laws
In Cope I, we determined that Laws’s failure to call EMS violated the
Constitution. See 3 F.4th at 209. However, we do not consider that

14
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

constitutional violation here because it did not “result[] from a municipal
policy or custom adopted with objective deliberate indifference.” See
Sanchez I, 866 F.3d at 280. To the contrary, the County’s Suicide Plan states
that “[i]f a Suicide attempt is in progress, the correctional officer or jailer will
. . . call the Emergency Medical Service.” Because Laws’s failure to call EMS
violated County policy, it cannot serve as a basis for municipal liability. See
id. 10
Turning to Laws’s other actions, we conclude that they do not meet
the extremely high standard of subjective deliberate indifference. On
Saturday, Laws observed Monroe on the surveillance camera tying a knot in
a bedsheet, and he intervened before Monroe seriously hurt himself. After
backup arrived, Laws assisted in moving Monroe to a cell without bedsheets
and placing him in a safety smock. Once Laws arrived for his shift the next
morning, he observed Monroe at least every fifteen minutes and watched him
continuously for some periods. During that time, one witness heard Laws
trying to comfort Monroe. When Monroe wrapped the cord around his neck,
Laws noticed immediately and called for backup within one minute. Laws
called three other County employees, one of whom arrived within seven
minutes of the phone call.

_____________________
10
Plaintiffs argue that the County had a de facto policy of failing to timely call EMS,
but they do not point to any such failure other than on the day of Monroe’s suicide. That
is insufficient to establish a routine practice or custom for purposes of Monell liability. See
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (noting a custom may give rise to Monell liability
if it is “so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law”); Piotrowski v.
City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 581 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A customary municipal policy cannot
ordinarily be inferred from single constitutional violations.”); see also Guillot ex rel. T.A.G.
v. Russell, 59 F.4th 743, 753 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding that two instances of inaction did not
prove a widespread custom). Further, although the record does not contain evidence that
Laws was reprimanded for his failure to call EMS, it also does not show that a policymaker
“essentially ratified” Laws’s actions. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 578 n.18. Plaintiffs have
thus failed to raise a fact dispute regarding the existence of this alleged de facto policy.

15
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

We note that “taking some reasonable precautions does not mean the
officer, on the whole, behaved reasonably.” Converse v. City of Kemah, 961
F.3d 771, 779 (5th Cir. 2020). Nevertheless, in light of the reasonable
measures Laws took to prevent Monroe’s suicide and his promptness in
calling for backup, we conclude that his decision to follow County policy and
wait for another officer to arrive before entering Monroe’s cell does not
evince a wanton disregard for Monroe’s safety. Moreover, Laws’s failure to
retrieve the breathing machine while waiting for backup can only be classified
as negligence, see Cope I, 3 F.4th at 208 n.8, which is insufficient to support a
deliberate indifference claim, see Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 642 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc). Accordingly, outside of Laws’s failure to call EMS, he
did not demonstrate subjective deliberate indifference to Monroe’s safety.
****
Plaintiffs have failed to identify any constitutional violation
committed by a County employee that resulted from County policy. Thus,
we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
episodic claim.
B. Conditions-of-Confinement Claim
When a plaintiff brings a jail suicide claim under alternative theories
of episodic acts and omissions or unconstitutional conditions of confinement,
courts determine which theory applies based on an assessment of the facts
alleged. See, e.g., Olabisiomotosho, 185 F.3d at 526; see also Sanchez I, 866 F.3d
at 279 & n.3. 11 Here, Plaintiffs argue that several unconstitutional County
policies caused Monroe’s death, including: (1) staffing only one jailer on

_____________________
11
Even the County acknowledged that the “court must determine whether, based
on the facts alleged, the claims asserted fall under an episodic act or conditions of
confinement theory.”

16
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

nights and weekends (“Staffing Policy”); (2) instructing jailers not to enter
an occupied cell alone and to wait to intervene until help arrives (“Do-Not-
Enter Policy”); and (3) maintaining lengthy phone cords in jail cells (“Phone
Cord Policy”). 12 According to Plaintiffs, the Staffing and Do-Not-Enter
Policies create conditions at the Coleman County Jail under which no at-risk
detainee experiencing a medical emergency at night or over the weekend can
receive immediate attention, and the Phone Cord Policy increases the
likelihood of a suicidal detainee experiencing a medical emergency under
such conditions. Plaintiffs thus argue that these three County policies have
a “mutually enforcing effect” resulting in the deprival of all pretrial
detainees’ constitutional rights to adequate medical care and protection from
known suicidal tendencies. See Sanchez v. Young County, 956 F.3d 785, 791,
795 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Sanchez II”) (quotation omitted). 13 In other words,

_____________________
12
As discussed previously, Plaintiffs have failed to raise a fact dispute regarding the
existence of the alleged EMS Policy. For the same reasons, Plaintiffs have failed to show
that the County had a de facto policy of failing to timely administer CPR. The alleged
“suicide watch policy” appears not to be a standalone policy, but rather a combination of
the Staffing and Do-Not-Enter Policies. Plaintiffs also allege a County policy of “allowing
suicide training for employees to lapse,” but our court has held that failure-to-train claims
are episodic. See Sanchez v. Young County, 956 F.3d 785, 792 (5th Cir. 2020). That leaves
the Staffing Policy, Do-Not-Enter Policy, and Phone Cord Policy as potential bases for
Plaintiffs’ conditions claim.
13
We note that “specific examples of other instances of detainees who suffered
[Monroe’s] fate as a result of [Coleman County’s] polic[ies]” are not necessary. See
Montano v. Orange County, 842 F.3d 865, 876 (5th Cir. 2016). Plaintiffs assert that every
detainee at the Coleman County Jail who experiences a medical crisis is at risk of receiving
constitutionally inadequate treatment due to the policies at issue here, which is sufficient
to meet the “condition or practice” element of a conditions claim. See id.

17
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

“the conditions themselves constitute the harm,” Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51,
53 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc), regardless of any individual’s act or omission. 14
Under that theory, as in other conditions cases, the Staffing, Do-Not-
Enter, and Phone Cord Policies impose “durable restraints or impositions on
inmates’ lives” that transcend a single act or omission by an officer. See
Garza v. City of Donna, 922 F.3d 626, 633 (5th Cir. 2019); see also Shepherd v.
Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445, 453 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding a claim alleging
constitutionally inadequate medical care due to “poor or non-existent
procedures and understaffing of guards and medical personnel” was a
conditions claim); cf. Scott, 114 F.3d at 53–54 (concluding a claim was
episodic where the plaintiff challenged a policy of having only one staff
member on duty, but the harm—sexual assaults committed by the jailer on
duty—was determined to be “an episodic event perpetrated by an actor
interposed between [the plaintiff] and the city”). Plaintiffs seek damages for
the harm to a single detainee, but—in contrast to episodic claims—the
alleged cause of the harm is the broader “conditions, practices, rules, or
restrictions.” See Sanchez II, 956 F.3d at 791 (quotation omitted); cf.
Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 452 (stating that, in episodic claims, “the focus of the

_____________________
14
The dissenting opinion appears to take issue with the fact that Plaintiffs also
allege Laws’s failure to call EMS contributed to Monroe’s death. One fundamental
problem with that argument is that it assumes an otherwise valid conditions claim—i.e.,
one alleging that the conditions alone are sufficient to cause the harm—cannot survive if
an individual’s actions also contributed to the alleged harm. This court has never said that,
either in Estate of Henson v. Wichita County or otherwise. See 795 F.3d 456, 464 (5th Cir.
2015) (stating only the well-established principle, which is consistent with this opinion, that
episodic claims “fault specific jail officials for their acts or omissions rather than conditions,
practices, rules, or restrictions” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). To the
contrary, in Sanchez I (not cited by the dissenting opinion), the plaintiffs alleged that both
the conditions of confinement and the individual actions of employees caused the
detainee’s suicide, and this court held that the district court erred by failing to consider the
conditions claim in addition to the episodic claim. 866 F.3d at 279–80.

18
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 19 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

claim is one individual’s misconduct” 15). We thus conclude that Plaintiffs
properly asserted a conditions claim, and the district court should have
considered it as such. 16
Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the district court to consider
in the first instance whether Plaintiffs have raised a genuine dispute of
material fact on their conditions claim. See Sanchez I, 866 F.3d at 279
(vacating and remanding under similar circumstances “[i]n deference to the
trial court’s responsibility to review the record in the first instance”).
V. Conclusion
The district court erred in concluding that Cope I foreclosed Plaintiffs’
claims against the County in this case. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth
herein, the district court’s judgment regarding Plaintiffs’ episodic-acts-or-
omissions claim is AFFIRMED. However, we VACATE and REMAND
the district court’s judgment for further proceedings regarding whether
Plaintiffs have raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to their conditions-
of-confinement claim.

_____________________
15
The dissenting opinion alleges that this statement and another in this paragraph
constitute a “new rule.” But what is clear from the majority opinion, and omitted from the
dissenting opinion, is that these principles are quoted directly from prior Fifth Circuit
caselaw. We are bound by the law of the case doctrine to follow them.
16
Plaintiffs are correct that they need not demonstrate a County employee’s
deliberate indifference in order to succeed on their conditions claim. See, e.g., Shepherd,
591 F.3d at 454–55. If Plaintiffs can show the conditions at issue are not reasonably related
to a legitimate government objective, the court “permissibly may infer that the purpose of
the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon
detainees qua detainees.” See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979); see also Hare, 74
F.3d at 644 (noting that a state’s imposition of a rule during pretrial confinement
“manifests an avowed intent to subject a pretrial detainee to that rule or restriction” and,
“even where a State may not want to subject a detainee to inhumane conditions of
confinement or abusive jail practices, its intent to do so is nevertheless presumed when it
incarcerates the detainee in the face of such known conditions and practices”).

19
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 20 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority correctly affirms the summary judgment for plaintiffs’
“episodic act or omission” claims. But it commits egregious error in vacating
the summary judgment on the so-called “conditions-of-confinement” claim.
That claim, as a matter of law, does not exist, and the summary judgment
should be affirmed in full. I respectfully dissent.
Derrek Monroe attempted suicide by strangulation and died after
jailers failed to render timely emergency assistance. Given those facts, plain-
tiffs’ Monell claim can be classified as nothing other than an attack on “epi-
sodic acts or omissions.”
The standard for analyzing a pretrial detainee’s constitutional claim
turns on its categorization as a challenge to an “episodic act or omission” or,
instead, to a “condition of confinement.” Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51, 53 (5th
Cir. 1997) (en banc). The former deals with claims “where the complained-
of harm is a particular act or omission of one or more officials.” Id. The
latter, by contrast, includes only those claims in which the alleged harm is
caused by a policy’s “mere existence”—that is, its “very promulgation and
maintenance.” Id. at 53–54.
So, for valid conditions-of-confinement claims, the alleged harm must
occur without the fault of any “specific jail employees’ acts or omissions.”
Estate of Henson v. Wichita Cnty., 795 F.3d 456, 464 (5th Cir. 2015) (cleaned
up). In other words, a policy’s “mere existence” must be sufficient to bring
about the alleged harm. Scott, 114 F.3d at 53. 1 Only then can it be said that it

_____________________
1
Claims failing to meet that requirement must be episodic, because they require an
employee to do more than act as “a dispenser of intended conditions or restrictions.” Hare
v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). The question then becomes,
inter alia, “whether that [employee] breached his constitutional duty.” Id.
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 21 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

was the policy itself that “cause[d] the pretrial detainee’s alleged constitu-
tional deprivation.” Shepherd v. Dallas Cnty., 591 F.3d 445, 455 (5th Cir.
2009) (quoting Hare, 74 F.3d 633, 644–45 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
Plaintiffs’ conditions-of-confinement claim fails that test. Monroe’s
death occurred after a jail employee (1) acted unconstitutionally and (2) vio-
lated county policy.
(1) In Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Cope I”), a prior
panel determined that Jessie Laws’s failing timely to call for emergency medi-
cal assistance “was [] unreasonable and an effective disregard for the risk to
Monroe’s life,” id. at 209. Cope I therefore concluded that Laws’s response
“constitute[d] unconstitutional conduct.” Id.; see also Op. at 14. That deter-
mination and that conclusion are issues “decided on appeal [that] may not be
reexamined . . . by the appellate court on subsequent appeal.” United States
v. Lee, 358 F.3d 315, 320 (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
(2) Laws was not acting as a mere “dispenser of intended conditions
or restrictions” when he engaged in that unconstitutional conduct. Hare,
74 F.3d at 645. Quite the opposite. As the majority expressly concedes,
“[his] failure to call EMS violated County policy.” Op. at 15 (emphasis
added). So Laws’s response was wholly unrelated to the County’s “imple-
ment[ing] . . . an identifiable intended condition or practice.” Hare, 74 F.3d
at 645.
Given (1) and (2), just one conclusion can possibly follow: Monroe’s
death did not occur without the fault of a “specific jail employee for his acts
or omissions.” Estate of Henson, 795 F.3d at 464 (cleaned up). To put it
another way: None of the three policies—in isolation or combination—is
sufficient to bring about the actual harm Monroe suffered by virtue of its
“very promulgation and maintenance.” Scott, 114 F.3d at 53. Consequently,

21
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 22 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

the complaint’s factual allegations foreclose plaintiffs’ conditions-of-
confinement claim.
Yet, somehow, the majority concludes to the contrary. In so doing, it
runs roughshod over longstanding and well-settled Fifth Circuit precedent,
preferring instead to invent a rule from whole cloth.
Under the majority’s new rule, a conditions claim can rest on any pol-
icy that merely “imposes durable restraints or impositions on inmates’ lives
that transcend a single act or omission.” Op. at 17 (cleaned up). Events are
characterized based on the alleged “focus of the claim”—i.e., per its theory,
a claim is episodic if the allegations “focus” on “one individual’s miscon-
duct.” Op. at 18 (cleaned up). That is grave error.
For starters, the majority’s rule is strictly prohibited by our circuit’s
time-honored rule of orderliness. Unavoidable is the majority’s conflict with
legions of our circuit’s panel and en banc holdings—so much so that its own
citations prove the point.
Take, for example, its describing Scott. As stated by the majority, Scott
concluded that a claim faulting “a policy of having only one staff member on
duty . . . [for] sexual assaults committed by the jailer on duty” was episodic.
Op. at 18 (citing Scott, 114 F.3d at 53–54). That’s because the staffing poli-
cy’s mere implementation is insufficient to bring about Scott’s alleged
harm. 2 She would not have suffered harm had the jailer not “breached his
constitutional duty,” Hare, 74 F.3d at 645, by “entering [her] cell[] and
sexually assault[ing] her,” Scott, 114 F.3d at 52.
Per that description, Scott is legally indistinguishable from the matter
at hand. None of the three policies identified in the complaint—in isolation

_____________________
2
Put bluntly, the Scott policy did not command jailers sexually to assault prisoners.

22
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 23 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

or combination—was sufficient to cause Monroe’s harm by virtue of its
“very promulgation and maintenance.” Scott, 114 F.3d at 53. So too with
Scott’s policy of staffing one jailer. Like the jailer in Scott, Laws had to act
unconstitutionally and contravene jail policy for Monroe to suffer the harm
he experienced.
So, the very caselaw the majority cites fatally undercuts its conclusion.
Its attempt to distinguish Scott is utterly futile. It musters just one—that the
claim at issue in Scott was episodic because “the harm . . . was determined to
be ‘an episodic event.’” Op. at 18.
That makes negative sense, as the distinction is internally contra-
dictory. Just two pages earlier, the majority expressly (and correctly) states
that a claim’s categorization turns on facts internal to the complaint. See Op.
at 16 (“determin[ing] which theory applies based on an assessment of the
facts alleged” (citation omitted)).
But that’s all but ignored by the majority when it comes time to dis-
tinguish Scott. Now, dispositive are qualities inherent to the type of harm
experienced. So, for reasons unstated and still unknown, the majority regards
sexual assault harms—but not suicides—as just the kind of harm that is
“episodic.”
Never mind that the basis for such a distinction undoubtedly turns on
facts external to the complaint. But that’s the least of the problems with this
imagined distinction.
The majority’s distinction, if true, would render incomprehensible
this very case. To defend the proposition that a claim’s categorization turns
on the qualities of an alleged harm, the majority must accept the premise that

23
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 24 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

any one particular harm gives rise to either an episodic or conditions-of-
confinement claim—but not both. 3
That mires the majority in a factual quandary from which it cannot
escape. In Cope I, this court considered plaintiffs’ episodic claims alleging
the exact same harm before us now. Cope I held, under an episodic-acts theory
of liability, that such harm was the result of Laws’s failing timely “to call for
emergency assistance [for] a detainee . . . suffering from a suicide attempt.”
3 F.4th at 209.
The upshot is blissfully ironic. Under the majority’s reasoning,
Cope I’s holding—which is binding on this panel as law of the case—would
foreclose the possibility of plaintiffs’ conditions-of-confinement claim.
The majority can pick its poison. It can admit that a complained-of
harm’s qualities have no bearing on determining a claim’s categorization. Or
it can stick to its guns and insist that certain harms—such as sexual assaults—
are cognizable only as “episodic harms.” Picking the former concedes that
Scott is indistinguishable, thereby placing the majority into an irreconcilable
conflict with en banc precedent. Choosing the latter places suicides in the
episodic-harm category, rendering the majority opinion internally contradic-
tory. So, either way, the majority cannot avoid the inescapable conclusion—
that plaintiffs’ conditions-of-confinement claim must fail.
The destruction that is sown by the majority extends well beyond the
facts of this case. Its reasoning effectively eliminates the objective deliberate-
indifference requirement for episodic claims.

_____________________
3
That is, after all, the very basis of the majority’s distinguishing Scott. Rejecting
that premise would require the majority to concede that Scott is indistinguishable, since a
so-called “episodic harm” would be legally indistinguishable from a “conditions-of-
confinement harm,” at least for purposes of categorizing a Monell claim.

24
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 25 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

Recall that the majority suggests that events can be characterized
based on the “source of the harm” on which a claimant’s allegations
“focus.” Op. at 18. That effectively categorizes claims solely on the basis of
ipse dixit—now, to raise a conditions claim, claimants need do nothing more
than artfully “allege[]” that the “source of the[ir] harm is [a] broader condi-
tion[], practice[], rule[], or restriction[].” Id. (quotation omitted). 4
But that cannot be, for the legal analysis applicable to each of the two
categories of claims is wholly distinct. 5 Only conditions-of-confinement
claims permit “the jury reasonably [to] presume that the government acted
with the requisite intent to punish.” 6 Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 455. For
episodic-acts claims, however, “intentionality is no longer a given,” because
a jail employee can act with subjective deliberate indifference to a detainee’s
constitutional rights independently of any intent to punish on part of the gov-
ernmental unit. See Hare, 74 F.3d at 649 n.4.
Under the majority’s newly-announced rule, claimants are but one
artful pleading away from recasting their episodic claims into ones chal-
lenging conditions of confinement. The majority has therefore granted
claimants, armed with nothing but their own ipse dixit, the benefit of pre-

_____________________
4
Indeed, under the majority’s rule, the claim in Scott would fall into the conditions-
of-confinement category. That’s because Scott’s “amended state petition . . . com-
plain[ed] generally of inadequate staffing,” 114 F.3d at 53, which would be a “broader
condition or practice,” Op. at 18 (cleaned up).
5
Though the threshold for liability for both is “functionally equivalent.” Shepherd,
591 F.3d at 455 (quoting Hare, 74 F.3d at 643).
6
That follows from the premise that the governmental unit promulgates and imple-
ments policies only for the purpose of achieving some goal. See Hare, 74 F.3d at 644–45.
If a policy creates a condition that bears no reasonable relationship to any legitimate govern-
mental objective, then—by process of elimination—punishment is the only remaining jus-
tification for what is an otherwise senseless policy. See Shepherd, 591 F.3d at 452 (citation
omitted).

25
Case: 23-10414 Document: 61-1 Page: 26 Date Filed: 06/26/2024

No. 23-10414

suming that the governmental body intended any and all harms caused by any
and all of its employees’ episodic acts and omissions.
That is plainly impermissible, as it holds municipalities liable for the
constitutional violations of its employees absent any showing of its acting with
“objective deliberate indifference to the detainee’s constitutional rights.” 7
In sum, the majority has gone out of its way to keep on life-support
plaintiffs’ supposed conditions-of-confinement claim—notwithstanding its
obvious lack of merit. Worse, the majority disposes of longstanding and well-
established Fifth Circuit precedent and runs amok on the rule of orderliness.
Worse still, it leaves us with an inscrutably vague rule that holds gov-
ernmental entities liable for the subjective deliberate indifference of its
employees.
I respectfully dissent.

_____________________
7
Hare, 74 F.3d at 649 n.4 (emphasis removed); see also Piotrowski v. City of Hous.,
237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Bd. of Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)).

26

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10347994. Public record. Not legal advice.