# Kane v. de Blasio

> District Court, S.D. New York · August 26, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10343847

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 26, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10343847

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing” requires that a plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact.”
- finding that Court may properly take judicial notice of publicly available FDA guidance
- holding that in opposing a motion to dismiss, “bald assertions and conclusions of law will not suffice”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------X
MICHAEL KANE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

- against -

BILL DE BLASIO, et al., MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
21 Civ. 7863 (NRB)
Defendants. 21 Civ. 8773 (NRB)
---------------------------------------X
MATTHEW KIEL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

- against -

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,

Defendants.
---------------------------------------X

NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Since the novel coronavirus emerged two and a half years ago,
over a million people in the United States have died from COVID-
19, including over 40,000 residents of New York City (the “City”).1
Due to the rapid spread of COVID-19, City schools were abruptly
compelled in the spring of 2020 to operate remotely.2 In order to
combat the further spread of the coronavirus and to allow schools

1 Covid Data Tracker Weekly Review, Centers for Disease Control (Aug. 19,
2022) https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covidview/index.html;
COVID-19: Data, City of New York (Aug. 24, 2022), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/
covid/covid-19-data-totals.page.
2 New York City to Close All School Buildings and Transition to Remote
Learning, Office of the Mayor (Mar. 15, 2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-
the-mayor/news/151-20/new-york-city-close-all-school-buildings-transition-
remote-learning.
to reopen as safely as possible, in August 2021, following the
Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) full approval of a COVID-
19 vaccine, the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental
Hygiene issued an order requiring Department of Education (“DOE”)
staff, along with other City employees and contractors working in

person in school settings, to provide proof of vaccination against
COVID-19, which was restated with minor amendments in September
2021 (the “Vaccine Mandate” or “Mandate”). Plaintiffs are 21
teachers, administrators, and other DOE staff who challenge this
Mandate on behalf of themselves and a purported class because they
believe its requirement that they be vaccinated against COVID-19
violates, inter alia, their religious freedoms guaranteed by the
First Amendment.3 Presently before this Court are defendants’
motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, ECF
No. 111, and plaintiffs’ fourth motion for a preliminary
injunction, which seeks an injunction “barring enforcement of the
Mandate against [p]laintiffs and any other DOE employee who has

applied for religious accommodation and offering each
reinstatement of pay and benefits pending resolution on the
merits,” ECF No. 121 at 25.4

3 The above-captioned cases were both originally assigned to Judge Caproni
and consolidated by her. After consolidation, plaintiffs filed an amended
consolidated complaint, ECF No. 102 (“ACC”), alleging injuries on behalf of
themselves and a purported class.
4 Plaintiffs in both cases filed motions for a preliminary injunction and
a temporary restraining order at the outset of their case. Judge Caproni denied
the motions, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second Circuit considered the
appeals together and granted a preliminary injunction, as discussed infra.
The present motions are the first before this Court. After
Judge Caproni repeatedly denied plaintiffs’ motions for
preliminary injunction, plaintiffs filed a motion asking Judge
Caproni to recuse herself, arguing that Judge Caproni had held
Pfizer stock, which could theoretically be impacted by the outcome

of this litigation. While Judge Caproni doubted the resolution of
the merits of the case would have any meaningful impact on Pfizer
stock, she decided to recuse herself “out of an abundance of
caution and to avoid even the possible appearance of any bias or
prejudice[.]” ECF No. 175 at 2-3. For the following reasons,
this Court joins the long list of other courts who have upheld
COVID-19 vaccine mandates,5 and holds that the defendants’ motion

After consolidation, the plaintiffs filed an additional motion for a preliminary
injunction, which was denied. Thus, this present motion is the fourth motion
for a preliminary injunction filed in this case.
5 See, e.g., We the Patriots, USA, Inc. v. Hochul, 17 F.4d 266 (2d Cir.
2021) (denying preliminary injunction of vaccine mandate for healthcare
workers), op. clarified, 17 F.4d 368 (2d Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Dr.
A. v. Hochul, 142 S. Ct. 2569 (2022); Maniscalco v. New York City Dep’t of
Educ., 563 F. Supp. 3d 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (denying preliminary injunction of
vaccine requirement for teachers and other DOE employees), aff’d, No. 21-2343,
2021 WL 4814767 (2d Cir. Oct. 15, 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1668, 212 L.
Ed. 2d 578 (2022); Broecker v. New York Dept. of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 6387 (KAM)
(LRM), 2022 WL 426113 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2022) (denying preliminary injunction
of vaccine mandate for other DOE employees); Marciano v. de Blasio, No. 21 Civ.
10752 (JSR), 2022 WL 678779, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2022) (dismissing challenge to
vaccine requirement for City employees); O’Reilly v. Bd. of Educ., Index No.
161040/2021, 2022 NY Slip Op 30173[U] (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Jan. 20, 2022)
(denying preliminary injunction of vaccine mandate for other DOE employees);
New York City Mun. Lab. Comm. v. City of New York, 73 Misc. 3d 621, 628, 156
N.Y.S.3d 681, 687 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. 2021) (denying preliminary
injunction of vaccine mandate and dismissing case); Ferrelli v. Unified Ct.
Sys., No. 22 Civ. 68 (LEK) (CFH), 2022 WL 673863, (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022)
(denying injunction of vaccine mandate in the New York State Court system);
Brock v. City of New York, No. 21 Civ 11094 (AT) (SDA), 2022 WL 479256, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2022) (denying preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order blocking vaccine mandate for City employees); Garland v. New
York City Fire Dep’t, 574 F. Supp. 3d 120 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (E.D.N.Y. 2021)
(denying preliminary injunction of vaccine mandate for City employees); Andre-
to dismiss is GRANTED and plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction is DENIED.6
I. Background7
A. The Vaccine Mandate and the Arbitration Award
On August 23, 2021, the FDA approved the Pfizer-BioNTech
COVID-19 vaccine for individuals 16 years and older.8 On August

24, 2021, the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene (the “Commissioner”) promulgated an order (the “Original
Vaccination Mandate” or “Original Mandate”) requiring all DOE
staff, along with all City employees and staff of contractors of
the DOE and City who work in person at a DOE school setting or DOE
building, to provide proof that they were fully vaccinated or on
track to become fully vaccinated by September 27, 2021 or prior to
beginning employment. See ACC ¶ 63; Declaration of Lora Minicucci,
ECF No. 113-2 (“Ex B”) at 2-3. The Original Mandate defined “fully

Rodney v. Hochul, No. 21 Civ. 1053 (BKS) (CFH), 2022 WL 3027094, (N.D.N.Y. Aug.
1, 2022) (dismissing challenge to vaccine mandate for hospital employees).
6 Plaintiffs requested oral argument on the motion to dismiss. ECF No.
119. The Court has concluded that oral argument is unnecessary in light of the
extensive briefing submitted by the parties, the numerous prior decisions in
this case, and because the issues before the Court are purely legal.
7 The following facts are primarily drawn from the operative complaint, ECF
No. 102. Where noted, certain facts of which the Court takes judicial notice
or which are incorporated by reference in the ACC are drawn from exhibits
attached to the Declaration of Lora Minicucci, ECF No. 113, and the Declaration
of Sujata S. Gibson, ECF No. 122. For the purposes of the Court’s ruling on
the instant motion, the Court draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’
favor. See Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012).
8 FDA Approves First COVID-19 Vaccine, FDA.gov, (Aug. 23, 2021),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-covid-
19-vaccine. The Court takes judicial notice of the FDA’s press release
announcing the full approval of the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine. See Apotex Inc.
v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., 823 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that Court
may properly take judicial notice of publicly available FDA guidance).
vaccinated” to mean “at least two weeks have passed after an
individual received a single dose of a one-dose series, or the
second dose of a two-dose series, of a COVID-19 vaccine approved
or authorized for use by the Food and Drug Administration or World
Health Organization.” Ex. B at 2.

The Original Mandate explained that the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control (“CDC”) “has recommended that school teachers and
staff be ‘vaccinated as soon as possible’ because vaccination is
‘the most critical strategy to help schools safely resume] full
operations . . . [and] is the leading public health prevention
strategy to end the COVID-19 pandemic;’” Id. at 2 (alterations and
quotation marks in original). It further stated that “a system of
vaccination for individuals working in school settings or other
DOE buildings will potentially save lives, protect public health,
and promote public safety,” and noted that the DOE “serves
approximately 1 million students across the City, including
students in the communities that have been disproportionately

affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and students who are too young
to be eligible to be vaccinated.” Id. The Original Mandate
contained no medical or religious exemptions. Id.
On September 1, 2021, the United Federation of Teachers, Local
2, AFT, AFL-CIO (“UFT”) filed a Declaration of Impasse, and shortly
thereafter entered into arbitration with the City and the Board of
Education of the City School District for the City of New York
(the “BOE”). ACC ¶¶ 66; 70(a). On September 10, 2021, following
arbitration, the City, the BOE, and the UFT reached an agreement
(the “UFT Award”) that provided for, “as an alternative to any
statutory reasonable accommodation process,” a procedure and
criteria for religious exemptions. Id. ¶¶ 67; 70(a). With respect

to religious exemptions, the UFT Award stated that:
Religious exemptions for an employee to not adhere
to the mandatory vaccination policy must be
documented in writing by a religious official (e.g.,
clergy). Requests shall be denied where the leader
of the religious organization has spoken publicly in
favor of the vaccine, where the documentation is
readily available (e.g., from an on line source), or
where the objection is personal, political, or
philosophical in nature. Exemption requests shall
be considered for recognized and established
religious organizations (e.g., Christian
Scientists).
Id. ¶ 70(c). Employees who wished to submit applications for this
exemption were required to submit their requests via an online
system, SOLAS, by September 20, 2021 at 5 p.m. Id. ¶ 70(b).
Staff in the Division of Human Capital in the Office of Medical,
Leaves and Benefits; the Office of Equal Opportunity; and Office
of Employee Relations were to issue decisions in writing by
September 23, 2021, and, if the request was denied, set forth a
reason for a denial. Id. ¶ 70(d). Thereafter, those employees
whose requests were denied had one school day from the issuance of
the decision to appeal, with an additional 48 hours after the
filing of the appeal to submit any additional documentation. Id.
¶ 70(e). The UFT Award noted that if the reason for the denial
was a lack of documentation, an arbitrator could permit additional
time to submit the documentation. Id. Appeals were to be
conducted by a panel of arbitrators identified by Scheinman
Arbitration and Mediation Services. Id. ¶ 70(f). The UFT Award

provided that if an employee was granted a religious exemption,
they were permitted to remain on the payroll, but were “in no event
required/permitted to enter a school building while unvaccinated,
as long as the vaccine mandate is in effect.” Id. ¶ 70(i).
The UFT Award also provided that if an unvaccinated employee
chose not to request an exemption or was denied an exemption, the
employee could be placed on leave without pay effective September
28, 2021 or upon denial of their appeal, whichever was later,
through November 30, 2021. Id. ¶ 70(k). The UFT Award also
created two options for employees to leave the DOE rather than be
vaccinated. First, during the period of September 28, 2021 through
October 29, 2021, any employee who was on leave without pay due to

their vaccination status and wished to separate from the DOE was
permitted to do so on the understanding that they would be deemed
to have resigned involuntarily and would waive the right to
challenge their resignation. Id. ¶ 70(m). In exchange, they would
receive a reimbursement for their unused CAR days,9 and would be

9 Plaintiffs do not define the term “CAR days”, but it appears to refer to
“Cumulative Absence Reserve” days, which are the equivalent of sick days. See
eligible for health insurance through September 5, 2022, unless
they were eligible for health insurance from a different source.
Id.
Second, the UFT Award provided that during the period from
November 1, 2021 through November 30, 2021, any employee could

alternately opt to extend their leave without pay until September
5, 2022, provided they waived the right to challenge their
voluntary resignation. Id. ¶ 70(n). Any employee who decided to
get vaccinated had the right to return to their same school within
two weeks. Id. The UFT Award also stated that, beginning December
1, 2021, the DOE would seek to unilaterally separate employees who
had not opted into one of these two options. Id. ¶ 70(o).
On September 15, 2021, an arbitrator announced an arbitral
award between the DOE and the Council of Supervisors and
Administrators (“CSA”), which mirrored the UFT Award in all
relevant respects (the “CSA Award”). Id. ¶ 71. On September 12
and September 15, 2021, the Commissioner issued slightly revised

versions of the vaccine mandate. ECF No. 113-3 (“Ex. C” or
“Vaccine Mandate”) at 2. The September 15, 2021 order is currently
in effect. Id. It provides the same justifications as the
Original Mandate, id. at 1-2, and required that:
No later than September 27, 2021, or prior to beginning
employment, the following individuals must provide
proof of vaccination as described below:

Cumulative Absence Reserve (CAR), United Federation of Teachers, https://
www.uft.org/your-rights/know-your-rights/cumulative-absence-reserve-car.
a. DOE staff must provide proof of vaccination to the
DOE.
b. City employees who work in-person in a DOE school
setting, DOE building, or charter school setting must
provide proof of vaccination to their employer.
c. Staff of contractors of DOE or the City, as defined
below, must provide proof of vaccination to their
employer, or if self-employed, to the DOE.
d. Staff of any charter school serving students up to
grade 12, and staff of contractors hired by charter
schools co-located in a DOE school setting to work in
person in a DOE school setting or DOE building, must
provide proof of vaccination to their employer, or if
self-employed, to the contracting charter school.
Id. at 2. The order further defined “proof of vaccination” as
proof that an individual:
a. Has been fully vaccinated;
b. Has received a single dose vaccine, or the second dose
of a two-dose vaccine, even if two weeks have not
passed since they received the dose; or
c. Has received the first dose of a two-dose vaccine, in
which case they must additionally provide proof that
they have received the second dose of that vaccine
within 45 days after receipt of the first dose.

Id. It also defined “fully vaccinated” to mean “at least two weeks
have passed after an individual received a single dose of a COVID-
19 vaccine that only requires one dose, or the second dose of a
two-dose series of a COVID-19 vaccine approved or authorized for
use by the Food and Drug Administration or World Health
Organization.” Id.
C. Plaintiffs Refuse to Be Vaccinated and Commence This Suit
Plaintiffs are DOE employees who refuse to be vaccinated due
to their religious beliefs. The majority of plaintiffs in both
cases timely applied for religious exemptions before the September
20, 2021 deadline, pursuant to the process set out in the UFT
Award.10 See, e.g., ACC ¶¶ 226, 263, 292, 314, 362, 382, 408, 452,
553, 582, 613. Their applications were subsequently denied.11 See,
e.g., id. ¶¶ 234, 264, 292, 315, 328, 363, 382, 408, 453, 483,

554, 583, 614. Plaintiffs Kane, Castro, Chu, Clark, Di Capua,
Gladding, Nwaifejokwu, Romero, Ruiz-Toro, and Smith (collectively,
the “Kane plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit on September 21, 2021 - the
day after the deadline for applying for a religious exemption under
the UFT Award - seeking a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 1. They
subsequently moved for a temporary restraining order on October 4,
2021. ECF No. 12. The Kane plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary
restraining order was denied on October 5, 2021, ECF No. 33, and
their motion for a preliminary injunction was denied on October
12, 2021, ECF No. 60. Plaintiffs Keil, De Luca, Delgado, Strk,

10 Plaintiffs Grimando, Giammarino, LoParrino, Weber, and Smith did not
timely apply for a religious exemption. Plaintiffs Giammarino, LoParrino, and
Smith did not do so because they believed they did not meet the criteria under
the UFT Award. Id. ¶¶ 422-23, 733, 758. Plaintiff Weber applied for a religious
exemption on October 1, 2021 (days after the September 20, 2021 deadline). Id.
¶ 642. His application was nonetheless reviewed and denied, and after his
denial, he decided not to appeal. Id. ¶ 652. Plaintiff Grimando initially and
repeatedly applied for medical exemptions, and after securing a medical
exemption for 45 days, then applied for a religious exemption, although she was
“intimidated by the requirements.” Id. ¶¶ 660, 663-666. At the time that the
ACC was filed, plaintiff Bryan’s application was pending before the Citywide
panel. Id. ¶¶ 727-28. Based on her declaration filed in support of the motion
for a preliminary injunction, ECF No. 123, it appears that her application has
been denied. Id. ¶ 13.
11 Plaintiff Ruiz-Toro appealed her denial and was subsequently approved for
a religious exemption to the Mandate through June 2022. Id. ¶ 488. As a
condition of this exemption, Ruiz-Toro is prohibited from entering any school
building or classroom. Id. ¶¶ 489-90. She challenges this condition, and
maintains a claim that the Mandate violates her constitutional and statutory
rights. Id.; see also id. at ¶¶ 920-21.
and Buzaglo (collectively, “the Keil plaintiffs”) filed a lawsuit
on October 27, 2021. Complaint, Keil et al. v. City of New York,
21 Civ. 8773 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2021), ECF No. 10. The Keil
plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction were denied on October 28, 2021. Plaintiffs

appealed these denials on October 25 and 28, 2021, respectively.
ECF No. 67; Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, Keil et al. v. City of
New York, 21 Civ. 8773 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2021), ECF No. 33.
The Second Circuit considered plaintiffs’ appeals in tandem
and issued a 48-page opinion addressing the substantive issues in
this case. It found that “[t]he Vaccine Mandate, in all its
iterations, is neutral and generally applicable.” Kane v. De
Blasio, 19 F.4th 152, 164 (2d Cir. 2021) (hereinafter “Kane”). It
also found that the Mandate’s exemptions do not treat secular
conduct more favorably than comparable religious conduct. Id. at
166. Accordingly, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiffs
were not likely to succeed on their argument that the Mandate was

facially unconstitutional. Id.
However, in accordance the City’s concession that the
procedure used in examining the religious exemption requests may
have been “constitutionally suspect” as applied to plaintiffs, the
Second Circuit made the “exceedingly narrow” determination that
the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their as applied
challenges. Id. at 167. Specifically, the Second Circuit found
that plaintiffs provided evidence that the arbitrators had
evaluated their requests in accordance with the UFT Award’s
standards for a religious exemption, which stated that “requests
shall be denied where the leader of the religious organization has
spoken publicly in favor of the vaccine, where the documentation

is readily available (e.g., from an online source), or where the
objection is personal, political, or philosophical in nature.”
Id. at 168. Therefore, the Court reasoned that:
Denying an individual a religious accommodation based on
someone else’s publicly expressed religious views — even
the leader of her faith —runs afoul of the Supreme
Court’s teaching that “[i]t is not within the judicial
ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or
practices to a faith, or the validity of
particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”

Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)
(emphasis in original)).
Accordingly, the Second Circuit ordered that plaintiffs’
requests receive fresh consideration “by a central citywide panel,
which will adhere to the standards of, inter alia, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, rather than the challenged criteria
set forth in . . . the arbitration award . . . .” (hereinafter,
the “Citywide Panel.”) Id. at 162 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Further, the Circuit also stayed the
deadline for plaintiffs to opt into the extended leave program.
Id. It further provided that if a plaintiff’s request for
religious accommodation is granted by the Citywide Panel, the
plaintiff will receive backpay from the date the plaintiff was
placed on leave without pay. Id. The case was subsequently stayed
pending the conclusions of the proceedings before the Citywide
Panel. ECF No. 80.
D. The Citywide Panel Reviews Plaintiffs’ Claims

Subsequently, each of the named plaintiffs who were then a
part of this case had their claims reviewed by the Citywide Panel.12
Plaintiffs allege that the Citywide Panel “rubber-stamped” the
denials, although they acknowledge that plaintiff Castro’s request
for a religious accommodation was granted by the Citywide Panel
and that he was reinstated with backpay. ACC ¶¶ 835, 271.
Likewise, plaintiffs concede that in each denial, the Citywide
Panel noted that the “it would be an undue hardship” for the DOE
to allow unvaccinated teachers to enter school buildings. Id. ¶
158. Plaintiffs filed a letter informing the Court that the
Citywide Panel had concluded its review on December 11, 2021. ECF
No. 85.

E. Subsequent Procedural History
During the pendency of the appeal and the stay, the Kane
plaintiffs twice attempted to amend their complaint to add class
allegations, ECF No. 74, and requested leave to file a motion for
class certification, ECF No. 83. Judge Caproni denied these

12 Plaintiffs Grimando, Giammarino, LoParrino, Weber, Bryan, and Solon were
added to this case in the ACC. ECF No. 102.
requests because the Second Circuit had not yet issued a mandate
remanding the case to her and because the Citywide Panel had not
yet concluded its decision-making process. ECF No. 80 at 2, 84 at
2. On December 11, 2021, after receiving the outcome of their
appeals to the Citywide Panel, plaintiffs filed an additional

motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to certify a
class.13 ECF No. 85. Judge Caproni denied both motions, reasoning
that the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable harm, likelihood of
success on the merits, or pled class allegations in the operative
complaints. ECF No. 90. She further ordered that the Kane and
Keil cases be consolidated, as neither party objected to
consolidation, and gave the plaintiffs leave to file an amended
complaint. Id.
On December 15, 2021, plaintiffs appealed Judge Caproni’s
denial. ECF No. 91. Subsequently, on December 17, 2021, they
again asked Judge Caproni to stay the enforcement of the Vaccine
Mandate pending the resolution of their appeal. ECF No. 92. Judge

Caproni denied the request. ECF No. 93. Thereafter, plaintiffs
sought a stay from the Second Circuit, which stayed the deadline
for plaintiffs in this action to opt-in to the extended leave

13 Plaintiffs initially received notices that they would be placed on leave
without pay within three business days if they did not submit proof of
vaccination. Keil v. City of New York, No. 21-3043-CV, 2022 WL 619694, at *3
(2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2022). The City thereafter explained that these notices were
erroneously sent to plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs had 14 days to opt into the
DOE’s leave without pay package. Id.
program and ordered that no further steps be taken to terminate
the named plaintiffs in this action for noncompliance with the
Mandate during the pendency of the appeal. ECF No. 94.
Subsequently, the Second Circuit denied plaintiffs’ motion for a
preliminary injunction, ECF No. 108, and affirmed Judge Caproni’s

decision in its entirety, ECF No. 116.
Defendants moved to dismiss on February 14, 2022. ECF No.
111. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on March 30, 2022. ECF
No. 119 (“Opp.”). That motion was fully briefed as of April 22,
2022. See ECF No. 151. During the briefing on the motion to
dismiss, on April 12, 2022, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction for the fourth time. ECF No. 121. On April 29, 2022,
Judge Caproni informed the parties that she would decide the motion
to dismiss and the motion for preliminary injunction in tandem.
ECF No. 157. The motion for a preliminary injunction was fully
briefed on May 20, 2022. See ECF No. 168.
On June 9, 2022, plaintiffs moved to disqualify Judge Caproni,

citing her decisions against them and her ownership of Pfizer
stock. ECF No. 171, 172. Although Judge Caproni noted that she
doubted there was any actual conflict, as she doubted that the
resolution of the merits of the case would have any meaningful
impact on Pfizer stock, she decided to recuse herself “out of an
abundance of caution and to avoid even the possible appearance of
any bias or prejudice.” ECF No. 175 at 2-3. The case was
subsequently briefly assigned to Judge Ramos before being assigned
to this Court. Plaintiffs sought to disqualify this Court on June
14, 2022. ECF No. 179. This Court made clear that there is no
disqualifying conflict in responses dated June 15, 2022, ECF No.
180, and June 22, 2022, ECF No. 182.

II. Legal Standard
A. Motion to Dismiss
To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the non-movant’s
pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. While the Court accepts
the truth of the allegations as pled, “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice and we are not bound to accept as true
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Brown v.
Daikin Am., Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
a district court may consider “the facts alleged in the pleadings,
documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the
pleadings and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.”
Samuels v. Air Transp. Local 504, 992 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1993).
B. Preliminary Injunction
“When a preliminary injunction will affect government action
taken in the public interest pursuant to a statute or regulatory

scheme, the moving party must demonstrate (1) irreparable harm
absent injunctive relief, (2) a likelihood of success on the
merits, and (3) public interest weighing in favor of granting the
injunction.” Kane, 19 F.4th at 163 (citing Agudath Isr. of Am. v.
Cuomo, 983 F.3d 620, 631 (2d Cir. 2020).
III. Discussion
Plaintiffs bring no fewer than 30 causes of action, under
both federal and state law, challenging the Vaccine Mandate. We
first consider their federal claims.
A. Free Exercise Challenge
Plaintiffs first allege that the Vaccine Mandate violates the
Free Exercise clause. The Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof ....” U.S. CONST., amend. I; see Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporating the Free Exercise Clause
against the states). “The free exercise of religion means, first
and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious
doctrine one desires.” Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). “The Free Exercise
Clause thus protects an individual’s private right to religious
belief, as well as ‘the performance of (or abstention from)
physical acts that constitute the free exercise of religion.’”
Kane, 19 F.4th at 163–64 (quoting Cent. Rabbinical Cong. of U.S.

& Can. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 763 F.3d 183,
193 (2d Cir. 2014)). “In order to prevail on a Free Exercise
Clause claim, a plaintiff generally must establish that ‘the object
of [the challenged] law is to infringe upon or restrict practices
because of their religious motivation,’ or that its ‘purpose . .
. is the suppression of religion or religious conduct.’” Okwedy v.
Molinari, 69 Fed. App’x. 482, 484 (2d Cir. 2003) (alterations in
original) (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993)).
Importantly, the protection of the Free Exercise clause “does
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid
and neutral law of general applicability.” Smith, 494 U.S. at

879. “Where the government seeks to enforce a law that is neutral
and of general applicability . . . it need only demonstrate a
rational basis for its enforcement, even if enforcement of the law
incidentally burdens religious practices.” Fifth Ave.
Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, 293 F.3d 570, 574 (2d
Cir. 2002); see Cent. Rabbinical Cong., 763 F.3d at 193 (“[T]he
Free Exercise Clause “does not relieve an individual of the
obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”). However,
laws and government policies that are either non-neutral or not
generally applicable are subject to “strict scrutiny,” meaning

that they must be “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling” state
interest. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct.
63, 67 (2020); see Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868,
1881 (2021) (“A government policy can survive strict scrutiny under
only if it advances interests of the highest order and is narrowly
tailored to achieve those interests.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
1. The Vaccine Mandate is Facially Neutral and Generally
Applicable

The Second Circuit has already found that “[t]he Vaccine
Mandate, in all its iterations, is neutral and generally
applicable.” Kane, 19 F.4th at 164. Nevertheless, plaintiffs
rehash arguments the Second Circuit has already rejected, and ask
us to revisit this conclusion, arguing that the Court should apply
strict scrutiny (1) because of a purported animus held by City and
State officials and (2) because (contrary to the Second Circuit’s
view), it is not generally applicable.14 Neither argument is
meritorious.

14 Although the Second Circuit’s opinions regarding the plaintiffs’ prior
motions for preliminary injunctions span 53 pages and deliver carefully
a. There Is No Evidence of “Animus”
Ignoring the fact that the pandemic has claimed the lives of
more than a million people in the United States, plaintiffs take
the bold position that the Mandate has the “express purpose of
inflicting special disability against minority religious

viewpoints,” Opp. at 4, rather than its obvious and explicit goals
to, inter alia, “potentially save lives, protect public health,
and promote public safety.” Vaccine Mandate at 2. Plaintiffs
argue that this case is analogous to Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). There, the
Supreme Court found that a series of laws enacted with the purpose
of preventing members of a religion from ritualistically
sacrificing animals in accordance with their beliefs violated the
Free Exercise clause. Id. at 524. The record of animus was clear;
for example, the Supreme Court noted that “almost the only conduct
subject to [the challenged ordinances] is the religious exercise
of Santeria church members. The texts show that they were drafted

in tandem to achieve this result.” Id. at 535. Here, there is no
such record. Instead, the Mandate lays out its reasoning, noting

considered holdings on substantive issues in this case, including on the issue
of whether the Mandate is neutral and generally applicable, plaintiffs assert
that we should review their claims de novo both in light of the differing
standards for a preliminary injunction and a motion to dismiss and in light of
the new facts they allege in their consolidated amended complaint. See Opp. at
5. Even assuming arguendo that we should review plaintiffs’ claims de novo, we
would independently concur with the Second Circuit’s reasoning and reach the
same conclusion: namely, that plaintiffs’ facial challenge to the Mandate fails.
that the CDC has found that “vaccination is an effective tool to
prevent the spread of COVID-19 and benefits both vaccine recipients
and those they come into contact with, including persons who for
reasons of age, health, or other conditions cannot themselves be
vaccinated,” and is “the most critical strategy to help schools

safely resume full operations [and] is the leading public health
prevention strategy to end the COVID-19 pandemic.” Vaccine Mandate
at 1 (alteration in original). This Court, like the other Courts
which have considered this Mandate, find that the clear object of
the Mandate is to reduce the spread of COVID-19 in New York’s
schools and permit them to open. See, e.g., Kane, 19 F.4th at 172
(holding “[t]he Vaccine Mandate . . . is designed to further the
compelling objective of permitting schools fully to reopen[.]”);
Maniscalco v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 563 F. Supp. 3d 33, 39
(E.D.N.Y. 2021) (“[E]ven if plaintiffs disagree with it, the
[Mandate] at issue represents a rational policy decision
surrounding how best to protect children during a global

pandemic.”), aff’d, No. 21-2343, 2021 WL 4814767 (2d Cir. Oct. 15,
2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1668 (2022); Broecker v. New York
City Dep’t of Educ., 573 F. Supp. 3d 878, 891 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)
(holding Vaccine Mandate served a “obvious, significant
governmental interest in preventing transmission of the COVID-19
virus and protecting students”); New York City Mun. Lab. Comm. v.
City of New York, 73 Misc. 3d 621, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty.
2021) (noting Mandate represents “the reasoned views and
directives of public health officials seeking to best protect the
health and welfare of children”).
Plaintiffs assert that statements made by City and State
officials and the existence of the prior arbitration scheme are

evidence of animus. The Second Circuit has already rejected the
argument that Mayor De Blasio’s and Governor Hochul’s statements
reflect animus. Kane, 19 F.4th at 165 (“[T]hese statements
reflect nothing more than the Mayor’s personal belief that
religious accommodations will be rare, as well as general support
for religious principles that [he] believes guide community
members to care for one another by receiving the COVID-19
vaccine.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); We The
Patriots, 17 F.4th at 283 (“Governor Hochul’s expression of her
own religious belief as a moral imperative to become vaccinated
cannot reasonably be understood to imply an intent on the part of
the State to target those with religious beliefs contrary to hers;

otherwise, politicians’ frequent use of religious rhetoric to
support their positions would render many government actions non-
neutral . . . .”). Similarly, Mayor Adams’s statements committing
to keeping schools open reflect a policy decision, not animus
towards any religious group. Moreover, statements made by DOE
officials in applying the overturned UFT Award standards have no
bearing on the current standards, which are applied by a different
panel using different criteria.
b. The Mandate Is Generally Applicable
Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Vaccine Mandate is not
generally applicable again rely on arguments that the Second

Circuit already rejected. Plaintiffs ask us to reconsider the
Second Circuit’s conclusion in light of the number of vaccination
mandates the City has imposed and the fact that the Mayor has
carved out certain exceptions to the private employer vaccination
mandate (a mandate not at issue in this case) through Emergency
Executive Order 62 (“EEO 62”). Opp. at 7-8. The number of
vaccination mandates is plainly irrelevant. At most, the numerous
mandates demonstrate the deep concern of the City to stem the
coronavirus pandemic. As to the second point, plaintiffs’ counsel
seem to have forgotten that, as they conceded at oral argument
before the Second Circuit on the initial preliminary injunction
motions, “a law can be generally applicable when, as here, it

applies to an entire class of people.” Kane, 19 F.4th at 166.
The Vaccine Mandate applies to the class of people who work in the
New York City public schools. The fact that it does not apply to
professional athletes is of no significance here. Indeed, if a
distinction were even needed, it is obvious that New Yorkers may
choose whether to attend a sporting event with unvaccinated
athletes and accept whatever risk those athletes pose. In
contrast, school attendance is not a similar choice, and the risk
posed by unvaccinated teachers is obvious.15 Further, plaintiffs’
argument that these policies demonstrate that strict scrutiny is
required here because the polices “single out secular but not
religious activities for favored treatment,” Opp. at 9, is

confusing and false. Working in a public school is not a religious
activity. See U.S. CONST., amend. I.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that because the DOE provides a
process for applying for religious exemptions, strict scrutiny
must apply because the Citywide Panel considers each request for
a religious exemption individually. In support of this position,
plaintiffs rely on the Supreme Court’s holding in Fulton v. City
of Philadelphia that “[t]he creation of a formal mechanism for
granting exceptions renders a policy not generally applicable . .
. because it invites the government to decide which reasons for
not complying with the policy are worthy of solicitude[.]” 141 S.
Ct. 1868 at 1879 (quotation marks, citation, and alterations

omitted); Opp. at 8. This position does not withstand cursory
analysis. In rejecting a similar argument that the Supreme Court’s
decision in Fulton required strict scrutiny for every religious

15 The Second Circuit has already rejected plaintiffs’ former argument about
an exempt group (emergency responders), finding that “[v]iewed through the lens
of the City’s asserted interest in stemming the spread of COVID-19, these groups
are not comparable to the categories of people that the Mandate embraces. While
the exempt groups do not come into prolonged daily contact with large groups of
students (most of whom are unvaccinated), the covered groups (for example,
teachers) inevitably do.” Kane, 19 F.4th at 166.
exception, a recent decision noted that “such an interpretation
would create a perverse incentive for government entities to
provide no religious exemption process in order to avoid strict
scrutiny.” Ferrelli v. Unified Ct. Sys., No. 22 Civ. 0068 (LEK)
(CFH), 2022 WL 673863, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022). Here, the

City’s exemptions were provided in accordance with Title VII, which
requires employers to offer reasonable religious accommodations in
certain circumstances, as the Second Circuit provided in its order
requiring the City to establish the Citywide Panel.16 Kane, 19
F.4th at 175. Indeed, as discussed infra, the record shows that
the City only inquired as to whether each plaintiff’s belief was
sincere, and where it determined it was, then proceeded to
determine if a reasonable accommodation could be provided.
Further, we remind plaintiffs that the government faces different
burdens when it, as here, acts as an employer as opposed to a
lawmaker. Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 598
(2008) (“We have long held the view that there is a crucial

16 Plaintiffs also cite to Bear Creek Bible Church v. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n, 571 F. Supp. 3d 571, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2021), which is currently on appeal,
for the proposition that “[b]ecause Title VII is not a generally applicable due
to the existence of individualized exemptions, the Court finds that strict
scrutiny applies.” Id.; Opp. at 11. Bear Creek is an outlier case. Title
VII, which was passed in 1964, has been routinely analyzed and applied by courts
for over half a century. Moreover, the Second Circuit and Supreme Court do not
apply strict scrutiny in considering Title VII claims. See e.g., Ansonia Bd.
of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986) (“We find no basis in either
[Title VII] or its legislative history for requiring an employer to choose any
particular reasonable accommodation.”); Cosme v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158
(2d Cir. 2002) (“Nevertheless, to avoid Title VII liability, the employer need
not offer the accommodation the employee prefers. Instead, when any reasonable
accommodation is provided, the statutory inquiry ends.”).
difference, with respect to constitutional analysis, between the
government exercising the power to regulate or license, as
lawmaker, and the government acting as proprietor, to manage [its]
internal operation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).17

Similarly, we also reject plaintiffs’ argument that because
they have articulated a “hybrid rights” claim, strict scrutiny
applies. The Second Circuit has repeatedly refused to apply strict
scrutiny merely because plaintiffs claim a hybrid rights
violation, reasoning that “[t]he allegation that a state action
that regulates public conduct infringes more than one of a public
employee’s constitutional rights does not warrant more heightened
scrutiny than each claim would warrant when viewed separately.”
Knight v. Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d
Cir. 2001); see also Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d
Cir. 2003) (“[A]t least until the Supreme Court holds that legal
standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on whether

other constitutional rights are implicated, we will not use a
stricter legal standard to evaluate hybrid claims.”) (internal

17 Plaintiffs claim in a footnote that Engquist is not applicable because
the Mandate is a regulatory action, “extending beyond government employees and
imposing requirements on patrons and private sector employees.” Opp. at 21 n.
8. Plaintiffs, however, are employees of the DOE and do not have standing to
challenge the aspects of the Vaccine Mandate that apply to contractors or
visitors to public schools.
quotation marks and citation omitted). This precedent binds this
Court.
Thus, we find that rational basis review applies.18 In this
context, plaintiffs claim that the City and DOE have no rational
basis for the Mandate because vaccines cannot completely prevent

the spread of COVID-19, and because other groups, like performers,
are not required to be vaccinated. This argument is not
persuasive. The DOE clearly explained that “a system of
vaccination for individuals working in school settings, including
DOE buildings and charter school buildings, will potentially save
lives, protect public health, and promote public safety.” Vaccine
Mandate at 2. This is an articulated rational, and indeed,
compelling basis. See Kane, 19 F.4th at 172 (“[t]he Vaccine
Mandate . . . is designed to further the compelling objective of
permitting schools fully to reopen[.]”); Roman Cath. Diocese of
Brooklyn, 141 S. Ct. at 67 (“Stemming the spread of COVID–19 is
unquestionably a compelling interest . . . .”).19

18 Plaintiffs argue that the court cannot deviate from strict scrutiny simply
because the case involves public health. Opp. at 18-19. We agree. But
plaintiffs are not correct that strict scrutiny must apply to an immunization
mandate. As the Second Circuit recently stated, “no court appears ever to have
held that Jacobson requires that strict scrutiny be applied to immunization
mandates. To be sure, courts have consistently rejected substantive due process
challenges to vaccination requirements without applying strict scrutiny.” Goe
v. Zucker, No. 21-0537-CV, 2022 WL 3007919, at *8 (2d Cir. July 29, 2022)
(citations omitted).
19 Plaintiffs object that the vaccines are ineffective and that their
“natural immunity” from having contracted the coronavirus would protect them
equally as well as receiving a federally approved and tested vaccine. We
consider the facts set forth in the Mandate as an explanation of the decision-
making of the City and DOE. See Goe, 2022 WL 3007919, at *5 (“[T]o the extent
that the district court relied on facts from the extrinsic materials that were
Because the City had a rational basis for mandating
vaccinations, namely, in order to allow schools to continue in
person safely, plaintiffs’ Free Exercise Claim fails.
B. Establishment Clause
Plaintiffs claim that the Vaccine Mandate also violates the

Establishment Clause because it creates a denominational
preference, in that certain “unorthodox religious denominations”
are more burdened than mainstream denominations.20 Opp. at 15.
This is nothing more than a repackaging of plaintiffs’ free
exercise claims. Plaintiffs point to no case law requiring that
government action impact all religions equally. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has “never held that an individual’s religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the
contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise
jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.” Smith, 494 U.S. at
878–79.21

in dispute, it did not rule on the factual accuracy of those materials; instead,
it cited those materials to explain the decision-making of state authorities.”).
Even if plaintiffs’ claims regarding “natural immunity” were true, they would
not be significant as many of the plaintiffs do not allege that they have ever
contracted the coronavirus or have any “natural immunity.”
20 Plaintiffs also mischaracterize the statements of City and State officials
to claim that “the government openly stated that their purpose was to target
certain religious denominations for discriminatory treatment in implementing
the Mandate against religious objectors.” Opp. at 15 (emphasis in original).
For the reasons stated above, see supra at pp. 20-22, this argument fails.
21 Plaintiffs’ citations to the amended consolidated complaint for the
proposition that the DOE is still applying the standards set forth in the UFT
Award are unavailing. See Opp. at 15 (citing ACC 102 ¶ 808, ¶¶ 134-145).
Paragraph 808 states a legal conclusion unrelated to the Establishment Clause
claim: “The DOE violates the Free Exercise Clause every time it applies the
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent decision Kennedy v.
Bremerton Sch. Dist. instructs courts “that the Establishment
Clause must be interpreted by reference to historical practices
and understandings.” 142 S. Ct. 2407, 2428 (2022) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). We note that there is a

long history of vaccination requirements in this country and in
this Circuit. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905) (upholding smallpox
vaccination mandate); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166–67 (1944) (“[A parent] cannot claim freedom from
compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on
religious grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease . . . .”); Phillips v. City of New York, 775
F.3d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (holding that “New York
could constitutionally require that all children be vaccinated in

terms of the Exemption Standards to deny an individual request for religious
exemption.”). “Even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8, courts need not credit conclusory allegations, or legal conclusions
without factual allegations.” Glob. View Ltd. Venture Cap. v. Great Cent. Basin
Expl., L.L.C., 288 F. Supp. 2d 482, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Plaintiffs’
allegations in paragraphs 134-45 similarly either recite legal conclusions or
conclusory allegations (e.g., ¶¶ 140, 144), do not support the proposition
plaintiffs cite them for (e.g., ¶ 139), or do not refer to process applied to
plaintiffs’ requests, but to the process applied to the requests of other
individuals (e.g., ¶ 137-38). Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge procedures
that do not apply to them. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560,
112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992) (holding the “irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing” requires that a plaintiff must have suffered
an “injury in fact.”).
order to attend public school” and that “New York law goes beyond
what the Constitution requires by allowing an exemption for parents
with genuine and sincere religious beliefs”).
C. Equal Protection
Similarly, plaintiffs claim that the Vaccine Mandate violates

the equal protection clause because the mandate is “facially
discriminatory” and impacts unorthodox religious minorities
disproportionately. Opp. at 19-21. As we have already stated,
the Mandate is facially neutral and generally applicable.
Moreover, the fact that certain individuals have religious
objections to the Mandate does not, contrary to plaintiffs’
opposition brief, provide plaintiffs with a “per se victory”, id.
at 19-20. “[I]t is axiomatic that [to establish an equal
protection violation] a plaintiff must allege that similarly
situated persons have been treated differently.” Gagliardi v.
Village of Pawling, 18 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs
point to no similarly situated persons who have been treated

differently - indeed, they do not point to any DOE employee who
has been granted a religious exemption to the Vaccine Mandate and
been permitted to work in person. Since there is no claim of
differential treatment, plaintiffs’ equal protection claim fails.
D. Due Process
Plaintiffs also claim that their substantive and procedural
due process rights were violated by the Vaccine Mandate. Both
arguments fail.
1. Substantive Due Process

“Substantive due process rights safeguard persons against the
government’s exercise of power without any reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental
objective.” Southerland v. City of New York, 680 F.3d 127, 151
(2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
To analyze a claim under substantive due process, courts perform
a two-step analysis. Hurd v. Fredenburgh, 984 F.3d 1075, 1087-89
(2d Cir. 2021).
“The first step in substantive due process analysis is to
identify the constitutional right at stake.” Kaluczky v. City of
White Plains, 57 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, plaintiffs
cite to the “basic, and sacred, natural right to control one’s own

body, and care for it as one best sees fit, in accordance with
one’s creed and religious beliefs, as well as one’s best judgment
in independent consultation with one’s doctor.” Opp. at 17.22 But
“[b]oth [the Second Circuit] and the Supreme Court have
consistently recognized that the Constitution embodies no

22 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022) makes clear that to the extent this right exists,
it is not absolute.
fundamental right that in and of itself would render vaccine
requirements imposed in the public interest, in the face of a
public health emergency, unconstitutional.” We The Patriots USA,
17 F.4th at 293; id. at n. 35 (“This Court cannot find an overriding
privacy right when doing so would conflict with Jacobson [which]

for over 100 years [] has stood firmly for the proposition that
the urgent public health needs of the community can outweigh the
rights of an individual to refuse vaccination.”). Moreover, the
Second Circuit has also held that the “[p]laintiffs are not
required [by the Vaccine Mandate] to perform or abstain from any
action that violates their religious beliefs.” Kane, 19 F.4th at
172; id. at 171 (“The City is not threatening to vaccinate
Plaintiffs against their will and despite their religious
beliefs[.]”). Indeed, all but one plaintiff remain unvaccinated.23
Moreover, plaintiffs have no constitutional right to work
in person with children in the New York City public schools. See
Maniscalco, 563 F. Supp. 3d at 39 (holding no fundamental

constitutional right is infringed by the Vaccine Mandate because,
inter alia, “plaintiffs may pursue teaching or paraprofessional
jobs at private schools in New York City, public and private
schools outside of New York City, daycares or early childhood

23 Plaintiff Solon appears to have chosen to be vaccinated. See ECF No. 166
¶ 9.
education centers, tutoring centers, adult or continuing education
centers, virtual institutions, or within home settings”).
Even if a fundamental right were at issue, plaintiffs’
arguments fail at the second step of the analysis. At the second
step, plaintiffs “must demonstrate that the state action was so

egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the
contemporary conscience” such that the Due Process Clause “would
not countenance it even were it accompanied by full procedural
protection.” Hurd, 984 F.3d at 1087 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). As discussed, supra, there is a long history
of mandatory vaccination laws in this country. As the Maniscalo
court found, “Requiring that DOE employees take a dose of
ivermectin as a condition of employment might qualify as ‘a plain,
palpable invasion’ of such rights, not having any real relation to
the public health crisis. However, mandating a vaccine approved
by the FDA does not.” Maniscalco, 563 F. Supp. 3d at 39.24

24 Plaintiffs assert that the COVID-19 vaccines available in New York City
are “experimental,” and that this disputed issue of fact precludes a motion to
dismiss. Opp. at 25-27. While at one time, the COVID-19 vaccines were only
authorized for emergency use, that is no longer the case, and as explained
above, the Vaccine Mandate was only promulgated after the FDA had fully approved
a COVID-19 vaccine. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that both the
Pfizer-BioNTech (COMIRNATY) COVID-19 vaccine and the Moderna (Spikevax) COVID-
19 vaccine have been fully approved by the FDA for use in people 16 years and
older and found by the FDA to meet high standards for safety, effectiveness,
and manufacturing quality. See Developing COVID-19 Vaccines, Centers for
Disease Control,(July 20, 2022), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/va
ccines/distributing/steps-ensure-safety.html?s_cid=11700:covid%20vaccine%20fd
a%20approval:sem.ga:p:RG:GM:gen:PTN:FY22 (stating the “FDA has granted full
approval for Pfizer-BioNTech (COMIRNATY) COVID-19 Vaccine for people ages 16
years and older and for Moderna (Spikevax) COVID-19 Vaccine for people ages 18
years and older . . . . These vaccines were found to meet the high standards
for safety, effectiveness, and manufacturing quality FDA requires of an approved
Accordingly, plaintiffs have not stated a claim for substantive
due process.
2. Procedural Due Process
Plaintiffs have also failed to state a claim for violations
of procedural due process. “In order to succeed on a claim of

deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must establish
that state action deprived him of a protected property or liberty
interest.” White Plains Towing Corp. v. Patterson, 991 F.2d 1049,
1061–62 (2d Cir. 1993). For the reasons already set out, there is
no protected liberty interest. Further, plaintiffs do not dispute
that teachers who do not have a tenure do not have a property
interest in their employment. See Biehner v. City of New York,
No. 19 Civ. 9646 (JGK), 2021 WL 878476, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,
2021). As such, only plaintiffs Kane, Smith, Keil, Delgado, and
Strk even have a property interest at stake. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 227,
445, 495, 540, 574.
Moreover, the Second Circuit has “held on several occasions

that there is no due process violation where, as here, pre-

product.”). Further, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that these
vaccines are widely available in New York City. See COVID-19 Vaccine Locations,
Vaccines.gov, https://www.vaccines.gov/results/?zipcode=10007&medicationGuids=
6e9b0945-9b98-4df4-8d10-c42f526eed14,cd62a2bb-1e1e-4252-b441-68cf1fe734e9,784
db609-dc1f-45a5-bad6-8db02e79d44f&medicationKeys=pfizer_comirnaty_covid_19_va
ccine,moderna_spikevax_covid_19_vaccine,j%26j_janssen_covid_19_vaccine&appoin
tments=true (displaying numerous locations where fully approved vaccines are
available)(last visited Aug. 25, 2022). As such, the Court rejects the
plaintiffs’ arguments premised on the assertion that the vaccines fully approved
by the FDA are not available in New York. See Opp. at 25-27 (arguing that the
Mandate is unconstitutional because the COVID-19 vaccines available in New York
are only approved under an Emergency Use Authorization).
deprivation notice is provided and the deprivation at issue can be
fully remedied through the grievance procedures provided for in a
collective bargaining agreement.” See Adams v. Suozzi, 517 F.3d
124, 128 (2d Cir. 2008). “Pre-deprivation processes need not be
elaborate, and the Constitution mandates only that such process

include, at a minimum, notice and the opportunity to respond.”
Garland v. New York City Fire Dep’t, No. 21 Civ. 6586 (KAM) (CLP),
2021 WL 5771687, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2021). Here, that notice
and opportunity were plainly given. The amended consolidated
complaint describes in detail how plaintiffs received notice of
the Citywide Panel and the standards it would apply, that they had
an opportunity to submit materials in support of their
accommodation requests to the Citywide Panel, and the Citywide
Panel issued written explanations for each of the named plaintiffs,
clearly spelling out how it reached its conclusions.25 See, e.g.,
ACC ¶¶ 235-36, 263-65, 271, 292, 293, 297-98, 314-20, 328, 335,
338, 362, 367-68, 382-83, 408-09, 426-28, 483-88, 498, 500-12,

522-36, 553-69, 582-92, 613-26, 669, 680, 693-95, 726-28, 750,
769-73, 778-79; see also ECF No. 122-2 (setting forth the Citywide
Panel’s reasoning in reaching its decision regarding each
plaintiff). Moreover, plaintiffs have the ability to challenge

25 This Court, having found that strict scrutiny does not apply in this case,
finds plaintiffs’ assertion that the Citywide Panel had to provide plaintiffs
with a response that could survive strict scrutiny in order to avoid violating
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, Opp. at 23-24, without foundation.
any decision terminating their employment through their collective
bargaining agreement, or through an Article 78 proceeding.26
Sindone v. Kelly, 439 F. Supp. 2d 268, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]he
Second Circuit has gone to considerable lengths to recognize the
adequacy of Article 78 procedures as affording adequate safeguards

to satisfy federal procedural due process standards.”).
E. Plaintiffs Have Not Pled As-Applied Claims
Further, the Mandate is not unconstitutional as applied to
the plaintiffs. As a threshold matter, two of plaintiffs (Ruiz-
Toro and Castro) have had their requests for religious
accommodation granted.27 ACC ¶¶ 271, 488. While these plaintiffs
may have preferred a different accommodation, “where the employer
has already reasonably accommodated the employee’s religious
needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end. The employer need not
further show that each of the employee’s alternative
accommodations would result in undue hardship.” Ansonia Bd. of
Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986); see also We The

Patriots USA, 17 F.4th at 292 (“Title VII does not require covered
entities to provide the accommodation that Plaintiffs prefer—in
this case, a blanket religious exemption allowing them to continue
working at their current positions unvaccinated.”).

26 Indeed, plaintiff Giammarino appears to have filed an Article 78
proceeding. See Giammarino v. Board of Education et al., Index No. 160829/2021
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. Jan. 18, 2021).
27 Specifically, these plaintiffs were given permission to work remotely,
but cannot enter DOE school buildings. ACC ¶¶ 281, 488-89.
Likewise, plaintiffs Grimando, Giammarino, LoParrino, Weber,
and Smith did not avail themselves of the process for seeking a
religious exemption set out by the DOE, and so have not stated a
due process claim.28 “Plaintiffs are not entitled to circumvent
established due process protections and then claim they were never

afforded such protections.” Capul v. City of N.Y., No. 19 Civ.
4313 (KPF), 2020 WL 2748274, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020), aff’d
832 F. App’x. 766 (2d Cir. 2021); see also Garland, 574 F. Supp.
3d at 130 (finding no due process violation where plaintiffs chose
not to participate in the process of requesting vaccination waivers
by the deadline). As such, these plaintiffs have failed to state
a claim.29
The remainder of the plaintiffs had their claims reviewed by
the Citywide Panel. While plaintiffs have pled that the Citywide
Panel just “rubber-stamped” the plaintiffs’ previous denials in
“bad faith,” ACC ¶¶ 140, 835, these assertions are insufficient to
state a claim. Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors Inc., 464

F.3d 338, 344 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that in opposing a motion to
dismiss, “bald assertions and conclusions of law will not
suffice”). Moreover, these conclusory allegations are

28 Specifically, plaintiff Grimando did not submit a timely religious
exemption, although she did submit a timely medical exemption. ACC ¶¶ 668-69.
Plaintiffs Giammarino and LoParrino opted not to submit a request for an
exemption through the SOLAS portal, as required, but instead sent separate
letters to DOE. Id. ¶¶ 733-34, 769. Plaintiff Weber chose not to appeal his
denial of a religious exemption. Id. ¶ 652.
29 Plaintiff Solon has apparently decided to be vaccinated, and as such, her
claims are moot. See ECF No. 166 ¶ 9.
contradicted by the fact that the Citywide Panel reversed the
arbitrators’ denial of plaintiff Castro’s religious accommodation.
ACC ¶¶ 269, 271.
Further, while plaintiffs criticize the process by which the
Citywide Panel evaluated their applications as improperly

disregarding their religious beliefs, only one of the Citywide
Panel’s decisions turned on whether the plaintiffs had a sincere
religious belief.30 In all other circumstances in which it denied
a plaintiff’s request for a religious accommodation, the Citywide
Panel found that the plaintiff’s request presented an “undue
hardship” because the plaintiff “is a classroom teacher who, under
the present circumstances, cannot physically be in the classroom
while unvaccinated without presenting a risk to the vulnerable and
still primarily unvaccinated student population.”31 See, e.g., ACC
¶¶ 158, 512 (denying Keil’s appeal), 536 (denying De Luca’s
appeal), 569 (denying Delgado’s appeal), 592 (denying Strk’s
appeal), 626 (denying Buzaglo’s appeal), see also ECF No. 122-2

(setting forth Citywide Panel’s reasoning regarding each

30 Plaintiff Clark’s appeal was denied because the panel found that her
decision to not receive a vaccination was not based on her religious belief,
but rather, on non-religious sources. ECF No. 122-2 at 2. This is entirely
proper - under Title VII, an employer may inquire into whether an employee has
“a genuine religious practice that conflicts with a requirement of employment.”
Bind v. City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 11105 (RJH), 2011 WL 4542897, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011) (holding “[a]n employer asked to grant a religious
accommodation is permitted to examine whether the employee’s beliefs regarding
the accommodation are sincerely held” and collecting cases).
31 Plaintiffs’ argument that they can work remotely as they did when the
City’s schools were remote fails, because the City and DOE have decided to
return to in-person learning.
plaintiff’s appeal). These findings satisfied the requirements of
Title VII. Under Title VII “when an employee has a genuine
religious practice that conflicts with a requirement of
employment, his or her employer, once notified, must offer the
aggrieved employee a reasonable accommodation, unless doing so

would cause the employer to suffer an undue hardship.” Cosme v.
Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2002). “An accommodation is
said to cause an undue hardship whenever it results in ‘more than
a de minimis cost’ to the employer.” Baker v. The Home Depot, 445
F.3d 541, 548 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc.
v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977)). Plaintiffs’ inability to
teach their students safely in person presents more than a de
minimis cost.
Further, we note that the Second Circuit and other courts in
have repeatedly found that vaccination against COVID-19 is a proper
condition of employment. See, e.g., We the Patriots, 17 F.4d at
294 (holding vaccination was a condition of employment for

healthcare workers); Garland, 574 F. Supp. 3d at 129 (concluding
that vaccination was a condition of employment under a Health
Commissioner Order applicable to City employees); Broecker v. New
York Dept. of Educ., No. 21 Civ. 6387 (KAM) (LRM), 2022 WL 426113,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2022) (holding vaccination was a condition
of employment for NYC DOE employees); O’Reilly v. The Bd. of Educ.
of the City School Dist. of the City of New York, No. 161040/2021,
2022 WL 180957, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. Jan. 20, 2022)
(same). Thus, “[t]he termination of NYC DOE employees who failed
to comply with the COVID-19 vaccination condition of employment is
not disciplinary. Rather, [p]laintiffs’ separation is [be]cause of
their failure to avail themselves of existing processes or comply

with a lawful job condition.” Broecker, 2022 WL 426113, at *11.
As the DOE has provided notice and processes that comport with
Constitutional due process before and after termination, see supra
pp. 35-36, no additional process is required. Broecker, 2022 WL
426113, at *11.
F. The State Law Claims Are Dismissed for Lack of
Supplemental Jurisdiction

As there are no remaining federal claims, this Court declines
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.32
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court “may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” where “the
district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Carnegie–Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual
case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial,
the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent

32 While plaintiffs have also pled a claim for a violation of Section 1983,
“Section 1983 does not create any independent substantive right, but rather is
a vehicle to ‘redress . . . the deprivation of [federal] rights established
elsewhere.’” Laface v. Eastern Suffolk BOCES, 349 F. Supp. 3d 126, 153 (E.D.N.Y.
2018) (quoting Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999)). As such,
this claim is dismissed.
jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness,
and comity — will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction
over the remaining state-law claims.”). We therefore do not
address the arguments regarding state law claims.
G. The Preliminary Injunction is Denied

Plaintiffs have also moved again for a preliminary
injunction. “When a preliminary injunction will affect government
action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statute or
regulatory scheme, the moving party must demonstrate (1)
irreparable harm absent injunctive relief, (2) a likelihood of
success on the merits, and (3) public interest weighing in favor
of granting the injunction.” Kane, 19 F.4th at 163. As Judge
Caproni and the Second Circuit have held, having found no violation
of a Constitutional right, “the only alleged harm is economic, and
it can be remedied by money damages, were the [p]laintiffs to
prevail on the merits of the litigation.” Kane v. de Blasio, 575
F. Supp. 3d 435, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), aff’d sub nom. Keil v. City

of New York, No. 21-3043-CV, 2022 WL 619694 (2d Cir. Mar. 3, 2022).
Moreover, for the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs have not stated a
claim and therefore have not demonstrated a likelihood of success
on the merits. Finally, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the
public interest weighs in their favor. There is a strong public
interest in vaccination to support the City’s schools safe
reopening and to allow the children who attend daily to learn with
as little risk as possible to them and their families. As such,
the preliminary injunction is denied.*
Iv. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court denies the motion for
a preliminary injunction and dismisses plaintiffs’ complaint in
its entirety with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to terminate the open motions and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
August 26, 2022
/ ( ZL _— f
A git! Pe fal cd Le £ pemhel
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

33 Plaintiffs’ request to supplement the preliminary injunction record with
the May 24, 2022 deposition transcript of Eric Eichenholtz, ECF No. 167, is
denied because the request is procedurally improper and because consideration
of the transcript would not alter our decision. First, we note that plaintiffs
have already filed the transcript, despite the fact that they are purporting to
request leave to do so. This filing violates the Individual Practices of Judge
Caproni, who was presiding at the time the transcript was filed, which
explicitly state “[t]he Court will not search through the record in support of
facts relevant to a party’s claim or defense.” Individual Practices in Civil
Cases of Judge Caproni, 4.H.ii.e. Second, as noted supra at pp. 24-25, we find
plaintiffs’ argument that the individual consideration that plaintiffs asked
for and were granted by the Citywide Panel triggered strict scrutiny under
Fulton unpersuasive. But even if we accepted plaintiffs’ argument, it would
not alter the result, as we would still deny the preliminary injunction because
plaintiffs have failed to meet each and every prong of the preliminary
injunction analysis.

42

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10343847. Public record. Not legal advice.