# Yerdon v. Poitras

> District Court, N.D. New York · April 24, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10316536

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** April 24, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

EDWARD A. YERDON,

Plaintiff,

-against- 1:21-CV-565 (LEK/ML)

KARIN POITRAS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION
On May 17, 2021, pro se Plaintiff Edward Yerdon commenced this action pursuant to
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., against Defendants
Karin Poitras (“Poitras”), Elizabeth Romand (“Romand”), and the New York State Department
of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Dkt. No. 1 (“Complaint”). Defendants
now move to dismiss. Dkt. No. 48-1 (“Motion”). Plaintiff has filed a response. Dkt. No. 54.
For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is granted.
II. BACKGROUND
The Court assumes familiarity with the factual background and procedural posture of this
case, as detailed in this Court’s previous Memorandum-Decision and Orders. See Dkt. Nos. 22 at
1–2, 38 at 2–3.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to
dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “A case is properly dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
2000). “To survive a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of standing, plaintiffs
must allege facts that affirmatively and plausibly suggest that [they have] standing to sue.”

Kiryas Joel Alliance v. Village of Kiryas Joel, 495 F. App’x 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1), a court must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. See Buday v. N.Y. Yankees P’Ship, 486 F. App’x
894, 896 (2d Cir. 2012). The party asserting lack of subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden
of establishing its standing as the proper party to bring this action. See Garanti Finansal Kiralama
A.S. v. Aqua Marine & Trading Inc., 697 F.3d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 2012).
B. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a
“complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A court must accept as true the factual allegations
contained in a complaint and draw all inferences in favor of a plaintiff. See Allaire Corp. v.
Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249–50 (2d Cir. 2006). A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) only where it appears that there are not “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plausibility requires “enough fact[s] to raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the alleged misconduct].” Id. at
556. The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Supreme Court has
stated that “the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Where a court is unable to infer more than
the mere possibility of the alleged misconduct based on the pleading facts, the pleader has not

demonstrated that she is entitled to relief and the action is subject to dismissal. See id. at 678–79.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants first move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
12(b)(1). Specifically, Defendants argue that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity applies
to Defendants, and therefore deprives this Court of jurisdiction. See Mot. at 8–12.1
“Absent valid abrogation or express waiver of State sovereign immunity, the Eleventh
Amendment bars actions in federal courts asserted directly against a state and against state
agencies that act as arms of the state.” Harris v. New York State Educ. Dep’t, 419 F. Supp. 2d
530, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing, inter alia, Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425,

429–30 & n. 5 (1997)). “The Second Circuit has held that an ADA claim for damages against a
state official is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment only ‘if the plaintiff can establish that the
[ADA] violation was motivated by either discriminatory animus or ill will due to disability.’”
Clay v. Lee, No. 13-CV-7662, 2019 WL 1284290, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2019) (quoting
Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr. of Brooklyn, 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir. 2001)). The Second
Circuit has indicated that a plaintiff need only to plead “discriminatory animus or ill will” where
the plaintiff seeks to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Kearney v. N.Y.S. D.O.C.S., No.

1 Page numbers refer to ECF pagination.
11-CV-1281, 2013 WL 5437372, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kearney v.
N.Y.S. Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 581 F. App’x 45 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The court in Bolmer held that the
discriminatory animus requirement articulated in Garcia only applies where abrogation of
sovereign immunity is based on Congress’ enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.”)
Defendants argue that Plaintiff is seeking to enforce his Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights and has failed to plead discriminatory animus or ill will. See Mot. at 11–12.
Defendants are correct that Plaintiff is seeking to enforce his equal protection rights, as
Plaintiff’s Complaint clearly alleges that he was “treated [] differently” from his co-workers due
to his disability. Compl. at 5; see also Kearney, 2013 WL 5437372 at *10 (outlining that an
inmate’s ADA complaints regarding unequal medical treatment “are grounded in the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and Plaintiff must therefore “establish
discriminatory animus or ill will”). Defendants are therefore accurate in asserting that Plaintiff
must show discriminatory animus or ill will in order to abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity. Yet Defendants’ argument fails because Plaintiff has in fact pleaded animus or ill will.
Plaintiff pleads that: (1) Poitras knew of Plaintiff’s disability; (2) Poitras began to treat Plaintiff
differently by deliberately “removing tasks and limiting responsibilities”; (3) Poitras made crude
jokes regarding suicide and Plaintiff’s disability; and (4) Poitras began to provide negative
evaluations of Plaintiff only after learning of his disability. Compl. at 5. These facts taken as a
whole suggest enough ill will or animosity to abrogate sovereign immunity. Eleventh
Amendment immunity therefore does not protect Defendants from suit.
B. Failure to State a Claim Under the ADA
Defendants next move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim under the ADA. See Mot. at 12–16.
“In order to establish a violation under the ADA, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that (1)

they are ‘qualified individuals’ with a disability; (2) that the defendants are subject to the ADA;
and (3) that plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from defendants’
services, programs, or activities, or were otherwise discriminated against by defendants, by
reason of plaintiffs’ disabilities.” Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003).
“To demonstrate that he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability,’ the plaintiff must establish
that he has a physical or mental impairment and provide evidence that such impairment
‘substantially limits one or more of that person’s major life activities.’” Andino v. Fischer, 698
F. Supp. 2d 362, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718, 722
(2d Cir. 1994)). “‘Major life activities’ include: ‘caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing,

learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.’” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(A)) (emphasis omitted).
Title II of the ADA “does not provide for individual capacity suits against state officials.”
Browdy v. Karpe, 131 F. App’x 751, 754 (2d Cir. 2005). Moreover, “it is well established that
the State is the real party in interest for a plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants in
their official capacities.” Kearney, 2013 WL 5437372, at *5 (cleaned up). “As such, the Supreme
Court has explained that a suit brought against a person in his or her official capacity must be
treated as a suit against the entity represented by that person, provided that the public entity
received notice and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–
72 (1985)).
Plaintiff has not specified whether he is suing Poitras and Romand in their official or
individual capacities. Should Plaintiff intend to sue them in their official capacities, the Court

will treat the claims against DMV as “one and the same.” Id.; see also id. (“Where, as here, a
plaintiff may proceed on his ADA claims against the State entity directly, it is appropriate for the
court to dismiss the official capacity claims because they are redundant of the claims against the
government entity.”) (cleaned up). Likewise, as Plaintiff cannot maintain “individual capacity
suits against state officials,” Andino, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 380, Plaintiff’s claims against Poitras
and Romand are dismissed with prejudice. See Nwaokocha v. Sadowski, 369 F. Supp. 2d 362,
372 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“A court [] has discretion to dismiss with prejudice if it believes that
amendment would be futile or would unnecessarily expend judicial resources.”).
With respect to the remaining claims against DMV, Plaintiff is required to plead that he is
a qualified individual with a disability—meaning that he must show that he has an impairment

that “substantially limits one or more” of Plaintiff’s “major life activities.” Heilweil, 32 F.3d at
722. Plaintiff has made no such showing. At most, Plaintiff lists his disabilities as “ADHD
learning disabilities, Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Schizotypal Personality Disorder, [and]
Generalized Anxiety Disorder.” Compl. at 2. However, Plaintiff does not explain how those
disabilities substantially limit one or more of his major life activities. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to
plead the first prima facie element of an ADA violation, and his claims against DMV are
dismissed without prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion, Dkt. No. 48, is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED without prejudice
with respect to Defendant New York State Department of Motor Vehicles; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED with prejudice with
respect to Defendants Karin Poitras and Elizabeth Romand; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk close this action; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on all
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 24, 2024
Albany, New York
LAWRENCEE.KAHN —™
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10316536. Public record. Not legal advice.