# Poyneer v. New York State United Teachers

> District Court, N.D. New York · February 27, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10316448

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** February 27, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10316448

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that a court considering a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[b][6] may look to “facts stated on the fact of the complaint,” “documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference,” and “matters of which judicial notice may be taken”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________

LORETTA POYNEER,

Plaintiff,

v. 5:22-CV-0261
(GTS/ML)
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS;
SYRACUSE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION,
INC.; and SYRACUSE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.
_____________________________________________

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:

THE FAIRNESS CENTER DAVID R. DOREY, ESQ.
Counsel for Plaintiff LOGAN HETHERINGTON, ESQ.
500 North Third Street NATHAN J. MCGRATH, ESQ.
Harrisburg, PA 17101 TESSA E. SHURR, ESQ.

NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS ANDREA A. WANNER, ESQ.
Counsel for Union Defendants CLAYTON EICHELBERGER, ESQ.
800 Troy-Schenectady Road ROBERT T. REILLY JR., ESQ.
Latham, NY 12110-2455

ALTSHULER BERZON LLP SCOTT A. KRONLAND, ESQ.
Co-Counsel for Union Defendants
177 Post Street, Suite 300
San Francisco, CA 94108

FERRARA FIORENZA P.C. NICOLE M. MARLOW-JONES, ESQ.
Counsel for Syracuse City School District MILES G. LAWLOR, ESQ.
5010 Campuswood Drive
East Syracuse, NY 13057

GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this civil rights action filed by Loretta Poyneer (“Plaintiff”)
against New York State United Teachers (“NYSUT”), Syracuse Teachers Association (“STA”)
(together, the “Union Defendants”), and Syracuse City School District (“SCSD”) (collectively
“Defendants”), is the Union Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 47.) Defendant SCSD joined the Union

Defendants’ motion by a declaration filed on July 6, 2023. (Dkt. No. 54.) For the reasons set
forth below, the Union Defendants’ motion is granted, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Complaint
Generally, in her Complaint, Plaintiff asserts two claims. (Dkt. No. 1.) First, Plaintiff
claims that Defendants violated her First Amendment rights of association, free speech, and free
choice (as incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) by continuing to
deduct moneys from her wages to pay dues to the Union Defendants even after she resigned from
membership in those unions without procuring from her a valid waiver of her constitutional
rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 51-66.) As part of this claim, Plaintiff alleges that N.Y. Civ. Serv. L. §§ 201

and 208 (the “Taylor Law”) are unconstitutional, either facially or as applied, because they
require public employees to maintain an unwilling allegiance to and financial support of
employee organizations of which they are not members. (Id.)
Second, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated her right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide Plaintiff with notice or a meaningful opportunity to
object to the continued deduction of her wages as dues to the Union Defendants. (Id. at ¶¶ 67-
75.)
B. Parties’ Briefing on the Union Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

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1. Union Defendants’ Memorandum of Law
Generally, in their memorandum of law, the Union Defendants make five arguments.
(Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 1.) First, the Union Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory
and injunctive relief should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because, given

that evidence proves the wage deductions ceased in June 2022 pursuant to the terms of the
membership agreement and that she will not have any further deductions made unless she
voluntarily rejoins the union, there is no live case or controversy remaining as to those remedies.
(Id. at 11-13.)
Second, the Union Defendants argue that, apart from the merits, the claims against the
Union Defendants should be dismissed because their conduct does not qualify as a state action.
(Id. at 13-15.) More specifically, the Union Defendants argue that they are not state actors and
the alleged failure to secure a proper authorization for the dues deductions taken from Plaintiff’s
wages is based on a private contract between the parties and not on any state statute or policy.
(Id.)

Third, the Union Defendants argue that the claims against Defendant SCSD should also
be dismissed because Defendant SCSD was required to comply with the Taylor Law, which
requires it to deduct dues from employees who have signed an authorization agreement until
such time as that authorization is properly revoked in accordance with the terms of the
agreement, and it is well established that a local government entity cannot be held liable under
Section 1983 for complying with the mandate of state law. (Id. at 15.)
Fourth, the Union Defendants argue that the deductions made from Plaintiff’s wages
based on her voluntary membership agreement do not violate the First Amendment. (Id. at 15-

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23.) More specifically, the Union Defendants argue that (a) Plaintiff’s signing of the
membership agreement and dues authorization was voluntary because she alleges she signed it
out of a desire to keep the benefits of union membership, and the membership agreement itself
affirms that signing is not a condition of employment, (b) the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus

v. Am. Fed. Of State, Cnty., and Mun. Emps., Council 31, 585 U.S. --, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018),
does not change the obligation to be bound to the terms of a voluntarily signed agreement, nor
does it invalidate such agreements that were signed before that case was decided, and (c) Janus
does not stand for the proposition that the Union Defendants were required to obtain any special
waiver of Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights beyond the voluntarily signed agreement itself.
(Id.)
Fifth, the Union Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not been denied any due process
rights by continuing to have union dues deducted from her wages according to the terms of the
membership agreement even after she chose to leave the union because (a) she voluntarily agreed
to the terms of that agreement, and the requirement to continue to pay dues until she provided an

adequate revocation, whether or not she remained a member, was clear on the face of the
agreement, (b) she was not denied notice and opportunity to be heard because she knew what the
membership agreement contained before deciding to sign it, (c) Plaintiff is not entitled to certain
procedures outlined in pre-Janus authority because she was a union member and she had no right
to become a union member without also assuming the full obligations of that membership (i.e.,
she had no right to require that her dues go only to the funding of certain activities but not
others), and (d) even if there was some sort of error, the state provides adequate post-deprivation
remedies.

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2. Plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum of Law
Generally, in her opposition memorandum of law, Plaintiff makes seven arguments.
(Dkt. No. 53.) First, Plaintiff argues that, as a procedural matter, because the Union Defendants
have submitted extrinsic evidence with their motion and used such evidence to support their

arguments, their motion should be converted to one for summary judgment and a decision
deferred to allow Plaintiff to conduct proper discovery on the relevant issues. (Id. at 8, 14.)
Second, Plaintiff argues that, regardless of the membership agreement, Defendants were
required to obtain from her a valid constitutional waiver before continuing to deduct dues from
her wages after she revoked her union membership, and failed to do so here. (Id. at 15-18.)
More specifically, Plaintiff argues that not only is waiver of constitutional rights a federal matter
that is superior to state contract law, but Plaintiff’s signing of the membership agreement (which
does not contain a clear waiver of First Amendment rights) cannot be considered to be a waiver
of her constitutional rights because that agreement was signed before Janus made any such right
apparent under the First Amendment. (Id.)

Third, Plaintiff argues that her signing of the membership agreement and dues
authorization was coerced and not voluntary and therefore cannot constitute a valid waiver of
any rights or an enforceable agreement. (Id. at 18-19.)
Fourth, Plaintiff argues that the membership agreement is not enforceable even under
state law contract principles because (a) there was a lack of consideration to support the
agreement given that Plaintiff was already a member of the union at the time she signed the
agreement and therefore did not gain anything she had not already previously been given, (b) the
Union Defendants effectively waived the dues deduction provision in the membership agreement

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when they accepted her resignation from the union, (c) the agreement itself is ambiguous and
lacks a clear indication about the timing of the applicable waiver period, and (d) the Union
Defendants materially breached the contract by withholding the benefits of union membership
after her resignation while nevertheless continuing to deduct dues from her wages. (Id. at 19-

24.)
Fifth, Plaintiff argues that she has stated a claim for a violation of her due process rights
because she has plausibly alleged that the Union Defendants violated her First Amendment rights
and held her to an ambiguous agreement, and that they provided no process for her to object to
dues being deducted, the ways those dues were used, or the enforceability of the agreement. (Id.
at 24-27.)
Sixth, Plaintiff argues that the Union Defendants are state actors in that they acted in
concert with Defendant SCSD (a state entity), and because the ability of unions to deduct dues
from employees’ wages is a state law-enforced bargained-for right. (Id. at 27-30.) Plaintiff
further argues that Defendant SCSD’s actions in continuing to take deductions from Plaintiff’s

wages after she became a nonmember of the union violated New York law and thus constituted a
“policy” under Monell that is distinct from mere compliance with applicable law. (Id.)
Seventh, Plaintiff argues that the pleadings make a plausible showing that she was
coerced into signing the membership agreement, specifically because requiring her to complete
two written forms to resign her union membership rather than accepting her oral resignation was
“classic compelled speech,” and that she intends to move before the Court to assert an additional
First Amendment claim for violating her rights to freedom of speech and association in this
respect. (Id. at 31.)

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3. Defendant SCSD’s Response Letter
In a declaration, Defendant SCSD stated that it joins in the motion of the Union
Defendants, given that the Union Defendants’ arguments show that the claims asserted against
Defendant SCSD are legally insufficient and non-meritorious. (Dkt. No. 54.)

4. Union Defendants’ Reply Memorandum of Law
Generally, in reply to Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum of law, the Union Defendants
make five arguments. (Dkt. No. 55.) First, the Union Defendants argue that, as to the portion of
their motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Plaintiff has not opposed the dismissal
of her requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, and that consideration of the extrinsic
evidence related to this issue does not require conversion of the motion to one for summary
judgment because (a) consideration of such evidence is proper on motion considering issues of
subject-matter jurisdiction, and (b) Plaintiff does not need discovery to determine that her own
payroll deductions have ended. (Id. at 5.)
Second, the Union Defendants argue that their conduct cannot be considered to be a state

action, and Defendant SCSD’s ministerial role in processing payment deductions for the Union
Defendants pursuant to the membership agreement does not make them state actors. (Id. at 5-8.)
Third, the Union Defendants argue that the claims against Defendant SCSD should be
dismissed because it merely complied with state law as it was required to do. (Id. at 9.)
Fourth, the Union Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations do not plausibly allege a
violation of her First Amendment rights for the following reasons: (a) the voluntarily signed
membership agreement was a sufficient waiver of her First Amendment rights in this respect; (b)
the agreement was not the product of any duress or coercion because Plaintiff herself alleges that

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she signed it in order to continue receiving union benefits and there is nothing threatening or
coercive about merely informing Plaintiff she would lose those union benefits if she failed to
comply with the requirements of remaining a member of the union; (c) the agreement does not
lack consideration because there is no question that Plaintiff would have lost the union benefits

had she declined to sign the membership agreement, and it was the desire to retain those benefits
that induced her to sign the agreement; (d) the agreement clearly allows for the union to continue
to deduct dues for the period specified, whether she remained a member for that whole period or
not; (e) the language in the membership agreement regarding the revocation window is not
ambiguous because it clearly states the period is either August 1 through August 31, or a period
specified in the collective bargaining agreement, and there is no alternative period specified in
the collective bargaining agreement; and (f) the Union Defendants did not breach the agreement
by ceasing to provide union benefits after she withdrew from membership because Plaintiff
herself should not have had any expectation to continue to receive benefits after expressing her
wish to withdraw from the union. (Id. at 10-11.)

Fifth, the Union Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations do not plausibly allege a
violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because (a) she was not deprived of
any protected interest given that she voluntarily authorized the dues deductions, and (b) New
York State provides processes, such as the Public Employment Relations Board, that could have
addressed her concerns, processes of which Plaintiff did not avail herself. (Id. at 12.)
5. Supplemental Briefing
The Union Defendants also submitted a supplemental letter-brief regarding the Second
Circuit’s decision in Wheatley v. New York State Teachers, 80 F.4th 386 (2d Cir. 2023), which

8
had been issued after the completion of the parties’ briefing in this action. (Dkt. No. 57.) The
Union Defendants argue that the circumstances and issues decided in that case are materially
indistinguishable from those at issue in the current case, and thus the Second Circuit’s finding
supports their motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Id.)

Plaintiff argues in response that Wheatley is distinguishable because that case did not
involve any allegations that the relevant membership agreement was signed under coercion or
duress or that a valid contractual relationship was lacking, whereas Plaintiff has made such
allegations here. (Dkt. No. 59.) Plaintiff further argues that, in any event, the Court should wait
to render any decision in this case until the Second Circuit rules on a petition for rehearing of the
relevant decision in Wheatley. (Id.)
II. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
AIt is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.@ Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). Generally, a claim may be

properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where a district court lacks
constitutional or statutory power to adjudicate it. Makarova v. U.S., 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
2000). A district court may look to evidence outside of the pleadings when resolving a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113. The plaintiff bears
the burden of proving subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113 (citing Malik v. Meissner, 82 F.3d 560, 562 [2d Cir. 1996]). When a
court evaluates a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, all ambiguities must
be resolved and inferences drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp.

9
Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Makarova, 201 F.3d at 113).
B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State Claim
It has long been understood that a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), can be based on one or both of two grounds:

(1) a challenge to the “sufficiency of the pleading” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a
challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim. Jackson v. Onondaga Cty., 549 F. Supp.2d 204,
211 nn. 15-16 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J.) (adopting Report-Recommendation on de novo
review).
Because such dismissals are often based on the first ground, some elaboration regarding
that ground is appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) [emphasis added]. In the Court’s view, this tension between
permitting a “short and plain statement” and requiring that the statement “show[]” an entitlement
to relief is often at the heart of misunderstandings that occur regarding the pleading standard

established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long characterized the “short and plain”
pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) as “simplified” and “liberal.” Jackson, 549 F.
Supp. 2d at 212 n.20 (citing Supreme Court case). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
held that, by requiring the above-described “showing,” the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2) requires that the pleading contain a statement that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at
212 n.17 (citing Supreme Court cases) (emphasis added).

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The Supreme Court has explained that such fair notice has the important purpose of
“enabl[ing] the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial” and “facilitat[ing] a proper decision
on the merits” by the court. Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212 n.18 (citing Supreme Court cases);
Rusyniak v. Gensini, 629 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 & n.32 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing

Second Circuit cases). For this reason, as one commentator has correctly observed, the “liberal”
notice pleading standard “has its limits.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34[1][b] at 12-61 (3d
ed. 2003). For example, numerous Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist holding
that a pleading has failed to meet the “liberal” notice pleading standard. Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp.
2d at 213 n.22 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).
Most notably, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court reversed an
appellate decision holding that a complaint had stated an actionable antitrust claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). In doing so, the Court
“retire[d]” the famous statement by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),

that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 560-61, 577. Rather than turn on the conceivability of an
actionable claim, the Court clarified, the “fair notice” standard turns on the plausibility of an
actionable claim. Id. at 555-70. The Court explained that, while this does not mean that a
pleading need “set out in detail the facts upon which [the claim is based],” it does mean that the
pleading must contain at least “some factual allegation[s].” Id. at 555. More specifically, the

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“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level [to a
plausible level],” assuming (of course) that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Id.
As for the nature of what is “plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not
show[n]–that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). However, while the plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id., it “does not impose a probability
requirement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Because of this requirement of factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to

relief, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by merely conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Similarly, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement”
will not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citations and alterations omitted). Rule 8
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
(citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS

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A. Whether Plaintiff’s Claims Premised on a Request for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief Should Be Dismissed for Lack of Subject-Matter
Jurisdiction

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the
reasons stated in the Union Defendants’ memoranda of law. See Part I.B.1 and 3 of this Decision
and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.
The Court specifically finds that these requests for declaratory and injunctive relief
should be dismissed as moot based upon the same rationale discussed by Senior U.S. District
Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., in Wheatley v. New York State United Teachers, 629 F. Supp. 3d
18, 23-25 (N.D.N.Y. 2022), aff’d, 80 F.4th 386 (2d Cir. 2023). That case involved an essentially
identical request for declaratory and injunctive relief in a materially similar factual situation
where it was undisputed that the defendants had stopped deducting union dues from the
plaintiff’s wages once she properly submitted the required written revocation notice during the
period specified in the union agreement to do so; this Court dismissed such requests for relief
based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the defendants were no longer deducting
dues from her wages and therefore there was no harm for injunctive or declaratory relief to
remedy. Wheatley, 629 F. Supp. 3d at 23-25.
So too in this case. Although Plaintiff’s Complaint in this action alleges that Defendants
continue to deduct union dues from her wages, the Court notes that the Complaint was filed on
March 15, 2022. (Dkt. No. 1.) As evidence submitted by the Union Defendants with their
motion shows, the Vice President of Defendant STA sent a letter to Defendant SCSD on July 22,
2022, instructing the district to stop withdrawing dues from Plaintiff’s wages, and a confirmation
email indicated that deductions for Plaintiff had been cancelled as of July 22, 2022, and no dues

13
would be deducted for her from that day forward. (Dkt. No. 47, Attach. 3, at 60-62.) Plaintiff
does not appear to dispute this fact, but instead argues that the consideration of extrinsic
evidence would require conversion of the Union Defendants’ motion to one for summary
judgment. However, it is well-established that a district court is permitted to consider evidence

outside of the pleadings when resolving a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); indeed,
the Second Circuit has suggested that “it would be error for the district court to disregard . . .
extrinsic evidence” where such evidence “contradicts the material allegations of the complaint.”
See Harty v. West Point Realty, Inc., 28 F.4th 435, 441-42 (2d Cir. 2022). Because the Court is
permitted, or perhaps even required to consider the submitted evidence when determining
whether Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot, it is not necessary to
convert the motion to one for summary judgment for this limited purpose. Further, the evidence
submitted shows that Defendants stopped deducting dues from Plaintiff’s wages as of July 22,
2022, and there is nothing to indicate it could begin to do so again without Plaintiff taking the
action to re-join the union.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and declaratory
relief must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
B. Whether Plaintiff’s Substantive Claims Must be Dismissed for Failure to
State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the affirmative for the
reasons stated in the Union Defendants’ memoranda of law. See, supra, Part I.B.1 and 3 of this
Decision and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.
As an initial matter, the Court finds that, contrary to Plaintiff’s attempts to distinguish it,
the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Wheatley v. New York State Teachers, 80 F.4th 386 (2d
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Cir. 2023), controls much of the outcome in this case. In a letter-notice related to the issuance of
that decision, Plaintiff requested that the Court wait to render a decision in this case until the
Second Circuit considered a petition for panel rehearing or en banc rehearing. (Dkt. No. 59.)
The Court has confirmed that the Second Circuit denied that petition for rehearing on October

20, 2023. (See 2d Cir. Case No. 22-2743, Dkt. No. 122.) The Second Circuit’s decision of
September 5, 2023, is therefore direct binding authority that this Court must consider when
resolving the issues in this case.
1. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Claim
In Wheatley, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected many of the legal arguments that
Plaintiff relies upon in this action. Specifically, the Second Circuit concluded that continued
deduction of union dues following resignation from union membership was outside the scope of
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Janus because such deductions were made pursuant to the terms of
a contract that the plaintiff voluntarily entered into when choosing to become a union member,
and such action did not violate the First Amendment because the defendants ceased making such

deductions when plaintiff complied with the terms of that contract required to revoke her
consent. Wheatley, 80 F.4th at 391-92. The court further emphasized that, [h]aving the choice to
voluntarily join and resign from a union is the opposite of compelled speech,” and that “[t]he
First Amendment does not provide a right to ‘disregard promises that would otherwise be
enforced under state law.” Id. (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672 [1991]).
It also squarely rejected the argument that resignation from the union automatically converted
the plaintiff into a “nonmember” for the purposes of the Janus analysis, noting that “[u]nlike
nonmembers, as the term was used in Janus, who never agreed to join a union to begin with,

15
Appellant affirmatively entered a voluntary contractual agreement that requires her to pay dues
for a full year even if she resigns her membership during the course of that year,” finding that
nothing about the terms specified in the membership agreement, “to which Appellant voluntarily
consented, violates the First Amendment.” Wheatley, 80 F.4th at 391-92 n.3; see also Janus, 138

S.Ct. at 2486 (concluding that deduction of fees from nonmembers violated the First
Amendment, specifically stating that “[n]either an agency fee nor any other payment to the union
may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such
a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay. By agreeing to pay, nonmembers
are waiving their First Amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed. . . . Rather, to
be effective, the waiver must be freely given and shown by ‘clear and compelling’ evidence. . . .
Unless employees clearly and affirmatively consent before any money is taken from them, this
standard cannot be met.”) (emphasis added).
The case here involves a union member agreement whose relevant language is identical
to the agreement at issue in Wheatley. Plaintiff nonetheless argues that Wheatley does not

control because she has alleged in the Complaint that she was coerced into signing the
membership agreement and therefore her membership in the union (and consequent promise to
pay dues) was not voluntary, as well as that there are a number of reasons why the membership
agreement is unenforceable even under state contract law. These arguments are without merit.
As to Plaintiff’s argument that she was coerced into signing the membership agreement
and did so only under duress, that argument is not supported by her own factual allegations in the
Complaint. Specifically, as is relevant, Plaintiff alleges the following: (1) she was a member of
the STA and NYSUT since approximately 2015 when she was first hired, although she had not

16
been required to sign a membership agreement or a dues deduction authorization at that time; (2)
in June 2018, the former president of Defendant STA, William Scott, “informed Plaintiff that she
was required to sign a membership agreement and dues deduction authorization or else she
would be ‘dropped from the union’ and not receive union benefits”; (3) Mr. Scott informed her

that this need for a signed membership agreement and dues deduction authorization was new
based upon updated requirements by Defendant SCSD; (4) “[r]elying on Scott’s advice and
fearful of his warning that her failure to sign would cause her to be dropped by Defendant
Unions and to lose her benefits, Plaintiff signed a membership agreement and dues deduction
authorization on June 18, 2018; and (5) Plaintiff sent an email to STA vice president William
Magnarelli on September 14, 2021, in which she stated she had signed the membership
agreement and dues deduction authorization “during [her] very busy work day” and that she had
had “no idea and was never told that [she] would be giving up [her] [F]irst [A]mendment [rights]
by signing it.” (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 21-26, 35.)
Contrary to Plaintiff’s characterization, her own factual allegations reveal nothing that

can even plausibly be considered coercive or suggesting that she signed the membership
agreement and dues deduction authorization under duress. Mr. Scott’s informing her of the basic
fact that she was required to sign those documents in order to remain a member of the union and
continue receiving union benefits due to a change in policy by Defendant SCSD does not amount
to coercion. Nor does the fact that she later alleged that she was given this information and
signed the agreement during a busy day plausibly suggest that she was coerced; the membership
agreement itself is a one-page document containing three paragraphs of text and is written in
fairly straightforward language, and there is no allegation that Plaintiff was not provided with

17
adequate time to read through this document before signing it. Plaintiff herself alleges that she
chose to sign the agreement because she did not want to lose her union benefits. Her own factual
allegations therefore plausibly suggest that her desire to maintain those benefits outweighed any
disagreement or concerns she may have had about the contents of the membership agreement,

and a union’s act of conditioning the benefits of membership on compliance with union
procedures regarding membership is not coercive. Plaintiff offers no concrete argument
regarding why she believes these allegations plausibly suggest coercion, but instead repeatedly
cites to such allegations and offers the conclusion that her signing of the membership agreement
and dues deduction authorization was not voluntary. (Dkt. No. 53, at 15, 18-19.) Because even
Plaintiff seems unable to offer an explanation of how her own allegations support her argument,
there is no basis to find that she has established her burden of showing that her allegations
support a plausible claim under the First Amendment, or that the circumstances here represent a
factual scenario that would prevent the Court from applying the rationale of Wheatley in this
case.1

1 The Court also notes that, in the factual recitation portion of her response memorandum
of law, Plaintiff asserts that, regarding coercion, STA president Mr. Scott essentially lied to her
when he told her that she would be “dropped” by the union if she declined to sign the
membership agreement; in support of that assertion, Plaintiff cites a sentence in the membership
agreement purporting to show that signing the agreement is not a condition of her membership
with the union. (Dkt. No. 53, at 9-10.) Yet even a cursory glance at the three-paragraph
membership agreement indicates that the language Plaintiff relies upon for this assertion is not
related to the signing of the membership agreement itself, but rather to consent to receive calls or
text messages from the unions. (Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 2, at 2 [stating that “By providing my cell
phone number and signature I am expressly consenting to receive autodialed and/or prerecorded
calls and/or text messages from or on behalf of AFT, NEW, NYSUT, AFL-CIO and/or the local
union at the wireless number provided. The scope of this consent relates to any purpose for
which any of the above entities may call. I understand that this consent is not a condition of my
membership with NYSUT, its national affiliates, or the local organization named above”].) This
assertion appears to be either a careless or reckless misreading of the agreement. In either case,
18
The fact that the new requirement for a signed member agreement and dues deduction
authorization was implemented just prior to, and in anticipation of, the Janus decision does not
bear at all upon whether the choice to sign the membership agreement was voluntary. Plaintiff
herself alleges that she signed the membership agreement because she did not want to lose her

union benefits. It is not clear how knowledge of the pendency of Janus would have changed that
decision, given that any choice to be a “nonmember” in order to avoid the requirement to pay
union dues would inherently mean she would no longer have the union benefits she admits she
desired to keep. Indeed, Janus was issued on June 27, 2018, and Plaintiff alleges that she did not
attempt to revoke her union membership or the dues deduction authorization until September 10,
2021, more than three years later, during which time there is no allegation that she was either not
a member of the unions or that the unions failed to provide her with the promised benefits.
Therefore, the fact that the membership agreement requirement might have been implemented in
anticipation of the Janus ruling is immaterial to Plaintiff’s claims and does not in any way
suggest that her signing of the agreement was involuntary or coerced.

Plaintiff also argues that the membership agreement is not a valid and enforceable
contract under state law, but these arguments fair no better than her assertions that it was not
entered into voluntarily. First, her argument that there was no consideration to create a valid
contract because she was already a union member before signing the membership agreement in
2018 is without merit because, as the Union Defendants argue, the consideration was the fact that
she would lose her union membership, and by consequence her union benefits, if she chose not to

Plaintiff’s counsel are reminded that they are officers of the Court and cautioned to be more
careful in the future about the accuracy of the representations they make to this Court.
19
enter into the membership agreement; seeing as how Plaintiff’s own allegations indicate it was
the desire to retain her union benefits that induced her to sign the membership agreement, there
is no valid argument to be made that she did not receive valuable consideration. See Brevard v.
Credit Suisse, 23-CV-0428, 2024 WL 36991, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2024) (finding that,

“[w]hile past employment is inadequate consideration to establish a contract, however, continued
or future employment is sufficient to do so”).
Second, the Union Defendants did not waive any provision in the membership agreement
by accepting Plaintiff’s completed written documents related to her revocation of her union
membership and considering her to no longer be a union member after those were received on
September 13, 2021. Specifically, the membership agreement states in relevant part that the
authorization and assignment
shall remain in effect, regardless of whether I am or remain a
member of the Union, for a period of one year from the date of this
authorization and shall automatically renew from year to year
unless I revoke this authorization by sending a written, signed
notice of revocation via US mail to the Union between the window
period of August 1 and August 31 or another window period
specified in a collective bargaining agreement.

(Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 2, at 2.) Defendants proceeded exactly as allowed by the membership
agreement: Plaintiff submitted her revocation notice after the specified August window period,
thus subjecting her to renewal of the authorization to have dues deducted for another year,
whether or not she chose to remain a member of the unions during that year. The fact that the
Union Defendants accepted her resignation from the unions upon submission of her paperwork
does not change the terms of the membership agreement or waive any provision; the membership
agreement does not state that a member is unable to withdraw from the unions at any time they
20
wish, merely that they will be obligated to continue to pay dues until they properly revoke the
authorization during the August window period. Indeed, as stated above, the membership
agreement explicitly specifies that the authorization remains in effect “whether I am or remain a
member of the Union”; it is only the authorization to deduct dues that must be revoked within the

August window, not union membership itself. Plaintiff’s selective reading of the plain language
of the agreement cannot change this fact. Because the Union Defendants’ actions were entirely
in line with the terms of the agreement, they did not waive any part of that agreement as a result
of their conduct.
Third, Plaintiff’s argument that the terms of the membership agreement are ambiguous
because it states that revocation can be made in the “window period of August 1 and August 31
or another window period specified in a collective bargaining agreement” is also unpersuasive.
There is nothing ambiguous about this language. The only possible window periods under the
terms of the agreement are the specific one stated in the membership agreement, or one that is
contained within a collective bargaining agreement relevant to the union and the employer.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, discovery is not required to determine anything here, especially
given that Plaintiff appended at least a portion of the relevant collective bargaining agreement to
her Complaint, making it an appropriate piece of evidence for the Court to consider on this
motion. See Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that a court
considering a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[b][6] may look to “facts stated on the fact of
the complaint,” “documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by
reference,” and “matters of which judicial notice may be taken”). Further, to the extent that the
language “a collective bargaining agreement” could arguably be considered ambiguous because

21
it does not specify a specific collective bargaining agreement, it is clear Plaintiff understands
exactly what collective bargaining agreement is implicated, given that she appended it to her
Complaint. A review of the collective bargaining agreement as submitted in full by the Union
Defendants with their motion shows that there is no alternative window period defined in that

agreement. The only window period is therefore one that is explicitly stated in the membership
agreement. As a result, there is nothing materially ambiguous about the terms of the
membership agreement that would invalidate the agreement.
Fourth, Plaintiff’s argument that the Union Defendants breached the membership
agreement by continuing to deduct dues from her wages despite not providing her union benefits
is also not supported by the terms of the agreement itself. Plaintiff affirmatively revoked her
union membership by submitting paperwork to the union. It is not clear why she would expect
that the Union Defendants would continue to provide her with union benefits after she told them
she no longer wanted to be part of the union. Further, the membership agreement clearly states
that the authorization to deduct dues continues until properly revoked within the August window

regardless of whether the person remains a union member during that whole period; the fact that
Plaintiff was continuing to pay dues does not therefore, under the terms of the agreement, entitle
her to continued union benefits after the Union Defendants accepted her resignation. Plaintiff
therefore cannot show on the facts alleged that the Union Defendants committed a material
breach of the membership agreement by failing to continue to provide her with benefits after she
voluntarily chose to leave the union. See Fultz v. Am. Fed. Of State, County and Municipal
Employees, 549 F. Supp. 3d 379, 389 (M.D. Pa 2021) (rejecting a materially identical argument
based on similar agreement language as “nonsensical”).

22
Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that her signing of the
membership agreement and dues deduction authorization was involuntary or that the agreement
itself is unenforceable, she has not shown that there is a material difference between the
circumstances in this case and those that were present in Wheatley and thus no basis for a

different outcome here as to her First Amendment claim.
One more point merits discussion, which does not appear to be addressed in any great
detail by either the District Court or the Second Circuit in Wheatley (although consideration of
such issue is clearly implicated in the rationale applied): Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants
were required to obtain a “valid constitutional rights waiver” from her and that the membership
agreement does not constitute such a waiver. (Dkt. No. 53, at 15-18.) Plaintiff relies on
allegations that she was not aware that signing the membership agreement in 2018 would
constitute a waiver of her First Amendment rights, arguing that, because she was not aware she
was waiving these rights, the membership agreement does not constitute clear and compelling
evidence of an intent to waive these rights. (Id.) However, Plaintiff’s argument that some

additional waiver was required beyond the act of signing the membership agreement is
undermined by Janus itself, which, as was noted above, indicated that payments to a union can
be deducted even from a nonmember of a union where “the employee affirmatively consents to
pay,” and that “[b]y agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their First Amendment rights.”
Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2486. Janus acknowledges that, although waiver cannot be presumed in the
absence of any agreement, a nonmember signing an agreement to pay constitutes an expression
of clear and affirmative consent that acts as a waiver. Id. Thus, to the extent Janus is even
applicable to this case given that Plaintiff was already a member of the union at the time she

23
signed the membership agreement in June 2018 (and therefore was never a “nonmember” of the
union at any point in her relevant employment until she resigned in September 2021, after which
she was still subject to the membership agreement), her signing of the agreement (which again
explicitly stated she was consenting to continue to have dues deducted for the full applicable

year until she provided a valid written revocation of that consent during the August window,
regardless of whether she remained a union member for that whole time) constitutes a valid
waiver of any relevant First Amendment rights for the limited purposes encompassed by the
membership agreement.2 The Second Circuit stated similarly in Wheatley, indicating that
“Appellant affirmatively entered into a voluntary contractual agreement that requires her to pay
dues for a full year even if she resigns her membership during the course of that year,” and that
“[n]othing about that arrangement, which is clearly spelled out in the Membership Agreement to
which Appellant voluntarily consented, violates the First Amendment.” Wheatley, 80 F.4th at
391-92 n.3.3
Because Plaintiff signed the relevant membership agreement and she has not alleged facts

plausibly suggesting that her signing of that document was involuntary or coerced, her First
Amendment claim must be dismissed as a matter of law on the same legal grounds discussed by
the Second Circuit in Wheatley.

2 Indeed, even if Janus is not directly applicable due to the factual differences, there is no
logical reason why an affirmative agreement to pay union fees by a nonmember would constitute
a waiver of First Amendment rights, where the same agreement by a member would not
constitute such a waiver (in the event they resign their union membership before the period of the
agreement has finished).

3 The Second Circuit notably found that Janus did not apply at all to the case because the
appellant was not a “nonmember” as that term was defined in Janus. Wheatley, 80 F.4th at 391.
24
2. Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff’s arguments regarding her Fourteenth Amendment due process claim must also
be rejected for the reasons outlined in Wheatley. Specifically, the Second Circuit has already
rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Teachers Union, Local No. 1,

AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), provides procedures that the Union Defendants
in this case were required to offer her; in so doing, the Second Circuit has reasoned that the
Hudson procedures are both irrelevant post-Janus because charging any fees against
nonmembers is no longer constitutional and, in any event, Hudson does not apply to individuals
who are union members or who are subject to a membership agreement to pay union dues.
Wheatley, 80 F.4th at 392. Indeed, Janus effectively eliminated the distinction noted in Hudson
between chargeable and nonchargeable fees by finding that nonmembers could not be required to
pay either type of fees unless they gave sufficient consent, and therefore made obsolete the
procedures implemented by Hudson for determining how certain types of nonmember fees could
be used by the receiving union. Even assuming for the sake of pure argument that Plaintiff

became a “nonmember” as that term is used in Hudson and Janus (which she is not because,
although she resigned from the union, she was still subject to the membership agreement she
signed), there would therefore still be no basis to require the application of the Hudson
procedures post-Janus. Plaintiff’s attempt to rely on Hudson as a basis for her Fourteenth
Amendment claim is therefore nonsensical.

25
The other bases Plaintiff raises for her due process claim are all intertwined with the
arguments regarding her First Amendment claim that have already been rejected.4 (Dkt. No. 53,
at 25-26.) As in Wheatley, because Plaintiff’s arguments regarding a violation of her First
Amendment rights fail, so too must her Fourteenth Amendment claim premised on that supposed

protected interest. See Wheatley, 80 F.4th at 392-93 (“Because Appellant was contractually
obligated to pay union dues pursuant to the Membership Agreement that she voluntarily signed,
and the District’s withholding of union dues did not constitute a violation of her First
Amendment rights, Appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment claim fails.”).
C. The Union Defendants’ Remaining Arguments

Having found that Plaintiff’s substantive claims must be dismissed as a matter of law, the
Court will address the other arguments raised only briefly, primarily to say that it agrees with
Judge Scullin’s well-reasoned and detailed resolution of those same issues in the District Court’s
Wheatly decision. Wheatley, 629 F. Supp. 3d at 26-34.5 Specifically, Judge Scullin concluded
that the factual allegations were insufficient to plausibly suggest that the union defendants in that
case were acting under the color of state law because the membership agreement was essentially

4 She does argue in a cursory fashion that the Union Defendants failed to provide her with
any process “to object to the dues being deducted from her pay, the amount they deducted, or the
ways (including subsidizing their political speech) that they spent her money.” (Dkt. No. 53, at
25-26.) Yet this argument again ignores the fact that the deduction of dues was premised on her
voluntary signing of the membership agreement and choice to join the union, and she has not
provided any authority regarding the existence of any right of a union member to dictate how
their dues can be spent by the union.

5 The Second Circuit did not review these additional findings, but instead assumed, for the
sake of argument, that a state action was taken by the union and school district defendants in
order to address the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. Wheatley, 80 F.4th at 390.

26
a private contract between the plaintiff and the defendant unions and the plaintiff did not allege
that the school district “received any benefit from performing its ministerial task of” collecting
and forwarding plaintiff’s dues, such that the source of the alleged constitutional harm was not a
policy of the school district but rather a private agreement without any joint action between the

union defendants and the school district. Id. at 26-30. Judge Scullin further found that there was
no plausibly alleged basis for the imposition of Monell liability against the defendant school
district because “it was not a policy of Defendant District, but rather state law [the Taylor Law],
that required Defendant District to deduct union membership dues from Plaintiff’s wages until
Plaintiff revoked that authorization ‘in accordance with the terms of the signed authorization.’”
Id. at 30-34. Because the terms of the membership agreement and the relevant facts of Wheatley
are all materially similar to those asserted in the Complaint in the current case, a different
outcome is not warranted here regarding any of those arguments.6 The Court therefore finds
that, alternatively, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the Union Defendants acted under the

6 Any potential additional First Amendment claims Plaintiff might seek to plead would be
subject to dismissal for many of the same reasons already discussed as to her existing First
Amendment claim. (See Dkt. No. 53, at 31 [stating that Plaintiff expects to seek leave to amend
her Complaint to add claims for violations of her right of freedom of speech and association
related to the Union Defendants’ actions in requiring her to complete two forms in order to
resign from the union].) Because such claims would necessarily be dismissed as a matter of law,
particularly based on the inability to plausibly allege that the Union Defendants are state actors,
allowing Plaintiff the opportunity to make such an amendment would be futile. See Kane v.
Mount Pleasant Cent. Sch. Dist., 80 F.4th 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2023) (noting that “[p]roposed
amendments are futile if they would fail to cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim under Rule
12[b][6] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).

27
color of state law or that Defendant SCSD can be held liable for complying with the
nondiscretionary requirements of the Taylor law.’
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that the Union Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 47) is GRANTED;
and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED, her claims
requesting injunctive or declaratory relief are dismissed without prejudice, and her remaining
claims are dismissed with prejudice.
Dated: February 27, 2024
Syracuse, New York

Glenn T. Suddaby ;
U.S. District Judge

7 Plaintiffs various allegations in the Complaint to the effect that “Defendants, act[ed] in
concert under color of state law” are legal conclusions that need not be accepted as true. (See
e.g., Dkt. No. 1, at Jf 43-47, 56, 63.) See Cunningham vy. New York State Dept. of Labor, 05-
CV-1127, 2006 WL 2639372, at *1 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2006) (Hurd, J.) (noting that “only
plaintiff's factual allegations, as opposed to conclusory allegations or legal conclusions, are
taken as true” on a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[b][6]).
28

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10316448. Public record. Not legal advice.