# Davis-Guider v. City of Troy

> District Court, N.D. New York · March 29, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10315890

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 29, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MICHAEL DAVIS-GUIDER,
Plaintiff,
1:17-CV-1290
v. (DJS)
4) CITY OF TROY, RONALD FOUNTAIN, DANIELLE
COONRADT, CHARLES McDONALD, RENSSELAER
COUNTY, MICHAEL SIKIRICA, and TIM COLANERI,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
OFFICE OF BRETT H. KLEIN, PLLC BRETT H. KLEIN, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
_,|305 Broadway
Suite 600
New York, New York 10007
PATTISON, SAMPSON, GINSBERG, RHIANNON I. GIFFORD, ESQ.
& GRIFFIN, PLLC
Attorney for City of Troy Defendants
22 First Street
P.O. Box 208
Troy, New York 12181-0208
BAILEY, JOHNSON, & PECK, P.C. CRYSTAL R. PECK, ESQ.
“| Attorney for Rensselaer County Defendants JOHN W. BAILEY, ESQ.
5 Pine West Plaza WILLIAM C. FIRTH, ESQ.
Suite 507
Albany, New York 12205
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This case began on February 26, 2015 with the death of two year old “V.D.,” the
daughter of Plaintiff's girlfriend. On October 2, 2015, Plaintiff was arrested in connection

with the death, following his indictment by a Rensselaer County Grand Jury. Plaintiff
has long maintained his innocence and was acquitted by a jury in Rensselaer County
Court in August 2016. In 2017, Plaintiff filed this action alleging violations of his rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Dkt. No. 1. The operative pleading before the
Court is Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 77, Third Am. Compl. As a
result of the decision on a motion to dismiss filed by the County Defendants, Dkt. No. 35,

_| the following causes of action remain in this litigation:
1) false arrest/false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted against
Defendants Coonradt, Fountain, McDonald, and Sikirica,! Third Am. Compl. at 99 64-
66;
2) malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted against Defendants
Coonradt, Fountain, McDonald, Colaneri, and Sikirica, id. at {| 67-76;
3) denial of the right to a fair trial under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted against
Defendants Coonradt, Fountain, McDonald, Colaneri, and Sikirica, id. at {§ 77-81;
4) failure to intervene under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserted against Defendants
Coonradt, Fountain, McDonald, and Colaneri, id. at JJ 82-86;

' Plaintiff has now abandoned this claim. See Dkt. No. 125, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 18 (noting that “plaintiff has
withdrawn his false arrest claim”); see also id. at p. 12 n.2.

5) section 1983 conspiracy claims related to Plaintiff's false arrest, malicious
prosecution, and fair trial claims, id. at J§ 87-90;7
6) Monell municipal liability claims against the City of Troy and County of
Rensselaer, id. at J 91-113; and

7) a state law claim for malicious prosecution against all Defendants, id. at JJ 114-
124,
The parties proceeded through discovery and presently pending are Motions for
Summary Judgment on behalf of Defendants Sikirica and Rensselaer County, Dkt. No.
115, and Defendants City of Troy, Colaneri, Coonradt, Fountain, and McDonald. Dkt.
No. 116.° Plaintiff opposes the Motions. Dkt. Nos. 121-125. Defendants filed replies.

_| Dkt. Nos. 129-130. The Court heard oral arguments on the Motions in December 2022
and now grants each Motion for the reasons set forth below.
Il. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In February 2015, Plaintiff was living in Troy, New York with his girlfriend
Rebecca Parker and Ms. Parker’s two and a half year old daughter, V.D. Dkt. No. 115-4
at pp. 22-23 & 33. On the morning of February 26, 2015, after Ms. Parker went to work,
“| Plaintiff was home alone with V.D. Dkt. No. 123-1 at pp. 56-67. At some point around
7:00 that morning, Plaintiff helped V.D. go to the bathroom and put her back to sleep. Jd.
at pp. 56-57. Plaintiff also fell asleep. /d. at p. 59. Later that morning or in the early

2 Given Plaintiff's withdrawal of his false arrest claim, the related conspiracy claim is dismissed.
3 The respective motions were also originally made on behalf of Joel Abelove and Adam Mason, who by stipulation
of the parties have since been dismissed from the case. Dkt. No. 131.

afternoon, Plaintiff discovered V.D. unresponsive in her bed. /d. at p. 60; Dkt. No. 115-
4 at p. 54. When she did not respond to his calls, he attempted CPR. Dkt. No. 123-1 at
p. 61. Unable to find a working phone in his apartment, Plaintiff went across the street
to call 911. Jd. at p. 66-67. Emergency personnel arrived at Plaintiff's apartment as did

officials from the Troy Police Department. Dkt. No. 115-4 at p. 72. V.D. was transported
to St. Mary’s Hospital and was in cardiac arrest when she arrived at the hospital. Dkt.
No. 116-3 at p. 20. V.D. was pronounced dead soon after the ambulance arrived at the
hospital. Id.
Troy Police officials began an investigation into the circumstances of V.D.’s death,
which included interviewing Plaintiff on February 26 and on several subsequent

occasions. See Dkt. No. 116-1 at 9 6, 34, 38, & 70. On February 27, 2015, Dr. Sikirica
conducted an autopsy on V.D. Dkt. No. 115-9 at p. 25. The investigation into V.D.’s
death continued for several months without an arrest. Dr. Sikirica issued a final autopsy
report on August 14, 2015. Dkt. No. 123-28. The report concluded that there was “[n]o
evidence of significant natural disease,” but found “multiple lacerations of the liver with
right rib fractures due to blunt force trauma.” at p. 11.
Defendants Fountain and Sikirica testified before a Rensselaer County Grand Jury
investigating V.D.’s death. Dkt. No. 123-9. The Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging Plaintiff with two counts of manslaughter and endangering the welfare of a
child. Dkt. No. 115-18. Plaintiff was acquitted following a jury trial. Third Am. Compl.
at 9 45.

I. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is
appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the burden to

demonstrate through “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with [ | affidavits, if any,” that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
F.D.L.C. v. Giammettei, 34 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of
the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that the moving party

_| claims will demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323. To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant
must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and cannot rest
merely on allegations or denials of the facts submitted by the movant. FED. R. CIv. P.
56(c); see also Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Conclusory
allegations or denials are ordinarily not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment when the moving party has set out a documentary case.”); Rexnord Holdings,
Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1994).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nora
Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736, 742 (2d Cir. 1998). “[T]he
trial court’s task at the summary judgment motion stage of the litigation is carefully

limited to discerning whether there are any genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not
to deciding them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-finding; it does not
extend to issue-resolution.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d
1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994).

5 IV. DISCUSSION
A. Malicious Prosecution
“To state a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim a plaintiff ‘must show a violation
of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and must establish the elements of a malicious
prosecution claim under state law.’” Cornelio v. Connecticut, 32 F.4th 160, 178 (2d Cir.
2022) (quoting Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2010)).

New York, that substantive showing requires Plaintiff to prove “(1) the commencement
or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the
termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause
for the criminal proceeding and (4) actual malice.” Kee v. City of New York, 12 F.4th
150, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Smith-Hunter v. Harvey, 95 N.Y.2d 191, 195
(2000)). No party contests that Plaintiff, given his acquittal, satisfies the favorable
“termination element. Defendants do, however, maintain that summary judgment is
appropriate as to the remaining elements.
1. Initiation of the Criminal Prosecution
Defendants Coonradt and Colaneri seek summary judgment on the ground that
they did not initiate Plaintiff's prosecution. Dkt. No. 116-9 at pp. 8-10.

“To initiate a prosecution, a defendant must do more than report the crime or give
testimony. He must ‘play[ ] an active role in the prosecution, such as giving advice and
encouragement or importuning the authorities to act.”” Manganiello v. City of New York,
612 F.3d at 163 (quoting Rohman v. New York City Transit Authority, 215 F.3d 208, 217

(2d Cir. 2000)) (alteration in the original). “Initiation in this context is a term of art.”
Sotak v. Bertoni, 501 F. Supp. 3d 59, 83 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (internal quotation and citation
omitted). By that, courts look not to whether a party had any role in events leading to the
prosecution, but whether a party had an active or significant role in bringing it about.
Tretola v. Cnty. of Nassau, 14 F. Supp. 3d 58, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Mitchell v. Victoria
Home, 434 F. Supp. 2d 219, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

a. Defendant Coonradt
The undisputed record establishes that Coonradt played a limited role in the
investigation of V.D.’s death. The only substantive factual dispute between the parties
about her role is whether a particular statement attributed to Plaintiff and recorded by
Coonradt in her police report was false. Coonradt was the first police officer on the scene.
Dkt. No. 116-2 at 4. She filed a report recounting that Plaintiff told her that he had gone
”\ to wake up V.D. at “1100 and she wouldn’t wake up. When I told Michael it was 1:30,
he didn’t seem to understand and said ‘time must be flying.’” /d. at Ex. B. Plaintiff
disputes the accuracy of the timing reported by Coonradt. See Dkt. No. 123-1 at pp. 79-
81. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that he did not tell Coonradt what time he attempted to
wake V.D. /d. at p. 80. While Plaintiff disputes the reported timing, the record reflects
that V.D.’s mother later gave police a statement in which she reported that Plaintiff had

told her he went to wake V.D. at 11 a.m. or 12 p.m. Dkt. No. 123-8 at p. 2. While a
dispute of fact may exist about statements reportedly made by Plaintiff, the Court does
not find that dispute material to a determination regarding the extent of Coonradt’s role
in the investigation.

Coonradt had no other role in the investigation of V.D.’s death beyond her initial
interactions with Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 116-2 at 26. She did not testify before the Grand
Jury and was not present when Plaintiff was arrested. /d. at J] 29 & 30. “Clearly, these
allegations - involving the taking of a statement and the drafting of a police report - are
insufficient to constitute the requisite personal involvement of Defendants in initiating
Plaintiffs prosecution.” Melendez v. City of New York, 2017 WL 4221083, at *4
_|(S-D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017). Merely furnishing information to those investigating a crime
is insufficient to establish an individual’s role in initiating a prosecution. Jiang v. Corpuz,
2020 WL 5517237, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2020). And even assuming that Coonradt
was mistaken, “a mistake does not support liability for malicious prosecution.”
Bornschein v. Herman, 304 F. Supp. 3d 296, 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2018).
Plaintiff nonetheless argues that Coonradt played a role in initiating the criminal
prosecution against him because her purportedly inaccurate statement “created an
inference that there was two hours of essentially ‘lost time’ between when plaintiff woke
up and when he called police.” Dkt. No. 125, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 15. In Plaintiff's
view, because a reasonable jury could find that this “created a gap in plaintiff's story,” it
may have contributed to the initiation of Plaintiff's prosecution. Jd. This view of the
initiation element has no limiting principle. Under it, any investigating officer who makes

any report which a plaintiff later alleges was inaccurate or untrue could be said to have
initiated a prosecution. The Court declines to adopt such a sweeping theory of what it
means to initiate a prosecution.
Coonradt’s Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore, is granted.

b. Defendant Colaneri
The Court reaches the same conclusion with respect to Defendant Colaneri. There
is no meaningful dispute among the parties regarding his role in the investigation. He
was present during an early interview with Plaintiff and asked questions, but all agree that
Plaintiff did not incriminate himself during that interview, it did not lead to Plaintiff's
arrest at that time, and no claim of misconduct during the interview has been made against
_,|Colaneri. He also attended V.D.’s autopsy and a meeting of people involved in the
investigation. Dkt. No. 116-5 at 12 & 24. Unlike even Defendant Coonradt, however,
there is no allegation that Colaneri authored any false investigative reports. He was
present when Plaintiff was arrested following his indictment, but Colaneri testified neither
before the Grand Jury nor at Plaintiff's trial. Dkt. No. 116-5 at 4] 28, 30, & 32. None of
those undisputed facts suggest an active role in the investigation or initiation of the
”) criminal charges against Plaintiff. Initiation requires specific actions on the part of the
Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege here. Keller v. Vill. of Hempstead,
2014 WL 2718573, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2014) (dismissing claim in absence of
“specific” allegation of role in initiating prosecution); Roper v. Hynes, 2006 WL 2773032,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006) (same).

In opposing the Motion, Plaintiff says of Colaneri only that he was “directly
involved in nearly every step of the investigation that ultimately led to Sikirica
determining V.D.’s death was a purported homicide.” P1.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 15-16.
Plaintiff offers no evidence to support that assertion, however, and “Plaintiff's conclusory

allegations do not satisfy the initiation prong of a malicious prosecution claim.” Salim v.
City of New York, 2017 WL 946345, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2017); see also Rys v.
Grimm, 2021 WL 827671, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2021).
Defendant Colaneri’s Motion for Summary Judgment, therefore, is granted.
2. Probable Cause
“TU|nder New York law, indictment by a grand jury creates a presumption of

_| Probable cause that may only be rebutted by evidence that the indictment was procured
by ‘fraud, perjury, the suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad
faith.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Colon v. City
of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82 (1983)). “[I]t is the plaintiff who bears the burden of
proof in rebutting the presumption of probable cause that arises from the indictment.” Jd.
at 73; see also Dufort v. City of New York, 874 F.3d 338, 352 (2d Cir. 2017); Bernard v.
United States, 25 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 1994). That burden has been characterized as
“heavy.” Cunny v. City of New York, 2001 WL 863431, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2001)
(citing Simms v. Village of Albion, 115 F.3d 1098, 1107 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Plaintiff was arrested after the Grand Jury returned an indictment charging him
with manslaughter in the second degree. Dkt. No. 115-18. Plaintiff recognizes that the
Indictment created a presumption of probable cause. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 19.

However, he makes several arguments regarding the evidence presented, or not presented,
to the Grand Jury to overcome that presumption. These arguments fail to satisfy
Plaintiff's heavy burden. Summary judgment for all Defendants, therefore, is warranted.
Plaintiff contends that the District Attorney’s Office “presented extremely limited

evidence to the grand jury ... which appeared to intentionally omit” evidence Plaintiff
believes is exculpatory, including findings in the autopsy report. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at
pp. 19 & 22. First, the District Attorney has been dismissed from this case in large part
based on Plaintiff's concession that the DA 1s “absolutely immune” from suit for his role
in prosecuting the case. /d. at p. 18. In light of that and on the facts of this case, Plaintiff
cannot hold the remaining parties liable for the evidence the District Attorney’s Office

_| failed to present to the Grand Jury. Burgess v. DeJoseph, 2017 WL 1066662, at *7
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2017), aff'd, 725 F. App’x 36 (2d Cir. 2018) (“it was the prosecutor,
not the Defendant officers, who had the discretion and authority to decide what evidence
to present to the grand jury”) (internal quotations omitted). Second, “[t]he People
maintain broad discretion in presenting their case to the Grand Jury and need not seek
evidence favorable to the defendant or present all of their evidence tending to exculpate
the accused.” Williams v. City of New York, 2003 WL 22434151, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
23, 2003), aff'd, 120 F. App’x 388 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting People v. Mitchell, 82 N.Y.2d
509, 515 (1993)); see also United States v. Regan, 103 F.3d 1072, 1081 (2d Cir. 1997)
(“The government had no obligation to present exculpatory material to a grand jury.”’)
(citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1992)). Given the lack of a duty to
do so, the failure to present exculpatory evidence is not evidence of bad faith. Savino v.
10

City of New York, 331 F.3d at 73; Battisti v. Rice, 2017 WL 78891, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.
9, 2017) (citing cases). As a result, the purported limited nature of the evidence presented
by the District Attorney’s Office is not a basis for finding the presumption of probable
cause overcome.

Plaintiff also relies extensively on his view that Defendants Fountain and Sikirica
testified falsely at the Grand Jury. This, he claims, is evidence of bad faith sufficient to
rebut the presumption. See Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 20-21. For reasons outlined below
in Section [V(B) of this opinion, the Court disagrees with Plaintiff's characterization of
much of the testimony he relies on as false. But in the first instance, this argument runs
headlong against the decision in Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 (2012) which affords

_| absolute immunity from section 1983 liability for testimony presented to a Grand Jury.
Historically, witnesses who testified at a trial were afforded absolute immunity for
that testimony. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983). In Rehberg, the Court
considered the extent of immunity a witness testifying before a Grand Jury should receive.
The Court concluded that “grand jury witnesses should enjoy the same immunity as
witnesses at trial.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. at 369. By its express terms, that immunity
extends to law enforcement personnel testifying before a Grand Jury. Jd. at 368-369;
Coggins v. Buonora, 776 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2015); Boyde v. Barnes, 2022 WL
11765034, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2022) (Report-Recommendation and Order) (“This
immunity attaches even if the testimony is false and given by a police officer.”).
“Following Rehberg, a plaintiff may not be able to rebut the presumption of probable
cause by relying on a police officer’s perjurious testimony before the grand jury.”
1]

Adamou v. Doyle, 2017 WL 1230541, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2017); see also Crespo v.
Rivera, 2018 WL 4500868, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2018) (collecting cases). Under
these standards, the allegedly false evidence relied upon by Plaintiff to rebut the
presumption of probable cause is immunized under Rehberg to the extent it is the result

of testimony offered to the Grand Jury and cannot be used for that purpose by Plaintiff.
Appling v. City of New York, 2021 WL 695061, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2021) (“Plaintiff
cannot, in light of Rehberg, rely on grand jury testimony to rebut the presumption of
probable cause created by his indictment.”).*
Citing no other evidence of bad faith, Plaintiff is unable to overcome the
presumption of probable cause and his malicious prosecution claim, therefore, must be

dismissed.
3. Actual Malice
Nor has Plaintiff shown any evidence to suggest actual malice existed here. “As
for actual malice, plaintiff] ] must show that the defendant ‘commenced the prior criminal
proceeding due to a wrong or improper motive, something other than a desire to see the
ends of justice served.’” LaFontaine v. City of New York, 2009 WL 3335362, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2009) (quoting Rounseville v. Zahl, 13 F.3d 625, 630 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff's opposition papers rely almost exclusively on his view that questions of fact
exist regarding probable cause which would then carry over to the actual malice element.
Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 23-24. For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has not

4 Nor can a plaintiff attempt an end run around this immunity by alleging a conspiracy with other individuals to
present false testimony. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S.at 369.
12

established questions of fact on the probable cause element. “Therefore, the [P]laintiff’s
argument that malice may be inferred by a lack of probable cause fails.” McGee v. Dunn,
940 F. Supp. 2d 93, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Plaintiff also briefly alleges that malice is shown by what Plaintiff considers

Defendants’ “myopic focus” on him as a suspect. Dkt. No. 125 at p. 24. He, however,
offers nothing more than this conclusory statement to support this assertion, which is
insufficient to establish malice. Fowler v. Kingston City Police Dep’t, 2009 WL 3064775,
at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2009). Manganiello v. City of N.Y., on which Plaintiff relies,
also does not support his position. Plaintiff takes the Second Circuit’s reference to
myopic focus as a basis for inferring actual malice out of context because it was just one

_| of several factors identified by the Circuit in making an inference of malice. 612 F.3d at
164. The other cited grounds for inferring malice were the defendant’s “otherwise
seemingly inexplicable false statements about [plaintiff's] conduct that were contrary to
the reported first-hand knowledge of others; [defendant’s] willingness to coerce an
inculpatory statement from one unwilling person in exchange for not reporting that
person’s known criminal activities; and his willingness to have [plaintiff] indicted on the
basis of testimony of another person who was known to have lied to [defendant] at least
once in this very matter and who was evidently willing to intimidate others into falsely
providing the evidence [defendant] sought.” /d. There is no claim of coercion here, nor
any claim that Defendants knowingly relied on false testimony of third parties. And while
Plaintiff claims that Defendants falsified statements, he offers no evidence that
Defendants were aware of any third party who supported Plaintiff's version of the
13

particular statements at issue here. Those factors, present in Manganiello are, therefore,
absent here. Moreover, there is no dispute that Plaintiff was alone with V.D. when she
was found unresponsive. Given that fact, police officials certainly had a reasonable basis
to examine Plaintiff's role in her death. For all these reasons, Manganiello is inapposite.

The Court, therefore, grants Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s section 1983 malicious prosecution claim.>
B. Right to a Fair Trial
Plaintiff's claim regarding the denial of a fair trial relates to the alleged “creation,
forwarding to prosecutors and use of false, fabricated evidence.” Third. Am. Compl. at J
80. The Third Amended Complaint asserts this claim against all “individually named

defendants.” Jd. at 4 78. Plaintiff now appears to pursue this claim only against
Defendants Fountain, Coonradt, and Sikirica. See Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 26 (discussing
City Defendants’ Motion and noting that this claim should “proceed to trial as to Fountain
and Coonradt’) & 28 (asserting issues of fact as to Dr. Sikirica on this claim). Because
there are no specific allegations of fabrication on the part of Colaneri and McDonald, the
fair trial claim against them is dismissed.
“To succeed on a fabricated-evidence claim, a plaintiff must establish that an (1)
investigating official (2) fabricated information (3) that is likely to influence a jury’s
verdict, (4) forwarded that information to prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff suffered a
deprivation of life, liberty, or property as a result.” Jeanty v. Cerminaro, 2023 WL

5 Given that “the state and the federal claims [are] identical,” Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir.
2003), Plaintiff’s state law malicious prosecution claim is also dismissed.
14

325012, at *5 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 2023) (quoting Ashley v. City of New York, 992 F.3d 128,
139 (2d Cir. 2021)).
The Court assumes for purposes of these Motions that Plaintiff has established, or
at least raised a question of fact, as to the first, fourth, and fifth elements identified above.

The Court, therefore, focuses tts analysis specifically on whether Plaintiff has raised a
question of fact about the existence of fabricated evidence that was likely to influence a
jury’s verdict.°
As U.S. District Court Judge Mae Agostino recently noted, “there is a notable
bar for evidence to be considered ‘fabricated.’” McDonough v. Smith, 2022 WL 3279348,
at *24 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2022). Courts across the country have recognized that

_| ‘testimony that is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated merely
because it turns out to have been wrong.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 295 (3d Cir.
2014); see also Richards v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 2022 WL 2292830, at *1 (9th Cir.
June 24, 2022); Johnson v. City of New York, 2020 WL 2192830, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May
5, 2020). This imposes a high burden on a civil plaintiff. See Black v. Montgomery Cnty.,
835 F.3d 358, 372 (3d Cir. 2016)(quoting Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d at 295) (“we expect
that it will be an unusual case in which a police officer cannot obtain a summary judgment
in a civil action charging him with having fabricated evidence used in an earlier criminal
case.”).

6 The Court also assumes for purposes of this Motion, that Rehberg does not preclude Plaintiff from relying on the
objected to statements for purposes of his fair trial claim. See Rucks v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 3d 138, 149
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
15

With respect to alleged fabrication, a plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment
simply by raising a question of fact as to the truth of the information that is forwarded to
prosecutors. Bennett v. Vidal, 267 F. Supp. 3d 487, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“[A] mere
difference in testimony between the defendant [officer], the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's

mother of what occurred on the day of the arrest is not sufficient evidence to create a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether [the officer] intentionally falsified
information or fabricated evidence.”’); see also Hewitt v. City of New York, 2012 WL
4503277, at *6 & 11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012), aff'd, 544 F. App’x 24 (2d Cir. 2013).
Despite Plaintiff's assertion that facts relied upon by officers are fabrications, “summary
judgment is appropriate where a plaintiff has failed to present evidence indicating that an

officer falsified information or fabricated evidence.” Johnson v. McMorrow, 2023 WL
1797063, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2023) (internal quotations and alteration omitted) (citing
cases).
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Coonradt, Fountain, and Sikirica each fabricated
evidence, either by falsely reporting statements made by Plaintiff or by misrepresenting
the evidence collected. As discussed more fully below, as to none has Plaintiff raised a
question of fact as to fabrication or materiality of the evidence at issue. What the record
shows is not that the evidence which Plaintiff characterizes as “false and misleading,”
Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 19, was in fact fabricated, but simply that Plaintiff has a different
view of that evidence. Each Defendant, therefore, is entitled to summary judgment.

16

1. The City Defendants
As discussed above, Coonradt allegedly fabricated a report following her initial
atrival at Plaintiff's residence. Plaintiff alleges Coonradt fabricated a statement
suggesting “lost time between when plaintiff woke up and when he called police.” Pl.’s

Mem. of Law at p. 15. Plaintiff also alleges that Coonradt falsely testified that on the
morning of V.D.’s death, Plaintiff told police that he put V.D. back in bed because he was
tired, while Plaintiff claims he did so because she seemed tired. Plaintiff's only evidence
that Coonradt fabricated the first of the two statements is his denial that he made the
statements. See Dkt. No. 122-1 at 26. The record, however, demonstrates that he made
a similar, if not verbatim, statement to others. Fountain testified that Plaintiff had told

_| him he woke up sometime between 11 a.m. and noon and could not explain the gap in
time between waking up and calling 911. Dkt. No. 123-9 at p. 26. Plaintiffs girlfriend
also reported to police that Plaintiff had told her that he had awakened between 11 a.m.
and noon. Dkt. No. 123-8 at p. 2. As such, this is not a case where there is a stark conflict
between the plaintiff and one defendant about what was said, see Bellamy v. City of N_Y.,
914 F.3d 727, 746 (2d Cir. 2019), but one where multiple sources report the same or
similar evidence. See Isaac v. City of New York, 2020 WL 1694300, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
6, 2020) (“Plaintiff claims that the testimony of four witnesses and [the] defendant □ □ .
was false, but offers no evidence in support, other than his own testimony.”). Given the
record evidence that Plaintiff made this statement to multiple people, he cannot meet his
burden to establish that Coonradt “created false information.” Garnett v. Undercover
Officer C0039, 839 F.3d 265, 280 (2d Cir. 2016). Nor, in any event, could a reasonable
17

jury conclude that this one comment was likely to influence the ultimate verdict of the
criminal jury, or that the inclusion of the statement in a single police report, months before
Plaintiff was indicted had any role at all in Plaintiff being deprived of his liberty. As to
the second alleged fabrication, Plainiff cites to Coonradt’s testimony during Plaintiff's
criminal case, but does not cite to any evidence at all from any source suggesting that the

statement was untrue. See Dkt. No. 122-1 at § 92.
Consider next the testimony offered by Defendant Fountain that Plaintiff now
claims was false or misleading. According to Plaintiff:
These false facts include Fountain’s testimony to the grand jury that Davis said
it was a normal occurrence for V.D. to wake up tired, that V.D.’s bed was
really neat and made up, and not fussed or messed up at all, and therefore
inconsistent with someone performing CPR on the bed as Davis claimed he
did, that Davis and Parker were not prevented from going in the ambulance to
the hospital, and that Davis was calm, subdued, even keeled, and not acting
like you would think somebody would if they had found a two-and-a-half-
year-old who wasn’t breathing.
Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 20.
Plaintiff has offered no independent evidence to suggest fabrication. See
Demosthene v. City of New York, 2018 WL 10072931, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 20, 2018),

eport and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 3992868 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2019), aff'd,
831 F. App’x 530 (2d Cir. 2020). What the record establishes at most regarding this
testimony is that Plaintiff disagrees with the statements made by Fountain to the Grand
Jury. That, however, as just noted falls far short of his burden on the Motion for Summary
Judgment because “a plaintiff cannot survive summary judgment merely by establishing
a genuine issue of fact as to the veracity of the information that the officer forwarded to

18

prosecutors.” Steinbergin v. City of New York, 2021 WL 396690, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
4, 2021), aff'd, 2022 WL 1231709 (2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2022); see also Lauderdale v. City of
New York, 2018 WL 1413066, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2018).
Fountain testified that Plaintiff commented to him that it was a “normal occurrence

for [V.D.] to be a little tired” and go back to bed in the morning. Dkt. No. 123-9 at pp.
56-57. While Plaintiff cites to several other statements in the record as evidence that this
statement was false, none establishes the falsity of Fountain’s testimony. Plaintiff cites,
for example, to a statement from V.D.’s mother that she observed V.D. to be “a little
sluggish.” Dkt. No. 123-8. While speaking to police, Plaintiff advised that V.D. “seemed
extremely tired” the morning of her death. Dkt. No. 123-10 at p. 3. These statements,

_| which are consistent with Fountain’s testimony, simply fail to demonstrate the falsity of,
let alone the fabrication of, Fountain’s testimony.
During his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he attempted CPR on V.D. in the
bedroom. Specifically, he testified:
Q. So, how did you -- describe for me how you gave CPR when she was in the
bed?
A. I blew into her mouth and I pushed down a little bit on her chest area and I
blew into her mouth again and it seemed like her stomach would like stay full.
So, I tried to push it down a little bit. I put no pressure on her at all because I
was very nervous and scared. And I tried that twice. Nothing happened. So, I
took her into the living room and I tried to like use these phones that were on
the table.
Dkt. No. 123-1 at p. 19; see also Dkt. No. 115-4 at p. 38 (“I tried two times on the bed.”’).
Fountain testified to the Grand Jury about the condition of V.D.’s bedroom that V.D.’s
bed “looked like made.” Dkt. No. 123 at p. 29. He further told the Grand Jury that it did
19

not appear that the bed was “messed up.” /d. According to Plaintiff this testimony gave
the false impression to the jury that Plaintiff had not been truthful regarding statements
he made about conducting CPR on the bed. Dkt. No. 125 at p. 20. The record of
Fountain’s Grand Jury testimony belies this claim because, despite his testimony about

the condition of the bed, Fountain testified very clearly that he did not know whether or
not CPR had been performed. Dkt. No. 123-9 at p. 30.
Nor does Plaintiff's claim that Fountain falsely testified that no one prevented
Plaintiff or V.D.’s mother from riding in the ambulance with her, undercut the
presumption of probable cause. Neither Plaintiff nor Ms. Parker ever specifically stated
that any Defendant or any member of the Troy Police Department prevented them from

tiding in the ambulance. Ms. Parker stated only that “they” would not let her ride in the
ambulance, but it is unclear whether she was referring to police or EMS officials. See
Dkt. No. 123-8. Plaintiff's deposition contained similar testimony indicating “[t]hey just
drove off without either of us in the ambulance.” Dkt. No. 123-1 at p. 30. In fact, he
testified that there was “no” conversation about either of them going in the ambulance
because when he raised the issue “they” just drove off. Jd. In this context, “they” rather
clearly refers to EMS personnel. See id. Fountain testified that neither Troy Police nor
emergency services personnel would have prevented Plaintiff or Ms. Parker from riding
in the ambulance. Dkt. No. 123-9 at pp. 16-17. At most, Plaintiff's deposition can be
read to suggest that Coonradt intimidated Plaintiff into not riding in the ambulance. See
Dkt. No. 123-1 at p. 44. But nothing suggests that, even if true, Fountain was aware of
this when he testified. /d. (noting Fountain arrived after Coonradt told Plaintiff to sit
20

down). Plaintiff's evidence does not provide any basis for concluding that this statement
was false.
Finally, Plaintiff cites Fountain’s testimony before the Grand Jury that Plaintiff
was “calm” and had a “very even keel about everything” when questioned by police. Dkt.

No. 123-9 at p. 24. The record demonstrates that those who interacted with Plaintiff found
him to be experiencing, not surprisingly, a range of emotions. One of the emergency
services personnel who responded to the initial 911 call stated that “did not... act upset,”
while another described Plaintiff as “calm.” Dkt. No. 116-3 at pp. 16 & 18. Others
variously described Plaintiff as “upset,” Dkt. No. 123-21 at p. 4, crying at times, id. at p.
8, and “distraught.” /d. at p. 12. Fountain was describing Plaintiff's demeanor at the

_| Police station after he was taken there for questioning. The other individuals observed
Plaintiff at different times. It is certainly possible, and would not be unexpected, that
Plaintiff's demeanor would be different at different times. There is simply no evidence
in this record that even raises a factual question about the accuracy of Defendant
Fountain’s observations at the moment in time that he testified before the Grand Jury.
The citations to the record on which Plaintiff relies all appear to be from times at which
Defendant Fountain was not present. See Dkt. No. 130-5 at § 73. In any event,
“Tvjariations in one’s testimony or with other witnesses’ testimony do not mean that
testimony is untrustworthy.” Thorpe v. Duve, 2022 WL 332804, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb. 4,
2022).
Nor has Plaintiff satisfied his burden of establishing a question of fact on the
materiality of the fabrications alleged by the City Defendants. “[A] civil plaintiff alleging
21

that . . . the prosecutor used fabricated evidence should not be permitted to survive a
motion for summary judgment . . . unless he can demonstrate that the record supports a
conclusion that the allegedly fabricated evidence was so significant that it could have
affected the outcome of the criminal case.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d at 295; see also

Appling v. City of New York, 2021 WL 695061, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2021) (citing
Garnett v. Undercover Officer C0039, 838 F.3d at 277). The testimony that Plaintiff
alleges was fabricated here falls far short of reaching this standard. Plaintiff's sole
argument in this regard is that the alleged fabrications were material because they “served
to undermine [his] consistent explanation of the incident.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 26.
There is no evidence to suggest that Grand Jurors were made aware of Plaintiffs version
_,|of events, however, and so no way Coonradt’s report or Fountain’s testimony could
undermine that narrative.
2. Defendant Sikirica
Plaintiff also cites several alleged fabrications on the part of Defendant Sikirica
that purportedly denied him the right to a fair trial. The Court finds that Plaintiff has
similarly failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to fabrication regarding the objected to
statements by Dr. Sikirica and, he too, is entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiff first argues that Sikirica falsely testified to the Grand Jury that there was
no natural cause of death possible and cites as evidence his later “concession” that it was
possible the child had died of a natural event. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 20-21. Plaintiff
makes more of the purported concession than the record will bear. At his deposition Dr.
Sikirica stated “[i]t’s possible, I will not say it’s impossible, but it’s very, very highly
22

unlikely that she died from a natural event before this series of events.” Dkt. No. 123-15
at p. 82. He made this statement only after outlining his findings and why he did not view
the death as resulting from natural causes. Dr. Sikirica’s testimony that essentially
anything is theoretically possible is hardly a concession demonstrating perjured
testimony.

Plaintiff next relies on Dr. Sikirica’s testimony regarding particular autopsy report
findings, the performance of CPR, and V.D.’s injuries. Plaintiff's objection that Sikirica
“did not inform” the jury of certain findings, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 21, again goes to
what evidence a prosecutor chooses to present to a Grand Jury and is no basis for finding
fabrication. Burgess v. DeJoseph, 2017 WL 1066662, at * 7.

Plaintiff also makes much of Dr. Sikirica’s allegedly false statements about the
amount of blood present in V.D.’s abdomen, including the purported medical and legal
significance of that testimony, the timing of V.D.’s injuries and potential blood loss, her
condition when emergency personnel responded to the home, and the alleged correlation
of Sikirica’s findings with Plaintiff's statements to police. According to Plaintiff, those
statements were all false. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 21-22 & 27-28. Plaintiff, however,
offers no evidence of falsity, let alone fabrication. The only evidence on these points is
that Plaintiffs criminal trial expert and the retained expert in this case disagree with Dr.
Sikirica’s statements and opinions. Dkt. Nos. 123-6 (trial testimony of Dr. Teas) & 124-
2 (expert report of Dr. Maloney). Plaintiff offers no evidence to suggest that Dr. Sikirica
did not actually hold the medical opinions to which he testified. Neither of the doctors

23

upon whom Plaintiff relies specifically state an opinion that Dr. Sikirica fabricated his
findings.
That these medical professionals disagree about the relevant medical findings
regarding V.D. “evinces nothing more than a professional disagreement over what

conclusions can properly be drawn from the medical evidence; what the evidence does
not do is support the assertion that Defendant[] fabricated evidence.” Ferris v. City of
Cadillac, Mich., 726 F. App’x 473, 483 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Caminata v. Cnty. of
Wexford, 664 F. App’x 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Although this testimony impugns the
quality of [defendant’s] investigation, it is insufficient to establish knowing fabrication or
deliberate or reckless falsehoods, rather than mere negligence.”). At best, Plaintiff has
_|faised questions of fact about the correctness of statements or medical conclusions
reached by Sikirica. That Plaintiff, and some of his witnesses, disagree with Sikirica does
not make those statements or conclusions fabricated.
C. Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity provides an immunity from suit, and thus
liability, for public officials acting reasonably under the circumstances presented.
“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78-79 (2017) (internal quotation and citation
omitted); see also Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996). “A clearly established
right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood
that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (internal
24

quotation omitted); see also Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (“To be clearly
established, a right must be sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.”) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). “The principles of qualified immunity shield an officer from personal liability

when an officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law.”
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244 (2009).
The rights to be free from malicious prosecution and the fabrication of evidence
were clearly established at the time of Plaintiffs prosecution. Kinzer v. Jackson, 316
F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2003); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 357 (2d Cir. 2000).
Conduct of a defendant, however, is judged by a standard of objective reasonableness.

_| funter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991). The appropriate standard for reviewing,
then, is whether, despite these clearly established rights, a reasonable police officer under
the circumstances then presented to Defendants could have known that their actions
violated those rights. Jd. at 227. Here, because the answer to that question is no, the
individual police officers are each entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants Coonradt and Fountain are accused of fabricating evidence about
Plaintiffs conduct and statements on the day of V.D.’s death. Viewed in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, the record might, at best, raise questions about the accuracy of some
of those statements. Others, on the contrary, are clearly supported by contemporary
statements of others. Rebecca Parker, V.D.’s mother, for example, made statements at or
near the time of V.D.’s death that corroborate statements about the way V.D. was acting
on the day of her death and the timeline of her being found unresponsive which Plaintiff
25

now alleges are false. These differing opinions about facts, none of which directly
implicate or exculpate Plaintiff, provide no direct evidence of the fabrication underlying
Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants. Given that, and the corroboration of at least
some of the statements attributed to Defendants, no reasonable police official could have
known that reporting or testifying as to them violated any of Plaintiffs clearly established
o
rights.
Finally, the record reveals no specific claim of misconduct regarding either
Colaneri or McDonald, other than being a part of the overall investigation of V.D.’s death.
Given the lack of specific allegations of misconduct qualified immunity is appropriate as
to them. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Town of Fairfield, 2011 WL 3563160, at *6 (D. Conn.

_| Aug. 15, 2011)
Dr. Sikirica also is entitled to qualified immunity.’ Plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution and fair trial claims accuse Dr. Sikirica of the same misconduct — that he
fabricated evidence. This allegation is largely based on conclusory assertions of a
conspiracy among Defendants. What the record evidence establishes, however, is only
that several different medical professionals have different views of the medical evidence.
light of that evidence, Dr. Sikirica is clearly entitled to qualified immunity. To hold
otherwise, based on a purely conclusory claim of misconduct, would “open the floodgates

7 The Court has considered Sikirica’s claim of entitlement to absolute immunity and the arguments advanced by the
parties on this question. Though ultimately not necessary to resolution of the Motion, the Court finds that absolute
immunity is not proper here. Newton v. City of New York, 738 F. Supp.2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), on which Sikirica
relies, is readily distinguishable since that case involved a lab technician, not a coroner, and in any event the Court
is persuaded here by the cases cited by Plaintiff more closely analogizing the role of a medical examiner to that of
an investigating police officer. See, e.g., Kompare v. Stein, 801 F.2d 883, 887 (7 Cir. 1986). Here, in particular,
Sikirica’s role was closely tied to the investigation of V.D.’s death.
26

for civil rights claims against coroners by acquitted criminal defendants who believe a
coroner made a mistake in performing an autopsy or in reaching a conclusion about the
cause or causes of death of a victim.” Storey v. Chelan Cty., 2011 WL 1575506, at *9
(E.D. Wash. Apr. 26, 2011); see also Laurent v. Edwin, 528 F. Supp. 3d 69, 92 (E.D.N.Y.
2021).

D. Plaintiff's Remaining Claims
Each of Plaintiff's remaining claims is dependent upon the existence of a violation
of a constitutional right. Because Plaintiff has raised no triable question of fact as to the
claims discussed above, the remaining claims must also be dismissed.
Plaintiff alleges that individual Defendants witnessed the violation of his rights by

_| other Defendants, but failed to intervene. Third Am. Compl. at {{{ 83-86. Such a claim
“is contingent upon the disposition of the primary claims underlying the failure to a
intervene claim.” Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F. Supp. 2d 418, 443-44 (E.D.N.Y.
2012). “Since all of plaintiff's other claims have been dismissed, no predicate
constitutional violation remains to support a failure-to-intervene claim. This claim is
therefore dismissed as well.” Grinols v. Beers, 532 F. Supp. 3d 95, 108-09 (W.D.N.Y.
“)2021).
Plaintiff also alleges the existence of a conspiracy to “undermine” Plaintiff's right
to be free from malicious prosecution and the fabrication of evidence. Third Am. Compl.
at | 88. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish any underlying constitutional violation,
his related conspiracy claim necessarily fails. Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 72
(2d Cir. 2001); Mitchell v. Cnty. of Nassau, 786 F. Supp. 2d 545, 564 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
27

(citing cases) (“a § 1983 conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law where there is no
underlying constitutional violation.”).
Finally, Plaintiff's Sixth and Seventh causes of action assert Monell municipal
liability claims against the City of Troy and County of Rensselaer. Third. Am. Compl. at

91-113. Monell liability requires the existence of an “underlying constitutional
violation.” Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Claudio
v. Sawyer, 675 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff'd, 409 F. App’x 464 (2d Cir.
2011) (“Under Second Circuit case law, however, a prerequisite to municipal liability
under Monell is an underlying constitutional violation by a state actor.’”’). Dismissal of
the substantive claims against the individual actors mandates dismissal of Plaintiff's

_| Monell claim. Demosthene v. City of New York, 831 F. App’x 530, 534 n.3 (2d Cir. Oct.
9, 2020) (“[I]n light of the absence of an underlying constitutional violation, the district
court correctly dismissed the claim against the [c]ity pursuant to Monell.’”’); Morales v.
City of New York, 752 F.3d 234, 238 (2d Cir. 2014) (similar).
V. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the Motions for Summary Judgment (Dkt. Nos. 115 & 116) are
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Memorandum-

28

Decision and Order upon the parties to this action.
Dated: March 29, 2023
Albany, New York

Set
US-Magistrate Judge

29

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10315890. Public record. Not legal advice.