# Lebovits v. Cuomo

> District Court, N.D. New York · February 4, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10314482

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** February 4, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
YITZCHOK LEBOVITS et al.,
1:20-cv-1284
Plaintiffs, (GLS/DJS)
v.
ANDREW M. CUOMO1 et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty ERIC C. RASSBACH, ESQ.
1919 Pennsylvania Ave. NW MARK RIENZI, ESQ.
Ste 400 DANIEL CHEN, ESQ.
Washington, DC 20006 JOSEPH DAVIS, ESQ.
WILLIAM HAUN, ESQ.
Josh Blackman LLC JOSHUA BLACKMAN, ESQ.
1303 San Jacinto Street
Houston, TX 77002
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
Andrew M. Cuomo, Letitia James,
Howard A. Zucker, Kathy Hochul &
Mary T. Bassett
New York State Attorney General CHRISTOPHER LIBERATI-
1 Since commencement of this action, Kathy Hochul succeeded Andrew M. Cuomo as
Governor of the State of New York, Eric L. Adams succeeded Bill de Blasio as Mayor of the
City of New York, and Mary T. Bassett succeed Howard A. Zucker as Commissioner of the
New York State Department of Health. Accordingly, Hochul, Adams, and Bassett are
automatically substituted insofar as Cuomo, de Blasio, and Zucker were sued in their official
capacities. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Where appropriate, references throughout to the
originally named defendants are to be read to encompass the substituted parties.
The Capitol CONANT, ESQ.
Albany, NY 12224
Bill de Blasio, New York City
Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene, City of New York &
Eric L. Adams
New York City Law Department MELANIE SADOK, ESQ.
100 Church Street HILARY M. MELZER, ESQ.
New York, NY 10007
Gary L. Sharpe
Senior District Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiffs Yitzchok Lebovits and Chana Shapiro-Lebovits, individually
and on behalf of their daughters E.L. and A.L., and Bais Yaakov Ateres
Miriam (BYAM) bring this action against defendants Andrew M. Cuomo,
individually and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of New
York, Letitia James, in her official capacity as Attorney General of the State
of New York, Howard A. Zucker, in his official capacity as Commissioner of
the New York State Department of Health (hereinafter, collectively referred
to as “State Defendants”), Bill de Blasio, individually and in his official

capacity as Mayor of the City of New York, the New York City Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH), and the City of New York

2
(hereinafter, collectively referred to as “City Defendants”). (Compl., Dkt.
No. 1.) Plaintiffs allege claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking

declaratory relief, damages, and attorney’s fees. (Id.) Pending are City
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, (Dkt. No. 51), and State
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, (Dkt. No. 52).

For the reasons that follow, City Defendants’ motion is granted, and
State Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part, as
described below.
II. Background2

Lebovits and Shapiro-Lebovits are Orthodox Jews, residents of
Inwood, New York, and parents to E.L. and A.L. (Compl. ¶ 11.) BYAM is a
New York religious corporation that operates a religious school for

Orthodox Jewish girls located in Far Rockaway, New York, which is
attended by E.L. and A.L. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.)
On October 4, 2020, while BYAM was closed during the holiday of

Sukkot, de Blasio announced a plan which would prevent the reopening of
BYAM after the holiday on October 13, 2020 (hereinafter “the ZIP Code

2 The facts are drawn from plaintiffs’ complaint, (Dkt. No. 1), presented in the light
most favorable to them, and from facts of which the court may properly take judicial notice.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201.
3
Plan”), because BYAM was located in a ZIP code identified as a COVID-19
“hotspot”. (Id. ¶¶ 95-97.) The ZIP Code Plan would also close

“nonessential” businesses, and require restaurants to serve takeout only in
these “hotspot” ZIP codes. (Id.)
However, Cuomo refused to approve the ZIP Code Plan, “fault[ing]

[it] for relying on ZIP codes, stating that ‘targeting by [ZIP] codes is
imperfect’ because ‘neighborhoods and communities aren’t organized by
[ZIP] codes.’” (Id. ¶¶ 100-01.) Instead, on October 6, 2020, Cuomo
announced the “Cluster Action Initiative,” which “supersed[ed] Mayor de

Blasio’s [ZIP Code plan].” (Id. ¶ 110.) The Cluster Action Initiative
identified at-risk areas by “cluster,” rather than by ZIP code, and divided
those areas into “red,” “orange,” and “yellow” zones, with each zone being

subjected to different levels of COVID-19-related restrictions. (Id. ¶¶ 111-
12.) Of note, the Cluster Action Initiative “close[d] altogether any schools
falling within red or orange zones.” (Id. ¶ 112.)

Cuomo formalized the Cluster Action Initiative by issuing Executive
Order 202.68 (hereinafter “the Order”), which made the Cluster Action

4
Initiative restrictions “effective immediately.”3 (Id. ¶ 132.) On October 7,
2020, de Blasio announced that the Order would be enforced in New York

City beginning on October 8, 2020. (Compl. ¶ 133.) BYAM was located in
a red zone and was, thus, “shuttered entirely.” (Id. ¶ 142.)
In the complaint, plaintiffs sought, among other things, declaratory

relief allowing BYAM to reopen on October 27, 2020. (Id. ¶ 144.) Since
the filing of the complaint, there have been a multitude of developments
regarding New York State’s approach to the COVID-19 pandemic, which
have allowed BYAM to open.4 On December 4, 2020, schools within red

and yellow zones were permitted to open, subject to COVID-19 testing
requirements, (Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.79 [9 NYCRR
8.202.79]), and, on May 6, 2021, Cuomo terminated the Cluster Action

Initiative, (Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.106 [9 NYCRR 8.202.106]
(“[T]he following directive[] shall no longer be in effect: The [Cluster Action

3 “The . . . [Cluster Action Initiative] shall be effective immediately, and at such time as
notice is provided to such affected areas, may be enforced and shall be enforced no later than
Friday, October 9, 2020, as determined by the county in which the red zones, orange zones,
and yellow zones are located.” (Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.68 [9 NYCRR
8.202.68]).
4 Although not pertinent to the determination of these motions, based on other filings
in this case, it appears that BYAM was given permission to reopen on October 26, 2020, (Dkt.
No. 20), and, on November 16, 2020, plaintiffs withdrew their application for a temporary
restraining order given that “[d]efendants agreed to allow [BYAM] to reopen,” (Dkt. No. 45).
5
Initiative].”)).
Further, Cuomo’s emergency executive powers have been

terminated, (2021 NY Senate Bill 5357, A5967), and, on June 25, 2021,
the COVID-19 state of emergency ended, (Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No.
210 [9 NYCRR 8.210]). Finally, on August 10, 2021, following an

independent investigation conducted by the New York State Attorney
General’s Office, and in the face of a multitude of sexual assault and
sexual harassment allegations, Cuomo announced his resignation as
Governor, effective August 24, 2021.

III. Standard of Review
The standard of review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is well settled
and will not be repeated here. For a full discussion of the governing

standard, the court refers the parties to its prior decision in Ellis v. Cohen &
Slamowitz, LLP, 701 F. Supp. 2d 215, 218 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). The standard
of review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) is similar, except that the court

“may refer to evidence outside the pleadings,” and “[a] plaintiff asserting
subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that it exists.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113
(2d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

6
IV. Discussion
In their motions to dismiss, both City Defendants and State

Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ requests for declaratory relief on
mootness grounds. (Dkt. No. 51, Attach. 1 at 6-13; Dkt. No. 52, Attach. 1
at 11-14.) Further, City Defendants seek dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims for

damages, because de Blasio is entitled to qualified immunity, (Dkt. No. 51,
Attach. 1 at 15-18), suing de Blasio, in his official capacity, and the DHMH
is duplicative of suing the City of New York, (Dkt. No. 51, Attach. 1 at 13),
and City Defendants were not responsible for plaintiffs’ alleged harm, (Dkt.

No. 51, Attach. 1 at 14-15, 18-19). State Defendants claim that any
damages against Cuomo, James, and Zucker, in their official capacities,
are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, (Dkt. No. 52, Attach. 1 at 14), and

that any claims against Cuomo individually must be dismissed because he
is entitled to legislative immunity, (Dkt. No. 52, Attach. 1 at 14-16).
A. Mootness

Plaintiffs seek a declaration “that [d]efendants must . . . cease
discriminating against [p]laintiffs on the basis of their Orthodox Jewish faith
and . . . permit [p]laintiffs to conduct in-person religious instruction.”
(Compl. at 32.) Defendants argue that the complaint must be dismissed on

7
mootness grounds, to the extent that it seeks the above relief, given
subsequent developments related to New York’s handling of the COVID-19

pandemic, including the revocation of the Order, and termination of
Cuomo’s emergency powers and the COVID-19 state of emergency. (Dkt.
No. 51, Attach. 1 at 6-13; Dkt. No. 52, Attach. 1 at 11-14; Dkt. No. 67 at 3-

5; Dkt. No. 69 at 2-5.)
Plaintiffs dispute this, claiming that, while BYAM is now open, a
forced re-closure could reasonably be expected to occur, noting that
“Governor [Hochul] has focused specifically on tightening COVID

restrictions on schools and children,” citing to her imposition of a mask
mandate in schools; and because “the rise of . . . [a new] variant makes the
risk that [d]efendants will swiftly revise the relevant restrictions and

reimpose school closures all the more tangible.” (Dkt. No. 70 at 2-3
(internal quotation marks omitted); Dkt. No. 68 at 2.)
“The voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct usually will

render a case moot if the defendant can demonstrate that (1) there is no
reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and (2) interim
relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of
the alleged violation.” Lamar Adver. of Penn, LLC v. Town of Orchard

8
Park, 356 F.3d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Generally, when a lawmaker withdraws an allegedly

unconstitutional law, any plaintiff's request for an injunction against its
application becomes moot.” Lewis v. Cuomo, No. 20-CV-6316, 2021 WL
3163238, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. July 27, 2021) (citing Campbell v. Greisberger,

80 F.3d 703, 706 (2d Cir. 1996)). “[C]laims will not be found moot where
the defendant’s amendments [to the law] are merely superficial or the law,
after amendment, suffers from similar infirmities as it did at the outset.”
Lamar, 356 F.3d at 378.

Given that, on December 4, 2020, schools within red and yellow
zones were permitted to open, subject to COVID-19 testing requirements,
(Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.79 [9 NYCRR 8.202.79]), and, on

May 6, 2021, Cuomo terminated the entire Cluster Action Initiative by
revoking the Order, (Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.106 [9 NYCRR
8.202.106] (“[T]he following directive[] shall no longer be in effect: The

[Cluster Action Initiative].”)), “interim relief or events have completely and
irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation,” Lamar, 356 F.3d
at 375. Put plainly, BYAM is now open.
Further, “there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation

9
will recur.” Lamar, 356 F.3d at 375. Given the revocation or termination of
the Governor’s emergency powers and the COVID-19-related state of

emergency, Governor Hochul is without the same unilateral authority that
Cuomo had at the time he imposed the Cluster Action Initiative.
Considering this, along with the current state of the COVID-19 pandemic, it

is unlikely that BYAM will face a state-mandated school shut down again.
See Dark Storm Industries LLC v. Hochul, No. 20-2725-cv, 2021 WL
4538640, at *1 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2021) (holding, where plaintiffs were
disputing the mootness of their claims by arguing that COVID-19 “is a sui

generis worldwide situation that has created a state of extreme flux and
almost certainly will require varying responses by state executive
branches,” that “[p]laintiffs do not remain under a constant threat of . . .

restrictions. Nor do recent developments suggest that they may recur . . .
in fact, quite the opposite, as a recent increase in COVID-19 cases has
prompted neither a renewed disaster emergency declaration nor an order

closing businesses.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see
also Conn. Citizens Defense League, Inc. v. Lamont, 6 F.4th 439, 446 (2d
Cir. 2021) (“Particularly in view of the mitigation measures that have
become available to combat the spread of COVID-19, and the providential

10
infrequency of pandemics, [the alleged violation’s reoccurrence] is
speculative, even if [the Governor’s authority to do so] were granted (which

itself is a contingency).”); Lewis, 2021 WL 3163238, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. July
27, 2021) (denying injunctive relief as moot where “the challenged conduct
. . .ceased” due to the termination of Cuomo’s emergency powers, the end

of the state of emergency, and the recision of the “allegedly
unconstitutional statute and executive orders,” and that because of the
“revocation of the . . . Governor’s expanded emergency powers by the . . .
legislature, the Court finds that there is no reasonable expectation of a

recurrence” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In light of the
foregoing, plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief are dismissed as moot.
B. City Defendants’ Motion Regarding Damages

With respect to plaintiffs’ claims seeking damages, City Defendants
contend that the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations establishing
that they were involved in the alleged harm, because they were merely

enforcing the Order, which was not drafted or issued by any of the City
Defendants, and, thus, must be dismissed.5 (Dkt. No. 51, Attach. 1 at 14,

5 City Defendants also claim de Blasio is entitled to qualified immunity, (Dkt. No. 51,
Attach. 1 at 15-18), and that suing de Blasio, in his official capacity, and the DHMH, is
duplicative of suing the City of New York, (Dkt. No. 51, Attach. 1 at 13). As explained below,
11
18-19; Dkt. No. 57 at 6-9.)
Plaintiffs argue that, while City Defendants did not draft or issue the

Order, the Order authorized them to enforce the Cluster Action Initiative,
but did not mandate it, and, thus, they can be held liable for choosing to
enforce it. (Dkt. No. 55 at 30 (“[T]he City’s enforcement actions against

BYAM and other religious gatherings manifest its authority and
discretion.”)) Plaintiffs focus on the following language in support of their
assertion that City Defendants had discretion in whether or not they chose
to enforce the Order: “[The Cluster Action Initiative] may be enforced and

shall be enforced . . . , as determined by the county in which the red zones,
orange zones, and yellow zones are located.” (Dkt. No. 55 at 30.)
Plaintiffs further contend that de Blasio may be liable for damages

stemming from the enforcement of the Order because “[b]y proposing the
initial ZIP-code targeting effort [that] Governor Cuomo would refine, Mayor
de Blasio certainly helped others violate the Constitution.” (Dkt. No. 55

at 31-32.)
“To sustain a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that there was

because the complaint fails to sufficiently allege involvement in the alleged harm by City
Defendants, the court need not reach these issues.
12
sufficient personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivations on
the part of the defendants.” Zdziebloski v. Town of East Greenbush, 336

F. Supp. 2d 194, 201-02 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Moffitt v. Town of
Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir.1991)) (other citation omitted). In
order to hold a municipality liable within the meaning of § 1983, a plaintiff

must establish that the municipality itself was somehow at fault. See
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 810 (1985).
“Municipal liability may attach under § 1983 when a city policymaker
takes action that violates an individual’s constitutional rights.” Gronowski

v. Spencer, 424 F.3d 285, 296 (2d Cir. 2005). Where a municipality is
merely carrying out a state law, it may still be liable under § 1983 when it
makes a “meaningful” and “conscious” choice to carry out that law. Vives

v. City of New York, 524 F.3d 346, 351, 353 (2d Cir. 2008); see Dudek v.
Nassau Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 991 F. Supp. 2d 402, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
“Freedom to act is inherent in the concept of choice.” Vives, 524 F.3d

at 352 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] municipality’s ‘decision’ to
fulfill a mandatory obligation does not constitute a ‘choice.’” Id. at 353 n.4.
Here, City Defendants had no choice when it came to enforcing the
Order. In relevant part, the Order states:

13
The above directive shall be effective immediately,
and at such time as notice is provided to such
affected areas, may be enforced and shall be
enforced no later than Friday, October 9, 2020, as
determined by the county in which the red zones,
orange zones, and yellow zones are located.
(Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No. 202.68 [9 NYCRR 8.202.68]). Further,
the full text of the Order uses the word “shall” numerous times when
directing how the Order is to be enforced.6 Id. The Order mandated the
implementation and enforcement of the Cluster Action Initiative, and was
not simply recommending or authorizing it. “[A]s determined by the county”
simply means that the various counties will be responsible for enforcing the
Order with their own employees and resources, rather than the State’s.

Given that the Order mandated enforcement of the Cluster Action Initiative,
City Defendants cannot be held liable under § 1983 for enforcing it. Vives,
524 F.3d at 353 n.4 (“[A] municipality’s ‘decision’ to fulfill a mandatory

obligation does not constitute a ‘choice.’”).
Finally, de Blasio may not be held liable for damages stemming from
the enforcement of the Order simply because he “propos[ed] the initial

6 For example: “The Department of Health shall determine areas in the State that
require enhanced public health restrictions based upon cluster-based cases of
COVID-19. . . .”; “Based upon the severity of the cluster, the [DHMH] shall adopt in most
severe, or ‘red zones,’ the following mitigation measures. . . .” Id.
14
ZIP-code targeting effort [that] Governor Cuomo would refine.” (Dkt.
No. 55 at 31-32.) The fact that de Blasio previously proposed a regulation

that was never adopted, and, in fact, was rejected by Cuomo is not enough
to establish personal involvement for purposes of § 1983. See Zdziebloski,
336 F. Supp. 2d at 202 (“Involvement in discussions that lead to a decision

is not personal involvement under § 1983.”); see also Schallop v. N.Y.
State Dept. of Law, 20 F. Supp. 2d 384, 392 (N.D.N.Y. 1998)
(“[P]articipat[ing] in discussions leading to the decision on [plaintiff’s]
employment . . . fails to establish personal involvement under section

1983.”). Given that enforcement of the Order by City Defendants was
mandatory, and because de Blasio’s proposal of the rejected Zip Code
Plan cannot alone establish his personal involvement the in plaintiffs’

alleged constitutional deprivations, City Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
claims against them for damages is granted.
C. State Defendants’ Motion Regarding Damages

State Defendants seek dismissal of the complaint insofar that it
seeks damages against them in their official capacities, because such
damages are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Dkt. No. 52, Attach. 1
at 14.) The court agrees. “The Eleventh Amendment . . . bars damages

15
claims brought against . . . individual state defendants in their official
capacities.” Morabito v. New York, 803 F. App’x 463, 465 (2d Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted). Further, “[i]t is well settled that § 1983 does not override
Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore,
plaintiffs’ claims seeking damages from Cuomo, James, and Zucker in their

official capacities, are dismissed.
State Defendants seek dismissal of the damages claims against
Cuomo in his individual capacity as well, claiming that he is entitled to
legislative immunity. (Dkt. No. 52, Attach. 1 at 14-16; Dkt. No. 58 at 5-6.)

In making this claim, they argue that the Order is legislative in form
because the New York State Legislature delegated to Cuomo the authority
“to declare a disaster emergency and to issue directives suspending and

modifying the laws of the State.” (Dkt. No. 52, Attach. 1 at 14-16.)
“Legislative immunity shields an official from liability if the act in
question was undertaken in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.”

Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Legislative immunity can apply to
“officials in the executive and judicial branches when they are acting in a
legislative capacity.” State Emps. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494

16
F.3d 71, 82 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“A defendant is entitled to legislative immunity if the defendant (1)

was acting in his or her ‘legislative’ capacity under the test articulated in
Bogan [v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1998)], and (2) the grant of the
requested relief would enjoin the defendant in his or her performance of

legislative functions.” Ass’n of Jewish Camp Operators v. Cuomo, 470 F.
Supp. 3d 197, 212 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). Courts apply a two-part test to
determine whether a defendant’s actions were taken within the “sphere of
legitimate legislative activity.” Rowland, 494 F.3d at 89 (quoting Bogan,

523 U.S. at 54). The first prong of the test is “whether the defendant’s
actions were legislative in form, i.e., whether they were integral steps in the
legislative process.” Jewish Camp, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 312 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted); see Rowland, 494 F.3d at 90
(explaining that legislative in form means “passed by means of established
legislative procedures” (citations omitted)). The second prong of the test is

whether the defendant’s “actions were legislative in substance, i.e.,
whether the actions bore all the hallmarks of traditional legislation,
including whether they reflected discretionary, policymaking decisions
implicating the budgetary priorities of the government and the services the

17
government provides to its constituents.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

Here, the Order is not legislative in form, as it was not “passed by
means of established legislative procedures,” Rowland, 494 F.3d at 90, but
rather was unilaterally enacted by Cuomo, see Jewish Camp, 470 F. Supp.

3d at 213 (“By nature, executive orders are not legislative . . . [because]
[t]he legislature plays no part in the drafting or passing [of] executive
orders.” (citation omitted)). State Defendants’ argument that the Order was
legislative in form because the New York State Legislature delegated their

legislative authority to Cuomo is without merit, as there is “no reason why a
defendant should be entitled to legislative immunity simply because the
harm alleged originated, in some sense, with a legislative act.” Rowland,

494 F.3d at 89 (citation omitted). Therefore, State Defendants’ motion to
dismiss is denied insofar as it seeks dismissal of plaintiffs’ damages claims
against Cuomo in his individual capacity.

V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Kathy Hochul is substituted insofar as Cuomo was
sued in his official capacity; and it is further

18
ORDERED that Eric L. Adams is substituted insofar as de Blasio was
sued in his official capacity; and it is further

ORDERED that Mary T. Bassett is substituted insofar as Zucker was
sued in his official capacity; and it is further
ORDERED that City Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 51) is

GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk terminate the following defendants: Bill de
Blasio, Eric L. Adams, the New York City Department of Health and Mental

Hygiene, and the City of New York; and it is further
ORDERED that State Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 52) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

GRANTED with respect to all claims against Hochul, James, Zucker,
and Bassett; and
DENIED in all other respects; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs’ complaint may proceed only as to their

damages claims as against Cuomo, in his individual capacity; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Clerk terminate the following defendants: Kathy

Hochul, Leticia James, Howard Zucker, and Mary T. Bassett; and it is
19
further
ORDERED that Cuomo shall respond to the complaint (Dkt. No. 1)
within the time allotted by the Rules; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall contact Magistrate Judge Daniel J.
Stewart to schedule further proceedings; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this Memorandum-
Decision and Order to the parties.
IT 1S SO ORDERED.
February 4, 2022 \. g
Albany, New York .
S-Pistiet Judge

20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10314482. Public record. Not legal advice.