# Hogan v. Lewis County, New York

> District Court, N.D. New York · June 1, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10312892

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, N.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 1, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MARK HOGAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

-against- 7:16-CV-1325 (LEK/ATB)

LEWIS COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This is the latest round in a long-running feud between plaintiffs Mark Hogan and
Elizabeth Hogan and several of their neighbors on Hiawatha Lake in the Town of Greig, New
York. The feud has principally involved disputes about property lines and rights, but has
sprawled to include allegations of harassment and other tortious conduct and has enmeshed
various local officials in its sprawl. In this particular lawsuit, Plaintiffs have sued both their
neighbors and local officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York law. Dkt. No. 1
(“Complaint”).
Presently before the Court are two separate summary judgment motions seeking
dismissal of the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The first has been filed by
defendant Wilbur L. Stanford, Jr., one of Plaintiffs’ neighbors. Dkt. Nos. 82 (“Stanford
Motion”); 82-1 (“Stanford Statement of Material Facts” or “Stanford SMF”); 82-13 (“Stanford
Memorandum”). The second has been filed by defendants Michael Fayle and Ricky Craft, both
employed by the New York State Police (together, the “NYSP Defendants”). Dkt. Nos. 83
(“NYSP Motion”); 83-14 (“NYSP Memorandum”); 83-15 (“NYSP Statement of Material Facts”
or “NYSP SMF”). Plaintiffs oppose both these motions. Dkt. Nos. 89-7 (“Response to NYSP
SMF”); 89-8 (“Response to Stanford SMF”); 89-9 (“Opposition to NYSP Motion”); 89-10
(“Opposition to Stanford Motion”). Both Stanford and the NYSP Defendants have filed a reply.
Dkt. Nos. 91 (“NYSP Reply”); 92-1 (“Stanford Reply”).
For the following reasons, the Court grants the NYSP Defendants’ motion in its entirety,

and grants in part and denies in part Stanford’s motion.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The following facts are relevant to the instant motions. Where necessary, the Court
provides additional details in its analysis.
1. The Prior State Court Action
Both Plaintiffs and Stanford own property around Hiawatha Lake, in Grieg, New York.
Stanford SMF ¶ 1; Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 1. Though the details of the parties’ various property
rights and obligations is much in dispute in this lawsuit (and others), it appears beyond dispute

that an access road to several lakefront properties, including Stanford’s, crosses Plaintiffs’
property. Hogan Dep. at 326–28, 332–34; Stanford Aff. ¶ 3–4; Stanford SMF ¶ 5. Stanford
claims he has a deeded right-of-way to use this road, see Stanford SMF ¶ 5; Plaintiffs’ assert that
Stanford holds no such right-of-way, see Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 5.
Back in 2008, Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit in state court against several of their neighbors,
including Stanford, in which they sought, amongst other relief, clarification regarding the
existence, nature, and extent of the right-of-way across Plaintiffs’ property. Stanford SMF ¶ 4;
Dkt. No. 82-5 (“2008 Decision”). In that lawsuit, the Stanford and Plaintiffs “agree[d] that there
exists [at least some] right of way,” and the state court issued a preliminary injunction ordering
the parties to “maintain the status quo of the right of way,” including no “widen[ing] or
narrow[ing].” 2008 Decision at 3, 5–6. The State Court matter was eventually resolved in 2013,
when the state court granted Stanford’s summary judgment motion in that case. See Stanford
SMF ¶ 4; Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 82-6 (“2013 Decision”).
2. The September 1, 2016 Incident

On September 1, 2016, Stanford was driving home to his cabin along the access road.
Stanford SMF ¶ 6; Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 6. At a Y-intersection, Stanford encountered Mark
Hogan,1 who was digging a hole on the side of the roadway. Stanford SMF ¶ 6; Resp. to Stanford
SMF ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 82-3 9 (“Stanford Affidavit”) ¶ 6. Hogan insists he was doing repair work to
fix electrical lines that Stanford had damaged. Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 6. Stanford, however,
believed that Hogan was altering the road in violation of the preliminary injunction issued in the
2008 Decision. Stanford Aff. ¶¶ 7–8; Dkt. No. 82-8 (“Stanford Deposition”) at 14.
To document Hogan’s actions, Stanford stopped his car and began recording Hogan with
a cellphone camera. Stanford SMF ¶ 6; Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 6; Dkt. Nos. 89-1 (“Hogan

Deposition”) at 347; 81-10 (“First Video”). Observing this, Hogan became agitated. He
approached Stanford with a golf club, told him repeatedly to go and “get out of here,” and called
him a “little fucker.” First Video. Hogan then used the handle of the golf club to knock
Stanford’s phone out of his hand. Id.2

1 Because all of the events that are pertinent to this decision involve Mark Hogan alone,
and not his wife and co-plaintiff Elizabeth Hogan, when the Court refers to “Hogan” elsewhere
in this opinion, it means only Mark Hogan.

2 Though Hogan testified that he never struck Stanford or his phone, and instead that
Stanford dropped the phone, Hogan Dep. at 350, this is not borne out by the First Video.
Crucially, the parties dispute where exactly this altercation took place. Hogan attests that
the event took place wholly on “Lake lot 29 on Hiawatha Lake I” (“Lot 29”), which he insists is
purely his private property, subject to no easement by Stanford. Dkt. Nos. 89-5 (“Hogan
Affirmation”) ¶ 2; 89-6, Ex. A (“Hogan Deed”). In contrast, Stanford asserts that the incident
took place on “Great Lot 24,” over which his deeded right-of-way runs. Dkt. No. 92-7

(“Response to Hogan’s SMF”) ¶ 13; Dkt. No. 82-9 (“Stanford Deed”).3
In any event, at this point, Stanford picked up his phone, drove to a second location, and
began filming Hogan again. Stanford SMF ¶ 7; Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 89-6, Ex. C
(“Second Video” and “Third Video”). After a brief period, Stanford left. Stanford SMF ¶ 7;
Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 7.
Stanford then made a call to the New York State Police about Hogan’s actions. Stanford
SMF ¶ 8; Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 8. Defendant Fayle and Trooper Emerson Lyndaker, who is
not a party to this action, both responded to Stanford’s call, with Fayle arriving first. NYSP SMF
¶¶ 4–8; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶¶ 4–8.

Stanford described to the troopers the incident between him and Hogan and showed them
at least the First Video he had taken with his phone. NYSP SMF ¶ 10; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 10.
Fayle also took a sworn deposition statement from Stanford in which Stanford described the
incident. NYSP SMF ¶ 9; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 9; Dkt. No. 82-11 (“Criminal Complaint and
Deposition”). Stanford then told the troopers he wanted a restraining order against Hogan. NYSP
SMF ¶ 17; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 17. Lyndaker spoke with their sergeant and then told Stanford
that they could charge Hogan with harassment in the second degree, a violation of N.Y. Penal

3 The Court notes that the record as to the boundaries of Hogan’s property is quite
confused. See, e.g., Hogan Dep. at 324–32; 343–44; Stanford Dep. at 14.
Law § 240.26, and that Stanford could perform a “citizen’s arrest” of Hogan. NYSP SMF ¶ 18;
Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 18. Stanford agreed, and proceeded to file a criminal complaint against
Hogan for harassment in the second degree. Stanford Aff. ¶ 14.
The troopers then followed Stanford back to where Hogan was working on the access
road. NYSP SMF ¶ 20; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 20. There, Stanford told Hogan that he was under

arrest for harassment. Stanford SMF ¶ 9; Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 9. Lyndaker then placed
handcuffs on Hogan and placed him in a police cruiser to transport him to court. NYSP SMF ¶
22; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 22; Dkt. No. 89-3 (“Fayle Deposition”) at 40. Hogan remained in
custody approximately three hours. Hogan Aff. ¶ 15.
In the aftermath of this incident, Stanford received a six-month order of protection
against Hogan. Stanford SMF ¶ 10; Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 10. Additionally, on July 25, 2017,
after a bench trial (the “Criminal Trial”) in the Watson Town Court, Hogan was convicted of
harassment in the second degree. NYSP SMF ¶ 25; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 25; Dkt. No. 82-12
(“Certificate of Disposition”). He did not appeal the conviction. Stanford SMF ¶ 10; Resp. to

Stanford SMF ¶ 10. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the Second Video and Third Video taken by
Stanford were exculpatory and were illegally withheld from them by the district attorney’s office
during the course of the Criminal Trial. Hogan Aff. ¶ 11.
3. The September 3, 2016 Incident
Two days after his arrest over his altercation with Stanford, Hogan had another run-in
with state police.
David Vandewater, one of Hogan’s neighbors and a defendant in this action, placed a call
to state police in which he reported observing Hogan remove several orange traffic cones from
their position around a dirt pile. NYSP SMF ¶ 30; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 30; Dkt. No. 83-4
(“Craft Declaration”) ¶ 6. Vandewater was unsure who owned the cones but thought that it was
possible Hogan had stolen them. Craft Decl. ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 83-6 (“Craft Deposition”) at 25–27.
As the unit closest to Vandewater’s location, defendant Craft was assigned to respond to
Vandewater’s call. Craft Decl. ¶ 4. Craft drove to Vandewater’s house and parked his car on the
right side of the narrow roadway. NYSP SMF ¶ 29; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 29. Vandewater then

explained to Craft what he had seen Hogan do with the cones. NYSP SMF ¶ 30; Resp. to NYSP
SMF ¶ 30.
While Craft was speaking with Vandewater, Hogan happened to drive by. NYSP SMF ¶
31; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 31. He drove around Craft’s patrol car—still parked on the right side
of the road—and onto Vandewater’s lawn before continuing on his way. NYSP SMF ¶ 31; Resp.
to NYSP SMF ¶ 31.4
Observing this, Craft believed that Hogan had violated several provisions of New York’s
Vehicle and Traffic Law, as well as Penal Law § 145.00 for criminal mischief, and that he had
potentially committed larceny of the traffic cones as well. Craft Decl. ¶¶ 8–9. Craft turned on his

emergency lighting and pulled Hogan over. NYSP SMF ¶ 32; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 32. Craft
told Hogan that he had seen him drive off the roadway onto Vandewater’s lawn and that he was

4 In their Response to the NYSP SMF, Plaintiffs deny the NYSP Defendants’ assertion
that Hogan drove on to Vandewater’s lawn, stating that Hogan did not leave his “designated 50-
foot right-of-way” and citing to the Hogan Deed in support. See Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 31 (citing
Hogan Deed). But the deed indicates only that Hogan owns a right-of-way, not that he remained
on it on September 3, 2016 as he drove by Craft’s cruiser. Thus, because the citation does not
support the denial, this fact is deemed admitted. See Hogan v. Lewis Cty., No. 16-CV-1325,
2018 WL 4689094, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018) (“Plaintiffs deny this asserted fact, but
provide no record citation to support that denial. . . . This fact is therefore deemed admitted.”)
(citing N.Y. Teamsters v. Express Servs., Inc., 426 F.3d 640, 648–49 (2d Cir. 2005)). Moreover,
in his deposition, Hogan effectively admits that he drove over Vandewater’s lawn. See Hogan
Dep. at 416 (“Q. Is the grass that you drove over part of Mr. Vandewater’s lawn? A: It’s a pretty
crappy lawn, but he mows it so you can say yes. But in that area it’s a mixture of grass and dirt.
It’s sort of like gravel, grass and dirt, nice grass. And I wasn’t in the nice grass.”).
also investigating a potential larceny of traffic cones. NYSP SMF ¶ 34; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶
34. Hogan assured Craft that the cones were his, and to prove it he showed Craft where he had
written his initials and address on the cones. NYSP SMF ¶¶ 35–37; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶¶ 35–
37. At this, Craft apparently no longer suspected Hogan of stealing the cones. Craft Dep. at 38.
By this point, however, Hogan and Vandewater began arguing and shouting at one

another. Craft Decl. ¶ 11. The parties dispute exactly what happened next. Craft says that, “[i]n
order to defuse the conflict and complete [his] investigate work,” he “advised Mr. Hogan that he
was free to go, and [Craft] would stop by his cabin [to complete their conversation] as soon as
[he] finished [his] discussions with Mr. Vandewater.” Craft Decl. ¶ 12; see also Craft Dep. at 37.
By contrast, Hogan says that Craft ordered him to go wait at home until Craft showed up to
continue the interview. Hogan Aff. ¶ 17; Hogan Dep. at 414, 418; see also Dkt. No. 83-5
(“Incident Report”) (stating that Craft “directed” Hogan “to return to his house” and that Craft
would be “down to talk with him in a few minutes”).
In any event, whether in response to Craft’s request or command, Hogan returned to his

home and waited for Craft. After “maybe 15 or 20 minutes,” Craft arrived. Hogan Dep. at 419–
20; see also Hogan Aff. ¶ 18 (“20 minutes”). Craft and Hogan had a brief conversation, at which
point Craft left. NYSP SMF ¶¶ 43–45; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶¶ 43–45; Hogan Dep. at 419. Craft
decided not to charge Hogan with any offenses based on the events of September 3, 2016. NYSP
SMF ¶ 46; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 46.
B. Procedural History and Plaintiffs’ Claims
Plaintiffs initially brought ten separate claims against nine named defendants: (1) the
County of Lewis, New York; (2) Lewis County District Attorney Leanne Moser; (3) Assistant
District Attorney Caleb Petzoldt; (4) Assistant District Attorney Mark Lemieux; (5) Frank Rose,
yet another of Hogan’s Hiawatha Lake neighbors; (6) Vandewater; (7) Stanford; (8) Fayle; and
(9) Craft. See Compl. In a prior decision, the Court dismissed the claims against Moser, Petzoldt,
Lemieux, and Lewis County. See Dkt. No. 68 (“2018 Order”). Relevant to Stanford’s and the
NYSP Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are the following claims: (1) a § 1983 claim
for false arrest against Stanford and Fayle arising out Hogan’s arrest following the September 1,

2016 incident, Compl. ¶¶ 53–57; (2) a § 1983 claim for illegal seizure or false imprisonment
against Craft arising out of Hogan’s brief confinement in his house during the September 3, 2016
incident, id. ¶¶ 58–62; (3) a state law defamation claim against Stanford regarding his statements
to Fayle on September 1, 2016, id. ¶¶ 63–66; (4) a state law trespass claim against Stanford
arising out of the events of September 1, 2016, id. ¶¶ 67–72; and (5) a claim for punitive
damages against all defendants, id. ¶¶ 87–88
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs courts to grant summary
judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a dispute is “‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Thus, while “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or
unnecessary” will not preclude summary judgment, “summary judgment will not lie if . . . the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see
also Taggart v. Time, Inc., 924 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Only when no reasonable trier of
fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party should summary judgment be granted.”).
The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis
for the motion and identifying those portions of the record that the moving party claims will
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). Similarly, a party is entitled to summary judgment when the nonmoving party
has failed “to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322.
In attempting to repel a motion for summary judgment after the moving party has met its
initial burden, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). At the same time, a court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). Hence, “a court’s duty in reviewing a motion for summary
judgment is ‘carefully limited’ to finding genuine disputes of fact, ‘not to deciding them.’”
Macera v. Vill. Bd. of Ilion, No. 16-CV-668, 2019 WL 4805354, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,

2019) (Kahn, J.) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., Ltd. P’ship, 22 F.3d 1219, 1224
(2d Cir. 1994)).
IV. DISCUSSION
The Court considers, in turn: (A) Plaintiffs’ federal claims under § 1983; (B) Plaintiffs’
state law claims; and (C) their request for punitive damages.
A. Federal Claims Under § 1983
Plaintiffs bring their federal claims under § 1983. “[Section] 1983 provides a civil claim
for damages against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a right,
privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Thomas v.
Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999). Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights;
instead it provides litigants a procedure to redress the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.
See Doe v. Patrick, No. 17-CV-846, 2020 WL 529840, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2020) (Kahn, J.)
(citing Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004)). Bearing these
principles in mind, the Court turns first to the false arrest claims against Fayle and Stanford, then

to the illegal seizure claim against Craft.
1. False Arrest Claim Against Fayle and Stanford
Hogan asserts a false arrest claim under § 1983 against Fayle and Stanford stemming
from Hogan’s arrest on September 1, 2016. Compl. ¶¶ 53–57. “Claims for false arrest
. . . brought under § 1983 to vindicate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable seizures, are substantially the same as claims for false arrest . . . under state
law.” Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Callahan v. City of New York, 90 F. Supp. 3d 60, 68 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citation omitted)
(“A [Section] 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth Amendment right of an individual

to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without probable cause, is substantially
the same as a claim for false arrest under New York [state] law.”) (alterations in original). To
state a claim for false arrest under § 1983 or New York law, a plaintiff must allege that: “(1) the
defendant intended to confine [the plaintiff], (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement,
(3) the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise
privileged.” Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1991).
Both Fayle and Stanford argue that the Court should grant them summary judgment on
this claim because, among other reasons, Hogan was convicted of the charge that was the basis
of the citizen’s arrest. NYSP Mem. at 11–14; Stanford Mem. at 3–4. The Court agrees with
respect to Fayle, but disagrees with respect to Stanford.
a. Fayle
The false arrest claim against Fayle is barred by his conviction for harassment. “The
existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and is a complete defense to an

action for false arrest, whether that action is brought under state law or under § 1983.” Weyant v.
Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, “if a person [is] convicted of the crime for which he [is] arrested, he [is] barred
from bringing a claim for false arrest because . . . a valid conviction establishes the existence of
probable cause.” Vallen v. Connelly, 36 F. App’x 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2002 ) (citing Cameron v.
Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 388 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also Clark v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-
7744, 2018 WL 4372671, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2018) (“A conviction of the crime for which
an[] individual is arrested bars recovery for false arrest or malicious prosecution.”) (citing
Cameron, 806 F.2d at 387). As explained below, the Court finds that Hogan’s conviction for

harassment in the second degree bars his false arrest claim, and even if it did not, Hogan’s claim
would otherwise fail because Fayle had probable cause to make the arrest.5
i. Conviction
Here, it is undisputed that, on September 1, 2016, Fayle responded to a dispatch call
regarding the altercation between Stanford and Hogan. NYSP SMF ¶¶ 7–10; Resp. to NYSP

5 In light of the fact that Stanford effected a citizen’s arrest of Hogan and Lyndaker
actually cuffed Hogan and took him into custody, see Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶¶ 21–22, the NYSP
Defendants argue that Fayle is not the proper defendant for this false arrest claim, see NYSP
Mem. at 9–11. However, for the purposes of resolving the instant motion, the Court assumes—
without deciding—that Fayle was sufficiently involved in Hogan’s arrest to potentially face
liability under § 1983.
SMF ¶¶ 7–10. It is further undisputed that, as a result of this altercation, Hogan was arrested and
charged with harassment in the second degree, a violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 240.26. See
NYSP SMF ¶¶ 20–24; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶¶ 20–24; Criminal Compl. and Dep. Finally, it is
undisputed that, after a bench trial on July 25, 2017, Hogan was convicted of harassment in the
second degree, and that he declined to appeal. NYSP SMF ¶ 25; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 25;

Certificate of Disposition; Hogan Dep. at 363. Because Hogan was convicted of the crime for
which he was arrested, he does not have a viable claim for false arrest against Fayle. See
Cameron, 806 F.2d at 387 (“[T]he plaintiff can under no circumstances recover if he was
convicted of the offense for which he was arrested.”).
To rebut this conclusion, Plaintiffs offer several arguments, none of them successful.
First, Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he New York Court of Appeals has unequivocally ruled that an
harassment conviction under Penal Law Sec. 240.25 is not to be given collateral estoppel effect
in a subsequent civil action.” Opp’n to NYSP Mot. at 7 (citing Gilberg v. Barbieri, 53 N.Y.2d
285 (1981)); see also Opp’n to Stanford Mot. at 4. But this argument is flawed because the

doctrine of collateral estoppel is not necessary to the Court’s decision. Cameron is clear that
subsequent conviction bars a claim for false arrest, separate and apart from any application of
collateral estoppel, through an independent “common-law defense.” See Cameron, 806 F.2d at
384 (explaining that plaintiff’s false arrest claim “is not barred by principles of collateral
estoppel,” but, rather, “under common-law principles, as properly incorporated into § 1983
actions of this type, [plaintiff’s] present lawsuit is defeated by his prior conviction”); see also
John v. Lewis, No. 15-CV-5346, 2017 WL 1208428, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (“[E]ven
though a conviction does not always preclude a claim for false arrest under principles of res
judicata or collateral estoppel, the ‘common law defense of conviction’ to a false arrest claim
[nonetheless] provides immunity to [the defendant].”) (citing Cameron, 806 F.2d at 386–89).
Therefore, whether or not a conviction for harassment in the second degree has collateral
estoppel effect is immaterial to the Court’s determination that Hogan’s conviction bars his false
arrest claim. See Patterson v. Labella, No. 12-CV-1572, 2014 WL 4892895, at *13 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2014) (“As to Plaintiff’s false arrest claim, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled

to summary judgment because Plaintiff was convicted after trial of violating N.Y. Penal Law
§ 240.26. Plaintiff did not appeal his conviction and it is therefore still valid. A conviction that
survives appeal is conclusive evidence of probable cause and is therefore a complete defense to a
false arrest claim brought under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 641 F.
App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2016).
Next, Plaintiffs argue that Hogan’s conviction for harassment in the second degree should
not bar his false arrest claim because the conviction “was procured through fraud and
concealment.” Opp’n to NYSP Mot. at 9. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that “critical recordings
were withheld from Plaintiff in the course of the prosecution,” i.e., the Second Video and Third

Video that Stanford took of Hogan on September 1, 2016. Id. at 9. But this argument, too, fails.
While Plaintiffs are correct that a showing of “fraud or perjury” can vitiate a conviction such that
it will not bar a claim for false arrest, see Roundtree v. City of New York, 778 F. Supp. 614, 619
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[A] conviction . . . conclusively [bars a false arrest claim] unless the
conviction was obtained by fraud, perjury or other corrupt means.”), they have failed to raise a
triable issue of fact as to whether the conviction at issue in this case was procured through fraud
or other corrupt means.
First, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Second Video and Third Video are
exculpatory. The videos do not depict Stanford engaging in any violent or aggressive behavior
such that Hogan’s conduct would be justified, and even if they did, Plaintiffs have not explained
how videos taken after Hogan had already knocked Stanford’s phone out of his hand could
justify Hogan’s earlier actions. Nor do the videos prove that Stanford was trespassing on
Hogan’s land when he was filming, as they do not depict any property lines or boundaries, and
Hogan’s unsworn assertions in the Third Video that Stanford was trespassing do not prove that

Stanford, in fact, was. Finally, the videos, in which Stanford is silent, offer nothing to
substantiate Plaintiffs oft-repeated claim that Stanford “delighted in the damage and destruction
he inflicted.” See Opp’n to Stanford Mot. at 6; Resp. to Stanford’s SMF ¶ 23; Hogan Aff. ¶ 11.
No reasonable jury could find these brief videos—one 23 seconds long, the other 31 seconds—to
be exculpatory, much less find that failing to turn them over to the defense meant that Hogan’s
conviction was obtained through fraud or corruption.
Second, Plaintiffs also fail to demonstrate that these allegedly exculpatory videos were
“withheld” in a manner that qualifies as fraudulent or corrupt. Hogan knew these videos existed,
as he viewed Stanford recording them, Hogan Dep. at 351–52, yet Plaintiffs have directed the

Court to no evidence demonstrating that they requested the videos in discovery prior to the
Criminal Trial, that the prosecutor unjustifiably withheld the videos, or that they raised a
potential Brady violation with the criminal court. Furthermore, “despite plaintiff commencing
this action in November 2016, plaintiff’s counsel did not serve a demand for any videos until
February 2018, which was six months after plaintiff was convicted of harassment.” Stanford
Reply at 3 (citing Dkt. No. 92-3 (“Plaintiff’s Request for Documents”)); see also Dkt. No. 92
(“Hurley Affidavit”) ¶ 3; Certificate of Disposition (demonstrating that Hogan was convicted of
harassment in the second degree on July 25, 2017). Plaintiffs have offered no evidence
controverting this timeline, nor any explanation for why, when discovery opened in this case in
May 2017, see Dkt. No. 44, they did not immediately request videos that they now claim were
crucial to their criminal case.
Without any such explanation for how these videos would exculpate Hogan, nor any
evidence that they were withheld through the malevolent acts of Stanford, the police, and the
prosecution, no reasonable jury could find that Hogan’s conviction was procured through fraud

or perjury. See Artis v. Liotard, 934 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s false arrest claim because, even though plaintiff
argued that his conviction for the crime of arrest had been procured through a “malicious police
conspiracy against him,” plaintiff had “not introduced any evidence of such a conspiracy”).6
Therefore, Hogan’s conviction serves as a complete defense to his false arrest claim
against Fayle, and the Court grants the motion for summary judgment as to this claim.
ii. Probable Cause
Assuming for the sake of argument that, for some reason, Fayle cannot rely on Hogan’s
conviction for harassment in the second degree as a defense against Hogan’s false arrest claim,

the claim would still fail because Fayle had probable cause to make an arrest.
As described above, “probable cause is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.”
Simpson v. City of New York, 793 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir. 2015). “An officer has probable cause
to arrest when he or she has knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and
circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the

6 Plaintiffs make additional arguments regarding the correctness of Hogan’s conviction,
but these arguments address the merits of that decision, rather than whether any fraudulent
conduct helped procure it, and therefore do not affect Court’s decision. See Opp’n to Stanford
Mot. at 6–8 (arguing that Stanford was a trespasser and, therefore, Hogan had a right to defend
his property). If Plaintiff wished to make these arguments, he could have appealed his conviction
in state court.
person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime.” Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149,
152 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “An arresting officer advised of a crime
by a person who claims to be the victim, and who has signed a complaint or information
charging someone with the crime, has probable cause to effect an arrest absent circumstances
that raise doubts as to the victim’s veracity.” Singer v. Fulton Cty. Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d

Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted). “Information about criminal activity provided by a single
complainant can establish probable cause when the information is sufficiently reliable and
corroborated.” Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 647 (2d Cir. 1994).
Here, it is undisputed that Fayle interviewed Stanford about his altercation with Hogan,
took Stanford’s sworn deposition, and saw the First Video in which Hogan knocked Stanford’s
phone out of his hand. NYSP SMF ¶¶ 9–10; Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶¶ 9–10. Fayle, therefore,
“received his information from . . . the putative victim,” which alone was enough to establish
probable cause. See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2000) (determining that
officers had probable cause to arrest when they received information about a crime from the

victims). In addition to Stanford’s statements, Fayle also viewed the First Video, which
corroborated Stanford’s account. Accordingly, there was probable cause to arrest Hogan. See
Corsini v. Bloomberg, 26 F. Supp. 3d 230, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (explaining that probable cause
can be founded “on the victims’ allegations that a crime has been committed”) (internal
quotation marks omitted), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. Corsini v. Nast, 613 F.
App’x 1 (2d Cir. 2015).
Plaintiffs first response, rather than to contest probable cause, is to argue that,
“irrespective of whether probable cause was present,” Hogan’s arrest “for a non-criminal
violation constitute[d] an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.” Opp’n to NYSP
Mot. at 3. Specifically, Plaintiffs point out that harassment in the second degree is a “violation,”
see N.Y. Penal Law § 240.26, a level of offense below misdemeanors, see Gilberg, 53 N.Y.2d at
293 (describing how “violations” are “petty infractions below the grade of a misdemeanor”), and
that “N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law 140.10 does not grant police officers the authority to arrest
for noncriminal violations committed outside their presence,” Opp’n to NYSP Mot. at 3 (citing

N.Y. C.P.L. § 140.10(1)(a)). Further, they argue that, since Hogan’s alleged harassment of
Stanford occurred outside Fayle’s presence, he was not “authorized to arrest [Hogan] for the
alleged harassment” under New York law. Id.
Fatal to Plaintiffs’ argument, however, is that they have brought their false arrest claim
under § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment, not New York law. The Supreme Court has stated
that, “while States are free to regulate . . . arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not
alter the Fourth Amendment’s protections.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). In line
with this principle, “several courts” have rejected exactly the argument Plaintiffs make here, and
“correctly found [NY C.P.L. 140.10] inapplicable in the context of a § 1983 false-arrest claim.”

See Mikulec v. Town of Cheektowaga, 909 F. Supp. 2d 214, 225 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing
cases); see also Penree v. City of Utica, New York, No. 13-CV-1323, 2016 WL 915252, at *11
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2016) (“[T]he Constitution . . . is not concerned with the restrictions that New
York chooses to place on its police officers.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ argument that Hogan’s
arrest “for a non-criminal offense was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment”
fails. See Opp’n to NYSP Mot. at 4; see also Worytko v. Cty. of Suffolk, No. 02-CV-2233, 2007
WL 9724944, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2007) (rejecting plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the
basis that his allegedly false arrest was invalid because violations—trespass and harassment in
the second degree—did not occur in the police officers’ presence), aff’d, 285 F. App’x 794 (2d
Cir. 2008); cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights are not violated when the subject is arrested for a misdemeanor that is
punishable only by a fine).
Plaintiffs also attempt to argue Hogan’s arrest was not supported by probable cause
because Fayle “was not entitled to ignore a plainly obvious justification for . . . Hogan’s

conduct,” namely, that he was defending his property against a trespasser. Opp’n to NYSP Mot.
at 5. Specifically, as justification for Hogan’s actions, Plaintiffs cite to N.Y. Penal Law § 35.20,
which states, in relevant part:
A person in possession or control of any premises, or a person licensed
or privileged to be thereon or therein, may use physical force upon
another person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary
to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be the
commission or attempted commission by such other person of a
criminal trespass upon such premises.

N.Y. Penal Law § 35.20 (emphasis added).
But even assuming, as Plaintiffs would have the Court do, that Stanford parked his
vehicle on Hogan’s property without permission and that Fayle was aware of this fact, § 35.20
still would not justify Hogan’s response—nor undermine Fayle’s probable cause assessment—
because it is limited by its terms to defense against “criminal trespass.” New York’s Penal Law
distinguishes between three degrees of “criminal trespass,” see §§ 140.10, 140.15, and 140.17,
and simple “trespass,” which is a violation, see § 140.05; see also People v. Orta, 54 Misc. 3d 16,
17 (N.Y. App. Term. 2016) (distinguishing between “trespass” and “criminal trespass”). The
three degrees of criminal trespass each contain aggravating elements that simple trespass does
not, such as entering a school, public housing project, or other area enclosed in a manner
designed to exclude intruders. See §§ 140.10, 140.15, and 140.17. Here, where there is no
indication that any of the aggravating factors were met during Stanford’s brief stop on September
1, 2016, Stanford’s actions could constitute nothing more than a simple trespass. See N.Y. Penal
Law § 140.05 (“A person is guilty of trespass when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully
in or upon premises.”). Consequently, § 35.20 would not apply and could provide no justification
for Hogan’s conduct that day, which in turn means that Fayle’s arrest is still supported by
probable cause.

For all these reasons then, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a genuinely
disputed issue of material fact as to the false arrest claim against Fayle, and the Court grants the
NYSP Defendants’ summary judgment motion as to that claim.7
b. Stanford
By contrast, the Court cannot grant Stanford’s summary judgment motion as to Plaintiffs’
false arrest claim.
Preliminarily, the Court notes that Plaintiffs bring their false arrest claim against
Stanford—who appears to be a private citizen8—under § 1983, which offers a cause of action
only against those who act under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While there is some

authority to support Plaintiffs’ decision to bring this false arrest claim against Stanford under
§ 1983, see Fraser v. Cty. of Maui, 855 F. Supp. 1167, 1177 (D. Haw. 1994) (“[S]tate action may
exist where the private citizen makes a citizen’s arrest upon the advice of police officers.”), the

7 Because the Court grants the Motion on these grounds, it need not address Fayle’s
personal involvement or qualified immunity arguments. See NYSP Mem. at 9–11, 14–16; see
also Kampfer v. Argotsinger, No. 18-CV-7, 2020 WL 906274, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2020)
(Kahn, J.) (“Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims on the above grounds, there is no
need to address Defendants’ alternative arguments as to legislative immunity, qualified
immunity, or personal involvement.”).

8 The Court has scoured the record but has been unable to find any evidence, from any
party, indicating what Stanford does for a living. However, since both parties agree that Stanford
made a “citizen’s arrest,” the Court thinks it reasonable to assume that Stanford is a private
citizen.
issue is not clear cut, see Patterson v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-3525, 2017 WL 3432718, at
*7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2017) (stating that “private citizens may effectuate arrests without
becoming state actors” and dismissing § 1983 claims against private-citizen defendants), aff’d,
758 F. App’x 217 (2d Cir. 2019); Spencer v. Lee, 864 F.2d 1376, 1380 (7th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that citizens’ arrests are not made under color of state law). However, because

Stanford has failed to argue this point in his motion, and Plaintiffs have correspondingly also
failed to brief the issue, the Court assumes that Plaintiffs can properly bring their false arrest
claim against Stanford under § 1983.
Turning to the merits of Stanford’s Motion, he argues that Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim
against him is barred, under Cameron, by Hogan’s conviction for harassment in the second
degree. See Stanford Mem. at 3–4. But the Court cannot find that Cameron protects private
citizens accused of false arrest. Cameron enunciated its rule in the context of a federal false
arrest claim brought against police officers, a fact that appears crucial to its decision and
analysis. See Cameron, 806 F.2d at 386 (“Cameron’s complaint was properly dismissed because

under long-established common-law principles, Cameron’s conviction gives the defendant police
officers a complete defense to the present claim.”) (emphasis added); id. at 387 (“The law
enforcement officer is given th[e] protection [of the valid-conviction rule] because he has a duty
to the public to prevent crime and arrest criminals.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
particular, the foundation of Cameron’s rule— that conviction provides the defendant “a
complete defense” against a false arrest claim—is that “conviction of the plaintiff following the
arrest is viewed as establishing the existence of probable cause,” and “the defendant is entitled to
prevail if he can establish that there was probable cause for the arrest,” Cameron, 806 F.2d at 387
(citing Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 458 (1975)). Significantly, while probable cause
shields law enforcement officers from liability for false arrest, see Broughton, 37 N.Y.2d at 458,
it provides no such shield to private citizens, see Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78, 96 (2d
Cir. 2012) (“In New York, a private citizen who makes an arrest does so at his peril; if the person
arrested did not in fact commit the crime for which he is arrested, the person who arrests him is
liable [for false arrest] even if he acts in good faith or has probable cause to make an arrest.”)

(citing White v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 151 A.D.2d 859, 861 (1989)); Biswas v. City of New
York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[P]robable cause is not a defense for false
arrests by private citizens.”). Therefore, because probable cause cannot shield Stanford from
Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim against him, and because Cameron’s rule rests upon the probable
cause defense, the Court finds that Cameron is inapplicable to the claim against Stanford and,
thus, that the ruling in that case does not support awarding summary judgment to Stanford.
The Court recognizes that, despite this analysis, Cameron has been extended to some
subsequent cases in which the defendant was not a police officer. See Vallen, 36 F. App’x at 31
(citing Cameron rule in case where plaintiff brought claim against state social workers for

making reports to police that led to plaintiff’s arrest by police); Croft v. Greenhope Servs. for
Women, Inc., No. 13-CV-2996, 2013 WL 6642677, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2013) (granting
summary judgment to employee of “private non-profit” drug treatment organization who
reported plaintiff’s parole violation to police because plaintiff “pled guilty to [the parole
violation], thus conclusively establishing that probable cause existed to arrest her for violating
her parole [and] [a]s a result, . . . no claim for false arrest may lie.”); Blackwood v. Omorvan,
No. 16-CV-644, 2018 WL 816839, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2018) (dismissing false arrest claim
brought against hospital security guard because plaintiff “was arrested, prosecuted and
convicted” and “[t]herefore, there was probable cause to effectuate the arrest”). But these cases
do not resolve the issue to the Court’s satisfaction. In Vallen, the reference to the Cameron rule
is mere dicta, and in Croft and Blackwood, the courts applied Cameron without analyzing
whether its common law defense protected non-police-officer defendants. Moreover, these cases
do not address the particular issue at stake here, i.e., whether Cameron’s common law defense
applies to a false arrest claim against a private citizen who made a citizen’s arrest.9 As such,

these cases do not alter the Court’s conclusion that Cameron’s rule is unavailable as a defense to
Stanford.
Without Cameron to rely on, to prevail on his Motion, Stanford must show that Hogan
actually committed the crime of harassment in the second degree. See White, 151 A.D.2d at 861;
Scanlon v. Flynn, 465 F. Supp. 32, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“If [defendant] acted as a private citizen,
. . . he can justify the arrest only by showing that [plaintiff] in fact committed th[e] crimes [of
arrest].”). At least for the purposes of this summary judgment motion, he has not met his burden
to do so. First, though Hogan was convicted of harassment in the criminal court, collateral
estoppel does not resolve the issue in this case. Even if a conviction for a criminal violation has

collateral estoppel effect, compare Gilberg, 53 N.Y.2d at 291 (ruling that conviction for
harassment in the second degree did not have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent civil
action) with Akwaboa v. Bowe, 791 N.Y.S.2d 867, at *2 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (finding that
defendant’s plea of guilty to charge of harassment in the second degree estopped him from
arguing in a subsequent civil suit that he had not struck the plaintiff), Stanford bears the initial
burden to prove estoppel, see Maiello v. Kirchner, 949 N.Y.S.2d 200, 202–03 (2012) (“The party
seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identical issue was

9 Stanford has identified no cases expressly addressing this question, see Stanford Mem.;
Stanford Reply, nor has the Court’s own independent research.
necessarily decided in the prior proceeding, and is decisive of the present action.”), and he makes
no effort to argue that the doctrine applies here, see Stanford Mem. (failing even to mention
collateral estoppel). The Court will not do the parties’ work for them.
Alternatively, without addressing the estoppel issue, Stanford could also prevail on his
motion by demonstrating that Hogan’s actions on September 1, 2016 did, in fact, satisfy the

elements of the charge of harassment in the second degree. Under New York law, “[a] person is
guilty of harassment in the second degree when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another
person . . . [h]e or she strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects such other person to physical
contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same . . . .” N.Y. Penal Law § 240.26. The video is
certainly highly probative as to whether Hogan’s conduct met these elements, but the Court notes
§ 240.26’s precise mens rea requirement. In order to be guilty of the harassment charge, Hogan
must have knocked Stanford’s camera from his hand “with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm”
Stanford. Id. “[Q]uestions of subjective intent,” such as this one, “can rarely be decided by
summary judgment,” See United States v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 2013)

(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982)), particularly where, as here, a jury might
find that Hogan intended merely to prevent Stanford from filming him, rather than to harass,
annoy, or alarm him. For this reason, the Court declines to grant Stanford summary judgment as
to Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim. See J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Bernabe, No. 08-CV-690, 2009
WL 2905781, at *1 (D. Conn. Sept. 8, 2009) (denying motion for summary judgment because
“[t]he Court believe[d] it would be inappropriate on summary judgment to make any conclusions
as to the Defendant’s intent”).
2. Illegal Seizure Claim Against Craft
As an initial matter, although Plaintiffs’ Complaint clearly asserts a claim for “false
imprisonment” against Craft. See Compl. ¶¶ 58–62 (“[A]s and for a fourth cause of action
against defendant Trooper Craft for false imprisonment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”), the
parties instead treat this cause of action as one for the related, but distinct, claim of illegal

seizure. See NYSP Mem. at 16–22; Opp’n to NYSP Mot. at 10–15; see also Allen v. Antal, 665
F. App’x 9, 12 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that the district court had dismissed plaintiff’s claim for
“false imprisonment” and his claim for “illegal search and seizure”). Accordingly, the Court does
the same.
Turning to the illegal seizure claim, Hogan asserts that he was seized for the twenty
minutes he remained at home waiting for Craft, after Craft had ordered him to do so. See Compl.
¶ 59. The NYSP Defendants argue that the Court should grant summary judgment as to
Plaintiffs’ illegal seizure claim against Craft because: (1) Craft did not seize Hogan “within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment,” see NYSP Mem. at 17; (2) even if he had seized Hogan, the

brief seizure was “authorized as incident to [his] investigation,” see id. at 19; and (3) he is
entitled to qualified immunity, see id. at 22. The Court grants the motion because it finds that
seizure of Hogan was authorized.
“Whether a seizure occurred and, if so, whether it was justified by the requisite showing,
are questions of law.” United States v. Tehrani, 49 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 1995). “A person is
seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action under the Fourth
Amendment when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or
restrains his freedom of movement, through means intentionally applied.” Brendlin v. California,
551 U.S. 249, 254 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”). If the seizure is a brief,
“investigative detention,” it is justified if the police have “reasonable suspicion to believe that
criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” Tehrani, 49 F.3d at 58 (internal quotation

marks omitted). “If an investigative detention is properly premised upon articulable suspicion,
the next inquiry is whether its scope and duration are reasonable.” Id. By contrast, if the seizure
qualifies as an arrest or its equivalent, the police must have probable cause. See Gilles v.
Repicky, 511 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 2007). In turn, “probable cause to arrest exists when police
officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that
are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested
has committed or is committing a crime.” Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139, 156 (2d Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the parties dispute what Craft said to Hogan on September 3, 2016, and whether

Craft’s words—whatever they were—sufficed to “seize” Hogan for the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.10 However, the Court need not resolve this issue because, even if Craft did order

10 Craft attests that, after Hogan and Vandewater began “arguing and shouting” on
September 3, 2016, he “advised Mr. Hogan that he was free to go, and [he] would stop by
[Hogan’s] cabin as soon as [he] finished [his] discussions with Mr. Vandewater.” Craft Decl.
¶¶ 11–12; see also Craft Dep. at 37. Therefore, according to Craft, there is no basis to find that
Hogan would not have felt free to leave his home. See NYSP Mem. at 17–19. By contrast,
Hogan attests that Craft ordered him to go to his cabin and to stay there. See Hogan Aff. ¶ 17
(“[Craft] then stated to me[:] . . . “Don’t go anywhere. Go down to your cabin. Stay there.” I did
not consent to the detainment but complied.”); see also Hogan Dep. at 414. Consequently, Hogan
argues that he was seized because “a reasonable person would believe that he was required to
follow such a command from a police officer.” Opp’n to NYSP Mot. at 11.
Hogan to remain at his home and Hogan was seized as a result of this order, Hogan’s claim still
fails because such an order was reasonable under the circumstances.
As described above, it is undisputed that, while interviewing Vandewater, Craft observed
Hogan drive his vehicle onto Vandewater’s lawn. As Craft attests in his affidavit, based on what
he had observed, “[Hogan’s] driving upon Mr. Vandewater’s lawn constituted a violation of

several New York State statutes, including . . . Penal Law § 145.00 (criminal mischief).”11 Craft
Decl. ¶ 8; see also People v. Each, 901 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Dist. Ct. 2009) (denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss charge of criminal mischief in the fourth degree where defendant had driven
over victim’s lawn). Having witnessed this potential violation, Craft thus had probable cause to
stop and detain Hogan.12 See Santagata v. Diaz, No. 17-CV-3053, 2020 WL 1536347, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2020) (officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff where “he had
reasonably trustworthy information that Plaintiff had” violated Penal Law § 145.00); Garcia v.
Cty. of Westchester, No. 11-CV-7258, 2017 WL 6375791, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017)
(finding that officer had probable cause to arrest plaintiff where he “witnessed conduct that could

reasonably be said to fall under the purview of N.Y. Penal Law § 145.00”); Cf. Atwater, 532
U.S. at 354 (no fourth amendment bar against plaintiff’s arrest after officer had witnessed her
commit minor infraction).

11 “A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the fourth degree when, having no right to
do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he or she has such right, he or she . . .
[i]ntentionally damages property of another person . . . .” N.Y. Penal Law § 145.00.

12 For this reason, to the extent Plaintiffs have not abandoned their traditional false
imprisonment claim, that claim would also fail. See Greenaway v. Cty. of Nassau, 97 F. Supp. 3d
225, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Probable cause is a complete defense to both Fourth Amendment
and New York State law claims of false imprisonment.”).
Since Craft’s “seizure” of Hogan was justified by probable cause, the Court next asks
whether the seizure was reasonable, and finds that it was. Hogan admits that, after his discussion
with Craft on the road, he returned to his lake cabin and waited for “maybe 15 or 20 minutes.”
Hogan Dep. at 418–19; see also Resp. to NYSP SMF ¶ 42. Therefore, the restraint of Hogan’s
movement in his cabin lasted, at most, 20 minutes. To begin, since Craft had probable cause to

arrest Hogan, and since such an arrest would almost certainly have taken more than twenty
minutes and involved a trip to the state police barracks, the Court fails to see how a twenty-
minute period of confinement at home could be considered unreasonable. Cf. Atwater, 532 U.S.
at 354. And even if Craft had only had reasonable suspicion to believe that Hogan had
committed some sort of violation, other courts have found similar periods of detention to
comport with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement when officers were
investigating similarly minor infractions. See Harwe v. Floyd, 545 F. App’x 20, 22 (2d Cir.
2013) (30-minute traffic stop not unreasonable); Ikezi v. City of New York, No. 14-CV-5905,
2017 WL 1233841, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (25-minute stop during which defendants

were handcuffed not unreasonable where police were investigating potentially forged license
plates); Cady v. McCook, No. 01-CV-4375, 2002 WL 999429, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2002)
(20-minute stop of uncooperative barefoot jogger found reasonable).
Harwe is especially persuasive. There, the district court granted summary judgment to a
defendant police officer who had pulled the plaintiffs over after observing their car change lanes
without signaling, finding that the eventual 30-minute traffic stop was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. See Harwe v. Floyd, No. 09-CV-1027, 2011 WL 674024, at *1 (D. Conn.
Feb. 17, 2011). The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that “once [the officer] stopped plaintiffs’
car for a suspected traffic violation, the officer was entitled to inquire into matters that could
have informed the violation,” and that the officer’s “decision to investigate further by briefly
questioning [the plaintiffs] separately . . . cannot be deemed more intrusive than necessary.”
Harwe, 545 F. App’x at 22. Similarly, once Craft had stopped Hogan to investigate the allegedly
stolen traffic cones, he was entitled to inquire further regarding the criminal mischief he had just
witnessed. Further, because Hogan and Vandewater then began shouting at one another, Craft

Decl. at 11, it was reasonable for Craft to separate Hogan and Vandewater—before the situation
escalated—in order to complete the investigation, see Harwe, 545 F. App’x at 22.
Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Harwe is not convincing. They argue that the Harwe
officers had a need to lengthen the traffic stop in order to administer sobriety tests, and there was
no similar need in the instant case. Opp’n to NYSP Mot. at 13. But the 20-minute “lengthening”
of the traffic stop in this case was directly due to Hogan’s and Vandewater’s burgeoning
argument in the midst of Craft’s investigation, conduct for which Hogan undoubtedly bears some
of the responsibility. Therefore, Craft’s decision to have Hogan wait for him at home—and, thus,
wait those extra 20 minutes—“can[not] . . . be found to have unnecessarily prolonged the stop.”

Id.; see also United States v. Glover, 957 F.2d 1004, 1011 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that courts
“should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing as to the means law enforcement officers
employ to conduct their investigations”) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Craft had probable cause to investigate Hogan for the very minor offense of
criminal mischief, and he resolved that investigation favorably for Hogan by declining to issue a
citation. Under the circumstances then, it appears to the Court that “[n]o reasonable jury
could . . . conclude [that,] where the interview means [Craft] employed yielded a result favorable
to plaintiff[] in the course of a stop lasting a total of half an hour,” Craft had violated Hogan’s
Fourth Amendment rights. See Harwe, 545 F. App’x at 22.13
B. State Law Claims
1. Choice of Law
First, the Court briefly discusses which state’s law governs Plaintiffs’ diversity claims.

See Lancaster v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 19-CV-1377, 2020 WL 819291, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 19,
2020) (Kahn, J.) (“This case is based on diversity jurisdiction. Federal law thus controls
procedural issues and state law controls substantive issues.”). Though not addressing the issue
explicitly, all parties appear to agree that New York law applies. “In the absence of any objection
from [the parties], and because all the significant contacts lie in the state of New York, . . . the
Court applies New York substantive law to Plaintiffs’ [state law] claims.” See Balura v. Ethicon,
Inc., No. 19-CV-1372, 2020 WL 819293, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2020) (Kahn, J.) (citing
Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994)).
2. Defamation

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ state law defamation claim against Stanford fails.
In New York, “[d]efamation is the making of a false statement which tends to expose the
plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce an evil opinion of him in the
minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse in society.” Elias
v. Rolling Stone LLC, 872 F.3d 97, 104 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Stepanov v. Dow Jones & Co.,
987 N.Y.S.2d 37, 41 (1st Dep’t 2014)). “To make a claim for defamation under New York law,
the plaintiff must allege ‘(1) a false statement that is (2) published to a third party (3) without

13 Because the Court grants the motion on these grounds, it need not address Craft’s
qualified immunity argument. See NYSP Mem. at 22; see also Kampfer, 2020 WL 906274, at
*10.
privilege or authorization, and that (4) causes harm, unless the statement is one of the types of
publications actionable regardless of harm.’” Cain v. Atelier Esthetique Inst. of Esthetics Inc.,
733 F. App’x 8, 11 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Elias, 872 F.3d at 104). “Generally, spoken
defamatory words are slander; written defamatory words are libel.” Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d
256, 265 (2d Cir. 2001).

Hogan asserts that the following statements defamed him: (1) Stanford’s statement that
he had a “deeded right-of-way across [Plaintiffs’] property” (“Statement 1”); (2) Stanford’s
statement that Hogan “hit [his] camera with [his] golf club” (“Statement 2”); and (3) Stanford’s
statement that Hogan “harassed” him (“Statement 3”). See Hogan Dep. at 369–70; Stanford SMF
¶ 11; Resp. to Stanford SMF ¶ 11; see also Compl. ¶¶ 65–66.14 Stanford argues that the Court
should grant him summary judgment on this claim because “the alleged defamatory statements
[were] true” and because Plaintiffs failed to properly plead damages. Stanford Mem. at 5–6. The
Court agrees that Stanford is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiffs have failed to
adequately plead damages and that, in any event, Stanford’s statements are privileged.

a. Damages
To satisfy the damages element of a defamation claim, a plaintiff must establish special
damages—i.e., “the loss of something having economic or pecuniary value which must flow
directly from the injury to reputation caused by the defamation”—or “defamation per se,” which
“absolves a plaintiff of the requirement to plead special damages.” Cain, 733 F. App’x at 11
(quoting Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 179 (2d Cir. 2000). Special
damages “must be fully and accurately stated, with sufficient particularity to identify actual

14 Since Stanford makes no argument challenging whether he made these statements, the
Court assumes for the sake of this motion that he in fact said these three things.
losses,” and “[r]ound figures or a general allegation of a dollar amount . . . will not suffice.”
Thorsen v. Sons of Norway, 996 F. Supp. 2d 143, 164–65 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Nor do [v]ague
injuries such as “dignitary harm” or mere “injury to reputation.” Macineirghe v. Cty. of Suffolk,
No. 13-CV-1512, 2015 WL 4459456, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2015). Here, Plaintiffs’
Complaint makes no allegations of special damages stemming from the reputational injury due to

Stanford’s alleged defamatory conduct, see Compl. ¶ 66 (“As a direct . . . result of [Stanford’s]
false statements, Plaintiff has been harmed to his reputation, suffered financial harm, and was
deprived of his liberty.”), nor have they directed the Court to any evidence in support of their
Opposition to Stanford’s summary judgment motion that quantifies and particularizes their
damages. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether they
suffered special damages due to Stanford’s alleged defamatory conduct.
Nor have Plaintiffs met the elements of defamation per se. A plaintiff has established
defamation per se—and, thus, “need not . . . prove[] [damages]”—“‘where [the] plaintiff alleges
statements: (i) charging plaintiff with a serious crime; (ii) that tend to injure another in his or her

trade, business or profession; (iii) that plaintiff has a loathsome disease; or (iv) imputing
unchastity to a woman.’” Thorsen, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 165 (quoting Zherka v. Amicone, 634 F.3d
642, 645 n.6 (2d Cir. 2011)). Here, the only possible category of defamation per se that might
apply to Stanford’s alleged statements is “charging plaintiff with a serious crime,” but case law is
clear that harassment in the second degree—a mere violation, see N.Y. Penal Law § 240.26
(“Harassment in the second degree is a violation”)—does not qualify as such, see Warlock
Enterprises v. City Ctr. Assocs., 611 N.Y.S.2d 651, 651 (1994) (“[H]arassment in the second
degree is beyond the definition of slander per se because the harm to the reputation of a person
falsely accused of it is insubstantial.”). Consequently, no reasonable jury could find that
Plaintiffs’ have a viable claim for defamation per se.
Plaintiffs attempt to salvage their defamation claim by arguing that they have asserted a
libel claim—because Stanford’s statements were written in the Criminal Complaint and
Deposition—and that, under New York law, damages for libel claims are presumed. Opp’n to

Stanford Mot. at 8 (citing Matherson v. Marchello, 100 A.D.2d 233, 237 (2d Dep’t 1984)).
Conversely, Stanford argues that because “Plaintiffs’ defamation claim is explicitly directed at
words spoken by [Stanford to Fayle and Lyndaker], not their subsequent reduction to writing in
the criminal complaint and/or supporting deposition, Plaintiffs’ claim is for slander.” See
Stanford Mem. at 4 (quoting Albert, 239 F.3d at 265). Plaintiffs position is somewhat strained,
though, since the first statement that Hogan claims defamed him—Stanford’s statement that he
had a “deeded right-of-way across [Plaintiffs’] property,” Hogan Dep. at 369–70—is nowhere
found in the Criminal Complaint and Deposition, see Criminal Compl. and Dep.
In any event, even assuming that Plaintiffs’ defamation claim sounds in libel, rather than

slander, Plaintiffs have offered no authority binding on this Court to support their argument that
claims for libel require no proof of damages. See Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 275
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Stern argues . . . that this Court is bound by New York Appellate Division
cases . . . [but] I am not so bound. The rulings of intermediate appellate courts are ‘helpful
indicators of how the state's highest court would rule,’ but they are not binding on me.”) (quoting
DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2005)). By contrast, this Court is bound by the
Second Circuit’s decision in Celle, which explains that “to recover in libel” “a plaintiff must
establish . . . special damages or per se actionability (defamatory on its face).” 209 F.3d at 176
(emphasis added); see also id. at 179 (adjudicating libel claim and differentiating between
“statements that are defamatory per se and those that require proof of special damages”); Davis
v. Ross, 754 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1985) (“New York recognizes a limited category of statements
to be libelous per se which do not require pleading and proof of special damages.”). For this
reason, the Court still finds that, to succeed on their defamation claim, Plaintiffs needed to—but
have failed to—plead special damages or damages per se.15 In light of this failure, Stanford is

entitled to summary judgment as to this claim.
b. Qualified Privilege
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ defamation claim fails for an alternative reason. Specifically,
“New York courts recognize a qualified privilege for statements made to police officers about
suspected crimes.” Udechukwu v. City of New York, 333 F. Supp. 3d 161, 172 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(citing cases); see also Remley v. State, 665 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1008 (Ct. Cl. 1997) (“A person
filing a formal complaint charging another with a crime is . . . entitled to absolute immunity from
a civil suit for defamation.”). “[A] plaintiff can overcome the privilege by showing malice—
evidence that the defendant knew the statement to be false, but made it anyway.” Udechukwu,

333 F. Supp. 3d at 172. Here, the basis for Plaintiffs’ defamation claim is statements Stanford
made to Fayle and Lyndaker—either oral or written—about Hogan’s conduct on September 1,
2016. Therefore, these statements are protected by the qualified privilege and cannot serve as the
basis for a defamation claim unless Plaintiffs can show malice. They cannot. Simply put, there is

15 This conclusion is not even necessary to dispense with Plaintiffs’ claim based on
Stanford’s alleged defamatory statement that he had a “deeded right-of-way across [Plaintiffs’]
property.” This statement is nowhere found in the Criminal Complaint and Deposition that
Plaintiffs insist libeled Hogan. See Criminal Compl. and Dep. Therefore, any defamation claim
arising out of this statement must sound in slander, rather than libel. Plaintiffs do not dispute that
special damages or slander per se must be pleaded to sustain a slander claim. See Opp’n to
Stanford Mot. at 8. Therefore, even assuming that Stanford’s statement about owning a right-of-
way over Hogan’s property is defamatory (a weak assumption at best), it is clear Plaintiffs have
failed to meet the damage element with regard to a claim based on this statement.
no evidence in the record that Stanford knew his statements to Fayle and Lyndaker on September
1, 2016 were false. Thus, the Court grants Stanford’s summary judgment motion as to Plaintiffs’
defamation claim for this reason as well. See Udechukwu, 333 F. Supp. 3d at 172 (dismissing
defamation claim where plaintiff could not show malice); Nevin v. Citibank, N.A., 107 F. Supp.
2d 333, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting summary judgment on defamation claim to defendant

who had reported a suspected crime to police because “[t]here is not one scintilla of evidence in
the record . . . to support any inference of malice” and so defendant was protected by the
qualified privilege).
3. Trespass
Plaintiffs have raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Stanford trespassed
on their property on September 1, 2016.
“Under New York law, trespass is the intentional invasion of another’s property.”
Scribner v. Summers, 84 F.3d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1996). “To establish a prima facie case of
trespass . . . , [the] [p]laintiff must show that [the] [d]efendant[] either entered without

permission, or if permission was granted, refused to leave after permission to remain ha[d] been
withdrawn.” Elmowitz v. Exec. Towers at Lido, LLC, 571 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377–78 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “[l]iability may attach regardless of
defendant’s mistaken belief that he or she had a right to enter.” Volunteer Fire Ass’n of Tappan,
Inc. v. Cty. of Rockland, 956 N.Y.S.2d 102, 105 (2d Dep’t 2012); see also Menkes v. Phillips,
940 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318 (2d Dep’t 2012) (“Entering upon the land of another without permission,
even if innocently or by mistake, constitutes trespass.”).
Stanford states that “no action for trespass can be maintained where the use of [an]
easement [by the owner of the dominant parcel is] . . . reasonable.” Stanford Mem. at 7 (citing
Kaplan v. Inc. Vill. of Lynbrook, 784 N.Y.S.2d 586 (2d Dep’t 2004)). He then argues that he is
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ trespass claim because “it is clear from the evidence
that . . . [he] had a deeded right of way easement through Plaintiffs’ property” and he was
“entirely reasonable in his use of the right of way easement on September 1, 2016.” Stanford
Mem. at 7. However, despite Stanford’s assertion, the evidence is less than clear that Stanford

had a deeded right of way through the entire portion of Plaintiffs’ property he traversed on
September 1, 2016.
In support of his Motion, Stanford submitted the deed for his Hiawatha Lake property.
See Stanford Deed. The deed states that Stanford’s parcel has a “right of way” over “Lot No. 27
on ‘Hiawatha Lake’ No. 1,” over “Lot No. 36 on ‘Hiawatha Lake[’] No. 2,” and “through Lot
No. 24 of the Brantingham Tract.” Stanford Deed at 3–5. Hogan, for his part, owns “lot Numbers
29, 30, 31, 32, and 33 on Hiawatha Lake I,” see Hogan Deed, over which Stanford’s deed does
not appear to provide any right-of-way, see Stanford Deed. As best the Court can discern from
the evidence submitted by the parties, it appears that the access road to both Stanford’s parcels

and Hogan’s parcels runs primarily across Lot No. 24, and both parties appear to have a right-of-
way along this road. See Stanford Deed; Hogan Deed. Were there no dispute that the September
1, 2016 altercation between Stanford and Hogan took place on Lot No. 24, Stanford’s assertion
that he was on his on lawfully-deeded right-of-way would appear to be correct. However, in his
affidavit, Hogan attests that “[t]he incident which occurred on September 1, 2016 . . . was . . .
wholly on Lake lot 29 on Hiawatha Lake I.” Hogan Aff. ¶ 2; see also Hogan Dep. at 325–30.
Therefore, there is a genuinely disputed issue of fact as to the location of the September 1, 2016
incident that precludes summary judgment at this juncture.16 If the altercation took place in a
location where Stanford had a deeded easement and if his use of the easement was reasonable, he
would not be a trespasser as a matter of law. However, if the altercation took place in a location
where Stanford did not have an easement, Plaintiffs’ trespass claim can move forward.17 Since
the precise location of the alleged trespass is disputed in the evidence before the Court, the Court

denies Stanford’s motion as to Plaintiffs’ trespass claim.
C. Punitive Damages
“Punitive damages are meant to punish the defendant for his willful or malicious conduct
and to deter others from similar behavior.” Milfort v. Prevete, 3 F. Supp. 3d 14 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]o be entitled to an award of punitive damages, a claimant
must show a positive element of conscious wrongdoing.” New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance
Corps, Inc. v. Meyers, 442 F.3d 101, 121 (2d Cir. 2001).
Stanford asks the Court to dismiss the claim for punitive damages against him. Stanford
Mem. at 8. However, “[g]enerally, the issue of whether defendants’ conduct is sufficiently

serious to warrant punitive damages is a question best left to the jury.” Lozada v. Weilminster,
92 F. Supp. 3d 76, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also Lin v. Cty. of Monroe, 66 F. Supp. 3d 341, 362

16 The Court notes that Stanford has submitted several maps that he says show the
location of the right-of-way he enjoys over Hogan’s property. Dkt. No. 92-5 (“Maps”). However,
since none of the parcels on this map are numbered, nor the location marked where the
September 1, 2016 confrontation took place, they are of little help to the Court in resolving this
issue.

17 Alternatively, to the extent Stanford had Hogan’s permission to enter any portion of
the Hogans’ property not covered by the right-of-way, see Hogan Dep. at 333 (“Q. But as of
September 1, 2016, you allowed him to use this roadway? A. Yes”), such permission would have
been revoked when Hogan told Stanford to leave. See First Video; Third Video; see also Navarro
v. Fed. Paper Bd. Co., 586 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (3d Dep’t 1992) (“[A] license or privilege to
remain in a building or public place may be terminated by a lawful order not to remain which is
personally communicated to the prospective trespasser by the owner or other authorized
person.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
(W.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Generally, the issue of whether to award punitive damages is an issue for the
jury to decide based on an evaluation of the plaintiffs[’] proof of sufficiently serious
misconduct.”). For this reason, “because [Plaintiffs] ha[ve] provided sufficient evidence to
overcome summary judgment, the Court cannot state as a matter of law that [they] [are] not
entitled to punitive damages.” See Emblen v. Port Auth. of New York/New Jersey, No. 00-CV-

8877, 2002 WL 498634, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002).18 Consequently, the Court denies
Stanford’s summary judgment motion as to the punitive damages claim asserted against him.
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the NYSP Defendants’ summary judgment motion (Dkt. No. 83) is
GRANTED in its entirety. All claims against the NYSP Defendants are hereby DISMISSED;
and it is further
ORDERED, that Stanford’s summary judgment motion (Dkt. No. 82) is GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part. The defamation claim against Stanford is DISMISSED; the false

arrest claim, trespass claim, and associated request for punitive damages against Stanford can
proceed; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk shall TERMINATE defendants Craft and Fayle from the
docket; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order
on all parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

18 Of course, because the Court has granted summary judgment to the NYSP Defendants
as to all of the substantive claims against them, the claim for punitive damages is also dismissed.
Eldridge v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 2d 546, 563 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[P]unitive
damages are a remedy and not a separate cause of action.”).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 1, 2020
Albany, New York

Lawrence E. Kahn
Senior U.S. District Judge

38

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10312892. Public record. Not legal advice.