# Goldman v. Trinity School of Medicine

> District Court, E.D. New York · June 4, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10311853

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 4, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------X

JACK GOLDMAN,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
23-CV-2935(KAM)(JRC)
-against-

TRINITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, through its
Board of Trustees; DOE DEFENDANTS 1-20,
in their individual and official
capacities,

Defendants.

--------------------------------------X

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
On April 20, 2023, Plaintiff Jack Goldman (“Goldman” or the
“Plaintiff”) brought this action asserting violations of N.Y. Gen.
Bus. Law § 349 along with breach of contract and breach of express
warranty claims against Trinity School of Medicine (“Trinity” or
“Defendant”) as well as unnamed “Doe” Defendants 1-20 (the “John
Doe” Defendants). (ECF No. 1, Complaint.) Presently before the
Court is Trinity’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, or, in the alternative,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
(See ECF No. 14, Defendant’s Notice of Motion to Dismiss.) For
the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of New York who was
admitted to and attended Trinity to pursue a Doctor of Medicine
Degree beginning in the Fall of 2016. (See Compl. at ¶¶6, 17.)
Plaintiff was anticipated to graduate in Spring 2020. (Id. at

¶18.) The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff successfully finished
the “first half of [the] medical school semesters” but that
Trinity’s requirement that he pursue “two, then[-]optional,
examinations . . . halted1 Plaintiff from pursuing the clinical
science phase of his education.” (Id. at ¶¶19-23.)
Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Trinity, through an
admissions specialist, “affirmatively stated to Plaintiff in
[April] 2016, during the recruitment stage, that residency in New
York could be provided should he choose to pursue his education
with Trinity.” (Id. at ¶11, 28.) Plaintiff alleges that Trinity

students are “not eligible for residency in the State of New York
due to New York practice eligibility rules,” but does not specify
which rules, or how they bar Trinity students. (Id. at ¶29.)
Based on these allegedly false statements, Plaintiff alleges that

1 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not specify how, exactly, the testing requirement
“halted” him from pursuing the clinical phase of his education, but the
affidavit of Trinity’s President, Steven R. Wilson, states that Plaintiff “was
not successful in passing the [United States Medical Licensing Examination Step
1] exam on his first (and only) attempt . . . in September 2020.” (ECF No. 14-
2, Affidavit of Steven R. Wilson, at ¶14.) The affidavit further states that
“[i]f Plaintiff had successfully passed the Step 1 [exam] and continued the
curriculum, he would have taken clinical courses in Georgia.” (Id. at ¶34.)
he was “attracted to attend [Trinity].” (Id. at ¶31.) Plaintiff
also alleges that he was charged for tuition “while he was not
registered for classes” during the time in which he was attempting

to seek disability accommodations for a National Board of Medical
Examiners (“NBME”) exam. (Id. at ¶¶33-43.) Plaintiff alleges
that the unnamed John Doe Defendants “were employed by [Trinity],”
that they were “acting within the scope of their employment on
behalf of [Trinity],” and that therefore Trinity is vicariously
liable for their actions. (Id. at ¶¶52-53.) Plaintiff does not
allege where the John Doe Defendants worked or were domiciled.
(Id.)
II. Jurisdictional Facts
“When evaluating a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, courts ‘may consider materials outside the
pleadings, including affidavits and other written materials.’”
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. TFS-ICAP, LLC, 415 F. Supp. 3d
371, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Jonas v. Estate of Leven, 116 F.

Supp. 3d 314, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). On September 5, 2023, the
Court granted Plaintiff the opportunity to engage in limited
jurisdictional discovery. (See Docket Order dated September 5,
2023.) That period of discovery closed on November 14, 2023.
(Minute Entry dated November 14, 2023.) Based on that discovery,
Defendant2 has provided the Court with the following facts relevant
to the determination of personal jurisdiction.
Trinity is a private Caribbean medical school located in

Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines. (ECF No. 14-2,
Affidavit of Steven R. Wilson (“Wilson Aff.”), at ¶4.) It
maintains its offices and principal place of business in St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, but also maintains an administration
office in the United States in Roswell, Georgia. (Id. at ¶5.)
Trinity recruits students from across the United States and Canada,
including New York. (Id. at ¶¶18-20.) From 2016 to 2020, 6.4% of
Trinity’s applications were submitted by individuals from New
York, and 7.19% of the students who matriculated were from New
York. (Id. at ¶22.) Trinity does not hold recruiting open houses
in New York but has sent admissions personnel to New York to
interview prospective students. (Id. at ¶¶23-24.) Specifically,

Trinity personnel conducted two visits for interviews in 2016,
four visits in 2017, and four visits in 2018. (Id. at ¶24.) Dr.
Michael Miller, the director of admissions who interviewed
Plaintiff, resides in and works in Georgia. (Id. at ¶26.)
Trinity has no offices, stores, or campus in New York, and it
also does not own any real property in the state. (Id. at ¶6.)

2 Plaintiff neither disputes the facts proffered by Defendant with its motion
to dismiss, nor does Plaintiff offer a competing statement of facts with his
memorandum in opposition.
Trinity is not registered to do business, offer continuing
education programs, or receive process in New York. (Id. at ¶¶6-
7.) Trinity does not derive any income or revenue from services
rendered in New York. (Id. at ¶8.) Trinity is also not affiliated

with any New York hospitals and has not had any clinical rotations
for students in any New York hospital since 2015. (Id. at ¶¶27,
32.) Prior to October 2015, Trinity was party to a contract with
an Illinois corporation to facilitate the placement of students in
clinical clerkships, including at hospitals in New York, but that
contract terminated on October 5, 2015. (Id. at ¶¶28-31.)
Currently, and since 2016, Trinity runs its clinical program at a
network of affiliated hospitals and medical facilities located in
Warner Robins, Georgia, and Baltimore, Maryland. (Id. at ¶¶9,
32.)
III. Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced the instant case on April 20, 2023. (See
generally Complaint.) After being granted an extension of time to

respond, Defendant moved on August 4, 2023, for a pre-motion
conference in anticipation of filing a motion to dismiss. (ECF
No. 7.) The Court held a pre-motion conference to discuss the
anticipated motion on August 22, 2023, at which Plaintiff’s counsel
failed to appear, and a separate attorney from Plaintiff’s
counsel’s law firm who was not admitted to practice in the State
of New York or the Eastern District of New York appeared. (Minute
Entry dated August 22, 2023.) Plaintiff’s counsel was ordered to
show cause regarding his failure to appear, and the Court noted
that “a variety of possible issues” were apparent on the face of

the complaint, “including but not limited to: forum non conveniens
and venue issues . . . [and] that Plaintiff's GBL § 349 claim may
be stale.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel responded to the Order to
Show Cause on August 29, 2023, apologizing for his absence, and
requesting preliminary discovery regarding personal jurisdiction.
(ECF No. 9.) The Court granted the request for jurisdictional
discovery, which was supervised by Magistrate Judge James Cho.
(Docket Order dated September 5, 2023.)
Jurisdictional discovery closed on November 14, 2023, and
Defendant again moved for a pre-motion conference on November 17,
2023. (ECF No. 11.) The Court denied the motion for a pre-motion
conference as unnecessary on November 22, 2023, in light of the

previously held conference, and directed the parties to brief the
motion to dismiss in accordance with the Defendant’s proposed
briefing schedule. (Docket Order dated November 22, 2023.) The
motion to dismiss was fully briefed on January 23, 2024. (See ECF
No. 14, Defendant’s Notice of Motion to Dismiss; ECF No. 14-1,
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss
(“Def. Mem.”); Wilson Aff.; ECF No. 14-3, Voronov Certification in
Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Voronov Cert.”); ECF
No. 15, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition (“Pl. Opp.”);
ECF No. 16, Defendant’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support
of its Motion to Dismiss (“Def. Reply”); ECF No. 16-1, Supplemental
Affidavit of Steven R. Wilson (“Supp. Wilson Aff.”).)

LEGAL STANDARD
I. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2)
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has
jurisdiction over the defendant.” DiStefano v. Carozzi North
America, Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
“[T]he showing a plaintiff must make to defeat a defendant's claim
that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over it ‘varies
depending on the procedural posture of the litigation.’”
Dorchester Financial Securities, Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d
81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-
Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990)). Before

jurisdictional discovery, a plaintiff's prima facie showing of
jurisdiction “may be established solely by allegations.” Ball,
902 F.2d at 197. However, where jurisdictional discovery has been
conducted, a plaintiff's prima facie showing must be factually
supported; that is, it must “include an averment of facts that, if
credited by [the ultimate trier of fact], would suffice to
establish jurisdiction over the defendant.” Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir.
1996) (quoting Ball, 902 F.2d at 197). In assessing the
plaintiff's showing, the court applies a “standard . . . akin to
that on a motion for summary judgment,” construing the “pleadings

documents, and other evidentiary materials . . . in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and all doubts are resolved in [his or
her] favor.” Melnick v. Adelson-Melnick, 346 F. Supp. 2d 499, 503
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because “a district court sitting in a diversity action such
as this may exercise personal jurisdiction to the same extent as
the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which it sits
. . . resolution of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction in the [Eastern] District of New York requires a two-
step analysis.” Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez &
Rodriguez, 305 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2002). “First, the court
must determine if New York law would confer upon its courts the

jurisdiction to reach the defendant,” such as under the New York
general jurisdiction statute (i.e., N.Y. Civil Practice Law and
Rules (“CPLR”) § 301) and the long-arm statute (i.e., CPLR § 302).
See id. Second, “[i]f there is a statutory basis for jurisdiction,
the court must then determine whether New York's extension of
jurisdiction in such a case would be permissible under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.; see also Reich
v. Lopez, 858 F.3d 55, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (“For a court to exercise
general jurisdiction over a defendant, 1) state law must authorize
general jurisdiction; and 2) jurisdiction must comport with
constitutional due process principles.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).
II. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation
omitted). Although “detailed factual allegations” are not
required, “[a] pleading that offers labels or conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

DISCUSSION
Personal jurisdiction is a “threshold question” that “must
precede merits.” In re Rationis Enterprises, Inc. of Panama, 261
F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the
Court first addresses the Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(2) arguments,
followed by the Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) arguments.
I. Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiff does not specify the basis for this Court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, so the Court
will first analyze whether Defendant is subject to general personal

jurisdiction in New York before evaluating whether Defendant is
subject to specific personal jurisdiction in the state. See Arzu
v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 1:23-CV-2116 (SDA), 2023 WL
5614586, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2023) (examining whether
defendant is subject to general personal jurisdiction prior to
considering whether the court could exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over defendant).
A. General Jurisdiction

General personal jurisdiction subjects a defendant to suit on
all claims. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014);
see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.
915, 919 (2011). In New York, pursuant to CPLR § 301, general
jurisdiction exists when a company “has engaged in such a
continuous and systematic course of ‘doing business’ [in New York]
that a finding of its ‘presence’ [in New York] is warranted.”
Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 224
(2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Landoil Resources Corp. v. Alexander &
Alexander Servs., Inc., 565 N.E.2d 488, 490 (N.Y. 1990)). However,
as discussed above, “even if general jurisdiction under N.Y. CPLR
§ 301 is satisfied, a court independently must ensure that due
process is satisfied.” Arzu, 2023 WL 5614586, at *3 (citation
omitted). Under the Due Process Clause, a corporation can “be
subject to general jurisdiction in a state only where its contacts
are so ‘continuous and systematic,’ . . . that it is ‘essentially
at home’ in that state.” Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768
F.3d 122, 135 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139).

“Aside from ‘an exceptional case’ . . . a corporation is at home
(and thus subject to general jurisdiction, consistent with due
process) only in a state that is the company’s formal place of
incorporation or its principal place of business.” Id. (quoting
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19).
Plaintiff’s complaint is silent as to the basis for exercising
personal jurisdiction over Defendant, but Plaintiff argues in his
opposition to the motion to dismiss that Defendant had
“intentional, systematic and ongoing contacts with the State of
New York,” (Pl. Opp. at 4), which the Court construes as an

argument that Defendant is subject to general personal
jurisdiction in New York. Even charitably construed, however,
Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing.
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to establish that
asserting general jurisdiction over Trinity in this case would
comport with due process. Defendant is neither incorporated in
New York, nor does it have its principal place of business in New
York. (See Wilson Aff. at ¶¶4-6). Thus, the Court cannot assert
general personal jurisdiction over Defendant in this case. See
Gleissner v. Turk Hava Yollari Anonim Ortakligi, No. 16-CV-8287
(JPO), 2018 WL 456296, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2018) (no personal
jurisdiction under Daimler where neither defendant's state of

incorporation nor its principal place of business was in New York);
see also Thackurdeen v. Duke Univ., 130 F. Supp. 3d 792, 799–800
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff'd, 660 F. App'x 43 (2d Cir. 2016) (“a
university or college cannot be deemed ‘at home’ in a forum merely
because it engages in the sort of minimal and sporadic contact
with the state that is common to all national universities”).
Plaintiff fails to make any factual allegations that might
distinguish this case from “the myriad of cases holding that
national universities are not subject to general jurisdiction
outside of their state of incorporation or operation.”
Thackurdeen, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 800 (collecting cases).
Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that this

is “an exceptional case” warranting the assertion of general
jurisdiction over Trinity. See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19.
Because Plaintiff cannot establish that it would comport with due
process to exercise general jurisdiction over Trinity, the Court
need not consider whether general jurisdiction would be consistent
with New York state law. See, e.g., Hood v. Ascent Medical Corp.,
691 F. App’x 8, 10 (2d Cir. 2017) (declining to address the scope
of general jurisdiction under New York law where exercising general
jurisdiction was clearly inconsistent with due process).
B. Specific Jurisdiction
Lacking general personal jurisdiction over Defendant, the
Court next looks to whether an exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction would be appropriate in the instant case. Specific

personal jurisdiction subjects a defendant to suit only on claims
that “arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the
forum.” Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S.
351, 362 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct.
of California, San Francisco County, 582 U.S. 255, 262 (2017)).
New York’s long-arm statute permits a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction in cases where a non-domiciliary: (1) “transacts any
business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or
services in the state;” (2) “commits a tortious act within the
state;” (3) “commits a tortious act” outside the state that
“caus[es] injury to [a] person or property within the state;” or
(4) “owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the

state.” CPLR § 302(a). “To establish personal jurisdiction under
[CPLR §] 302(a)(1), two requirements must be met: (1) The defendant
must have transacted business within the state; and (2) the claim
asserted must arise from that business activity.” Sole Resort,
S.A. de C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d
Cir. 2006) (citing McGowan v. Smith, 419 N.E.2d 321, 323 (N.Y.
1981)).
“Though many state statutes extend personal jurisdiction to
the full extent permitted by the Constitution—thereby merging the
statutory and constitutional inquiries—New York's long-arm statute
does not reach so far.” National Union Fire Insurance Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc., 74 F.4th 66,

72 (2d Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. UPS Supply Chain
Solutions, Inc. v. EVA Airways Corp., 144 S. Ct. 559 (2024)
(citation omitted). As a result, if “New York’s long-arm statute
does not authorize personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] . .
. [the Court] need not decide whether exercising such jurisdiction
would comport with constitutional due process.” Id. at 73 (citing
Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff’s argument for the exercise of specific personal
jurisdiction over Trinity appears to be based on several facts:
(1) visits by Trinity employees in 2016, 2017, and 2018, to conduct

interviews with New York students; (2) Trinity’s pre-2016 contract
with an Illinois-based company to place students in clinical
clerkships in New York; (3) Trinity’s conduct of outreach and
marketing efforts to prospective students “on a nationwide basis,
including within the State of New York”; and (4) the fact that
students from New York make up a “significant percentage” of
Trinity’s student body and applicant pool. (Pl. Opp. at 5-6.)
Plaintiff does not specify which section of New York’s long-arm
statute provides jurisdiction, but the facts he offers are
consistent with an argument that Trinity is subject to specific
jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1) because it transacts business
within the state of New York. (See Pl. Opp. at 5 (“Defendant

Trinity . . . availed themselves to litigation within the district
as they operated business [sic] within the State of New York”).)
Plaintiff makes no argument regarding tortious acts committed by
Trinity or real property owned by Trinity within New York, as would
be applicable to CPLR §§ 302(a)(2)-(4). Thus, the Court will
examine whether Trinity’s conduct meets the requirements of CPLR
§ 302(a)(1).
The New York Court of Appeals has explained that “the
overriding criterion necessary to establish a transaction of
business is some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within New York,”
Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834 (N.Y. 2007) (brackets

and internal quotation marks omitted), thereby “invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws,” Fischbarg v. Doucet, 880
N.E.2d 22, 26 (N.Y. 2007). “A defendant need not physically enter
New York State in order to transact business, ‘so long as the
defendant's activities here were purposeful.’” Licci ex rel. Licci
v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 61 (2d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 26). “Not all purposeful
activity, however, constitutes a ‘transaction of business’ within
the meaning of CPLR 302(a)(1),” and the New York Court of Appeals
has held that “the transitory presence of a corporate official [in
New York] . . . [does] not support CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdiction.”
Fischbarg, 880 N.E.2d at 26. “Although it is impossible to

precisely fix those acts that constitute a transaction of business,
[New York Court of Appeals] precedents establish that it is the
quality of the defendants’ New York contacts that is the primary
consideration.” Id.
The Court does not find Trinity’s contacts with the state of
New York sufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction
pursuant to CPLR § 302(a)(1). First, the presence of a Trinity
employee to conduct interviews of prospective students on a handful
of occasions is insufficient to satisfy New York’s long-arm
statute. Cf. Yih v. Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co., 815 F. App'x
571, 574–75 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Absent any allegation of recruiting
targeted at New York, the sole communications tying [defendant] to

New York were those it had with [Plaintiff]. These communications
-- two Skype interviews and emails through a third-party agent
regarding a position in Taiwan for which [Plaintiff] was not hired
-- were too limited to amount to a purposeful transaction of
business in New York.”). Trinity did not hold open houses in New
York for prospective students, does not partner with any New York
colleges and universities for recruiting, and did not specifically
target any recruiting emails at New York residents. (Wilson Aff.
at ¶¶18, 20-21.) Furthermore, although Trinity employees may have
contacted individuals in New York, it was in furtherance of the
individuals attending Trinity for an education entirely outside
the state of New York. See Berkshire Capital Group, LLC v. Palmet
Ventures, LLC, 307 F. App'x 479, 481 (2d Cir. 2008) (“the contract

here was to be performed entirely outside of New York . . . [t]he
mere fact that [Defendant] engaged in some contact with a New York
purchaser does not mean that [Defendant] transacted business in
New York”).
Second, even if Trinity’s contract with an Illinois company
to place students in New York clinical clerkships, which had
expired prior to Plaintiff’s interview, was a sufficient contact
with New York to provide jurisdiction, Plaintiff points to no
“relatedness between the transaction and the legal claim such that
the latter is not completely unmoored from the former.” Licci ex
rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 168–69

(2d Cir. 2013). The aforementioned contract, which had been
terminated before Plaintiff was even interviewed for admission by
Trinity and is not mentioned in the complaint, clearly has no
bearing on Plaintiff’s allegations against Trinity in April 2016
and thereafter. (See generally Compl.) Therefore, Trinity’s pre-
2016 contract cannot serve as a basis for specific personal
jurisdiction under CPLR § 302(a)(1).
Third, any “digital marketing” materials which Plaintiff
received, and which were not specifically targeted at New York
residents, do not provide a basis for specific personal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fanelli v. Latman, 162 N.Y.S.3d 140, 145
(2d Dep’t 2022) (no basis for long-arm jurisdiction when defendant

“advertises its services nationwide through a website that is not
specifically directed toward New York residents or businesses”);
see also Maranga v. Vira, 386 F. Supp. 2d 299, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“At bottom, the placement of the ads, even in conjunction with
the telephonic negotiations that followed, implies only that
Defendants invited residents of New York, and quite possibly others
as well, to transact business in Louisiana. That is not the same
thing as the Defendants themselves having transacted business in
New York.”) Even if such contacts were sufficient, Plaintiff has
not pleaded facts suggesting that the marketing materials are at
all related to his claims. Instead, his claims focus on allegedly
misleading statements made during his interview and a subsequent

breach of contract when he was charged tuition while not attending
school. Therefore, nationwide marketing by Trinity also cannot
support a finding of specific personal jurisdiction in New York
with regards to Plaintiff’s claims.
Finally, the mere fact that approximately 7% of Trinity’s
students hail from New York is not sufficient to justify a finding
of specific personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Apicella v. Valley
Forge Military Academy & Junior College, 478 N.Y.S.2d 663, 665 (2d
Dep’t 1984) (no general or specific personal jurisdiction over
school when, among other things, “New York State students made up
only 10% of the school's total enrollment and the school did not
maintain any physical plant in New York”). Trinity’s President

has stated, under penalty of perjury, that the school’s email and
recruiting activities “do[] not target New York over other states
where it recruits students.” (Wilson Aff. at ¶¶18, 20.) In the
absence of any facts to the contrary, the mere presence of New
Yorkers among Trinity’s student body does not suffice to grant
this Court specific personal jurisdiction over the school.
In conclusion, there is no statutory basis for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction over Defendant Trinity pursuant to CPLR
§ 302(a)(1). Because Plaintiff has failed to establish a statutory
basis for personal jurisdiction, the Court need not further analyze
whether Trinity lacks the necessary “minimum contacts” with New
York. See National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.,

74 F.4th at 72 (“Though many state statutes extend personal
jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Constitution—
thereby merging the statutory and constitutional inquiries—New
York's long-arm statute does not reach so far.”)
C. John Doe Defendants
The Court’s conclusion that it lacks jurisdiction over
Trinity leaves open the question of what should be done with the
John Doe Defendants. The only facts alleged in the complaint
regarding the John Doe defendants are as follows: “Doe Defendants
1-20 (“Doe Defendants”) are employees or agents of Defendant
TRINITY that caused the harms to the Plaintiff subject of this
lawsuit. At this time, their names and whereabouts are unknown.”

(Compl. at ¶8.) Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts suggesting
that the John Doe defendants conducted any relevant acts in, or
are domiciled in New York, and therefore “at home” in New York for
the purposes of general jurisdiction.3 Reich v. Lopez, 858 F.3d
55, 63 (2d Cir. 2017) (“General jurisdiction over an individual
comports with due process in the forum where he is ‘at home,’
meaning the place of ‘domicile.’”) (citation omitted). Plaintiff
has also not offered any basis for this Court retaining
jurisdiction over “employees or agents” of Trinity in the absence
of jurisdiction over Trinity itself, given that he appears to argue
Trinity is vicariously liable for its employees conduct. (See
Compl. at ¶¶51-54); see also Covington Industries, Inc. v. Resintex
A. G., 629 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1980) (“A judgment entered

against parties not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
rendering court is a nullity.”) Because Plaintiff has proffered
no separate basis for this Court’s jurisdiction over the John Doe
defendants other than their employment by Trinity, the Court
accordingly finds that it lacks a sufficient basis to exercise

3 The Court notes that the Affidavit of Trinity’s President states that the two
individuals who conducted interviews on behalf of Trinity in New York, Drs.
Miller and Bell, both work and reside outside of New York, in Georgia and
Maryland, respectively. (See Wilson Aff. at ¶26.)
personal jurisdiction over the John Doe defendants, and the claims
against them are dismissed.
II. Failure to State a Claim
In light of the Court’s conclusion that it lacks a statutory

basis for jurisdiction over Defendant Trinity, the Court declines
to consider Defendant’s arguments regarding Plaintiff’s failure to
state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See Arrowsmith
v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 221 (2d Cir. 1963) (“a court
without such jurisdiction [over the defendant] lacks power to
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim”).
III. Leave to Amend
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
a court “should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “A district court
has discretion to deny leave for good reason, including futility,

bad faith, undue delay, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.”
McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir.
2007) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). “Futility
is a determination, as a matter of law, that proposed amendments
would fail to cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Panther
Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Communications, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 119
(2d Cir. 2012) (citing Cortec Industries, Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P.,
949 F.2d 42, 50 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Plaintiff has not moved for leave to amend the Complaint, but
closes his opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss by stating
“[s]hould this honorable court determine that [the] complaint is

lacking in material facts, Plaintiff[] respectfully request[s]
leave to amend [his] complaint.” (Pl. Opp. at 16.) It is not
clear whether Plaintiff is requesting leave to amend only in the
event that the Court were to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim, or also in the event that the Court were to dismiss
the complaint for failure to establish personal jurisdiction over
the Defendant.
There is no basis for the Plaintiff to be granted leave to
amend the complaint in the instant case. “It is well settled under
Second Circuit law that, even where [the] plaintiff has not made
a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, a court may still
order discovery, in its discretion, when it concludes that the

plaintiff may be able to establish jurisdiction if given the
opportunity to develop a full factual record.” Leon v. Shmukler,
992 F. Supp. 2d 179, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing In re Magnetic
Audiotape Antitrust Litigation, 334 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2003));
see also APWU v. Potter, 343 F.3d 619, 627 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[A]
court should take care to give the plaintiff ample opportunity to
secure and present evidence relevant to the existence of
jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff has
been afforded the opportunity to engage in jurisdictional
discovery in the instant case and proffered no additional facts
supporting an exercise of jurisdiction in his opposition papers.
(See generally Pl. Opp.) Because the parties have already engaged
in jurisdictional discovery, and the Court has found that
Defendants are not subject to this Court’s jurisdiction, an
amendment to the complaint would be futile. See Arzu, 2023 WL
5614586, at *6 (“Because [defendant] is not subject to specific
jurisdiction, an amendment to the Complaint to plead that
jurisdictional basis would be futile.”) Therefore, Plaintiff will
not be granted leave to amend.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is
GRANTED. This Court lacks jurisdiction over Defendant, and
Plaintiff’s complaint is accordingly dismissed without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

SO ORDERED
Dated: June 4, 2024 b “7 YY, □□
Brooklyn, New York °
“Vy □□ et te
HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10311853. Public record. Not legal advice.