# Revill v. Pratz

> District Court, E.D. New York · May 1, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10311748

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** May 1, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------- X
:
MONICA REVILL,
:
Plaintiff,
: MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER
– against – :

24-CV-2782 (AMD) (JAM)
:
ERIK PRATZ, Police Officer, Badge #30562;
CHRISTIAN TATE WEGENER, Physician :
Assistant; MAXWELL SCOTT WITHORN,
:
Registered Nurse; MARK RYDZEWSKI, Doctor
of Osteopathic; JESSICA E POORAN, Registered
Nurse; JOHN DOE # 2, Queens Hospital Staff;
JOHN DOE # 3, Queens Hospital Staff;
TAUREAN DWIGHT HOWARD, Medical :
Doctor; DENESHA C FINDLEY, Physician
Assistant; CHRISTIAN CHUDI EYIUCHE, :
Medical Doctor; and JOHN DOE # 1, Queens
:
Hospital Staff,
:
Defendants.
:
--------------------------------------------------------------- X

ANN M. DONNELLY, United States District Judge:

On April 11, 2024, the pro se plaintiff filed a downloadable form complaint titled
“Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights,” as well as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
(ECF Nos. 1, 2.) The complaint does not describe the requested relief or assert a basis to invoke
the Court’s jurisdiction. The plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application is granted for the limited
purpose of this Order. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses the complaint sua sponte
with leave to amend.
BACKGROUND
On April 11, 2021, the plaintiff’s “motor functions shut down” and she needed to go to
the hospital “to find out if there was a date rape substance in [her] system;” she told her husband
to “call EMS and the police.”1 (ECF No. 1 at 10.) When the police arrived, the plaintiff told
them that she had been drugged. (Id.) The police then “cut off the ignition to [her] parked car”
and gave her keys “to Police Officer Erick Pratz.” (Id.) Pratz also “took [the plaintiff’s] purse
and searched it.” (Id. at 10, 12–13.)
The plaintiff went to the hospital,2 where “Pratz started screaming ‘DO YOU THINK

YOU’RE SAFE.’” (Id. at 10.) Pratz “immediately ran up to [physician’s assistant] Tate
Wagener and falsely claim[ed] that [the plaintiff] refused to give [her] name.” (Id. at 10–11.)
Wegener “falsely designat[ed] [the plaintiff] as a danger to [her]self and others” without
speaking to the plaintiff, evaluating her medical condition, or seeking her consent to treatment.
(Id. at 14.) The plaintiff says that Pratz, “having access to [her] vehicle and aware of [her] Bronx
purchases, fabricated [the prehospital] narrative and relayed it to Wagener and [another doctor
who signed the consent for treatment].” (Id. at 12–13.) Pratz also allegedly covered his cell
phone with a latex glove and recorded the plaintiff. (Id. at 11.)
The plaintiff “attempted to call her husband” and remove the “stretch cot straps with the

intention of using the restroom.” (Id. at 12.) At this point, “RN Weithorn turn around and
screamed ‘OH MY GOD! SHE’S AWAKE, NO YOU CAN’T LEAVE;’” the hospital staff
“attacked” her and “Withorn3 ran towards [her] with a pointed needle in the air and stabbed [her]
in the upper right neck and back.” (Id.). The plaintiff “was rendered unconscious from
approximately 6:42 am to 12:30 pm.” (Id. at 12.) During that time, the plaintiff says, Wegener

1 The plaintiff does not identify where this incident took place.
2 The plaintiff does not identify which hospital, although it appears that the plaintiff went to a hospital in
Queens, New York. (ECF No. 1 at 15 (“On April 14, 2021, I requested a copy of my entire medical
record from Queens HIM and did not receive it.”).)
3 The plaintiff spells the defendants’ names in different ways throughout the complaint.
searched her purses, got access to her medical records, undressed her, and “injected [her] with a
circular multi pin needle in [her] upper left thigh . . . .” (Id.)4
The plaintiff claims Mark Rydzewski, Jessica Pooran, Denesha Findley, and Chudi
Eyiuche, whom she identifies as medical staff, “did not assess or evaluate [her] medical
condition.” (Id. at 13.) However, the plaintiff also alleges: Rydzewski “said [the plaintiff]

appeared to be under the influence of a substance with erratic and violent behavior;” Pooler
reported that at 11:48 a.m., the plaintiff had a stroke and seizure and fell off of her bed; at 11:53
a.m., Findley and Eyiuche “said [the plaintiff] was standing up” and “consented to a psychiatric
evaluation;” Findley also retrieved the plaintiff’s home phone number from her cellular phone,
called the plaintiff’s husband, and asked him questions about the plaintiff’s psychiatric history.
Id. at 13–14.
The plaintiff says she woke up at a 12:30 p.m.5 “in a different room from where the
attack took place.” (Id. at 14.) Around 3:00 p.m., one of the plaintiff’s friends arrived and
Registered Nurse Jijo Jacob told the plaintiff that she could leave. As she was walking out of her

room “to call the Police Precinct to get [her] car keys from Officer Prarz [sic], Police officer
Mortimor yelled ‘NO YOU CAN’T LEAVE.’” (Id.) Dr. Taurean Dwight Howard “ran up” to
the plaintiff and her friend in the hallway “yelling, and pointing at [the plaintiff’s] swollen left
hand” and said, ‘Look what happened between you and the police,’ falsely accusing [her] of
fighting the Police.” (Id. at 14.)

4 She also says that the hospital staff gave her “additional” injections, but these “medications and
treatments are absent from [her] medical record.” (ECF No. 1 at 12.)
5 It is not clear from the complaint how she “consented to a psychiatric evaluation at 11:53 a.m.” (id. at
13), but did not wake up until noon.
On April 12, 2021, the plaintiff “lodged a verbal complaint with Ms. Bipasha Haque from
Patient Relations NYC Queens Hospital” about the alleged attack on the ambulance stretcher.
(Id. at 16.) When the plaintiff said she was injured, Haque asked if she was “going to sue.” (Id.)
On April 14, 2021, the plaintiff requested medical records from “Queens HIM.”6 (Id.
at 15.) On April 16, 2021, the plaintiff spoke with Dr. Howard, who told her that she “was a

danger to [her]self and others,” and he and the hospital staff “treated [her] accordingly.” (Id.)
On May 4, 2021, the plaintiff received a partial medical record, which included lab results. (Id.)
The plaintiff requested additional records but says she has not received the full record of
treatments, clinical notes, or medication documentation. (Id.)
On May 1, 2021, the plaintiff went to St. Luke’s Hospital in Utica, New York. (Id.
at 18.) She says that “[u]nbeknownst to [her], [a physician’s assistant] repeated the drug test PA
Wegener of Queens hospital conducted on April 11th, without [her] consent or explanation.
Given that PA Wegener of Queens hospital initially ordered the drug test, it can be inferred that
there was communication between them regarding the repetition.” (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD
A pro se plaintiff’s complaint must be “liberally construed, and . . . however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citations omitted). However, the
district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint if it “is frivolous,” “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a
claim, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

6 It is not clear what the plaintiff means by “Queens HIM.”
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are

true.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Further, if the Court “determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, [it] must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3); see also Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.A.R.L., 790 F.3d 411,
416–17 (2d Cir. 2015).
In addition, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs that the plaintiff must
provide a short, plain statement of claim against each defendant named so that they have
adequate notice of the claims against them. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (Rule 8 “demands more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). “[U]nnecessary prolixity in a
pleading places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because

they are forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo,
861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); Komatsu v. City of New York, No. 20-CV-
7046, 2021 WL 3038498, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2021) (noting that “length is only one
consideration under Rule 8,” and other issues include “redundancy and frequent frolics into
seemingly irrelevant materials [which] inhibit the Court and Defendants’ ability to understand
the nature of many of the issues he has raised.”). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply
with Rule 8 is generally reserved for cases where the complaint is “so confused, ambiguous,
vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Salahuddin,
861 F.2d at 42. This standard is applied with special lenience to pro se pleadings. See Simmons
v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1995).
Finally, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.” “A case
aris[es] under federal law within the meaning of § 1331 . . . if a well-pleaded complaint

establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Empire Healthchoice
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 689–90 (2006). A plaintiff properly invokes § 1331
jurisdiction when he or she pleads a colorable claim “arising under” the Constitution or laws of
the United States. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513 (2006). A claim alleging federal
question jurisdiction “may be dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction if it is not
colorable, i.e., if it is ‘immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction’ or is
‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Id. at 513 n.10. Although courts hold pro se complaints
“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S.

5, 9 (1980), pro se litigants must still establish subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Rene v.
Citibank N.A., 32 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541–42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
DISCUSSION
Section 1915 and Rule 8
The complaint, construed liberally, does not “disclose sufficient information to permit the
defendant[s] to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know
whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir.
2000); Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2019). The plaintiff did not complete
the sections of the form complaint that ask for the jurisdictional basis for the plaintiff’s claims,
the location of the alleged violations, or the requested relief—nor does the plaintiff’s appended
narrative provide these details. This alone is a sufficient basis for dismissal. See Koso v.
Haegele, No. 18-CV-4400, 2018 WL 6531496, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2018) (dismissing
sua sponte where “[the p]laintiff . . . left blank the entire section of the form complaint relating to
the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction” and did not otherwise “identify any federal law pertaining
to her claims”); see also Clarkes v. Hughes, No. 17-CV-961, 2018 WL 5634932, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.

Oct. 30, 2018) (dismissing allegations of constitutional violations for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction); cf. Villatoro v. Toulon, No. 22-CV-109, 2022 WL 493181, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,
2022) (dismissing Section 1983 claim because “there are no factual allegations in the complaint
concerning any conduct or inaction” by the defendant).
Further, the plaintiff does not explain how the allegations in the complaint amount to a
constitutional violation. She claims that Pratz, a police officer, searched her purse without her
consent and then provided false information to the hospital staff. She also says that Wegener
searched her purse and accessed her medical records. She suggests that Pratz and Wegener were
looking for identifying information and medical information; however, she does not explain how

this departs from routine hospital procedure and treatment, and there are no additional facts to
suggest that these alleged searches were improper.
The plaintiff also claims that Wegener and Weithorn gave her injections, and that certain
hospital staff deemed her to be “a danger to herself and others.” (Id. at 14.) She appears to have
been discharged from the hospital later that same day. The plaintiff’s only claims against
Rydzewski, Pooran, Findley, Eyiuche, and Jacob are that they made notes in her medical records
but did not “assess or evaluate” her medical condition. (Id. at 13–14.) Finally, she names four
John Doe defendants, but she does not describe how these individuals are involved or why their
conduct is actionable. The plaintiff says that she did not consent to treatment, but does not
explain how these allegations amount to a constitutional violation.
These deficiencies justify dismissal under both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Rule 8. Chavez v.
Cause Yall Took My Phone I Don’t Know Their Names, No. 21-CV-8526, 2021 WL 5401485, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021) (“The complaint does not contain a single fact suggesting that [the

plaintiff] can state a viable claim that falls within the Court’s jurisdiction.”); Hodge v. New York
Unemployment, No. 24-CV-1631, 2024 WL 1513643, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 8, 2024); see also
Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42.
Section 1983
If the plaintiff intends to pursue a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the conduct alleged
must have “been committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and “deprived a person
of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”
Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994); see also McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752
F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that
defendants violated plaintiff’s federal rights while acting under color of state law.”); Schiff v.

Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep’t, No. 12-CV-1410, 2015 WL 1774704, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20,
2015).
Here, the plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to show that the defendants acted in
concert with state actors in furtherance of an unconstitutional act. She does not explain how the
actions of seemingly private parties—the hospital staff members—are attributable to the state in
any way. Private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful, is generally beyond the
reach of § 1983. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50, (1999); cf.
Brentwood Academy v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (“[S]tate
action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the State and the
challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.’”) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). And in fact,
hospitals and hospital staff are “generally not considered” state actors. Anthony v. Med. Staff at
Inst., No. 16-CV-1122, 2016 WL 1383491, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2016) (quoting White v. St.
Joseph’s Hosp., 369 F. App’x 225, 226 (2d Cir. 2010)); see Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749,

757 n.3 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Our decision in this case turns in large part on our conclusion that the
[private] Hospital was not a state actor when it provided medical care to [plaintiff].”); Jones v.
Beth Israel Hosp., No. 17-CV-3445, 2018 WL 1779344, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2018)
(dismissing § 1983 claims against hospital and noting that “[i]t is well established that private
conduct is not controlled by Section 1983, unless the private entity’s challenged actions are fairly
attributable to the state.”); Abdul-Rahman v. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., No. 10-CV-1697, 2010 WL
1838607, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2010) (“[Brooklyn Hospital] is a private entity and its
employees are private parties, not state actors.”).
Even assuming that Pratz, the only defendant who is not employed by the hospital,

violated her constitutional rights, the plaintiff must explain how the private parties are “jointly
engaged” in that conduct. See, e.g., Betts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 2014)
(“Where . . . a police officer exercises independent judgment in how to respond to a private
party’s legitimate request for assistance, the private party is not jointly engaged in the officer’s
conduct so as to render it a state actor under Section 1983.” (quoting Ginsberg v. Healey Car &
Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999))). She does not do so here. The plaintiff
is therefore on notice of Section 1983’s requirements should she choose to amend her complaint.
In Forma Pauperis Application
Finally, the plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is incomplete. The
plaintiff says that she is unemployed and has no income or cash. (ECF No. 2 at 1, 3.) However,
she owns a car valued at $15,000 and makes monthly mortgage payments of $300 a month. (Id.
at 3.) She also reports a “school loan” to Nelnet7 in the amount of $70,000. Id. The application
does not explain how the plaintiff makes her house and student loan payments, or how she
affords basic necessities, given her reported income.
If she chooses to amend the complaint, the plaintiff must file the Long Form in forma

pauperis application and include sufficient financial information to establish that she is “unable
to pay [filing] fees or give security therefor.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); see Adkins v. E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948) (A litigant qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis if
she “cannot because of his poverty pay or give security for” the costs of filing “and still be able
to provide himself and [his] dependents with the necessities of life.”); Bey v. Queens Cnty.,
Supreme Cts., No. 19-CV-2038, 2019 WL 11690197 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2019) (dismissing the
action without prejudice where the plaintiffs did not pay the filing fee or submit an adequate in
forma pauperis application). The plaintiff says that she has no income or other assets. However,
she does not explain how she makes her house payments or pays for the necessities of daily

living. If the plaintiff’s husband is providing financial support, that support is relevant to her
claim of indigency; the Long Form application allows both spouses to provide their relevant
financial information.

7 Nelnet is a student loan services organization. See Nelnet Landing Page, https://nelnet.com/ (last visited
May 1, 2024).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the complaint is dismissed. The Second Circuit has advised that
district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least
once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be
stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). However, where a court does not

find that the complaint, liberally construed, “suggests that the plaintiff has a claim that she has
inadequately or inartfully pleaded,” but instead that “[t]he problem with [the plaintiff’s] causes
of action is substantive [and] better pleading will not cure it,” “[r]epleading would . . . be futile”
and leave to replead “should be denied.” Id. (citing Hunt v. All. N. Am. Gov’t Income Tr., 159
F.3d 723, 728 (2d Cir. 1998)).
The Court has carefully considered the allegations in the complaint and, out of an
abundance of caution, grants the plaintiff leave to amend within 30 days. However, as explained
above, the plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement” of facts sufficient to demonstrate
how the defendants violated her constitutional rights. The plaintiff is also on notice of the

requirements to pursue a § 1983 claim. If the plaintiff chooses to amend without addressing the
deficiencies identified in this Order, or does not amend within the time allotted, the Court will
dismiss the complaint without a second chance to amend and close the case.
The plaintiff is advised that the amended complaint will replace the original complaint,
must be captioned “Amended Complaint,” and must bear the same docket number as this
Memorandum and Order: 1:24-CV-2782 (AMD) (JAM). For free, limited-scope legal
assistance, the plaintiff may wish to consult the City Bar Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se Legal
Assistance Project in Brooklyn by calling (212) 382-4729.
SO ORDERED.
s/Ann M. Donnelly
___________________________
ANN M. DONNELLY
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
May 1, 2024

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10311748. Public record. Not legal advice.