# Junior-Tony Dieujuste v. Sin

> District Court, E.D. New York · April 26, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10311725

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** April 26, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10311725

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine to review “collateral attack” of Family Court Order
- explaining that “[g]enerally, spoken defamatory words are slander; written defamatory words are libel”
- explaining that “the [c]ourt [would] evaluate each allegedly defamatory statement (or set of statements
- applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine to review “collateral attack” of Family Court Order
- explaining that “American Airlines continues to be the law of this Circuit” after relevant intervening Supreme Court precedent

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------------------------------------------- x
JUNIOR-TONY DIEUJUSTE, holder in due
course of ®Junior Tony Dieujuste©,
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff,
23-CV-7805
v. (Marutollo, M.J.)

JESSICA SIN, KEISHA KEARSE, and
all successors and assigns.

Defendants.
--------------------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO, United States Magistrate Judge:
Plaintiff Junior-Tony Dieujuste, proceeding pro se, brings this action alleging trademark
infringement, slander, libel, and failure to protect or act against Defendants Judge Jessica Sin1 and
Clerk of Court Keisha Kearse of the Family Court of the State of New York (collectively,
“Defendants”). See generally Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”).
Currently pending before this Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint.2 See
Dkt. Nos. 8, 17. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and
dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint with prejudice.
I. Background
A. Factual background
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and the parties’ submissions related to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Dkt. Nos. 1, 8, 16, 17, 18.

1 As explained further below, at the time of the allegations in the Complaint, Judge Sin served as a Support
Magistrate in the Family Courts of Bronx, New York, and Queens counties prior to her appointment to the
bench. See, e.g., https://www.nyc.gov/site/macj/appointed/family-court.page. (last accessed Apr. 26,
2024).

2 On November 29, 2023, the parties consented to jurisdiction to the assigned United States Magistrate
Judge in this matter. Dkt. Nos. 11, 13.
On June 23, 2022, an individual identified as Keyona N. Florence filed an Initial Support
Petition in the Family Court of the State of New York (the “Family Court Petition”), seeking
current and retroactive child support from Plaintiff. See Compl, at ¶¶ 8, 21-38.3 A summons
accompanied the Family Court Petition and required Plaintiff to appear on February 22, 2023 in

the Family Court of the State of New York, County of Queens, before Judge Sin, then a Support
Magistrate. Id. at 22.
On February 22, 2023, Judge Sin issued a Temporary Order of Support directing Plaintiff
to remit ongoing child support payments. See Dkt. No. 8 at 1. On April 18, 2023, an Income
Withholding Order was issued to Plaintiff’s employer, garnishing Plaintiff’s wages for child
support. Compl. ¶¶ 10; 38-44. Additionally, on October 4, 2023, a National Medical Support
Notice was issued to Plaintiff’s employer, requiring health insurance enrollment for his children.
Id. at 45-54.
On April 27, 2023, Plaintiff served Defendants with a “New York State Department of
State Certificate of Service Mark Registration,” dated April 27, 2023, for the name “Junior-Tony

Dieujuste,” as well as “Notice of Trademark Infringement,” “Trademark License Agreement,” and
other related documents. See Compl. ¶ 11, 57-83; Dkt. No. 8 at 2.
B. Procedural history
On October 19, 2023, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed the instant Complaint against the
Defendants. See Compl., Dkt. No. 1. Read liberally, the Complaint alleges that Defendants
committed violations of federal trademark, copyright, and patent law, as well as slander, libel, and
a failure to protect or act. See Compl. at ¶¶ 24-27. In short, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’
references to his name on the Family Court documents unlawfully infringed on a service mark that

3 This Court references the ECF-generated page numbers.
Plaintiff purports to have registered on April 17, 2023 nunc pro tunc on October 27, 1980.4 Id. at
¶¶ 9, 62.
The Complaint seeks various forms of relief purportedly governed by Plaintiff’s “Fee
Schedule,” namely, damages of $50,000 per occurrence of service mark infringement and failure

to protect or act for each use of his name in court proceedings; damages of $100,000 per occurrence
of slander or libel; injunctive relief enjoining Defendants from invoking his service mark; an order
compelling Defendants to communicate the injunction to third parties, an order to “seize and
deliver” all materials with the relevant service mark to Plaintiff before destroying them; and a
declaration that Defendants’ actions and omissions are causes of action under various sections of
the United States Code. See Compl., ¶¶ 23-32.
On October 25, 2023, Plaintiff served Defendants. Dkt. No. 6.
On November 14, 2023, Defendants filed a letter-motion for a pre-motion conference letter,
which the Court deemed Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint. See Dkt. No. 8.5 In their
motion to dismiss, Defendants assert that the Complaint (i) fails to establish this Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction and (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Dkt. No. 8
at 2-3.

5 An in-person pre-motion conference was held before the undersigned regarding Defendants’ motion to
motions themselves – under appropriate circumstances.” Kapitalforeningen Lægernes Inv. v. United Techs.
Corp., 779 F. App’x 69, 70 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming the district court construing pre-motion letters as the
motions themselves). “A court does not abuse its discretion in construing a pre-motion letter as the motion
itself, where the party seeking leave to file the motion had a sufficient opportunity to make the necessary
arguments to preserve its position for appellate review” Loeb v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 22-CV-6410 (HG),
2023 WL 4163117, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2023) (citing In re Best Payphones, Inc., 450 F. App’x 8, 15
(2d Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court converting a pre-motion letter to a motion). Defendants
subsequently filed a reply brief (Dkt. No. 17) and Plaintiff filed, without Court approval, a sur-reply (Dkt.
No. 18).
As a threshold matter, Defendants assert that sovereign immunity bars claims for damages
against state judges in their official capacity. Id. at 2. Specifically, as Plaintiff fails to point to a
waiver of sovereign immunity (and as a waiver does not exist in this case), Defendants contend
that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Additionally,

to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Judge Jessica Sin accountable in her judicial capacity,
Defendants argue that such claims are barred due to the absolute immunity afforced to Support
Magistrates acting in their judicial capacity. Id. Third, Defendants argue that this Court may not
exercise federal question jurisdiction in this instance pursuant to the domestic-relations abstention
doctrine. Id. at 2-3. Finally, Defendants assert that, to the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to
invalidate his child support orders, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims as an
improper appeal of final state court judgments. In the alternative, Defendants assert that the instant
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted where Plaintiff fails to provide
evidence of a “valid patent, trademark, service mark, or copyright” and his claims sounding in
“sovereign citizen theories” should be dismissed as meritless. Id. at 3.

Plaintiff, in his Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, argues that Defendants have
failed to appropriately respond and rebut the claims asserted in his Complaint. See Dkt. No. 16,
at 10-11. Further, Plaintiff asserts that the cases cited by Defendants are “an attempt to confuse
the issues of the instant matter before this court”—noting that many of the cases cited by
Defendants do not implicate a trademark or service mark. Id. at 11-13
II. Legal standards

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

“When a party moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and on other grounds, courts
consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge first.” Whyte v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 21-CV-
3301 (PKC) (LB), 2022 WL 4484664, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2022) (cleaned up). “This is
because if a court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, then the defendant’s ‘other
defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined.’” Id. (quoting Daly v.
Citigroup Inc., 939 F.3d 415, 426 (2d Cir. 2019)). “Federal courts must determine that they have

jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.” Lance v. Cojfman, 549 U.S. 437, 439 (2007).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), courts must “accept as true all
material factual allegations in the complaint,” and refrain from “drawing from the pleadings
inferences favorable to the party asserting jurisdiction.” Whyte, 2022 WL 4484664, at *3 (cleaned
up). “The party asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that it exists.” Id. (cleaned up). “Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard
afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over
cases if subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.” Id. (cleaned up).
“In resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
a district court may consider evidence outside the pleadings.” Lee v. Banks, No. 23-CV-5800

(JLR), 2024 WL 1657908, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2024) (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank
Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008)). “Where, as here, the defendant moves for dismissal under
Rule 12(b)(1) as well as on other grounds, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) challenge
first since if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the accompanying
defenses and objections become moot and do not need to be determined.” Lee, 2024 WL 1657908,
at *3 (citations omitted).
Notwithstanding the liberal pleading standard afforded pro se litigants, federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction and may not preside over cases if they lack subject matter jurisdiction.
Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01 (2d Cir. 2000). “Although
courts hold pro se complaints ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers,’ Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), pro se litigants must establish subject matter
jurisdiction, see, e.g., Rene v. Citibank N.A., 32 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).”
Panchitkhaew v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., No. 18-CV-4434 (JFB)(AKT), 2019 WL 1492780,

at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2019). If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be
dismissed. Id. at 700-01; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
“To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “detailed factual allegations” are not
required, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff’s
factual allegations must also be sufficient to give the defendant “fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted) and must show that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v.
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
“[T]he court’s task is to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint; it is not to assess the
weight of the evidence that might be offered on either side.” Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d
67, 75 (2d Cir. 2020). Determining whether a complaint states a claim is “a context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679. The Court must accept the well-pleaded factual allegations set forth in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff; however, the court

need not “credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.”
Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94 (2d Cir. 2013).
“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
“District courts must interpret a pro se complaint to raise the strongest claims that it suggests.”
Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011) (cleaned up); see also Chavis v. Chappius, 618
F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). Moreover, at the pleadings stage of the proceeding, the Court must
assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint. Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013)

(citation omitted).
III. Discussion
A. This Court does not possess subject matter jurisdiction over this action
As a threshold matter, this Complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as (1) Defendants are entitled to absolute
immunity in their capacity as judicial officers, (2) the Domestic-Relations
Abstention Doctrine requires this Court to abstain from exercising its federal question jurisdiction
over squarely matrimonial matters, and (3) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Plaintiff’s claims to
the extent that he seeks review of state court judicial proceedings and determinations.
1. Absolute immunity
Federal subject matter jurisdiction is limited and available only when: (1) a “federal
question” is presented, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; or (2) the plaintiff and defendant are of diverse
citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “[S]ubject-

matter jurisdiction, because it involves the court’s power to hear a case, can never be forfeited or
waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). Courts “have an independent
obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a
challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (citing Ruhrgas
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999)). As noted above, “Plaintiffs, even those
proceeding pro se, bear the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists.” Kuai Le
Chen v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 3d 292, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
Here, the Complaint seeks damages from Judge Sin based on alleged conduct perpetrated
in her official capacity as a Support Magistrate in the Family Court of the State of New York,
County of Queens. See generally, Compl. Plaintiff’s claim against Judge Sin, however, may not

proceed given the sovereign and absolute immunity afforded to state judicial officials. Judges are
absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial
responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); accord Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204,
209 (2d Cir. 2009). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge
are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210; accord Kirkland v. Minihan, No. 20-
CV-8973, 2020 WL 6729409, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2020); Barton v. Clark, No. 23-CV-5827
(LGS), 2023 WL 6929178, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2023). “[E]ven allegations of bad faith or
malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209. This is because, “[w]ithout
insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation.” Young v. Selsky,
41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994).
Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge acts outside her judicial capacity, or when
the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in the absence of jurisdiction.”

Mireles, 502 U.S. at 13; accord Hart v. Thompson, No. 23-CV-3289, 2023 WL 3949041, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2023); see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial
in nature). But no such claim is plausibly raised here. Indeed, “the scope of [a] judge’s jurisdiction
must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 356 (1978); accord Lewis v. Doe, No. 23-CV-1934, 2023 WL 3977062, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 12, 2023).
Additionally, the fact that Judge Sin served as a Support Magistrate, rather than as a judge,
at the time of the allegations in the Complaint, does not render her any less entitled to judicial
immunity. As noted in a recent ruling in the case styled Cora v. Wright, No. 1:24-CV-0263 (LTS),
2024 WL 450247, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2024),

Family Court Support Magistrates, as New York State judicial officers, enjoy []
judicial immunity, when presiding over child support proceedings. See Arce v.
Turnbull, No. 21-642, 2021 WL 5816687 (2d Cir. Dec. 8, 2021) (summary order);
Chris H. v. New York, 764 F. App’x 53, 55 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order); Legister
v. Radowitz, No. 20-CV-9330 (LLS), 2020 WL 7405672, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
2020); Charles v. Lopez, No. 19-CV-8706 (CM), 2019 WL 5261154, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2019); Roger of the Fam. Forest v. 45 C.F.R. § 75.2 IV-D
Contractor Steve Banks, No. 18-CV-10866 (CM), 2019 WL 4194332, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019) (collecting other district court cases within the Second
Circuit).

2024 WL 450247, at *2; see also Lomtevas v. Cardozo, 95-CV-2779, 2006 WL 229908, *5
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2006) (“As a Support Magistrate in the Family Court, [Defendant’s] actions
were the same as those of a judge. Her decisions were both judicial in nature and subject to review.
Therefore, she is entitled to absolute immunity for her role as a Support Magistrate.”); Ramos v.
Putnam Fam. Ct., No. 15-CV-1443 (VAB), 2017 WL 3083727, at *3 (D. Conn. July 18, 2017)
(“Judicial immunity also entitles state officials that make decisions as to child support payments
and enforcement to “absolute quasi-judicial immunity” because, in that capacity, their “actions
[are] the same as those of a judge,” in that their decisions are “both judicial in nature and subject
to review.”).6 As a Support Magistrate presiding over child support proceedings, Judge Sin is

unquestionably entitled to judicial immunity. In light of her immunity, Plaintiff may not proceed
on her claims against Judge Sin.
Likewise, Plaintiff’s claims against Kearse are also barred on immunity grounds. Absolute
immunity extends to court clerks “for performance of tasks which are judicial in nature and an
integral part of the judicial process.” Rodriguez v. Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997); see
also Raghubir v. Cogan, No. 21-CV-6705 (PKC) 2022 WL 1085298, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11,
2022) (“The unnamed Clerk’s Office staff members who allegedly refused Plaintiff's submissions
are also absolutely immune from this lawsuit.”). “Absolute judicial immunity extends to non-
judicial officers who perform acts that are ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge’ or ‘are

integrally related to an ongoing judicial proceeding.’” Raghubir, 2022 WL 1085298, at *3
(quoting Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted)); see, e.g.,
Lewis v. Wolfe, No. 21-CV-6949, 2021 WL 4865317, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2021) (holding that

6 As the Court explained in Lomtevas, “[a]bsolute immunity is accorded to grand jurors and prosecutors
under a ‘quasi-judicial’ theory so that they ‘can perform their respective functions without harassment or
intimidation.’” Lomtevas, 2006 WL 229908, at *5 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978)).
“Persons performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency” are also entitled to absolute immunity,
as their role is “‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge.’” Lomtevas, 2006 WL 229908, at *5 (citing
Butz, 438 U.S. at 513-14). Since this absolute quasi-judicial immunity is afforded to state government
officials, see, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-24 (1976) (quasi-judicial immunity afforded to
a state prosecuting attorney); Quartararo v. Catterson, 917 F.Supp. 919, 949 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (state parole
officers entitled to absolute immunity), the Court in Lomtevas reasonably concluded that it applied to
Support Magistrates as well. See, e.g., Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that
quasi-judicial immunity applies when individuals are “performing discretionary acts of a judicial nature.”).
court clerks “are absolutely immune from suit for functions which are administrative in nature if
the task was undertaken pursuant to the explicit direction of a judicial officer or pursuant to the
established practice of the court.”); Stephens v. Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, No. 15-CV-1251
(LGS), 2015 WL 1608427, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2015) (judicial immunity applies to a county

clerk).
Here, as the Clerk of Court (Compl. ¶ 5), Kearse is being sued by Plaintiff for, in part,
“transmit[ing] an Income Withholding [sic] Order for Support . . . demanding garnishment of
[Plaintiff’s] wages . . .” Id. at ¶ 10. But court clerks “are absolutely immune from suit for
‘functions which are administrative in nature if the task was undertaken pursuant to the explicit
direction of a judicial officer or pursuant to the established practice of the court.’” Lewis, 2021
WL 4865317, at *2 (quoting Garcia v. Hebert, No. 08-CV-0095 (DFM), 2013 WL 1294412, at
*12 (D. Conn. Mar. 28, 2013)). As Plaintiff fails to identify any activity undertaken by Kearse
falling outside of the ambit of absolute immunity, Plaintiff may not proceed on his claims against
Kearse.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed because both Defendants are judicially
immune from suit. See Barton, 2023 WL 6929178, at *5; See Roger of the Fam. Forrest v. 45
C.F.R.§ 75.2 IV-D Contractor Steve Banks, No. 18-CV-10866 (CM), 2019 WL 4194332, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2019) (“Plaintiff seems to assert claims arising from the efforts of Evans, a
New York Family Court Support Magistrate, to assess and collect child support that Plaintiff owes
pursuant to a Family Court order, and the efforts of Cafasso [a current or former New York Family
Court First Deputy Clerk] to assist the Family Court in enforcing that order against Plaintiff. These
defendants are therefore immune from suit under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Accordingly,
the Court dismisses Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against these defendants under the doctrine of judicial
immunity and because these claims are frivolous.”).
2. The domestic-relations abstention doctrine
As noted above, Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal on judicial immunity grounds.

But even if Defendants were not entitled to judicial immunity, Plaintiff’s claims are still subject to
dismissal. To the extent that Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims in which Plaintiff asks the Court
to nullify a determination of the New York state court with regard to Plaintiff’s obligation to pay
child support, the Court must abstain from exercising its federal-question jurisdiction over these
claims under the domestic-relations abstention doctrine.
“A federal court presented with matrimonial issues or issues ‘on the verge’ of being
matrimonial in nature should abstain from exercising jurisdiction so long as there is no obstacle to
their full and fair determination in state courts.” American Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14
(2d Cir. 1990); see also Deem v. DiMella-Deem, 941 F.3d 618, 625 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining that
“American Airlines continues to be the law of this Circuit” after relevant intervening Supreme

Court precedent). Federal district courts must therefore abstain from exercising federal-question
jurisdiction over claims involving domestic-relations issues and dismiss those types of claims for
lack of jurisdiction when they are asserted under diversity jurisdiction. See id. at 621-24.
Courts in this district routinely find that the domestic-relations abstention doctrine bars
federal courts from exercising federal question jurisdiction over claims that affect family court
proceedings. See Evans v. Adams, No. 22-CV-3882 (KAM) (JRC), 2024 WL 306240, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2024) (where the district court abstained from hearing the plaintiff’s claims
when, although the allegations were framed “in constitutional terms,” the “requested relief as a
practical matter” would require the court to overturn “decisions in the underlying state court
action”); Shaheed v. Waldeier, No. 24-CV-915 (RER) (MMH), 2024 WL 964930, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 2024) (citing American Airlines, 905 F.2d at 14) (“Although Plaintiff alleges Constitutional
violations, the requested relief would infringe on the state court’s expertise in resolving family
court matters.”)

Plaintiff, in his Complaint, notes that “[t]he instant matter before this court is not intended
to be . . . an effort to argue or consider the merits or procedures of [the Family Court Petition].”
Compl. ¶ 22. But in the same paragraph, Plaintiff notes that the Complaint “is intended to
challenge the commercial activities of NYS CHILD SUPPORT PROCESSING CENTER and
FAMILY COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF QUEENS.” Id. (emphasis
in original). While it remains unclear what these “commercial activities” actually entail, Plaintiff
has requested that the Court grant relief which would invariably call the Family Court’s judgment
and determinations into question. See Compl. ¶¶ 29-31.
Therefore, to the extent that any of Plaintiff’s purported claims request that the Court
review matrimonial and child support decisions made by the Family Court on matters arising from

the Family Court Petition, this Court lacks the subject matter jurisdiction to do so. Said claims are
subject to dismissal.
3. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks review of previous state judicial proceedings, such
review is also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a doctrine of civil procedure enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in two cases, Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and Dist. of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine holds that federal
district courts shall not sit in direct review of state court decisions unless Congress has passed a
statute to authorize such relief. Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir.
2005). In practice, Rooker-Feldman bars federal district courts from becoming a court of appeals
for state court decisions. Id. Instead, a person seeking relief from a state court judgment must find
a state court remedy or obtain relief from the United States Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (“§ 1257,
as long interpreted, vests authority to review a state court’s judgment solely in [the Supreme]
Court”).
Rooker-Feldman bars federal courts from reviewing claims that were not only raised in the
state court action, but also claims that were not raised but are nonetheless “inextricably
intertwined” with the state court judgment. Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 86–87. There are four
requirements for the doctrine to apply: “(1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff
complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites district court
review of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment was entered before the plaintiff’s federal
suit commenced.” Worthy-Pugh v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 664 F. App’x 20, 21 (2d Cir.

2016) (quoting McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010)). Requirements one and
four are considered “procedural,” and elements two and three are considered “substantive.”
Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85; Francis v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 20-CV-5863 (EK) (MMH), 2023
WL 2707098, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023). “While all four requirements must be met to
preclude jurisdiction, the second requirement is the ‘core’ requirement.” Francis, 2023 WL
2707098, at *5. “The causation requirement is only satisfied if ‘the third party’s actions are
produced by a state court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by
it.’” Id. (quoting Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 94 (2d Cir. 2015)).
The long-standing Rooker-Feldman doctrine “provides that, in most circumstances, the
lower federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to review final judgments of state
courts.” Morrison v. City of N.Y., 591 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing D.C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482-83 (1983), Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414-16

(1923)). It is well settled that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction over claims that seek to “collaterally attack”––i.e., reverse or modify––a
state court judgment. See Lipko v. Christie, 94 Fed. Appx. 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462, 482 n. 16 (1983)); Davis v. Baldwin, 12-CV-6422, 2013 WL 6877560, (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31,
2013) (applying Rooker-Feldman doctrine to review “collateral attack” of Family Court Order);
Anghel v. N. Y. State Dep’t of Health, 947 F. Supp. 2d 284 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2013) (Rooker-
Feldman “mandates that a federal district court may not review collateral attacks upon a state court
determination.”)
Here, while Plaintiff’s Complaint notes that his claims should not be interpreted as “an

effort to argue on consider the merits or procedures” of the Family Court Petition (Compl. ¶ 22),
Plaintiff’s requested relief requires this Court to review certain determinations made by the
Family Court. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 28-32. But as Plaintiff’s claims are “inextricably intertwined”
with the Family Court’s determination, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits this Court from
reviewing such determinations. Cogswell v. Rodriguez, 304 F. Supp. 2d 350, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(citing Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir.2002)) (“This doctrine also prohibits a
district court review of state court judgments to claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with a
state court’s determinations.”).
Additionally, an application of the four Rooker-Feldman factors favor a finding that
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the doctrine. First, it is clear that Plaintiff lost in state court as
Plaintiff’s own submissions (i.e. the Income Withholding Order) denote a sufficient judicial loss.
See Remy v. New York State Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 507 F. App'x 16, 18 (2d Cir. 2013) (rejecting

a plaintiff’s contention that a family court child support arrears order was merely administrative
or ministerial as “[t]he Family Court’s arrears order was an entirely sufficient judicial loss because
[plaintiff] had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue.”). Second, as outlined above,
Plaintiff’s submissions are riddled with complaints of injuries caused by the state court judgment.
See, e.g. Compl. at ¶¶ 8, 22, 29-31. Third, Plaintiff’s requested relief invariably requires this Court
to review the Family Court’s determination and call its judgments into question—a review that is
cautioned against (if not prohibited) by controlling authority in this Circuit. American Airlines,
905 F.2d at 14. Finally, the determinations at issue were made by the Family Court on February
22, 2023 (Dkt. No. 8 at 1), April 17, 2023 (Compl. ¶¶ 10; 38-44), and October 4, 2023 (Id. at 45-
54)—all of which were issued prior to the filing of the operative Complaint on October 19, 2023.

Dkt. No. 1. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims require this Court to review the Family
Court’s determinations, such claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and must be
dismissed.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to allege that this Court has subject matter over any of the
claims asserted in the Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction here (and it does not), Plaintiff’s claims
are still subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
1. Plaintiff’s slander, libel, and failure to protect claims
“Defamation, consisting of the twin torts of libel and slander, is the invasion of the
[plaintiff's] interest in a reputation and good name.” Albert v. Loksen, 239 F.3d 256, 265 (2d Cir.
2001) (citation omitted). Specifically, a defamatory statement is one that “exposes an individual
to hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation,
or disgrace,” or one that would “induce[ ] an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking
persons,” and deprive the plaintiff of “confidence and friendly intercourse in society.” Celle v.
Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2000) (alteration and quotation marks
omitted). Because Plaintiff’s defamation allegations turn on written text produced by the Family
Court, the Court construes Plaintiff’s claim as a claim of libel. See Albert, 239 F.3d at 265
(explaining that “[g]enerally, spoken defamatory words are slander; written defamatory words are

libel”); Solstein v. Mirra, 488 F. Supp. 3d 86, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (construing a pro se defamation
claims as a libel claim). “Under New York law, a plaintiff must establish five elements to recover
in libel: (1) a written defamatory statement of fact concerning the plaintiff; (2) publication to a
third party; (3) fault (either negligence or actual malice depending on the status of the libeled
party); (4) falsity of the defamatory statement; and (5) special damages or per se actionability
(defamatory on its face).” Celle, 209 F.3d at 176.
Whether particular words are defamatory presents a legal question to be resolved by the
court[ ] in the first instance.” Id. at 177 (citations omitted). Accordingly, courts should evaluate
each allegedly defamatory statement to determine whether it is actionable at the pleading stage.
See Biro v. Conde Nast, 883 F. Supp. 2d 441, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that “the [c]ourt
[would] evaluate each allegedly defamatory statement (or set of statements) and determine whether
it is actionable, granting dismissal of claims based on nonactionable statements and denying
dismissal with respect to claims based on actionable statements”); Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster,

Inc., 85 N.Y.2d 373, 625 N.Y.S.2d 477, 649 N.E.2d 825, 892 (1995) (“Where a plaintiff alleges
that statements are false and defamatory, the legal question for the court on a motion to dismiss is
whether the contested statements are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory connotation.”).
Here, Plaintiff fails to assert any fact or assertion supporting a libel claim. Plaintiff
concludes, without factual support, that “Defendants Jessica Sin and Keisha Kearse have
committed the acts of … slander or libel.” Compl. ¶ 24. But no liberal reading of the Complaint
points to a libelous assertion. The Complaint also fails to identify which of Defendants’ statements
were allegedly defamatory. Additionally, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations do not plausibly allege
that any statement made by any of the Defendants is materially false or that Plaintiff has been
financially or reputationally harmed by this purportedly false statement. See Landa v. Am.

Prospect, Inc., No. 22-CV-1825 (JMA)(ARL), 2023 WL 5266334, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 16,
2023). Accordingly, Plaintiff does not state a claim for defamation upon which relief can be
granted.
Similarly, Plaintiff fails to assert facts supporting its “failure to protect or act” claim.
Where such a claim is a mere legal conclusion, this claim must be dismissed. Weinstein Co. v.
Smokewood Ent. Grp., LLC, 664 F. Supp. 2d 332, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
664 (2009)) (finding that a plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state claim on
which relief could be granted merely by alleging the violation of a legal right as legal conclusions
must be supported by factual allegations.).
Therefore, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to assert any facts supporting its
defamation and “failure to protect/act” claims. Such claims are hereby dismissed.
2. Plaintiff’s trademark infringement claim
The gravamen of Plaintiff’s Complaint, and his basis for federal court jurisdiction, is that

Defendants unlawfully infringed upon his registered service mark. See generally, Compl. Plaintiff
alleges, in relevant parts, that a duly-recorded service mark—bearing his full legal name—was
recorded into the “NEW YORK Register” (emphasis in original) nunc pro tunc to his date of birth.
Compare Compl. ¶ 9 and Compl., at 41. Because Plaintiff purportedly had a valid service mark,
Defendants infringed on his mark by referencing his full legal name in Family Court documents.
Id. at 10-11. Although Plaintiff tried placing Defendants on notice of infringement by serving
them with a litany of records and documents, Defendants’ failure to respond purportedly gave rise
to a cause of action for infringement requiring Plaintiff to turn to a federal district court—seeking
an order compelling the Defendants to remit payment in accordance with Plaintiff’s “Fee
Schedule.” Id. at 25-27. This Court finds that Plaintiff failed to properly plead a trademark

infringement claim.
The Court need not engage in a trademark infringement analysis as Plaintiff’s submissions
and the allegations contained therein are characteristic of claims by purported “sovereign citizens.”
See United States v. Bommer, 613 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding that a plaintiff’s
reference to her name as a “trademark name” and repeatedly referring to other individuals as
“corporations” as characteristic of claims by “sovereign citizens.”). The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has described “sovereign citizens” as “a loosely affiliated group
who believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore
have no authority to regulate their behavior.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 F. App’x 105, 107 n.1
(2d Cir. 2013). “The ‘sovereign citizen’ belief system has been described by other courts as
‘completely without merit,’ ‘patently frivolous,’ (United States v. Jagim, 978 F.2d 1032, 1036 (8th
Cir. 1992)), and having ‘no conceivable validity in American law,’ (United States v. Schneider,
910 F.2d 1569, 1570 (7th Cir. 1990)).” Bommer, 613 F. Supp. 3d 712, 717. “[L]egal-sounding

but meaningless verbiage commonly used by adherents to the so-called sovereign citizen
movement” is nothing more than a nullity. See United States v. Wunder, No. 16-9452, 2019 WL
2928842, at *5 (D.N.J. July 8, 2019) (discussing the futility of the sovereign citizen verbiage in
collection claim for student loan).
When claims are, as here, premised on a plaintiff’s rights as a “sovereign citizen,” those
claims are dismissed as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. Id.; Barton, 2023 WL 6929178,
at *6; Garcia v. Cnty. of Bucks, No. 17-CV-3381, 2017 WL 4844293, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26,
2017) (dismissing plaintiff’s trademark claims where plaintiff was a sovereign citizen seeking
relief under admiralty, copyright, and trademark laws); Johnson v. Scharf, No. 23-CV-4211, 2023
WL 7532488, at *1, n.1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13, 2023) (dismissing trademark claims where the plaintiff

represented to be a “living trust” as the “meaningless verbiage” of an adherent to the so-called
sovereign citizen movement) (citations omitted); People of New York v. Latnie, No. 1:14-CV-1581
(DNH) (DEP), 2015 WL 512800, at *1, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2015) (dismissing trademark claims
by a sovereign citizen who recorded his full legal name as a trademark).
The crux of Plaintiff’s Complaint involves a contention that Family Court child support
orders are unlawful infringements upon his state-registered service mark by the mere reference to
his full legal name. Though stylized as a trademark infringement claim, Plaintiff’s claims are, at
bottom, naked assertions that “state and federal governments lack [] legitimacy and therefore have
no authority to regulate [his] behavior.” United States v. Ulloa, 511 F. App’x 105, 106 n.1 (2d Cir.
2013) (summary order). For example, Plaintiff purports to be the “Absolute Trustee” of a
“revocable living trust” bearing his full legal name. See, e.g. Compl., at 58. Indeed, a mere cursory
review of Plaintiff’s purported “Trademark License Agreement”—as served on Defendants—
reveals that Plaintiff seeks to engage in a licensing agreement for the use of his mark—his full

legal name—with the Family Court of the State of New York, County of Queens. Id. at 59-61.
In sum, the Complaint and its supporting affidavits and exhibits make clear that Plaintiff is
an adherent to the “sovereign citizen” movement and seek to assert legally frivolous claims. As
Plaintiff fails to properly plead a trademark infringement claims, such claims are hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
IV. Leave to Amend
Generally, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend
at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might
be stated.” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015); accord Bey v. Trump, 850 F.
App’x 809, 810 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order). But a court has the inherent power to dismiss

without leave to amend or replead “where the substance of the claim pleaded is frivolous on its
face,” or where amendment would otherwise be futile. Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d
Cir. 1988); accord Thomas v. Carter, 581 F. Supp. 3d 651, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); see also Shapiro
v. McManus, 577 U.S. 39, 45-46 (2015) (holding that federal question jurisdiction is lacking where
the claims are “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” “essentially fictitious,” or “obviously without
merit”). Because the asserted claims are legally frivolous and because the defects in the Complaint
cannot be cured with an amendment, any request for leave to amend the Complaint shall be denied.
See Barton, 2023 WL 6929178, at *6.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint is GRANTED for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully

directed to terminate all pending deadlines and hearings in this action and to close this case.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
April 26, 2024

SO ORDERED.

s/ Joseph A. Marutollo
JOSEPH A. MARUTOLLO
United States Magistrate Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10311725. Public record. Not legal advice.