# Shin v. Party Well Rest & Oriental Bakery Inc

> District Court, E.D. New York · December 15, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310952

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** December 15, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310952

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- observing that “[c]osts relating to filing fees, process servers, postage, and photocopying are ordinarily recoverable” and that it “‘is also reasonable that counsel be reimbursed for mileage and parking costs’”
- discussing 50% reduction for travel time

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------------------------X

WOUN JAE SHIN,

Plaintiff,

-against- MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
PARTY WELL REST & ORIENTAL 20-CV-1319 (CBA) (TAM)
BAKERY, INC., DANIEL AHN, AND
YOUNG JOON AHN,

Defendants.

--------------------------------------------------------X

TARYN A. MERKL, United States Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Woun Jae Shin initiated this action against Defendants Party Well Rest &
Oriental Bakery Inc., doing business as Mail Garden Restaurant; Daniel Ahn; and
Young Joon Ahn on March 11, 2020. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleged various
claims, including violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
(“FLSA”) and New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), Art. 6 § 190 et seq. and Art. 19 § 650 et
seq. (Id. at ¶ 1.) Following two rounds of mediation, the denial of Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment, and two settlement conferences before the Honorable Carol Bagley
Amon and the Honorable Cheryl L. Pollak, the case proceeded to trial in April 2023.
Prior to trial, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his FLSA claim so as to streamline the trial.
(See Stip. of Dismissal, ECF No. 78; Pl.’s Ltr., ECF No. 76; Apr. 6, 2023 ECF Order.) The
jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, finding Defendants liable on all of Plaintiff’s
claims under the NYLL, including unpaid overtime, unpaid spread-of-hours, and
failure to provide a time-of-hire notice. (See Verdict Sheet, ECF No. 91, at ECF pp. 20–
25.) The jury also found that Defendants had not acted in good faith, as defined by the
court’s instructions, which was relevant to the applicability of liquidated damages. (See
id. at ECF p. 25.) Based on the jury’s findings, Judge Amon issued a judgment in favor
of Plaintiff in the amount of $618,788.76, plus interest. (Judgment, ECF No. 98.)
Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks fees and costs. (Decl. of Ryan Kim in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for
Att’y’s Fees & Costs, ECF No. 95 (hereinafter “Kim Decl.”).) Defendants object on
substantive and procedural grounds. (Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Award Att’y’s
Fees & Costs, ECF No. 96 (hereinafter “Defs.’ Mem.”).) For the reasons set forth herein,
the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for fees and costs in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As set forth in the complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants hired him to work
as a manual laborer at their restaurant from 2004 to 2017. (Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 7.) In
the complaint, Plaintiff claimed that he regularly worked six days per week, 12 to 13
hours per day, and was paid a flat rate of $600 or $700. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 9.) On April 12, 2023,
the last day of trial, the jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff on all claims under the
NYLL, finding that Defendants owed Plaintiff back wages from 2011 to 2017.1 (Verdict
Form, ECF No. 91, at ECF pp. 21–22.) Based on the jury’s findings, Judge Amon issued a
judgment awarding Plaintiff $618,788.76, including $296,093.63 in unpaid overtime,

1 Specifically, the jury found that Party Well Restaurant & Oriental Bakery was Plaintiff’s
employer during the entire liability period, i.e., from 2011 to 2017, and that Defendant Daniel
Ahn was jointly liable as an employer from 2011 to 2014, while Defendant Young Joon Ahn was
jointly liable from 2015 to 2016. (Verdict Form, ECF No. 91, at ECF p. 21.) Based upon the jury’s
findings regarding damages as to the years of employment for which each Individual
Defendant was found responsible, the judgment apportioned liability to Defendant Daniel Ahn
and Defendant Young Joon Ahn at the rates of 65.3% and 33.1%, respectively. (See App. to
Judgment, ECF No. 98, at ECF p. 2.) Since the jury did not find either Individual Defendant to
have been Plaintiff’s employer for 2017, the wage deficiency for that year, approximately 1.6%
of the total damages, is attributable to Corporate Defendant only. (See id.) As set forth below,
the Court uses these same percentages to apportion liability to Individual Defendants for the
attorney’s fee award. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Goord, No. 01-CV-9585 (SHS), 2014 WL 4058662, at
*13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2014) (exercising discretion “to apportion liability for attorney’s fees in
relation to each defendant’s share of the judgment”).
$12,050.75 in unpaid spread-of-hours pay, liquidated damages of $308,144.38, and a
statutory penalty of $2,500, as well as pre- and post-judgment interest, and additional
interest in the event the judgment is not paid, pursuant to the NYLL. (App. to
Judgment, ECF No. 98, at ECF pp. 2–3.) The statutory penalty was based on the jury’s
determination that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with a proper wage notice at
the time of hire. (Verdict Form, ECF No. 91, at ECF p. 24.) The judgment also detailed
each Defendant’s liability for the total award, and the basis for the interest calculations.
(Judgment, ECF No. 98.)

On April 21, 2023, shortly after trial, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a letter setting forth
Plaintiff’s arguments in support of his entitlement to pre- and post-judgment interest,
and requesting leave to file a motion for attorney’s fees and costs. (Pl.’s Ltr., ECF No.
92.) On May 8, 2023, Judge Amon set a briefing schedule for the attorney’s fee
application, directing Plaintiff’s counsel to move for attorney’s fees by May 12, 2023,
with Defendants to file a response by May 26, 2023. (May 8, 2023 ECF Scheduling
Order.) On May 12, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a letter motion seeking an extension of time
to May 19, 2023, to file the attorney’s fee application. (Pl.’s Ltr., ECF No. 94.) Judge
Amon granted the motion on May 15, 2023, directing Plaintiff’s counsel to file the
application by May 19, 2023, and setting June 2, 2023, as Defendants’ deadline for a
response. (May 15, 2023 ECF Order.)
On May 20, 2023, Plaintiff’s counsel filed the application for fees, styled as a
declaration in support of the fee petition, which was filed with an accompanying
memorandum of law and exhibit. (See Kim Decl., ECF No. 95; Pl.’s Mem. of Law in
Supp. of Appl. for Att’ys’ Fees & Costs, ECF No. 95-1 (hereinafter “Pl.’s Mem.”); Pl.’s
Ex., ECF No. 95-2 (hereinafter “Billing Records”).) On June 2, 2023, defense counsel filed
Defendants’ opposition to the attorney’s fee application, arguing that it is procedurally
deficient because it was filed late and not styled as a motion, and is substantively
deficient, as discussed more fully below. (Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 96.)
In the declaration submitted in support of the application for fees and costs,
Plaintiff’s counsel Ryan Kim seeks $276,407 in fees, including $262,295 in fees for his
work, based on 476.9 hours billed at an hourly rate of $550, and $14,112 in fees for the
work of paralegal Jia Choi, based on 117.6 hours billed at an hourly rate of $120. (Kim
Decl., ECF No. 95, ¶ 41.) Counsel also seeks reimbursement for costs in the amount of
$7,295.71.2 (Id. at 10.) Accordingly, counsel seeks a grand total of $283,702.71 in

attorney’s fees and costs. (Id. at ¶ 51.)
In response, Defendants contend that the court “should refuse to award Plaintiff
any attorney’s fees or costs on both procedural and substantive grounds.” (Defs.’ Mem.,
ECF No. 96, at 2.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s application is
procedurally deficient because it was filed one day late, and counsel failed to seek an
enlargement of time to file. (Id. at 3.) Defendants further argue that the application
should be denied because it was not filed “by motion in accordance with Rule 54” of the
Federal Rules and contending that the docket is “devoid” of materials required by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 54, and Local Rules 6.1, 7.1, and 54.1(c)(7). (Id. (emphasis in original).) Due to
Plaintiff’s counsel’s purported failure to file the application as a motion, Defendants
posit that “[i]t is axiomatic that the Court cannot grant a motion that has not been
made.” (Id.)

2 The Court notes that counsel’s original request for costs is less than the amount of costs
as to which he ultimately submitted receipts. Finding that the costs are reasonable and properly
documented, the Court awards costs in an amount consistent with the receipts submitted by
counsel, as detailed below. (Compare Kim Decl., ECF No. 95 with Receipts, ECF No. 108-1.)
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s motion has substantive deficiencies. First,
Defendants argue that “Plaintiff has failed to produce for review his engagement letter
with his counsel,” and question whether Plaintiff’s counsel has complied with the
professional rules with regard to contingency fees. (Id. at 4.) Defendants also contend
that Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records are an insufficient basis for a fee award, arguing
that they do not “appear” to be contemporaneous and because Plaintiff’s counsel
“admits that he has altered the information reflected in the Billing Statement from its
original condition.”3 (Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).) Relatedly, Defendants argue that

no additional information has been provided to “confirm” that the Billing Records were
contemporaneously generated, and that Plaintiff’s counsel has not provided metadata
for counsel’s billing software. (Id. at 5–6)
As to costs, Defendants argue that they should not be awarded because the
NYLL does not expressly provide for an award of costs, that Plaintiff has not submitted
receipts for costs, and that Plaintiff failed to file an appropriate motion under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54. (Id. at 6.) After Plaintiff’s original application was filed, the
Court issued an order noting that counsel had not provided “receipts, invoices, or
similar documentation regarding costs,” and directed Plaintiff to submit any such
documentation or authority. (Nov. 1, 2023 ECF Order.) On November 15, 2023,
Plaintiff’s counsel filed a supplemental letter, attaching various receipts in support of
the request for costs. (See Receipts, ECF No. 108-1.) On November 22, 2023, Defendants

3 The Court notes that Mr. Kim’s declaration states that he had reviewed his firm’s
“contemporaneous billing records and removed any and all charges for time spent that could be
considered duplicative of another billed task and reduced any time charged that could be
considered excessive for the particular task.” (Kim Decl., ECF No. 95, ¶ 29.)
filed a letter supplementing their memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff’s application
for attorneys’ fees and costs. (Defs.’ Ltr., ECF No. 109.)
As a threshold matter, the Court rejects Defendants’ procedural arguments
urging that the fee application should be denied since it was filed one day late and
because it was not styled as a formal motion, in an exercise of discretion. (See Defs.’
Mem., ECF No. 96, at 3.) Defendants were not prejudiced by the application being filed
one day late, and the Court has “broad discretion to determine whether to overlook a
party’s failure to comply with local court rules.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73

(2d Cir. 2001). Although the application should have been filed on time, and even if it
may be better practice to file a motion accompanied by a declaration, the motion should
not be denied on these formalistic grounds. Rather, for the reasons set forth herein, the
Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs in part.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
A. The FLSA and NYLL
Under both the FLSA and the NYLL, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to an award
of “reasonable” attorney’s fees. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); NYLL § 663(1). As the Second
Circuit observed in Fisher v. SD Protection Inc., “[a]ttorneys’ fees and costs in FLSA
actions generally arise in three contexts.” 948 F.3d 593, 600 (2d Cir. 2020). They arise
“following a ruling in favor of [the] plaintiff,” in the context of a negotiated settlement
where attorneys’ fees and costs are incorporated “into the settlement amount,” and in
the event of a negotiated settlement where “the settlement agreement reserves the
questions of fees and costs for the court to decide.” Id. at 600–01. The Fisher court further
observed that the primary goal of the FLSA’s fee shifting provisions is to provide
compensation for counsel sufficient to ensure that plaintiffs in “run of the mill FLSA
actions” are not left without legal recourse. Id. at 603–04 (quotation marks omitted). This
approach promotes “the remedial goals of the FLSA,” which is a “‘uniquely protective
statute.’” Id. at 603 (quoting Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199, 207 (2d
Cir. 2015)).
As to NYLL claims specifically, § 663 provides that prevailing employees are
entitled to “recover in a civil action the amount of any such underpayments, together
with costs[,] all reasonable attorney’s fees [and] prejudgment interest as required under
the civil practice law and rules.” See, e.g., Lin v. Joe Japanese Buffet Rest. Inc., No. 17-CV-

3435 (WFK) (CLP), 2022 WL 2718584, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 7, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2716487 (E.D.N.Y. July 13, 2022). The rationale
discussed in Fisher underlying the fee shifting in the FLSA context applies with equal
force to the NYLL. To promote the statute’s remedial ends, the compensation provided
to counsel in NYLL cases should be sufficient to ensure the availability of legal
representation for workers who are not paid according to the law.
B. Reasonable Attorney’s Fees
Courts have broad discretion in determining a reasonable attorney’s fee. See
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood
Ass’n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2008). The method for
determining reasonable fees in this circuit is based on a number of factors, such as the
labor and skill required, the difficulty of the issues, the attorney’s customary hourly
rate, the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney, and awards in similar cases.
See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 186 n.3, 190. In particular, when assessing an attorney’s
requested hourly rate, courts typically consider other rates awarded in the district in
which the reviewing court sits. This is known as the “forum rule.” See Simmons v. N.Y.C.
Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 174–75 (2d Cir. 2009) (recounting history of the forum rule).
Ordinarily, “the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence
— in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits — that the requested rates are in line with
those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
comparable skill, experience[,] and reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11
(1984). “In addition to the parties’ evidentiary submissions, the Court may consider its
own experience and familiarity with the case and with rates generally charged.” Lin,
2022 WL 2718584, at *4.
Once a court determines the reasonable hourly rate, it must multiply that rate by

the number of hours reasonably expended in order to determine the presumptively
reasonable fee. See Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190; id. at 183 (“[T]he district court should
generally use the prevailing hourly rate in the district where it sits to calculate what has
been called the ‘lodestar’ — what we think is more aptly termed the ‘presumptively
reasonable fee . . . .’”); see also Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)
(“Both this Court and the Supreme Court have held that the lodestar — the product of a
reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required by the case —
creates a ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’” (quoting Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 183)). To
calculate the presumptively reasonable fee, the Court looks at what a reasonable,
paying client would be willing to pay, “bear[ing] in mind that a reasonable, paying
client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively.” Arbor
Hill, 522 F.3d at 190; see also Simmons, 575 F.3d at 174 (observing that the presumptively
reasonable fee is “what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay, given that
such a party wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case effectively”
(quotation marks omitted)).
With very limited exceptions, “contemporaneous time records are a prerequisite
for attorney’s fees in this Circuit.” Scott v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir.
2010) (quotation marks omitted); see also Finkel v. Universal Elec. Corp., 970 F. Supp. 2d
108, 127–28 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). The court must review these time records and the hours an
attorney billed in order to determine reasonableness and, in doing so, should examine
the value of the work product and “exclude excessive, redundant or otherwise
unnecessary hours.” Concrete Flotation Sys., Inc. v. Tadco Constr. Corp., No. 07-CV-319
(ARR) (VVP), 2010 WL 2539771, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010) (quoting Quaratino v.
Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 2009)), report and recommendation adopted, 2010
WL 2539661 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 2010). “[A] fee award should be based on scrutiny of the

unique circumstances of each case[.]” McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411,
426 (2d Cir. 2010). In lieu of an itemized reduction, the Court may also “make an across-
the-board percentage reduction.” Guauque Castiblanco v. Don Alex Peru, Inc., No. 20-CV-
2235 (MKB) (RML), 2021 WL 4755701, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2021).
In the FLSA context, “[r]ecent decisions within the Eastern District of New York
approved hourly rates of $300 to $450 for partners, $200 to $300 for senior associates,
and $100 [to] $200 for junior associates, and $70 to $100 for support staff.” Bin Gao v. Jian
Song Shi, No. 18-CV-2708 (ARR) (LB), 2021 WL 1949275, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2021)
(collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Bin Gao v. ABC Corp., 2021
WL 1946322 (E.D.N.Y. May 15, 2021); see also Won v. Gel Factory, Corp., No. 20-CV-5269
(EK) (ARL), 2022 WL 903121, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2022) (observing, in an FLSA case,
that “[c]ourts in this district typically award hourly rates ranging from $300 to $450 per
hour for partners in cases such as this,” “$200 [to] $300 per hour for senior associates,”
and “$100 [to] $200 per hour for junior associates”), report and recommendation adopted,
2022 WL 903065 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022). In addition to typical billing rates, “case-
specific factors like the novelty or complexity of the matter are appropriately considered
in determining the reasonable hourly rate or hours billed.” Lilly v. City of New York, 934
F.3d 222, 232 (2d Cir. 2019).4
II. Analysis
As set forth above, Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $283,702.71, based on his request for
$276,407 in fees related to his work and the work of a paralegal, and reimbursement for
costs totaling $7,295.71. (Kim Decl., ECF No. 95, ¶¶ 41, 48, 51.) In support of this
request, Plaintiff’s counsel has submitted billing records that document specific tasks
performed, hours worked, and the hourly rates requested for attorneys and support

staff. (See Billing Records, ECF No. 95-2.) The requested fee for counsel is based on an
hourly billing rate of $550 for attorney Ryan Kim and $120 for paralegal Jia Choi. (See
generally id.) The billing records reflect that the attorney and paralegal’s total time spent
on the action was 594.5 hours. (Id. at 34.) More specifically, Plaintiff’s counsel seeks
compensation for 476.9 hours billed by Mr. Kim at a rate of $550 per hour (totaling
$262,295) and 117.6 hours of time billed by Ms. Choi at a rate of $120 per hour (totaling
$14,112). (Kim Decl., ECF No. 95, ¶ 41.)
In support of the application, Mr. Kim’s declaration details his and Ms. Choi’s
professional experience. Since his admission to the New York and New Jersey state bars

4 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s request is deficient because counsel has not cited cases
“as to how a court is to determine a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee in a matter where FLSA claims
were dismissed and the plaintiff prevailed only on state law claims.” (Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 96,
at 4.) This argument, as to which Defendant provides no citation to any authority other than the
NYLL provision that expressly allows for attorney’s fees, is without merit. As the procedural
history of this case makes clear, Plaintiff consented to proceeding to trial on the NYLL claims in
order to streamline the trial. (See Stip. of Dismissal, ECF No. 78; Pl.’s Ltr., ECF No. 76; Apr. 6,
2023 ECF Order.) Given that Plaintiff could only recover his wage deficiency once, and in light
of the similar statutory schemes established by the FLSA and NYLL (but given the NYLL’s
longer statute of limitations), it was eminently reasonable to agree to focus the trial in this way
after Judge Amon decided to retain supplemental jurisdiction. (See Apr. 6, 2023 ECF Order.)
Defense counsel’s nonsensical argument would, effectively, seek to penalize Plaintiff’s counsel
for agreeing to streamline the trial which, in turn, likely conserved scarce judicial resources
while also saving the time of the jury, the parties, and counsel.
in 2002, and the Illinois bar in 2004, Mr. Kim’s firm has specialized in representing
Korean and Korean-American workers and businesses in workplace disputes. (Kim
Decl., ECF No. 95, ¶ 38.) Mr. Kim is fluent in Korean and states in his declaration that
there are very few attorneys who are fluent in both Korean and English who specialize
in employment law. (Id.) Since 2019, Mr. Kim’s hourly rate has been $550, and he
represents that over 100 of his clients have paid his fees at this rate in the last four years.
(Id. ¶ 39.) Paralegal Jia Choi is likewise fluent in Korean and has more than 10 years of
experience in labor litigation and employment law. (Id. ¶ 40.) Her hourly rate is billed at

$120 for all clients. (See id.)
Having carefully reviewed the billing records, the history of the case, and the
case filings, as well as the attachments to Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds that the
requested hourly rates and the number of hours worked are somewhat excessive.
A. Hourly Rates
As set forth above, the hourly rates for FLSA cases in this district typically range
from $300 to $450 for partners, $200 to $300 for senior associates, $100 to $200 for junior
associates, and $70 to $100 for support staff. Bin Gao, 2021 WL 1949275, at *17. The rates
counsel seeks in this case are, accordingly, at the very high end or in excess of the
typical rates awarded in FLSA cases.
Recognizing that “Mr. Kim is an experienced litigator,” judges in this district
have very recently awarded him $450 per hour, the top end of the range typically
awarded for FLSA cases. Choi v. AHC Medical Servs, PLLC, No. 22-CV-1450 (MKB) (JRC),
2023 WL 5612394, at *11, 12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2023) (recommending, in the context of a
fee award on a motion for default judgment, a reduction of Mr. Kim’s requested hourly
rate of $475 to $450 “given the simplicity of this single plaintiff case” and reducing Ms.
Choi’s hourly rate to $100), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5613718
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2023); see also Ahn v. Sun Cleaners, Inc., No. 19-CV-5919 (DLI) (PK),
2022 WL 586022, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2022) (recommending an award based on $450
per hour for Mr. Kim in the context of a motion for default judgment, but reducing Ms.
Choi’s rate to $70, the “lowest end of the scale for paralegals” because Plaintiff’s
application for fees did not include “any description of Choi’s credentials”
notwithstanding that “Plaintiff’s counsel has previously been advised that motions for
fees should include Choi’s credentials” (citing Nam v. Ichiba Inc., No. 19-CV-1222
(KAM), 2021 WL 878743, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2021) (in which Mr. Kim was awarded

$450 per hour)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-5919 (DLI) (PK), Mar. 18,
2022 ECF Order. As to Ms. Choi, the Court notes that the declaration submitted in this
case does include background information regarding her experience, unlike the default
motion found deficient in Ahn. (See Kim Decl., ECF No. 95, ¶ 40.)
In this case, there is no compelling reason to deviate from the prevailing rates
awarded in this district and the rates recently awarded to Mr. Kim and Ms. Choi. Even
though this case went to trial, this was a one-Plaintiff wage-and-hour case in which the
trial lasted three days, including jury selection. (See Apr. 10, 11 & 12, 2023 Minute
Entries for Jury Selection and Trial.) The rates of $450 per hour for Mr. Kim and $100
per hour for Ms. Choi are appropriate.
B. Total Number of Hours
1. Applicable Law
“When considering an application for attorneys’ fees, the court should exclude
‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary’ hours.” Rosen v. LJ Ross Assocs., Inc.,
No. 19-CV-5516 (ARR) (VMS), 2022 WL 493728, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2022) (quoting
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 493274 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 17, 2022). Alternatively, “in dealing with such surplusage, the court has discretion
simply to deduct a reasonable percentage of the number of hours claimed ‘as a practical
means of trimming fat from a fee application.’” Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 173
(2d Cir. 1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also McDonald ex rel.
Prendergast v. Pension Plan of the NYSA - ILA Pension Tr. Fund, 450 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir.
2006) (reiterating that a court may use a percentage reduction “as a practical means of
trimming fat from a fee application” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Lunday v.
City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994) (remanding the case for reconsideration
“because the recitation of reasons for accepting all of counsel’s pre-verdict requests for

fees suggests that the Magistrate Judge may have failed to critically examine these
requests” but noting that “[w]e do not require that the court set forth item-by-item
findings concerning what may be countless objections to individual billing items”); see
also De La Paz v. Rubin & Rothman, LLC, No. 11-CV-9625 (ER), 2013 WL 6184425, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2013).
In determining a reasonable number of hours, “[t]he relevant issue . . . is not
whether hindsight vindicates an attorney’s time expenditures, but whether, at the time
the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time
expenditures.” Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992). Courts “must make ‘a
conscientious and detailed inquiry into the validity of the representations that a certain
number of hours were usefully and reasonably expended.’” Hernandez v. Quality
Blacktop Servs., Inc., No. 18-CV-4862 (RJD) (RML), 2021 WL 1413246, at *11 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 10, 2021) (citation omitted) (quoting Maldonado v. La Nueva Rampa, Inc., No. 10-CV-
8195 (LLS) (JLC), 2012 WL 1669341, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012)). At the same time, as
the Fisher court observed, courts “‘need not, and indeed should not, become green-
eyeshade accountants’” when evaluating fee requests. Fisher, 948 F.3d at 601 (quoting
Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011)).
As a general matter, courts agree with fee applicants’ requests when the amount
of hours billed is reasonable. See Gonzales v. Trees R US Inc., No. 14-CV-7487 (JMW),
2022 WL 3045714, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2022). For example, in Palaghita v. Alkor
Capital Corp., the parties engaged in two rounds of motion practice, participated in
mediation, and litigated FLSA claims for over two years. No. 19-CV-1504 (ARR) (RER),
2021 WL 4464121, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2021), report and recommendation adopted,
2021 WL 4463483 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2021). There, the court found 50.6 hours to be a
reasonable number of hours billed for the case and awarded the number of hours

plaintiff requested. Id. at *13.
By contrast, when the number of hours billed is excessive, courts may make a
blanket reduction. Lilly, 934 F.3d at 232–33. For example, in Lu Wan v. YWL USA, Inc., a
heavily litigated case, the plaintiffs prosecuted their FLSA claims for three years before
settling on the eve of trial. No. 18-CV-10334 (CS), 2021 WL 1905036, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y.
May 12, 2021). The court found that the billing records, which reflected a total of 144.93
hours of attorney and paralegal time, included excessive and unnecessary entries, and
“trimmed” 40% of the total hours. Id. at *6–7. Similarly, in Ahn, the court reduced the
number of hours for which fees were awarded to Mr. Kim’s firm by 30%, finding that
they were “excessive and unreasonable.” Ahn, 2022 WL 586022, at *12. The concerns
identified in Ahn included excessive time entries and billing for inappropriate
administrative tasks. Id. at *11–12. The Court has some of the same concerns here.
2. Analysis
In this case, Plaintiff’s counsel requests compensation for 594.5 hours, which
includes 476.9 hours billed by Mr. Kim and 117.6 hours billed by Ms. Choi. (Kim Decl.,
ECF No. 95, ¶ 41.) This of course leads to the question of whether that represents a
reasonable amount of time spent in this litigation. See generally Grant, 973 F.2d at 99–100
(discussing whether the district court’s determination of the number of hours in
calculating the lodestar was reasonable).
Defendants question the supporting documentation provided by counsel,
arguing that the billing records do not appear to be contemporaneous, and claiming
that counsel acknowledges that the records have been altered. (Defs.’ Mem., ECF No.
96, at 5–6.) These arguments, which border on frivolous, suggest (1) that the Court
should undertake an investigation into the metadata for counsel’s billing software and
(2) that the Court should find counsel’s records unreliable because he took efforts to

reduce excessive or duplicative billing entries prior to submitting the records in support
of his application, as discussed supra note 3. The Court declines both of these
invitations. However, having carefully reviewed the billing records, the Court finds that
they do contain various excessive and duplicative entries, and also notes that counsel
has sought to bill at his full hourly rate for travel time.
a. Excessive and Duplicative Entries
As to entries that appear to be excessively inflated, the Court first observes that
Mr. Kim billed more than 21 hours related to drafting the summary judgment motion
and Rule 56.1 statement of facts.5 Although 21 hours may not be excessive for a
somewhat complex or novel motion with unusual facts and law, that is not what we
have here. In this case, Plaintiff’s June 13, 2022 memorandum of law in support of
summary judgment was 14 pages and summarized well settled FLSA and NYLL

5 (See Billing Records, ECF No. 95-2, at 18–19 (5/28/2022 entry for 3.0 hours, which
included “begin drafting statement of facts and memorandum of law”; 5/31/2022 entry for 13.3
hours for continuing drafting of the statement of facts and memorandum, review of a transcript,
and review of a damages document; 6/1/2022 entry for 3.2 hours relating to drafting and
editing the memorandum of law and research regarding tolling; 6/2/2022 entry for 5.0 hours
for revising and editing memorandum of law and statement of facts and drafting Plaintiff’s
declaration).)
principles. (Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 35-1.) Meanwhile,
the Rule 56.1 statement was six pages, and cited 14 exhibits, which totaled
approximately 350 pages, 201 of which were a handwritten timesheet by Plaintiff. (Pl.’s
Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. 35-2.) Given the length and lack of complexity of
the summary judgment motion and accompanying Rule 56.1 statement, the Court finds
that 21 hours is excessive. The Court notes that in Ahn, Mr. Kim was likewise found to
have included excessive billing entries related to the drafting of routine legal
documents. See Ahn, 2022 WL 586022, at *11 (finding that the number of hours billed for

a default motion, “a boilerplate legal document,” was too high).
Another example of excessive, and seemingly duplicative, billing pertains to the
myriad entries relating to calculating Plaintiff’s damages. Mr. Kim billed 2.1 hours on
July 4, 2020, for the purpose of analyzing “Plaintiff’s damage calculation” and drafting a
settlement demand. (Billing Records, ECF No. 95-2, at 2.) Ms. Choi billed 1.0 that same
day for the purpose of making “Plaintiff’s brief damage calculation.” (Id.) Mr. Kim later
billed another 1.3 hours on July 24, 2020, also for drafting a settlement demand and
sending it to opposing counsel. (Id. at 3.) Ms. Choi then billed 7.5 hours on October 6,
2020, related to transferring data into an excel spreadsheet for the purpose of making a
damages calculation. (Id. at 5.) On April 15, 2021, and April 16, 2021, Ms. Choi again
billed 7.0 hours and 6.5 hours, respectively, relating to transferring timesheet records
and data to an excel spreadsheet. (Id. at 9.) Thereafter, the billing records included
repeated entries related to review and further revisions of the damages calculation. For
example, Ms. Choi billed 0.5 hours on April 16, 2021, relating to revisions to damage
calculation and drafting an email, (id. at 9), and Ms. Choi billed another 7.0 hours on
June 13, 2022, related to reviewing and doublechecking “time sheets, timerecord, [sic]
damage calculation, memorandum and statement of material fact,” (id. at 19). In
addition, on March 29, 2023, almost three years after the case began, Ms. Choi billed 0.1
hours for reviewing the “NYC minimum wage for 2011–2017 and double check[ing] if it
applied to our damage calculation.” (Id. at 28.) Although the Court recognizes that this
case involved a lengthy handwritten time record maintained by Plaintiff in Korean, and
that counsel may need to revisit and analyze a plaintiff’s damages calculation as the
evidence develops, given Plaintiff’s counsel’s and Ms. Choi’s experience in employment
law, the Court does not find the amount of time billed for calculating the damages here
to be entirely reasonable. Given the firm’s proffered expertise, counsel should have a

more streamlined approach to calculating damages, and a mechanism to assure that
important factors (such as the applicable minimum wage) are being utilized throughout
the analysis to reduce duplicative and redundant work.
The Court has additional concerns about overbilling related to emails. Mr. Kim
has over 150 billing entries relating to email, many of which are billed in 0.1 to 0.3 of an
hour increments, while some are even more. (Billing Records, ECF No. 95-2, passim.)
Although many of these entries relate to communications with opposing counsel, the
total amount of time billed on email is excessive, particularly in light of the fact that
scheduling is often considered to be an administrative task that should not be billed at a
full attorney rate. For example, between August 21, 2020, and October 5, 2020, Mr. Kim
billed over 2.5 hours on emails relating to scheduling the mediation.6 But this series is

6 (See Billing Records, ECF No. 95-2, at 3–5 (entries from 8/19/2020 (0.2 hours),
8/21/2020 (0.3 hours), 8/26/2020 (0.2 hours), 8/27/2020 (0.3 hours), 8/28/2020 (0.4 hours
billed for email related to scheduling mediation on the same date that 0.3 was billed relating to
discussion regarding same), 9/9/2020 (0.2 hours), 9/17/2020 (0.5 hours), 9/22/2020 (0.5 hours),
10/5/2020 (0.1 hours).) Another flurry of emails regarding the scheduling of mediation totals
over 2.0 hours between April 16, 2021, and June 15, 2021 (Id. at 9–10 (entries from 4/16/2021
(0.2 hours), 5/3/2021 (0.2 hours), 5/4/2021 (0.1 hours), 5/5/2021 (0.2 hours), 5/6/2021 (0.1
hours), 5/7/2021 (0.3 hours), 5/11/2021 (0.2 hours), 6/3/2021 (0.6 hours), 6/14/2021 (0.1
hours), 6/15/2021 (0.1 hours)).)
just one of many such examples of excessive time spent on email. The billing records are
replete with billing entries ranging from 0.1 to 0.5 relating to sending and receiving
emails. The Court of course recognizes that 0.1 is the smallest billing increment typically
used by lawyers, but when over 150 entries are billed at the rate of 0.1 and higher (and
when the reading and drafting of many of these emails very likely took less than 6
minutes), the overall total amount of time logged for email risks becoming too high
cumulatively. See, e.g., Ryan v. Allied Interstate, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 628, 637 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (observing that “several entries of 0.1 (six minutes) on the same day for review of

ECF emails” inflated the time spent); see also Jones v. Pawar Bros. Corp., No. 17-CV-3018
(PKC) (SJB), 2023 WL 6214213, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2023) (finding hours billed to be
excessive, in part, “due to the repeated 0.1 hour billings for email and ECF review”);
Hershkowitz v. ARstrat, LLC, No. 21-CV-6093 (EK) (TAM), 2023 WL 2311429, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2306071 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 28, 2023).
b. Travel Time
Counsel has also sought to bill at his full hourly rate for days that included travel
time, such as dates for court appearances and trial. However, “[c]ourts in this Circuit
award attorney hours spent on travel at ‘only 50 percent of the attorney’s otherwise
approved rate.’” Lin, 2022 WL 2718584, at *8 (quoting Ge Chun Wen v. Hair Party 24
Hours Inc., No. 15-CV-10186, 2021 WL 3375615, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Wen v. Hair Party 24 Hours Inc., 2021 WL 2767152
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2021)); see also id. (collecting cases). See also, e.g., Mister Sprout, Inc. v.
Williams Farms Produce Sales, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 2d 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing
50% reduction for travel time).
Here, Mr. Kim billed for his full hourly rate for time over six dates that involved
travel to the courthouse.7 Given that his office is located in Fort Lee, New Jersey, this
likely translates to at least 12 hours of travel time, if not more — all of which he billed at
the rate of $550 per hour. Assuming one hour per trip, the travel time would amount to
$6,600 at Mr. Kim’s requested rate (12 x $550=$6,600). In contrast, calculating the travel
time at half of the rate the Court finds appropriate ($450) would result in $225 for each
hour of travel time, or $2,700. ($450/2 = $225; $225 x 12=$2,700.) But because Mr. Kim
did not specifically delineate his travel time contemporaneously in the billing records,

the Court cannot reduce the travel hours specifically. Accordingly, the Court finds this
to be another basis for an across-the-board deduction, as discussed further below.
3. Compensable Hours
For all the foregoing reasons, and following a careful review of Plaintiff’s billing
records, the Court finds that many of the billing entries and the overall number of hours
billed here are excessive. Although the Court recognizes that counsel cannot operate
with the benefit of hindsight in deciding what steps to take during the course of a
litigation, billing for 594.5 hours of attorney and paralegal time for a one-plaintiff wage
and hour case that culminated in two mediations, some settlement discussions, and a
three-day trial is not reasonable. That being said, the Court also recognizes that Mr. Kim
did reasonably expend some extra hours in this case due to difficulties presented by
Defendants during discovery, including, for example, moving to compel the deposition

7 (See Billing Records, ECF No. 95-2, at 21–22, 30, 33 (11/16/2022 entry billing 3.5 hours
for “travel to/from the court and attend court conference followed by settlement discussion
with the judge”; 12/16/2022 entry billing 3.0 hours for traveling to court to attend settlement
conference; 4/3/2023 entry billing 4.0 hours for traveling to the court for pretrial conference
and motion in limine ruling; 17.0 billed for each of 4/10/2023 and 4/11/2023, for attendance at
trial and continued trial preparation, as well as 13.0 hours billed for travel to court and trial on
4/12/2023).)
of Defendant Daniel Ahn and for sanctions in connection therewith. (See Mot. to
Compel, ECF No. 22; Mot. for Sanctions, ECF No. 25; Mot. to Compel, ECF No. 28; see
also Kim Decl., ECF No. 95, ¶ 31 (representing that “a considerable portion of the time
that I spent on this case was spent engaging noncompliant and reticent Defendants”).)
However, even considering the fact that Defendants are partially responsible for
delaying and prolonging discovery and these proceedings overall, Plaintiff’s request for
compensation for 594.5 total billable hours is extremely high. In comparison, the Troy
Law Firm, another experienced firm that routinely handles employment matters,

recently billed 165.4 hours in a two-plaintiff FLSA case in which the parties litigated for
three years, engaged in a court-annexed arbitration, and completed a two-day de novo
bench trial. Luk v. ABNS NY Inc., No. 18-CV-5170 (AMD) (RLM), 2021 WL 829417, at *1,
7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Ying Ying Dai v.
ABNS NY Inc., 2021 WL 826014 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2021). Similarly, in another recent
case, the Troy Law Firm sought to recover $101,061.83 in total fees, representing 239.95
hours, following a two-day bench trial in a four plaintiff FLSA case; they were
ultimately awarded $67,265.55 in fees. Lin, 2022 WL 2718584, at *2, 8–9. Here, Plaintiff’s
counsel billed 354.55 more hours than in Lin — more than double. Accordingly, as with
another recent FLSA trial case in our district, “[t]he Court is highly skeptical of the
amount of hours being requested by Plaintiff’s attorneys.” Jones, 2023 WL 6214213, at
*12 (finding over 700 hours billed in connection with an FLSA trial resolved after a
three-day trial to be unreasonable).
In light of the relatively straightforward claims and legal framework in this case
and the procedural history, billing such a high number of hours is excessive on its face.8
Moreover, given Mr. Kim’s expertise, “the Court expects an efficient approach to this
simple FLSA/NYLL action, even considering Defendants’ refusal to concede facts.” Id.
For all of these reasons, a blanket reduction in fees is warranted. Overall, the Court
finds a reduction of 25% is appropriate. These deductions, coupled with a reduction of
the hourly rates to the levels discussed above, results in a total fee award of $169,773.75,
as set forth below:

Fees Hours Hourly Reduced Fee at Fee
Individual Requested Requested Rate Hourly Reduced Reduced
Requested Rate Rate 25%
Ryan Kim $262,295 476.90 $550 $450 $214,605 $160,953.75
Jia Choi $14,112 117.60 $120 $100 $11,760 $8,820

Totals $276,407 $226,365 $169,773.75

C. Costs
As noted above, in response to Plaintiff’s motion, Defendants argue that New
York Labor Law § 198-1 “does not expressly provide for costs” and that Plaintiff’s
application did not follow the procedures established in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(1) and Local Rule 54.1. (Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 96, at 6.) Defendants further
contend that Plaintiff has not supplied any evidence that the costs were paid. (Id.) To
that end, as noted above, the Court directed Plaintiff to submit documentation for costs.
In response, Plaintiff submitted various cost receipts and invoices. (See Receipts, ECF

8 The Court notes that Mr. Kim’s billing practices have been similarly questioned by
other courts. For example, in Kim v. Cathay Express Transportation Inc., No. 19-CV-2007 (SJB),
2021 WL 9219037, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2021), the court found that the total number of hours
was disproportionate to what had occurred in the case and rejected an FLSA settlement
agreement in part because “Ryan Kim Law’s request for attorney’s fees suffers from myriad
deficiencies and is grossly inflated.”
No. 108-1.) Specifically, counsel provided receipts detailing costs in the amount of
$8,062.07, broken down as follows: $400 for the filing fee; $60 for service of process; $300
to pay Plaintiff’s half of the mediator’s fee; $2,814.20 for deposition transcripts; $2,120 in
bills for interpretation services and interpreter cancellation charges; $281.66 in
transportation expenses; $2,031.51 for court reporter fees for trial; and $55 in charges
related to mailings, supplies, and postage charges. (Id.)
Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the New York Labor Law expressly provides
for the recovery of costs. See NYLL § 663; Santillan v. Henao, 822 F. Supp. 2d 284, 301

(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“As a general matter, a prevailing plaintiff in an action under the FLSA
or New York’s Labor Law is entitled to recover costs from the defendant.”). As to the
costs requested, counsel here seeks reimbursement for specific costs directly related to
litigating the case, which are typically recoverable. (See Receipts, ECF No. 108-1.) See,
e.g., Reiseck v. Universal Commc'ns of Miami, Inc., No. 06-CV-0777 (LGS) (JCF), 2014 WL
5374684, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2014) (evaluating request for costs involving “attorney
transportation and meals, fees for court reporting services, expert retainer fees,
investigative reports fees, WestLaw usage fees, and sundries including mail and
photocopies”); see also Teamsters Loc. 814 Welfare Fund v. Dahill Moving & Storage Co., 545
F. Supp. 2d 260, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (observing that “[c]osts relating to filing fees,
process servers, postage, and photocopying are ordinarily recoverable” and that it “‘is
also reasonable that counsel be reimbursed for mileage and parking costs’”) (quoting
Rand-Whitney Containerboard Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Montville, No. 96-CV-413, 2006 WL
2839236, at *27 (D. Conn. Sept. 5, 2006).
Following Plaintiff’s provision of receipts, Defendants supplemented their
memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff’s application for attorneys’ fees and costs.
(Defs.’ Ltr., ECF No. 109.) Defendants reiterate their previous procedural objection that
the application for costs was not made appropriately by motion and their previous
substantive objection that Plaintiff’s supporting documentation does not indicate that
claimed “expenses were actually paid by Plaintiff.” (Id.) Defendant does not cite any
authority for the proposition that the Plaintiff must submit proof of payment in the
form of cancelled checks or receipts, and Courts routinely grant applications for costs
after review of invoices. See, e.g., Pichardo v. El Mismo Rincon Latino Corp., No. 17-CV-
7439, 2018 WL 4101844, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2018), report and recommendation adopted,
2018 WL 4100480 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2018); cf. Shalto v. Bay of Bengal Kabob Corp., No. 12-

CV-920 (KAM) (VMS), 2018 WL 867420, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2013) (noting the
absence of “receipts or invoices” and declining to award costs for costs unsupported
with those types of documents).
Given that the types of expenses sought here are reasonable and “routinely
recoverable as litigation costs,” Hancock v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 3d 250, 258
(S.D.N.Y. 2022), the Court awards Plaintiff’s counsel $8,062.07 in costs.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has noted that in fee shifting cases, “[t]he essential goal . . . is
to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs in
part. Specifically, the Court awards Plaintiff $169,773.75 in attorney’s fees and $8,062.07
in costs, for a total award of $177,835.82. Corporate Defendant Party Well Rest &
Oriental Bakery is liable for the full amount of attorney’s fees and costs, while the
Individual Defendants are jointly and severally liable to the following extent: Daniel
Ahn, in the amount of $116,126.79 (65.3%) and (2) Young Joon Ahn, in the amount of
$58,863.66 (33.1%), consistent with their proportionate liability, as discussed supra
note 1.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
December 15, 2023
Taupe A Wiake
TARYN A. MERKL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

24

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310952. Public record. Not legal advice.