# Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, E.D. New York · December 21, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310947

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** December 21, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310947

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “any evidence of a desire by [Plaintiff] to work would merely emphasize the positive value of his 32-year employment history. A claimant with a good work record is entitled to substantial credibility when claiming an inability to work because of a disability.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------X

YVONNE BROWN,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against-
20-CV-5959(KAM)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

--------------------------------------X

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Yvonne Brown
(“Plaintiff”) appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration (“Defendant” or the
“Commissioner”) finding that Plaintiff is not disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and thus not
entitled to disability insurance benefits (“benefits”) under
Title II of the Act. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 12, “Ptf. Mem.”),
the Commissioner’s response to Plaintiff’s motion for judgment
on the pleadings and cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings
(ECF No. 13, “Def. Mem.”) and Plaintiff’s reply memorandum of
law in support thereof. (ECF No. 14, “Ptf. Reply”.)
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, the Commissioner’s cross-
motion is respectfully DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.
Background
The parties have filed a joint stipulation of relevant

facts detailing Plaintiff’s medical history, the ALJ’s review,
and the administrative hearing testimony, which the Court has
reviewed and hereby incorporates by reference. (See generally
ECF No. 15, Joint Stipulation of Facts (“Stip.”).) Here, the
Court briefly recounts the facts relevant to the instant
motions.
Plaintiff was born in 1958 (Stip. at 2) and worked for 38
years prior to the onset of the alleged disability, including as
an “application reviewer.” (ECF No. 16, Administrative
Transcript, “Tr.” at 215-16.) Plaintiff filed an application
for disability insurance benefits on October 20, 2017 wherein

she alleged that the onset date of her disability was January
16, 2017. (Stip. at 2.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied. (Id.)
On April 13, 2018, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.) ALJ Paul W. Goodale
held a hearing on September 16, 2019. (Id.) Although
Plaintiff’s original benefits application and supporting medical
documentation focused on respiratory and spinal impairments,
Plaintiff alleged at this hearing that she was disabled by hand
and wrist impairments, including bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome. (Tr. at 14.) On January 2, 2020, the ALJ issued a
decision denying Plaintiff’s application for disability
insurance benefits. (Stip. at 2.) Using a five-step sequential
analysis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled

within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. at 10.)
At the first step of the five-step sequential analysis, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since January 16, 2017, the alleged disability onset
date, and that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of
the Act through December 31, 2021. (Tr. at 12.)
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from a
number of severe impairments, including bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome, hand-wrist neuropathy in the bilateral upper
extremities, and status post wrist compression procedures
related to both of Plaintiff’s wrists (the “hand and wrist

impairments”). (Tr. at 12.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff
had non-severe impairments that were either under control or
that had improved with the assistance of medication including
hypertension, status post right knee arthroscopy, asthma, and
spinal disorder. (Tr. at 13.)
At the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s
impairments, both individually and in combination, did not
“reach the level of severity contemplated in the Listings.”
(Tr. at 13.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
impairments did not meet the requirement of Listing 1.04 as it
relates to Plaintiff’s spinal impairments. (Tr. at 13.) The
ALJ did not identify any listings that were applicable to those
of Plaintiff’s impairments that the ALJ described as medically

severe at step two, including Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome, hand-wrist neuropathy in the bilateral upper
extremities, and status post wrist compression procedures
related to both of Plaintiff’s wrists. Nevertheless, much of
the ALJ’s discussion of Plaintiff’s impairments in the context
of his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination
focused on Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments. (Tr. at 14-
17.)
Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the RFC to
perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) with
certain limitations.1 (Tr. at 14.) The ALJ stated that his RFC

“assessment [was] supported by the medical record” and concluded
that “[v]iewing the record as a whole, there is a substantial

1 The ALJ found that while Plaintiff was capable of engaging in work that
involved “handling and fingering bilaterally, and frequent overhead reaching
bilaterally[,]” Plaintiff “must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors,
dust, gases, poorly ventilated areas and pulmonary irritants” and that
Plaintiff “could not do assembly-line type work (i.e., outwardly paced,
working in close tandem with co-workers),” with the exception of “individual
table/bench work[,]” which Plaintiff could still perform. (Tr. at 14.)
disparity between the claimant’s documentary complaints and the
objective medical findings contained in the record” and that
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her condition was “neither
reasonably consistent with [the] medical findings [in the
record], nor sufficiently credible as additive evidence[.]”
(Tr. at 17.) In describing the medical findings in the record,

the ALJ referred primarily to treatment notes from Plaintiff’s
treating physician, Dr. Michael Rettig, M.D. as well as
Plaintiff’s own self-reported symptoms. The ALJ explicitly
disavowed “any prior administrative medical findings or medial
opinions,” stating that the record contained “no assessments or
Medical Source Statements by any treating provider.” (Tr. at
17.)
Although the ALJ stated Plaintiff’s testimony regarding
“the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her]
symptoms” and Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent
with the “medical opinions” in the record, the ALJ did not

appear to consider any medical opinions. (Tr. at 16.) In fact,
the ALJ stated that there were no medical opinions in the record
relating to the set of impairments that the ALJ determined were
severe. (Tr. at 17) (“There were no assessments or Medical
Source Statements by any treating provider[]” regarding
Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments or otherwise.) With
respect to the medical opinion of Dr. D. Chen, the ALJ declined
to consider Dr. Chen’s opinion because Dr. Chen’s opinion did
not include an assessment of Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity, because Dr. Chen’s medical opinion purported to
evaluate Plaintiff’s spinal impairments, as opposed to
Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments, and because Plaintiff
failed to attend a February 28, 2018 consultative examination

with Dr. Chen. (Tr. at 13, 17.) The ALJ further concluded that
“[a]s for medical opinions and prior administrative medical
findings, [he would] not defer or give any specific evidentiary
weight, including controlling weight, to any prior
administrative medical findings or medial opinions.” (Tr. at
17.)
Having ruled out “any prior administrative medical findings
or medical opinions” (Tr. at 17), the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s
medical history with respect to her bilateral carpal tunnel
syndrome and other hand and wrist related restrictions.
Specifically, the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s “January 13, 2017 .

. . evaluation of bilateral hand pain/numbness[,]” Plaintiff’s
“January 17, 2017 . . . right carpal tunnel release surgery
[and] . . . right wrist median nerve compression” following her
diagnosis with right carpal tunnel syndrome, Plaintiff’s “April
25, 2017 . . . left wrist median nerve decompression surgery”
and treatment notes from Dr. Rettig stating that Plaintiff’s
“left wrist incision was healed,” that, following Plaintiff’s
“November 6, 2018 . . . left thumb decompression of flexor
tendon,” Plaintiff’s “left thumb incision [had] healed,” and
that Plaintiff’s “left thumb locking [had] resolved” as of June
3, 2019. (Tr. at 16-17.) The ALJ also referred to “X-rays
reveal[ing] . . . joint osteoarthritis[.]” (Tr. at 17.) Based
on these observations, the ALJ concluded that although

Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably
be expected to” cause the symptoms alleged by Plaintiff,
Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of [her] symptoms [were] not entirely
consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the
record[.]” (Tr. at 16.)
At the fourth step, the ALJ determined that based on her
RFC, Plaintiff “is capable of performing her past relevant work
as a final application reviewer.” (Tr. at 17.)
Finally, at step five, the ALJ noted that, according to the
vocational expert’s testimony, Plaintiff could also perform

“other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy,” given Plaintiff’s “[RFC], age, education, and work
experience[.]” (Tr. at 18.) Specifically, the ALJ referenced
testimony from vocational expert, Zachary Fosberg, stating that
Plaintiff can work as an “office clerk[.]” (Tr. at 18.)
Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was “not disabled
under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the [Act]” and was not
therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. (Tr. at
19.)
Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision on January
7, 2020 and, on October 9, 2020, the Appeals Council denied
review of the ALJ’s decision, rendering the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. (Stip. at 2.) On December

7, 2020, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking judicial
review of the Commissioner’s final decision. (See generally ECF
No. 1, Complaint (“Compl.”).)
Legal Standard
I. The Commissioner’s Disability Determination
To receive disability benefits, a claimant must be disabled
within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), (d). A
claimant is considered disabled within the meaning of the Act if
she demonstrates her “inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in

death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). “The impairment must be of such severity that
[the claimant] is not only unable to do [her] previous work but
cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work which exists in the national economy.” Shaw v. Chater, 221
F.3d 126, 131-32 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In evaluating whether a claimant’s condition constitutes a
disability within the meaning of the Act and whether the
claimant is, therefore, entitled to benefits, the Commissioner
conducts a five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520. Throughout that analysis, the Commissioner
must consider “(1) the objective medical facts [and clinical
findings]; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such
facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or disability . . .; and
(4) the claimant’s educational background, age, and work
experience.” Balodis v. Leavitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 255, 262
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d
Cir. 1999) (alterations in original).
At the first step of the Commissioner’s five-step
sequential analysis, the Commissioner must determine whether the
claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If not, the Commissioner
must next determine whether the claimant has a severe
impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). The
Commissioner’s assessment of severity at the second step is
based on the combined effect of all the claimant’s impairments,
including those that are not considered medically severe. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523, 404.1545(a)(2). At step three, the
Commissioner must determine whether the claimant’s impairment or
combination of impairments is, or medically equals, one of the
listings of impairments included in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The
Commissioner then evaluates the claimant’s capacity for physical
and mental work activities on a sustained basis considering the

claimant’s impairments. This is referred to as the claimant’s
RFC and is defined as “the most [that a claimant] can still do
despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). At the
fourth step, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant can
engage in past relevant work in light of the claimant’s RFC.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Finally, at step five, the
Commissioner must determine whether the claimant can perform
other work that is available in the national economy, taking
into account the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and past work
experience. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
At steps one through four of the sequential five-step

analysis, the claimant bears the ”general burden of proving that
[] she has a disability.” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128
(2d Cir. 2008). Once the claimant has met her burden at steps
one through four, the Commissioner bears the burden, at step
five, of demonstrating that, notwithstanding the claimant’s RFC,
age, education, and work experience, she is “able to engage in
gainful employment within the national economy.” Sobolewski v.
Apfel, 985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
II. Judicial Review of the Commissioner’s Final Decision
Following a final decision of the Commissioner, denying a
claimant’s application for disability benefits, a claimant may
bring an action in federal district court seeking judicial

review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits “within sixty
days after the mailing . . . of notice of such decision or
within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security
may allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A reviewing court may not
conduct a de novo review of the claimant’s application. See
Cage v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012).
Nor can the district court “substitute its own judgment for that
of the [ALJ],” even if it would have justifiably reached a
different conclusion. Jones v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 57, 59 (2d
Cir. 1991) (internal citation omitted).
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a reviewing district court

may affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the Commissioner
with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. Butts v.
Barnhart, 388 F.3d 377, 384 (2d Cir. 2004). However, the
district court may only set aside the Commissioner’s
determination that a claimant is not disabled within the meaning
of the Act if the district court finds either that the factual
findings of the Commissioner are not supported by substantial
evidence or that the final decision of the Commissioner is based
on legal error. Burgess, 537 F.3d at 127 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla,” and
must be relevant evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362

F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 420
U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The
Commissioner’s final decision is based on legal error if the ALJ
“fail[ed] to apply the correct legal standard . . . [or]
fail[ed] to adhere to the applicable regulations.” Kohler v.
Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 262 (2d Cir. 2008).
Finally, federal regulations explicitly authorize a
reviewing district court to remand for further proceedings when
appropriate. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The court shall have
power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record,
a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of

the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding
the cause for a rehearing.”). Remand is warranted where “there
are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has applied an
improper legal standard[.]” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82-
83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d
Cir. 1996). Remand is particularly appropriate where further
findings or explanation will clarify the rationale for the ALJ’s
decision. Pratts, 94 F.3d at 39. If the record before the
reviewing court provides “persuasive proof of disability and a
remand for further evidentiary proceedings would serve no
purpose,” however, the reviewing court may reverse and remand
solely for the calculation and payment of benefits. Parker v.
Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 1980).

Discussion
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s decision was not based on
substantial evidence and that remand is warranted because (1)
the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical evidence in the
record, particularly as it relates to statements made by Dr.
Rettig, (2) the ALJ failed to adequately develop the medical
record with respect to the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s
RFC, and (3) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff’s
subjective statements. In response, defendants argue that (1)
Dr. Rettig’s statements were properly considered by the ALJ as
treatment notes, rather than medical opinions, (2) that the

medical record contained sufficient evidence to support the
ALJ’s RFC determination and did not require further development,
and (3) that the ALJ exercised the proper discretion to consider
and ultimately discount Plaintiff’s credibility.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that Dr.
Rettig’s statements do not constitute medical opinions within
the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1), that the ALJ failed
to adequately develop the record with respect to his RFC
determination, and that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate
Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. The ALJ also failed
to specify and discuss the relevant listings of impairments, as
required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The ALJ's
decision, particularly as it relates to his RFC determination,

was not supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ’s
credibility assessment of Plaintiff’s subjective symptom
testimony was rooted in legal error. Accordingly, the Court
reverses and remands the final decision of the Commissioner.
I. Dr. Rettig’s Treatment Notes
Plaintiff first contends that Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes
are medical opinions which the ALJ failed to properly consider
in his determination. (Ptf. Mem. at 2.) In response, the
Commissioner notes that “Dr. Rettig’s statements were not
‘medical opinions’ . . . under the regulations.” (Def. Mem. at
7.) Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes do not constitute medical

opinions as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1) and, even if
they did, the Commissioner would not be beholden to conclusory
statements regarding Plaintiff’s disability status, pursuant to
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).
“Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical
sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of
[a claimant’s] impairment(s), including [her] symptoms,
diagnosis and prognosis, what [she] can still do despite [her]
impairment(s), and [her] physical or mental restrictions.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1). Medical opinions are more than mere
treatment notes. See Fontanez v. Colvin, No. 16-cv-01300 (PKC),
2017 WL 4334127, at *25 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 28, 2017) (noting that
“based on the ALJ's decision, it is unclear how [Plaintiff’s

physical therapy and treatment notes] alone supported the ALJ’s
finding that Plaintiff is capable of sitting, standing, and
walking . . . [particularly] when Plaintiff also consistently
reported to her physicians that her . . . pain was exacerbated
by sitting or standing.”) In order to constitute a medical
opinion under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1), a medical
practitioner’s statements must “explicitly assess [the]
claimant’s limitations and RFC.” Reginald R. v. Comm’r of Soc
Sec., No. 21-cv-6326 (CJS), 2023 WL 5608869, at *10 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 30, 2023).
Dr. Rettig’s statements do not provide sufficient insight

into Plaintiff’s abilities or restrictions regarding her
functional limitations or capacity to work. Nor do Dr. Rettig’s
notes shed light on the nature and severity of Plaintiff’s
impairments for the purpose of an RFC determination.2 On March

2 In reviewing the record, it is apparent that Plaintiff’s first appointment
with Dr. Rettig resulted in the most descriptive of Dr. Rettig’s treatment
notes in terms of describing the manner in which Plaintiff’s symptoms
physically limit her work activities. On September 19, 2016, Dr. Rettig
noted in his treatment notes that Plaintiff “ha[d] been working” and that
9, 2017, Dr. Rettig states that Plaintiff’s “pre-operative
symptoms are resolving,” “follow[ing] [Plaintiff’s] . . . right
carpal tunnel” procedure, but that Plaintiff is “unable to work”
and is “[l]ikely [to] return to work [by] June 26, 2017.” (Tr.
at 487). On April 27, 2017, approximately two days after
Plaintiff’s left wrist median nerve compression procedure, Dr.

Rettig states that Plaintiff is “not working” and instructs her
to “limit use of [her] hand.” (Tr. at 491.) On May 4, 2017,
Dr. Rettig again states that Plaintiff is “not working,” noting
that she is “completely disabled from work” notwithstanding
Plaintiff’s “[f]ull digital active range of motion.” (Tr. at
492.) Plaintiff was instructed to “RTO” in “6 weeks” for
consideration of whether Plaintiff may “return to work at that
time.” (Id.) There are no further treatment notes in the
record for nearly 18 months. On November 12, 2018 and again on
February 25, 2019, Dr. Rettig notes that Plaintiff is “not
working,” although he remarks that Plaintiff is “[d]oing well,”

has “[g]ood thumb flexion,” “[h]as been using [her thumb] with

Plaintiff was “complaining of pain over volar aspect of wrist with radiation
proximally and distally.” (Tr. at 477.) Dr. Rettig further elaborates that
Plaintiff experienced “associated numbness/tingling to Right index and long
finger, [and] Left index/long/ring fingers” that is “[w]orse with typing” and
that Plaintiff’s “[p]ain/numbness wakes [her up] at night.” (Id.) There is
no further or even similar description of how Plaintiff’s impairments might
impact her functioning in any of the subsequent treatment notes. In fact, it
is unclear whether the treatment notes regarding Plaintiff’s complaints of
pain for the follow up visits with Dr. Rettig after each of Plaintiff’s
surgical procedures apply to both of Plaintiff’s hands/wrists or just the
hand/wrist that was the subject of the most recent surgical procedure and the
focus of the follow up visit.
daily activities,” and has “no complaints of pain.” (Tr. at
494.)
The statements in Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes do not
constitute an explicit assessment of Plaintiff’s mental or
physical limitations in connection with Plaintiff’s capacity to
work. As a result, these statements cannot, alone, support an

RFC determination in these circumstances. See Buonsignore v.
Commissioner of Social Security, No. 20-cv-4582 (MKB), 2022 WL
4121378, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 2022) (“As a general rule,
where the transcript contains only diagnostic evidence and no
opinion from a medical source about functional limitations . .
., to fulfill the responsibility to develop a complete record,
the ALJ must recontact the treating source, order a consultative
examination, or have a medical expert testify at the hearing[]”)
(internal citations omitted) (alterations in original).
Plaintiff alleges that “Dr. Rettig twice opined that Ms.
Brown was not cleared to return to work in any capacity” and

that “the ALJ failed to even mention these opinions . . . let
alone indicate how persuasive he found [them].” (Ptf. Mem. at
2.) It is not clear that Dr. Rettig’s statements that Plaintiff
was “unable to work” on March 9, 2017 (Tr. at 487), or that
Plaintiff was “completely disabled from work” on May 4, 2017
(Tr. at 492), particularly in the context of subsequent notes
remarking on Plaintiff’s progress, represent a conclusion that
Plaintiff is “not cleared to return to work in any capacity,” as
Plaintiff suggests. (Ptf. Mem. at 2.) In any case, 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(1) explicitly rejects conclusory statements made by
medical practitioners that a Plaintiff is “disabled” or “unable
to work” because such conclusions lie squarely within the realm
of the Commissioner’s judgment. Accordingly, Dr. Rettig’s

treatment notes neither constitute medical opinions within the
meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(1), nor do Dr. Rettig’s
statements on March 9, 2017 and May 4, 2017 require adoption by
the Commissioner in light of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).
II. The ALJ’s Duty to Develop the Record
Next, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly
develop the medical record because the ALJ failed to request an
updated and more detailed medical opinion from the treating
specialist or from an examining or non-examining consultant.
(Ptf. Mem. at 5.) Defendant raises two points in response: (1)
that the ALJ was under no obligation to obtain an updated and

more detailed medical opinion from Dr. Rettig because the record
was adequate to make a disability determination and that (2)
Plaintiff rejected contemporaneous opportunities to supplement
the record by declining to attend the consultative examination
scheduled for her by the ALJ. (Def. Mem. at 9-10.) Both of the
Commissioner’s responses are misguided in light of the notably
limited medical record, which the ALJ acknowledged and failed to
supplement, and because Plaintiff’s responsibility to proffer
supporting medical evidence “do[es] not derogate from the ALJ’s
responsibility to investigate[]” Plaintiff’s claims. Tankisi v.
Commissioner of Social Sec., 521 F. App’x 29, 33 n.1 (2d Cir.
2013) (citing Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996)).
A. The Medical Record was Notably Limited

“Social Security adjudications represent a unique variant
from the traditional model of adversarial litigation[]” because
“Social Security disability determinations are investigatory, or
inquisitorial, rather than adversarial.” Vincent v.
Commissioner of Social Sec., 651 F.3d 299, 304-05 (2d Cir. 2011)
(citing Morgan v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In light of the
investigatory nature of Social Security proceedings, the ALJ,
unlike a judge at trial, has a duty “to investigate and develop
the facts and develop the arguments both for and against the
granting of” social security benefits. Butts, 388 F.3d at 386

(internal citation omitted). An ALJ is not relieved of this
duty by virtue of a claimant’s failure to fulfill their own
responsibility “to bring all favorable evidence to the ALJ's
attention[.]” Tankisi, 521 F. App’x at 33 n.1.
In the context of the RFC determination, the ALJ typically
has a duty to request medical source opinions where no such
opinions or comparable information are otherwise available
within the record. See Arias v. Saul, No. l8-cv-1296 (KAM),
2020 WL 1989277, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2020) (“The ALJ should
have obtained a medical opinion from a qualified source, as her
RFC could not stand if unsupported by at least one medical
opinion.”). This is “[b]ecause an RFC determination is a
medical determination, [and] an ALJ who makes an RFC

determination in the absence of supporting expert medical
opinion has improperly substituted his own opinion for that of a
physician[.]” Fontanez, 2017 WL 4334127, at *19 (internal
citations omitted); see also Blowe v. Commissioner of Social
Security, No. 19-cv-2658 (JS), 2020 WL 3129062, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
June 12, 2020) (an “ALJ is not qualified to assess a claimant's
RFC on the basis of bare medical findings, and as a result an
ALJ’s determination of [a claimant’s] RFC without a medical
advisor’s assessment is not supported by substantial evidence”)
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,
"remand is not always required when an ALJ fails to request

[medical] opinions” Tankisi, 521 F. App’x at 34, and in
particular, “where there are no obvious gaps in the
administrative record, and where the ALJ already possesses a
complete medical history, the ALJ is under no obligation to seek
additional information.” Lowry v. Astrue, 474 F. App'x 801, 804
(2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, it cannot be concluded that the ALJ “already
possess[ed] a complete medical history” nor can it be decided
that there are “no obvious gaps in the administrative record.”
Lowry, 474 F. App'x at 804. First, there is no indication from
the record that the ALJ requested medical opinion evidence from
Dr. Rettig. As previously noted, Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes

are not medical opinions, nor does the content of Dr. Rettig’s
treatment notes constitute a substantive equivalent or
replacement of a medical opinion because Dr. Rettig did not
include any explicit functional assessment of Plaintiff’s
limitations. See Fontanez, 2017 WL 4334127, at *26 (where
there is a “lack of explicit functional assessments by
Plaintiff’s treating physicians, the ALJ should have requested
an RFC assessment from one of Plaintiff’s many treating
physicians who examined her on an ongoing basis.”). Nor were
there other medical opinions or assessments within the record
that obviated the need for the ALJ to solicit additional medical

opinions. Indeed, the ALJ explicitly acknowledged the limited
nature of the medical record, stating that there were “no
assessments or Medical Source Statements by any treating
provider” within the record and that he we would “not defer or
give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling
weight, to any prior administrative medical findings or medical
opinions.” (Tr. at 17.) In the absence of “any . . . medical
findings or medical opinions,” the ALJ should have obtained a
medical opinion from a qualified source. (Id.)
Furthermore, there is no indication from the record that
the ALJ made a reasonable attempt to request or obtain medical
records from any other medical source, including Plaintiff’s
occupational therapy treatment records. The first treatment

notes with Dr. Rettig from September 19, 2016, indicate that
Plaintiff “ha[d] been in occupational therapy for two years.”
(Tr. at 477.) After Plaintiff’s right carpal tunnel surgery,
Dr. Rettig said that Plaintiff was going to occupational therapy
and should continue to do so. (Tr. at 487.) On May 4, 2017,
during a follow up appointment after Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel
surgery on her left wrist, Dr. Rettig again stated in his
treatment notes that Plaintiff had “start[ed] occupational
therapy.” (Tr. at 492.) The ALJ made no reference to
Plaintiff’s history of occupational therapy treatment and does
not appear to have either solicited Plaintiff’s treatment

records or sought to explain why such records were unnecessary.
Particularly given the gap in Plaintiff’s treatment records with
respect to Dr. Rettig, the ALJ should have sought to obtain
Plaintiff’s occupational therapy treatment records to further
develop the record and support his RFC determination. See
Daniela B. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-03495 (NRM), 2023 WL 3719634,
at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 30, 2023) (finding that the ALJ failed to
develop the record because “[the ALJ] [did] not include any
treatment notes from the mental health counselor who treated
Plaintiff regularly for three years,” which was “a clear and
obvious gap in the record.”).
Second, as the Commissioner acknowledges, the record
reflects a significant gap in Plaintiff’s treatment by the sole

treating physician referenced in the record, Dr. Rettig. (Def.
Mem. at 13.) Following Plaintiff’s carpal tunnel surgery in
early 2017, Plaintiff does not appear to have met with Dr.
Rettig “for approximately 18 months between May 2017 and
November 2018.” (Id.) In light of the absence of any other
treatment records from this time period, including occupational
therapy treatment records that may have helped fill the gap in
the ALJ’s understanding of Plaintiff’s functional limitations,
this approximately 18-month gap placed an affirmative duty on
the ALJ to either solicit further medical evidence or to
articulate in his decision why any such effort would be in vain.

See Blash v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 813 F. App'x 642, 645
(2d Cir. 2020) (“When there is an obvious or ‘clear gap[]’ in
the record, the ALJ is required to seek out missing medical
records, even when a party is represented by counsel[]”) (citing
Rosa, 168 F.3d at 79); see also Powell v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 17-cv-05360 (AMD), 2019 WL 254036, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17,
2019).
The Commissioner asks this Court to find that the ALJ was
not required to solicit or rely on medical opinion evidence to
support the ALJ’s RFC determination. The Court denies the
Commissioner’s request because the record was notably sparse and
contains clear and obvious gaps that warranted further
development by the ALJ. Under these circumstances, the ALJ had

an obligation to solicit additional medical evidence and failed
to do so.
B. Plaintiff’s Failure to Attend the February 2018
Consultative Examination Does Not Excuse the ALJ’s
Failure to Develop the Record
With respect to Plaintiff’s failure to attend the February
28, 2018 consultative examination by Dr. D. Chen, the
Commissioner’s assertion that this failure constitutes a waiver
of Plaintiff’s disability insurance claim is not supported by
applicable regulations or relevant case law. To the extent the
ALJ finds that a record is insufficient to make a disability
determination and that the claimant is noncompliant such that
the record cannot be further developed, the ALJ may find a
claimant is not disabled based on her failure to cooperate. See
20 C.F.R. § 404.1518. However, in such a circumstance, “the ALJ
must include in his decision[] ‘a statement about the effect (if
any) of the claimant’s failure or refusal [to attend the
consultative examination] on the [ALJ’s] decision.’” McClean v.
Astrue, 650 F. Supp. 2d 223, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal
citations omitted).
The ALJ did not make a finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled within the meaning of the Act because of her failure to
cooperate and attend a medical examination pursuant to 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1518. Nor did the ALJ specify what effect, if any,
Plaintiff’s failure to attend the February 28, 2018 consultative
examination had on his ultimate decision. The ALJ notes that
Plaintiff “indicated she was unwilling to attend a consultative
examination and would not be pursuing her claim” in the context
of Dr. D. Chen’s “initial[] [assessment of] spinal impairments.”
(Tr. at 13.) The ALJ further notes that “in view of these
circumstances, [he] does not evaluate the opinion of Dr. Chen.”
(Tr. at 17.) However, the consultative examination and Dr. D.
Chen’s medical opinion relate only to Plaintiff’s spinal
impairments. There is nothing in the record to suggest that

Plaintiff was uncooperative with efforts by the ALJ to seek a
consultative examination or further medical evidence regarding
Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments, which are the only
impairments the ALJ found to be medically severe.
Moreover, the ALJ’s decision strongly suggests that
Plaintiff’s failure to attend the February 28, 2018 consultative
examination had no bearing whatsoever on his conclusion
regarding Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments. First, the
consultative examination was scheduled more than a year before
Plaintiff’s hearing with the ALJ wherein she alleged hand and
wrist impairments as the basis for her disability claim, rather
than the spinal impairments that Dr. D. Chen was supposed to
assess. Second, Dr. D. Chen explicitly stated that the purpose
of his examination was to assess Plaintiff’s assertion of “pain

of B/L shoulders, arms, right knee, left foot and HTN.” (Tr. at
473.)
More than a year after the February 28, 2018 consultative
examination was cancelled, Plaintiff appeared before the ALJ for
a hearing on September 16, 2019. (Tr. at 15-16.) At the
hearing, Plaintiff alleged a new basis for her disability claim,
her bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. (Tr. at 13.) Plaintiff’s
failure to attend the initial consultative examination regarding
her apparently abandoned claim of spinal impairments, does not
absolve the ALJ of his duty to develop the record with respect
to Plaintiff’s assertion of hand and wrist impairments and it

does not empower the ALJ to undergo a five-step sequential
analysis of Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments without the
assistance of any medical assessment or sufficient medical
evidence. Ordering a new consultative examination to assess
Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was one of many
avenues that the ALJ could have taken to develop the record
after the hearing. See Conyers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-
cv-5126 (BCM), 2019 WL 1122952, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2019)
(noting that the ALJ adjourned plaintiff’s hearing in order to
obtain additional medical records and for plaintiff undergo a
consultative examination). In light of the limited nature of
the medical record regarding Plaintiff’s hand and wrist
impairments, Plaintiff’s failure to attend a consultative

examination about a separate, apparently abandoned claim is
simply not an excuse for the ALJ to assess Plaintiff’s hand and
wrist impairments and make a conclusive RFC determination
without sufficient medical evidence.
III. The ALJ’s Analysis of Plaintiff’s Credibility
The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable
impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the above
alleged symptoms,” but that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning
the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these
symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence
and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. at 16.) The ALJ

further noted that “[v]iewing the record as a whole, there is a
substantial disparity between the claimant’s documentary
complaints and the objective medical findings contained in the
record” and that “[t]he evidence generally does not support the
alleged loss of functioning[.]” (Tr. at 17.) Plaintiff
contends the ALJ’s statements regarding the credibility of her
subjective symptom testimony were “conclusory,” were not
supported by the required explanation of the ALJ’s reasoning,
and were “not supported by substantial evidence” in light of the
ALJ’s concession that the medical record was sparse. (Ptf. Mem.
at 9.) The Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s assessment of
Plaintiff’s credibility was well-reasoned and supported by
evidence in the record. (Def. Mem. at 12-14.) The Commissioner

further notes that contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion, the ALJ
had no obligation to reference Plaintiff’s 38-year work history
in light of the “substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s
[credibility] determination. (Def. Mem. at 15) (citing Wavercak
v. Astrue, 420 F. App’x 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2011).
In evaluating a claimant’s subjective statements, the ALJ
follows a two-step process: (1) determining whether there is an
underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment
“that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant’s
pain or other symptoms,” and (2) once such an impairment has
been shown, “evaluat[ing] the intensity, persistence, and

limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms to determine the
extent to which they limit the claimant’s functional
limitations.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. The “subjective
element of pain,” as set forth in a claimant’s statements or
testimony, is “an important factor” in determining the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of the claimant’s
symptoms and the ALJ has discretion on how to “evaluate the
credibility” of such statements “in light of medical findings
and other evidence.” Valet v. Astrue, No. 10-cv-3282 (KAM),
2012 WL 194970, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Social Security Ruling
(“S.S.R.”) 96-7p guides the ALJ’s determination of the
credibility of a claimant’s statements. The seven factors that

an ALJ must consider in making this determination are:
(1) Daily activities; (2) The location, duration,
frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; (3)
Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; (4)
The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication an individual takes or has taken to alleviate
pain or other symptoms; (5) Treatment, other than
medication, an individual receives or has received for
relief of pain or other symptoms; (6) Any measures other
than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve
pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her
back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping
on a board); and (7) Any other factors concerning an
individual's functional limitations and restrictions due to
pain or other symptoms.
S.S.R. 96-7p; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).
“[T]he ALJ must consider all of the evidence in the record
and give specific reasons for the weight accorded to the
claimant’s testimony.” Alcantara v. Astrue, 667 F. Supp. 2d
262, 277–78 (2d. Cir. 2009) (quoting Lugo v. Apfel, 20 F. Supp.
2d 662, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffers from an
underlying medically determinable physical impairment that could
reasonably be expected to produce her pain or other symptoms,
but the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her hand and
wrist impairments “are not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. at 16.) The
ALJ then proceeded to review Plaintiff’s subjective symptom
testimony (Tr. at 14-15) and summarize Dr. Rettig’s treatment

notes. (Tr. at 16-17).
Putting aside the insufficiency of the medical evidence to
which the ALJ compares Plaintiff’s subjective testimony, the
ALJ’s determination fails to articulate his reasons with
specificity and fails to identify what evidence he gives weight
to in his assessment. See Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen,

859 F.2d 255, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1988) (“a finding that the witness
is not credible must . . . be set forth with sufficient
specificity to permit intelligible plenary review of the
record[]”) (quoting Carroll v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
705 F.2d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 1983). Specifically, the ALJ fails
to explain how Plaintiff’s testimony can properly be compared to
the record when he simultaneously asserts that the record
contains “no assessments or medical source statements.” (Tr. at
17.) This contradiction is highlighted by the ALJ’s conclusion
that Plaintiff’s “allegations are not consistent with, or fully
supported by, the documentary medical evidence, treating source
notes and medical opinions (DDS),” and the ALJ’s later statement
that he did not assess the opinion of the DDS whose opinion
Plaintiff’s statements are purportedly inconsistent with. (Tr.
at 16-17.)
With respect to Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes, although the
ALJ summarizes Plaintiff’s surgeries and diagnoses, and Dr.

Rettig’s treatment notes generally (Tr. at 16-17), the ALJ fails
to provide specific reasons for how Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes
were considered in his assessment of Plaintiff’s credibility or
conflicted with Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her exertional
limits or capacity to work. As noted earlier, Dr. Rettig’s
treatment notes do not purport to address Plaintiff’s exertional
limits and capacity to work.

Ultimately, the ALJ did not specify the reason for which he
accorded seemingly no weight to Plaintiff’s subjective symptom
testimony. See Alcantara, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 278 (remanding
“for the ALJ to provide more detailed reasons for her
credibility determination, taking into consideration the factors
set forth in 20 C.F.R. 404.1529(c)(3)” because the ALJ
“summarized her credibility finding in a single statement,
indicating that [Plaintiff’s] allegations . . . are not totally
credible for the reasons set forth in the body of the decision”
without detailing “the basis for her credibility assessment”)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As in
Alcantara, ALJ Goodale concluded that Plaintiff’s subjective
testimony was not consistent with the “record as a whole” and
the “evidence generally” for “the reasons explained in [his]
decision” without the required elaboration. (Tr. at 16-17.)
Finally, the Commissioner is correct that the absence of

any reference to Plaintiff’s work history in the ALJ’s decision
does not necessarily undermine the ALJ’s credibility assessment
and is not per se dispositive such that remand on this basis
alone would be warranted. (Def. Mem. at 15.) However, in light
of the sparseness of the overall record, Plaintiff’s 38 years of
dedicated work experience should have been particularly
probative of her credibility. See Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d
496, 502 (2d Cir. 1998) (“ALJs are specifically instructed that
credibility determinations should take account of ‘prior work
record’” because a Plaintiff’s “good work history may be deemed
probative of credibility”) (internal citation omitted). On

remand, the Court encourages the ALJ to consider Plaintiff’s
work history in assessing her credibility, consistent with the
governing regulations. See Rivera v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 719,
725 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that “any evidence of a desire by
[Plaintiff] to work would merely emphasize the positive value of
his 32-year employment history. A claimant with a good work
record is entitled to substantial credibility when claiming an
inability to work because of a disability.”)
Ultimately, remand is warranted where, as here, the ALJ
fails to detail a basis for his conclusion regarding Plaintiff’s
credibility. See Valet, 2012 WL 194970, at *22 (“Where the ALJ
fails [to] sufficiently [] explain a finding that the claimant’s

testimony was not entirely credible, remand is appropriate[]”)
(quoting Tornatore v. Barnhart, No. 05-cv-6858 (GEL), 2006 WL
3714649, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2006)).
IV. The ALJ’s Discussion of Relevant Listings of Impairments
Although Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s
determination of the relevant listings of impairments, this
Court finds that the ALJ failed to either specify the relevant
listing that applies to Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments
or articulate a finding that no relevant listing applied to
Plaintiff’s impairments. At step three of the five-step
sequential analysis, the ALJ considers whether the claimant

“[has] an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of the listings
in appendix 1 of this subpart[.]” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s hand and
wrist impairments were medically severe, but his analysis
stopped short of identifying any listing of impairments. (Stip.
at 6) (“ALJ Goodale found that [Plaintiff had] severe
impairments of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, hand-wrist
neuropathy in the bilateral upper extremities, and status-post
wrist compression procedures.”) By contrast, the ALJ properly
specified a listing applicable to Plaintiff’s spinal impairment,
giving “specific consideration . . . to Section 1.04 of the
Listing of Impairments,” and explained that Plaintiff’s spinal
impairment did not meet the requirements of Listing 1.04

“because the record does not demonstrate compromise of a nerve
root . . . or the spinal cord with additional findings[.]” (Tr.
at 13.) No such analysis was articulated with respect to
Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments. The ALJ does not
specify any other listing that he gave any consideration to or
any listing that would apply to Plaintiff’s bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome, hand-wrist neuropathy in bilateral upper
extremities, or status post wrist compression procedures on both
wrists. Nor does the ALJ conclude that no listing of impairment
applies to Plaintiff’s hand and wrist impairments. To the
contrary, the ALJ provided a thorough overview of Plaintiff’s

hearing testimony and a summary of Dr. Rettig’s treatment notes
in determining Plaintiff’s RFC with respect to her hand and
wrist impairments, but the ALJ failed to specify any applicable
listing that should have preceded his RFC determination. (Tr.
at 15-17.) Absent any reasoning from the ALJ regarding the
relevant listing or lack thereof, the Court is left with no
basis on which to review the ALJ’s determination. See Ferraris
v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The crucial
factors in [the ALJ’s] determination must be set forth with
sufficient specificity to enable [the reviewing court] to decide
whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence.”)}; see also Jones v. Barnhart, No. 04-cv-2772 (FB),
2004 WL 3158536, at *7 (E.D.N.Y Feb. 3, 2004) (“When the ALJ
does not adequately explain his rationale, [the] Court cannot
provide meaningful judicial review.”). Accordingly, on remand,
the ALJ is respectfully directed to assess whether there are any
listings of impairments that relate to Plaintiff’s hand and
wrist impairments and to conduct the relevant inquiry as to any
applicable listing at step three of the ALJ’s analysis.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings is GRANTED and Defendant’s cross-motion for judgment
on the pleadings is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order. The Clerk
of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and
to close the case.
SO ORDERED
Dated: December 21, 2023
Brooklyn, New York
Yn en
ye + iw
How. Ukrvo A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
35

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310947. Public record. Not legal advice.
