# Carter v. City of New York Dept. of Correction

> District Court, E.D. New York · December 1, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310874

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** December 1, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SEKWAN CARTER,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff, 23-CV-3763 (HG) (MMH)
v.

CITY OF NEW YORK DEPT. OF
CORRECTION; N.Y.P.D JAMES
ZOZZARO; ANTHONY FARANDA, 113
PRECINCT,
Defendants.

HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge:

On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff Sekwan Carter commenced this pro se action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, asserting false arrest and false imprisonment claims against the New York City
Department of Correction, NYPD Detectives James Zozzaro and Anthony Faranda and the 113th
Precinct. See generally ECF No. 1 (Complaint). On June 7, 2023, I dismissed Plaintiff’s claims
against the New York City Department of Correction and the 113th Precinct with prejudice. See
ECF No. 4 (Decision) at 5-6. I also dismissed Plaintiff’s remaining claims for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, but granted Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint
regarding his false arrest and false imprisonment claims as Plaintiff had failed to provide sufficient
facts supporting his claims and had not alleged a basis for equitable tolling in his complaint. Id. at
2-5. I warned that “[f]ailure to allege an adequate basis for equitable tolling will result in dismissal
of Plaintiff’s amended complaint with prejudice.” Id. at 5. On November 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed his
Amended Complaint, asserting false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims.
See ECF No. 8 (Amended Complaint). Plaintiff further alleged that his claims should be equitably
tolled because he relied on the law firm he had previously hired to “properly handle his case.” Id. at
6. For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice
because his claims are time barred. Plaintiff’s ignorance of the law and reliance on his lawyers do
not warrant equitable tolling.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that he was falsely arrested, imprisoned, and

maliciously prosecuted by Detectives James Zozzaro and Anthony Faranda (“Defendants”) on
March 14, 2014, for a murder that he did not commit. Id. at 2, 7-10. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges
he was coerced by the Defendants to confess to murder. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff claims that, as a result
of his false confession, he was wrongly imprisoned for two years. Id. at 4. Plaintiff was acquitted
on January 27, 2016. Id. at 4. Plaintiff then hired a law firm to file a case “against New York City
and all actors who caused him to be falsely arrested, detained against his will, and maliciously
prosecuted.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff’s lawyers filed suit in state court and did not seek relief in federal
court. Id. at 6. The state court case was dismissed in April 2023. Id. at 6. Plaintiff now seeks
monetary damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution claims. Id. at 7-9. Plaintiff asserts that his claims should be equitably tolled because he

“relied on the law firm to properly handle his case” and he was “unaware of the impact this would
have until the matter was dismissed.” Id. at 6.
LEGAL STANDARD
A district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it finds the action “(i) is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Although courts are “obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally,” see Harris v. Mills, 572
F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), the complaint must still plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).1
“A complaint that is time-barred fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and a
district court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint as time-barred where the facts supporting the

statute of limitations defense are set forth in the papers plaintiff himself submitted.” Khalil v. Pratt
Inst., 818 F. App’x 115, 116 (2d Cir. 2020). If a court is to dismiss a complaint sua sponte on a
statute of limitations basis, it must provide Plaintiff with “notice and the opportunity to be heard.”
Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007). Indeed, “[w]hile statute of limitations defenses
are ordinarily raised by the defendant . . . courts can and do dismiss cases on their own initiative
under Section 1915(e)(2) when an IFP plaintiff’s complaint reveals that [his] claim is clearly
untimely.” Kimberly W. v. Saul, No. 21-cv-00042, 2021 WL 880110, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 9,
2021); see also Merola v. Lowe, No. 20-cv-00491, 2020 WL 4350205, at *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. July 29,
2020) (dismissing Section 1983 claims with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) where
Plaintiff provided no basis to toll the statute of limitations).

DISCUSSION
As detailed in the Court’s June 7, 2023, Order, Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest, false
imprisonment and malicious prosecution are time-barred. ECF No. 4 at 4-5. Federal courts apply
the state law statute of limitations for personal injury actions for Section 1983 claims, and in New
York that statute of limitations is three years. Rivera v. City of New York, No. 20-cv-09968, 2022
WL 1523165, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2022). “Although courts look to state law for the length of
the limitations period, the time at which a § 1983 claim accrues is a question of federal law

1 Unless noted, case law quotations in this Order accept all alterations and omit all internal
quotation marks, citations, and footnotes.
conforming in general to common-law tort principles.” McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149, 2155
(2019). Consequently, Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims began to run at the
time Plaintiff was detained pursuant to legal process. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397
(2007); Jones v. City of New York, 846 F. App’x 22, 23 (2d Cir. 2021); Livingston v. Mejia, No. 20-

cv-2009, 2022 WL 976808, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2022) (noting that plaintiff’s false arrest and
false imprisonment claims under Section 1983 are time-barred because he initiated this action over
three years after his arraignment). Additionally, Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claims began to
run on the date he was acquitted. McDonough, 139 S. Ct. at 2156 (“the common-law tort of
malicious prosecution . . . accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in
the plaintiff's favor”).
Plaintiff was arrested on March 14, 2014, and arraigned on the charges shortly thereafter.
ECF No. 8 at 2, 4. He was then detained until he was acquitted on January 27, 2016. Id. at 4.
Under this set of facts, Plaintiff’s claims are untimely as they were brought beyond the three-year
statute of limitations. See, e.g., Izeh v. City of New York, No. 23-cv-0194, 2023 WL 2088180, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2023) (dismissing Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims as untimely where Plaintiff
filed claims over two years after the statute of limitations expired).
Plaintiff’s contention that he did not file his claims sooner because he “relied on the law
firm to properly handle his case” and he was “unaware of the impact this would have until the
matter was dismissed,” is insufficient to equitably toll the statute of limitations. ECF No. 8 at 6.
“Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1)
that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood
in his way.” Smalls v. Collins, 10 F.4th 117, 145 (2d Cir. 2021) (affirming denial of equitable
tolling for Section 1983 claims). Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate that extraordinary
circumstances “caused him to miss the original filing deadline,” and, even if that casual relationship
is established, plaintiff must also show he exerted “reasonable diligence in pursuing his claim
throughout the period he seeks to have tolled.” Id. While it may be true that Plaintiff here
conducted reasonable diligence in pursuing his claims when he hired a law firm that filed suit in

state court, see ECF No. 8 at 6, extraordinary circumstances did not cause Plaintiff to miss his
deadline in federal court. In particular, Plaintiff’s reliance on his lawyers to “properly handle his
case” does not amount to an extraordinary circumstance. See, e.g., Billeris v. Inc. Vill. of Bayville,
New York, No. 20-cv-03298, 2023 WL 6214108, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2023) (holding
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims were not equitably tolled where Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel did
not conduct proper due diligence); Senecal v. B.G. Lenders Serv. LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 199, 210
(N.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The extreme circumstances in which represented plaintiffs are entitled to
equitable tolling do not extend to situations in which a plaintiff's lawyer simply fails to exercise due
diligence.”). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s assertion that he was “unaware of the impact this would have
until the matter was dismissed,” does not entitle Plaintiff to equitable tolling because “ignorance of

the law is not sufficient to justify equitable tolling.” Rosenwasser v. Fordham Univ., 772 F. App’x
1, 3 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal of Section 1983 claims as untimely); see also Birch v.
Danzi, No. 18-cv-00839, 2018 WL 3613016, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2018) (holding that “delay in
timely filing due to legal research” did not merit equitable tolling). Consequently, Plaintiff has
failed to establish an adequate basis for the equitable tolling of his claims.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
No summons shall issue, and the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate this action. The Clerk of
Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to pro se Plaintiff.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of
any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.

/s/ Hector Gonzalez
HECTOR GONZALEZ
United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
December 1, 2023

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310874. Public record. Not legal advice.