# Leith v. The County of Nassau

> District Court, E.D. New York · October 25, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310719

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** October 25, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CLERK

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 3:27 pm, Oct 25, 2023

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U.S. DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TIVIA LEITH, et al.,
LONG ISLAND OFFICE

Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM &
ORDER
CV 22-6933 (GRB)(AYS)
-against-

THE COUNTY OF NASSAU, et al.,

Defendants.
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GARY R. BROWN, United States District Judge:
In this action alleging false arrest and wrongful detention, the County of Nassau and
individual defendant police officers K. Sovaras and Kathleen Reid move to dismiss the sixth cause
of action1 in the Second Amended Complaint, which purports to allege a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for “racial profiling and racial discrimination.” Docket Entry (“DE”) 34. The
individual defendants contend that the complaint alleges insufficient factual material to plausibly
state a claim of discrimination, while the County, in turn, argues that because the claim fails to
adequately state a claim against the individual officers, the Monell claim against the County also
fails. Id. Because plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege facts supporting the sixth cause of
action, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
Relevant Allegations
Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a Complaint in November 2022, an Amended
Complaint shortly thereafter and, following a pre-motion conference concerning a proposed
motion to dismiss, a Second Amended Complaint in April 2023. DE 1; DE 7; DE 21. In response

1 The motion is extremely limited in scope. The parties have agreed to the voluntary dismissal of the seventh and
eighth causes of action, which invoke the New York State Human Rights Law. DE 35-11 at 19. And the balance of
plaintiffs’ claims, concerning false arrest, false imprisonment and related matters, will proceed to discovery.
to defendants’ argument that the Second Amended Complaint fails to adequately allege that racial
discrimination was a motivating factor on the part of the defendant police officer in the traffic stop
and arrest (on an expired bench warrant) underlying this matter, plaintiffs cite a set of allegations
as “examples” of the factual underpinnings of their claim. See DE 35-11 at 14 (citing DE 21 ¶¶

15-22, 71, 73-127, 142, 147,148, 151, 193).
In sum, plaintiff Leith alleges that, while driving home at about 5 p.m. on December 7,
2021, she saw defendant Sovaras2 in his police car driving next to her. DE 21 ¶¶ 13-15. Defendant
Sovaras then pulled behind plaintiff Leith’s car, and after pacing her for a few minutes, pulled her
over. Id. ¶ 17. When Sovaras approached plaintiff Leith’s car window, Sovaras did not provide
her with a reason for the stop and instead requested her license and registration. Id. ¶¶ 18-21. A
few minutes later, Sovaras returned to plaintiff Leith’s car and informed her that she “had an
outstanding New York State warrant.” Id. ¶ 22. Ultimately, plaintiff Leith was arrested and taken
into custody. Id. ¶ 28. After eleven hours, she was released. Id. ¶ 51. Plaintiffs then conclusively
claim that:

Defendant County through Defendant K. Sovaras and Defendant Reid,
intentionally targeted and racially profiled Ms. Leith on the basis of her being
African American. Inexplicably, Defendants Sovaras did such under the guise of
having a phantom state arrest warrant . . . .

DE 21 ¶ 71.
Discussion
Standard of Review for 12(b)(6) Motions
Motions to dismiss are decided under the well-established standard of review for such
matters, as discussed in Burris v. Nassau County District Attorney, No. CV14-5540 (JFB)(GRB),

2 Notably, plaintiffs appear to concede that they have no basis to argue defendant Reid’s motivations were racially
based. Id. at 17.
2017 WL 9485714, at *3-4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2017), adopted by 2017 WL 1187709 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2017), and incorporated by reference herein. The gravamen of that standard, of course,
is whether, assuming the allegations in the complaint to be true solely for the purposes of the
motion, the complaint sets forth sufficient factual allegations to render the claims plausible.5 See

id. Notably, here, however, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Adequacy of the Allegations
In a recent en banc decision, the Second Circuit noted that civil rights statutes reach “‘only
purposeful discrimination.’ Therefore, to state a claim under either Section 1981 or 1982 a plaintiff
‘must allege facts supporting [a defendant's] intent to discriminate against him on the basis of his
race.’” Francis v. Kings Park Manor, Inc., 992 F.3d 67, 80 (2d Cir. 2021) (citations omitted).
Here, as to the individual officers, plaintiffs’ effort fails.

In arguing that they have “adequately pled an intention to discriminate,” plaintiffs rely
heavily on the decision in Dixon v. City of Syracuse, 493 F. Supp. 3d 30 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). There,
in a far more extreme factual situation (involving, inter alia, allegations of drawn weapons, a car
chase and an extended vehicular and physical assault of a plaintiff by a special police unit with a
developed reputation for targeting minority individuals), the district court found that plaintiffs had
sufficiently alleged specific acts of excessive force and racial profiling that fit within a larger
pattern of similar conduct. See generally id. Here, by contrast, plaintiffs’ attempt to buttress
conclusory allegations against the individual defendants with a purported statistical pattern of

5 In this regard, the Court has not, and will not, consider the extraneous factual material submitted by defendants on
this motion relating to various compliance programs implemented by the NCPD.
vehicular stops by Nassau County police officers reflecting “differential treatment of persons of
color.” See DE 35-11 at 16.
While the Second Amended Complaint’s allegations of statistical racial disparities in traffic
stops in Nassau County are concerning, these assertions do not establish a plausible factual basis

for the allegation of racial bias as against the individual officers in these circumstances. According
to the Complaint, plaintiff Leith was arrested based upon a bench warrant issued in late 2021,
which turned out to be vacated or resolved. DE 21 ¶¶ 49-51. In other words, unlike Dixon, no
pattern is alleged concerning the occurrences here that would further support a claim of racial
animus by the individual defendants. There is no allegation, for example, that Nassau County
police exhibited a pattern of utilizing expired or invalid court process to effect wrongful arrests.
Moreover, there are no facts alleged specific to these circumstances, such as the use of racial slurs,
that would form a basis for a plausible claim of animus by the individual officers. See in contrast
Ali v. Connick, 136 F. Supp. 3d 270, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“officers' use of racial epithets may be
regarded as direct evidence of racial animus”). As plaintiffs have not provided any plausible

factual allegations as to the motivations of the individual defendants, the motion to dismiss
pertaining to the individual defendants must be granted.
This leaves only the Monell claim against Nassau County. While plaintiffs have set forth
statistical allegations that could, under different circumstances, be considered in support of such a
claim against the County, the failure to allege facts supporting individual liability defeats the
municipal claim. “Statistics alone do not suffice to establish an individual disparate treatment
claim for a very good reason: the particular plaintiff must establish he was the victim of racial
discrimination.” Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). As the
Second Circuit explained:
[P]roof of discriminatory intent is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 538 U.S. at 194, 123 S.Ct. 1389.
Because neither a state nor a state official in his official capacity is a “person”
within the meaning of § 1983, see Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989), the requisite discriminatory intent must
be held by the state official in his individual capacity. Thus, liability for an Equal
Protection Clause violation under § 1983 requires personal involvement by a
defendant, who must act with discriminatory purpose. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
Id. at 204. Absent actionable allegations of discriminatory intent by the individual defendants, the
claim against the County must also fail.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action must be
GRANTED in its entirety.
Plaintiffs have, at least implicitly, requested the right to replead. While such applications
are granted liberally, they are routinely denied where repleading would be futile. In this case, the
record reflects the filing of an initial complaint, two amended complaints and the previewing of
supplemental allegations by plaintiff in response to the motion, none of which suffice to adequately
plead the subject cause of action. Therefore, leave to replead is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York
October 25, 2023

/s/ Gary R. Brown
GARY R. BROWN
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310719. Public record. Not legal advice.