# Daniels v. United States of America

> District Court, E.D. New York · July 10, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310065

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** July 10, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310065

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that rights of pretrial detainees are considered under the Fourteenth Amendment while rights of sentenced prisoners are considered under the Eighth Amendment
- noting that even after Twombly, the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
- finding that rights of pretrial detainees are considered under the Fourteenth Amendment while rights of sentenced prisoners are considered under the Eighth Amendment

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------X

BRANDON DANIELS,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff, 22-cv-01011(KAM)(CLP)

-against-

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; JONATHAN
SIEGEL, AUSA; MICHAEL W. GIBALDI, AUSA;
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; WARDEN OF
INSTITUTION MDC,
Defendants.

--------------------------------------X

KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Pro se plaintiff Brandon Daniels, currently incarcerated
at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”), filed this complaint
on February 22, 2022 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
violations of his constitutional rights based on his arrest and
subsequent confinement at the MDC. Because Plaintiff alleges that
federal defendants violated his constitutional rights, the Court
liberally construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (“Bivens”), rather than 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which applies only to state, not federal, actors.
Although Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis is granted, for the reasons stated below, the complaint
is dismissed as to the United States of America, Assistant United
States Attorney (“AUSA”) Jonathan Siegel, AUSA Michael W. Gibaldi,
the Warden of Institution MDC (“Warden”), and the Federal Bureau

of Prisons (“BOP”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and (2).
Plaintiff is, however, granted thirty (30) days from the date of
this Memorandum and Order to submit an amended complaint to the
extent permitted herein, as detailed below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts several claims resulting from his
confinement at MDC. First, he alleges that in December 2020, he
was attacked by unnamed and undescribed “staff officers” at MDC,
though Plaintiff does not provide any information regarding the
incident. (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 1.) Next, Plaintiff alleges
that, while incarcerated, he developed a hernia and lost a
“substantial amount of weight.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiff asserts
that the conditions of confinement at MDC are poor, that the
facility is extremely hot, there is a lack of air circulation, the
food is poor, and safety and security are lacking. (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff further asserts that he is at increased risk of

contracting the coronavirus while incarcerated because he has a
preexisting medical condition. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts
a claim for false arrest, false imprisonment and alleges misconduct
on the part of the prosecutors in his pending criminal action.
(Id. at 3.) Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Standard of Review
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all well-
pleaded allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be
true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678.
It is axiomatic that pro se complaints are held to less
stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and that
a court is required to read a pro se plaintiff’s complaint

liberally and interpret it to raise the strongest arguments it
suggests. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Hughes
v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant
#1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-93 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Harris v. Mills,
572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that even after Twombly,
the court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint
liberally”). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a
district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it
is satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.”
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims
It is well-established that the purpose of a Bivens claim
is to hold individual federal defendants accountable for their
personal conduct that violates a plaintiff's constitutional
rights. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“The purpose of the Bivens remedy ‘is to deter individual federal
officers from committing constitutional violations.’”) (quoting
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70 (2001)); accord
F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994).
To state a claim for relief under Bivens, a plaintiff

must allege facts that plausibly show: (1) the challenged action
was attributable to an officer acting under color of federal law,
and (2) such conduct deprived him of a right, privilege, or
immunity secured by the Constitution. See Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470
F.3d 491, 496 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389).
Like actions brought against state officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a plaintiff’s Bivens claims must be brought against the
individuals personally responsible for the alleged deprivation of
his constitutional rights, not against the federal government or
the agencies where they are employed. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 486;
see also Irizarry v. Manhattan Correctional Ctr., No. 21-cv-5170

(LTS), 2021 WL 3668045, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2021).
“Because the doctrine of respondeat superior does not
apply in Bivens actions, a plaintiff must allege that the
individual defendant was personally involved in the constitutional
violation.” Thomas, 470 F.3d at 496 (citation omitted); Martin
v. Mihalik, No. 19-cv-7979 (PMH), 2021 WL 1738458, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
May 3, 2021). A showing of personal involvement of a supervisory
defendant includes, but is not limited to, evidence that the
supervisory defendant: (1) directly participated in the
constitutional violation; (2) failed to remedy the violation after

learning of it through a report or appeal; (3) created a custom or
policy fostering the violation or allowed the custom or policy to
continue after learning of it; (4) was grossly negligent in
supervising subordinates who caused the violation; or (5) failed
to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were
occurring. Thomas, 470 F.3d at 496-96 (quotations omitted). The
fact that a defendant is a supervisor is not enough to impute
personal involvement onto that actor; rather, “supervisory
liability requires that the ‘defendant, through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.’” Williams v.
Novoa, No. 19-cv-11545 (PMH), 2021 WL 431445, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
5, 2021) (quoting Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir.

2020) (citation omitted)).
A. Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts
from hearing all suits against the federal government, including
suits against federal agencies, unless sovereign immunity has been
waived. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980);
see also Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502,
510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency .
. . is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits
are . . . barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless
such immunity is waived.”); see also Reynolds v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 21-cv-4763 (LTS), 2021 WL 2338249, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

June 7, 2021). Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's Bivens
claims against the BOP under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
and discusses possible claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
infra.
B. Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff names AUSAs Jonathan Siegel and Michael W.
Gibaldi — who prosecuted Plaintiff’s underlying criminal action —
as defendants in this suit. See USA v. Stroia et al., No. 19-cr-
00221 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y., filed May 10, 2019). “The doctrine of
absolute immunity bars claims against government attorneys with

regard to their actions in carrying out their prosecutorial
functions.” Shapiro v. Goldman, No. 14 CIV. 10119 (NRB), 2016 WL
4371741, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2016) (citing Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272–73 (1993), aff'd, 696 F. App'x 532
(2d Cir. 2017) (summary order)). The doctrine applies to Bivens
claims as well as Section 1983 claims. See Zahrey v. Coffey, 221
F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 2000). Provided that “a prosecutor acts
with colorable authority, absolute immunity shields his
performance of advocative functions regardless of motivation.”
Bernard v. Cty. of Suffolk, 356 F.3d 495, 498 (2d Cir. 2004).
To determine whether a prosecutor's activity is subject
to absolute (or qualified) immunity requires “[a]n examination of

the functional nature of the prosecutorial behavior, rather than
the status of the person performing the act.” Taylor v. Kavanagh,
640 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 431 (1976)). Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts
to support his allegation of “prosecutorial misconduct,” let alone
any facts suggesting that absolute immunity would not apply to
Defendants for performing their duties in prosecuting Plaintiff.
Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Jonathan
Siegel and Michael W. Gibaldi as barred by absolute immunity.
C. False Arrest, False Imprisonment Claims
Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest, “whether
brought under § 1983, pursuant to Bivens, or under state law, are

analyzed pursuant to the same standards as the applicable state
law's false arrest tort.” Nzegwu v. Friedman, 605 F. App’x 27,
29 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted) (summary order). “Under New
York law, false arrest is considered to be a species of false
imprisonment, and the two claims have identical elements.” Mejia
v. City of N.Y., 119 F. Supp. 2d 232, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). A
plaintiff alleging false arrest must therefore establish that “(1)
the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the plaintiff was
conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to
the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise
privileged.” Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19
(2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (quoting Broughton v. State of New
York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456 (1975)).

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert a Bivens
claim for false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, he fails to allege any facts in support of his
claim and fails to name any defendants who are alleged to have
been personally involved in Plaintiff's arrest. See Barrow v.
Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466, 470 (2d Cir. 1995),
modified, 74 F.3d 1366 (2d Cir. 1996). In the absence of such
allegations, Plaintiff's Bivens false arrest claims are dismissed.
D. Denial of Medical Care and Conditions of Confinement at
MDC
Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to
assert a Bivens claim based on violations of his Fifth or Eighth
Amendment rights due to his conditions of confinement and the
allegedly inadequate medical care at MDC. Prison officials have
a duty under either (1) the Eighth Amendment with respect to
convicted prisoners or (2) the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments with respect to pretrial detainees in
federal custody and state custody, respectively, to “ensure that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care, and ‘[to] take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety
of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994)
(citations omitted); see Darnell v. Piniero, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d
Cir. 2017) (finding that rights of pretrial detainees are
considered under the Fourteenth Amendment while rights of
sentenced prisoners are considered under the Eighth Amendment).
Here, Plaintiff simply names the MDC Warden in the
caption but fails to make any factual allegations against the
Warden. Plaintiff does not plead any facts to demonstrate that

the Warden was personally involved with or had any knowledge of
any alleged constitutional deprivation. See Thomas v. Dubois, No.
19-cv-7533 (KMK), 2020 WL 2092426, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2020)
(dismissing complaint of a pro se incarcerated plaintiff because

the plaintiff did “not even mention [the defendant] in the body of
the Complaint” (collecting cases)); see also Moore v. Westchester
Cnty., No. 18-cv-7782 (KMK), 2019 WL 3889859, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
19, 2019) (explaining that “personal involvement is not
established where the defendant's name appears only in the caption
of the complaint” (citation omitted)); Mercedes v. Westchester
Cnty., No. 18-cv-4087 (KMK), 2019 WL 1429566, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
29, 2019) (dismissing defendants who were not alleged to have
participated in, inter alia, any alleged constitutional violations
regarding medical care (collecting cases)); Lovick v. Schriro, No.
12-cv-7419 (ALC), 2014 WL 3778184, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014)
(dismissing the plaintiff's § 1983 claims against certain

defendants whose names appeared only in the caption of the
complaint and on the list of all defendants).
II. Federal Tort Claims Act
In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court has
considered whether his claims could be brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. The FTCA
“constitutes a limited waiver of sovereign immunity by the United
States and allows for a tort suit against the United States under
specified circumstances.” Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d 78,
85 (2d Cir. 2012). The only proper defendant for an FTCA claim
is the United States of America. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1)

(“[where] the defendant employee was acting within the scope of
his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which
the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon
such claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an
action against the United States . . . and the United States shall
be substituted as the party defendant”); see also Irizarry, 2021
WL 3668045, at *2.
An FTCA claimant must exhaust his administrative
remedies before filing suit in federal court by: (1) filing an
administrative claim for money damages with the appropriate
federal government entity and (2) receiving a final written
determination from that agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also
Phillips v. Generations Family Health Ctr., 723 F.3d 144, 147 (2d

Cir. 2013). FTCA claims must be “presented in writing to the
appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim
accrues,” and an FTCA action must be commenced within six months
of when the agency issues its final denial of administrative
remedy. Roberson v. Greater Hudson Valley Family Health Ctr.,
Inc., No. 17-cv-7325 (NSR), 2018 WL 2976024, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June
12, 2018); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
Nothing in the Complaint suggests that Plaintiff has
either filed an administrative tort claim for money damages with
the BOP or received a final written determination from the BOP.

Therefore, to the extent that a liberal reading of the Complaint
suggests a tort claim, the Court dismisses any potential FTCA claim
without prejudice to Plaintiff filing an amended complaint
demonstrating that he has appropriately timely and exhausted his
administrative remedies, or to file a new timely action asserting
an FTCA claim against the United States after he has timely
exhausted his administrative remedies.
CONCLUSION
In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants
Plaintiff 30 days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to
file an amended complaint alleging additional facts in support of
his claims. See Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597-98 (2d Cir.
2000). Should Plaintiff elect to file an amended complaint, he

is informed that the amended complaint must comply with Rule 8(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and must plead “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint
alleging Bivens claims, he must clearly name as defendant(s) those
individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his
federal rights in the caption of the complaint and in the statement
of claims. See, e.g., Flemming v. Velardi, No. 02 CIV.4113 (AKH),
2003 WL 21756108, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2003). If Plaintiff

does not know the name of an individual defendant, he may refer to
that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption
and the body of the amended complaint, and must describe the
physical characteristics of the individuals. See Boyd v.
LaGuardia Airport, No. 21-cv-5000 (KAM), 2022 WL 4357466, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2022).
Further, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain
statement of the relevant facts, in accordance with FRCP Rule 8(a),
that support each claim against each defendant. That information
must include: a) the names and titles of all relevant people; b)
a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant
did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event,

and the general location where each event occurred; c) a
description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and d) the relief
Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or
declaratory relief. Any claims pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act must allege facts showing timely compliance with
administrative prerequisites.
Finally, Plaintiff is informed that an amended complaint
does not simply add to the first complaint but instead completely
replaces the original complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff must
include in the amended complaint all the necessary and relevant
information contained in the original complaint, plus the
additional facts that are lacking, as discussed in this Order.
The amended complaint shall be captioned “Amended Complaint” and
bear the same docket number as the original complaint and this
Order, No. 22-cv-01011-KAM-CLP. If Plaintiff fails to file an
amended complaint within the time allowed (30 days from the date
of this Order) or to show good cause why he cannot comply, judgment
shall enter dismissing the action with prejudice, and the case
will be closed.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith,
and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45
(1962). The Court respectfully requests the Clerk of Court to
service Plaintiff with a copy of this Order and the docket, and
to note service by end of day, Tuesday, July 11, 2023.
SO ORDERED. bop
“Vy ee
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO”
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
Dated: July 10, 2023
Brooklyn, New York

14

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10310065. Public record. Not legal advice.