# Finkel v. J&H Electrical Contracting, Inc.

> District Court, E.D. New York · June 12, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10309858

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 12, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10309858

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding $200 per hour reasonable for associate attorney in ERISA matter

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT E YA OS RT KERN DISTRICT OF NEW
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK BROOKLYN OFFICE
---------------------------------------------------------------
GERALD R. FINKEL, as chairman of the Joint
Industry Board of the Electrical Industry,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Petitioner, 22-CV-4293 (MKB)
v.
J&H ELECTRICAL CONTRACTING, INC.,
Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------
MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:
Petitioner Gerald R. Finkel, chairman of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical
Industry, filed the above-captioned petition on July 21, 2022, to confirm an arbitration award
against Respondent J&H Electrical Contracting, Inc. (Pet. to Confirm Arb. Award (“Pet.”),
Docket Entry No. 1; Pet’r’s Mem. in Supp. of Pet. (“Pet’r’s Mem.”), Docket Entry No. 4.)
Petitioner alleges that Respondent failed to remit required contributions to certain employee
benefit plans pursuant to collective bargaining agreements, section 502(a)(3) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3), and
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185.
(Pet. ¶ 1.) On August 17, 2022, the Court granted Petitioner’s request to deem the petition
unopposed. (Order dated Aug. 17, 2022; Pet’r’s Letter dated Aug. 16, 2022, Docket Entry No.
11.)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Petitioner’s motion to confirm the
arbitration award in the amount of $117,381.14, plus interest accrued until entry of judgment,
and awards Petitioner $625 in attorneys’ fees and $477.57 in costs for a total damages award of
$118,483.71 plus accrued interest.
I. Background
Petitioner is the chairman of the Joint Industry Board (the “JIB”) located in Flushing,

New York. (Pet. ¶ 4.) The JIB is “the administrator of various employee benefit multi-employer
plans [including ERISA Plans,1] established and maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement between Local Union No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers”
(the “Union”), the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and
certain other employers and employer associations. (Id.) “Per the . . . collective bargaining
agreement, the JIB receives directly from each signatory employer a weekly remittance
consisting of contributions to each of the ERISA Plans, except the DSP,[2] as well as a Union

1 The JIB “is the administrator and fiduciary within the meaning of . . . 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002(16)(A)(i) and 1002(21)(A)” of certain employee benefit plans, including:
the Pension, Hospitalization and Benefit Plan of the Electrical
Industry, the Dental Benefit Fund of the Electrical Industry, the
Educational and Cultural Trust Fund of the Electrical Industry, the
Annuity Plan of the Electrical Industry, . . . the Health
Reimbursement Account Plan of the Electrical Industry, the
Deferred Salary Plan of the Electrical Industry (the “DSP”), . . . the
Joint Apprenticeship and Training Program . . . , and the National
Electrical Benefit Plan (“NEBF”) (collectively the “ERISA Plans”).
(Pet. ¶ 5.) “Each of the ERISA Plans is an employee benefit multiemployer plan within the
meaning of” 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(3) and 1002(37) and “is also jointly administered by a board of
trustees that is comprised of labor and management representatives who share equal
representation in the administration of the [p]lans in accordance with . . . 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).”
(Id. ¶ 7.)

2 “The DSP is . . . a tax-qualified profit-sharing plan with a cash or deferred arrangement
within the meaning of 401(k) of the Internal Revenue Code.” (Id. ¶ 8.)
assessment collected by the signatory employer from each Union member employed (the “Union
Assessment”).3 (Id. ¶ 6.)
On May 15, 2020, the Union notified Petitioner by letter that Respondent had agreed to
the terms of the New York City Housing Authority’s Project Labor Agreement (the “NYCHA

PLA”). (Id. ¶¶ 14, 17; see also Union’s May 2020 Letter, annexed to Pet. as Ex. A, Docket
Entry No. 1-1; NYCHA PLA 3–4, Schedule A, annexed to Pet. as Ex. B, Docket Entry No. 1-2.)
Pursuant to the NYCHA PLA, Respondent agreed to be bound to the collective bargaining
agreement among (1) the Union, (2) the New York Electrical Contractors’ Association, Inc. and
(3) the Association of Electrical Contractors, Inc., covering the periods from April 10, 2019
through April 13, 2022 and April 13, 2022 through April 9, 2025 (the “CBAs”). (Pet. ¶¶ 15–16;
Agreement & Working Rules 2019–2022, annexed to Pet. as Ex. C, Docket Entry No. 1-3; Mem.
of Agreement, annexed to Pet. as Ex. D, Docket Entry No. 1-4.)
“The CBAs require Respondent . . . to make [r]equired [c]ontributions to the ERISA
[p]lans, the [n]on-ERISA [p]lans, and to the Union for all work within the trade and geographical

jurisdiction of the Union and to submit weekly payroll reports that provide the name, gross
wages, and hours worked for each worker employed by the company on whose behalf [r]equired
[c]ontributions are made.” (Pet. ¶ 19.) The CBAs further provide that (1) “the parties . . . agree
to . . . be bound by the provisions of the [plan and its supporting documents] . . . including . . .
the Policy for the Collection of Delinquent Contributions” and that (2) “an employer ‘shall be
liable for the remedies under [s]ection 502(g)(2) of ERISA, including liquidated damages . . . in

3 “The JIB acts as a . . . collection agent with respect to the Union Assessment and NEBF
contribution.” (Id. ¶ 6.) “[T]he JIB may also collect employee loan payments due to the Union
and certain [p]lans, and contributions to fund the operations of the JIB (collectively, the ‘Non-
ERISA Plans’).” (Id. ¶ 9.)
the event of entry of judgment against the [e]mployer in an action to collect delinquent
contributions.’” (Id. ¶¶ 20–21.)
The JIB established (1) a “Policy for the Collection of Delinquent Contributions” (the
“Collection Policy”), (Id. ¶ 22), and (2) “Arbitration Procedures and Rules Governing Employer

Delinquency Disputes and Audits” (the “Arbitration Procedures”), (Id. ¶ 23). Pursuant to the
Collection Policy, “if an employer fails to remit contributions and has not submitted payroll
reports for such unpaid contributions, the JIB may ‘use a prior week’s payroll report submitted
by the employer to calculate the amount of [c]ontributions due from the employer.’” (Id. ¶ 24;
Collection Policy art. II(F)(1), annexed to Pet. as Ex. F, Docket Entry No. 1-6.) The Collection
Policy also provides that an employer shall be liable for liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees
and costs if legal action is commenced. (Pet. ¶ 26; Collection Policy art. II(E)(2)).
“The Arbitration Procedures provide that the arbitrator shall have the jurisdiction to
determine any disputes between the ‘JIB against an [e]mployer, related to the [e]mployer’s
obligation to contribute to the [f]unds, including but not limited to [a]udits, [d]elinquencies,

interest, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs,’” and “that if the arbitrator finds in
whole or in part for the JIB, the employer shall be liable for the arbitrator’s fees and attorneys’
fees and costs.” (Pet. ¶¶ 27, 28; Arb. Procs. §§ 1(K), II(A), and X, annexed to Pet. as Ex. G,
Docket Entry No. 1-7.)
A dispute arose between the parties regarding Respondent’s reporting and remittance
obligations for the periods from June 17, 2020 through July 8, 2020; July 22, 2020 through
October 28, 2020; and November 17, 2021 through April 27, 2022. (Pet. ¶ 29.) Petitioner
therefore initiated arbitration before arbitrator Stephen F. O’Beirne, Esq. (Id. ¶ 30.)
On June 6, 2022, the arbitrator held an arbitration hearing.4 (Id. ¶ 32.) JIB’s counsel
appeared on behalf of JIB and Respondent’s principal appeared on behalf of Respondent. (Op.
& Award 1, 3, annexed to Pet. as Ex. K, Docket Entry No. 1-11.) On September 17, 2018, the
arbitrator issued an opinion finding that Respondent had violated the terms of the CBA and

ordered it to pay a total of “$117,381.14 consisting of: (1) JIB Contributions of $76,227.70; (2)
interest of $491.91; (3) estimated DSP contributions of $20,983.85; (4) additional interest in the
amount of $1,419.94; (5) liquidated damages of $15,245.54; and (6) legal, administrative, and
arbitration fees of $2,950.” (Pet. ¶ 35; see also Op. & Award 15–16.) The arbitrator also found
that Respondent would be “responsible for any costs, including reasonable attorneys’ fees,
incurred by the JIB in enforcing [the arbitration award].” (Pet. ¶ 36; Op. & Award 6.)
Petitioner timely petitioned the Court to (1) confirm the arbitration award and award
Petitioner $117,381.14 plus interest from the date of the arbitrator’s award through the date of
judgment, and (2) award judgment in favor of Petitioner of $1,202.57 in attorneys’ fees and costs
arising out of this petition. (Pet. ¶ 48.) Petitioner represented that Respondent has made no

payments on the arbitration award, the arbitration award has not been vacated or modified and no
such application is pending. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 39.)

4 “At the [arbitration] hearing, Petitioner presented evidence that Respondent owed: (1)
JIB Contributions for payroll weeks ending November 17, 2021 through May 22, 2022 of
$76,227.70; and (2) estimated DSP Contributions for payroll weeks 25 through 28 and 30
through 44 of 2020 in the amount of $20,983.85.” (Id. ¶ 33.) Respondent did not contest JIB’s
calculations. (Op. & Award 4, annexed to Pet. as Ex. K, Docket Entry No. 1-11.)
II. Discussion
a. Standard of review
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that there is “a ‘two-step
process’ for the entry of judgment against a party who fails to defend: first, the entry of a default,

and second, the entry of a default judgment.” City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC,
645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005)).
However, Rule 55 does not provide the appropriate mechanism for considering a petition to
confirm an arbitration award, particularly where the non-appearing party appeared in the
underlying arbitration proceeding. See D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 107–08,
109 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Rule 55 does not operate well in the context of a motion to confirm or
vacate an arbitration award.”); Drywall Tapers & Pointers of Greater N.Y. Local Union 1974 v.
Viscal Contracting Servs. Corp., No. 22-CV-7580, 2022 WL 17805387, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
19, 2022) (“The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explained that a default judgment is
generally inappropriate in a proceeding to confirm or vacate an arbitration award.”).

When a motion to confirm an arbitration award is accompanied by a record, “the petition
and accompanying record should [be] treated as akin to a motion for summary judgment based
on the movant’s submissions.” D.H. Blair & Co., 462 F.3d at 109. Where a motion for
summary judgment is unopposed, “the district court may not grant the motion without first
examining the moving party’s submission to determine if it has met its burden of demonstrating
that no material issue of fact remains for trial.” Amaker v. Foley, 274 F.3d 677, 681 (2d Cir.
2001). “Before summary judgment may be entered, the district court must ensure that each
statement of material fact is supported by record evidence sufficient to satisfy the movant’s
burden of production even if the statement is unopposed.” Jackson v. Fed. Exp., 766 F.3d 189,
194 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Vt. Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir.
2004)). “In doing so, the court may rely on other evidence in the record even if uncited.” Id.
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3)).
Although a summary judgment standard is applied to arbitration confirmation

proceedings, “[a] federal court’s review of labor arbitration awards is narrowly circumscribed
and highly deferential — indeed, among the most deferential in the law.” A&A Maint. Enter.,
Inc. v. Ramnarain, 982 F.3d 864, 868 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (quoting N.Y.C. & Vicinity
Dist. Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Ass’n of Wall-Ceiling
& Carpentry Indus., 826 F.3d 611, 618 (2d Cir. 2016)). “[C]onfirmation of an arbitration award
is ‘a summary proceeding that merely makes what is already a final arbitration award a judgment
of the court,’ and the court ‘must grant’ the award ‘unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected.’” D.H. Blair & Co., 462 F.3d at 110 (first quoting Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 750
F.2d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 1984); and then quoting 9 U.S.C. § 9); see also Trs. of Mason Tenders
Dist. Council Welfare Fund, Pension Fund, Annuity Fund, & Training Program Fund v. A.J.S.

Project Mgmt., Inc., No. 19-CV-711, 2020 WL 6546212, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2020) (quoting
D.H. Blair & Co., 462 F.3d at 109). “The arbitrator’s rationale for an award need not be
explained, . . . [o]nly ‘a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached’ by the arbitrators
is necessary to confirm the award.” D.H. Blair & Co., 462 F.3d at 110 (first quoting Barbier v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 1991); then quoting Landy Michaels
Realty Corp. v. Loc. 32B–32J, Service Emps. Int’l Union, 954 F.2d 794, 797 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Accordingly, “courts ‘play only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an
arbitrator.’” Tully Constr. Co. v. Canam Steel Corp., 684 F. App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017)
(quoting United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)).
b. The Court confirms the arbitration award
Petitioner argues that confirmation of the arbitration award is warranted because
(1) Respondent is bound by the CBAs, which “bind Respondent to the Collection Policy and
Arbitration Procedures”; (2) Respondent failed to remit contributions, which authorized

Petitioner to initiate arbitration; and (3) “the independent arbitrator acted within the scope of his
authority in issuing the arbitration award.” (Pet.’s Mem. 3–4.) In addition, Petitioner contends
that “the arbitrator [properly] ordered Respondent to pay [Petitioner] a principal sum of
delinquent contributions, as well as interest thereon, liquidated damages, [and] attorney’s fees,”
pursuant to the CBAs, Collection Policy, and Arbitration Procedures. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner
further represents that the arbitration award “has not otherwise been vacated, modified, or
corrected.” (Id.)
Petitioner’s motion to confirm the arbitration award is accompanied by the NYCHA
PLA, the CBAs, the Collection Policy, the Arbitration Procedures, the Notice of Intent to
Arbitrate, the Statement of Claims, the Prehearing Memorandum of Law, a breakdown of

benefits owed submitted at the arbitration, and the arbitrator’s award. Based on the record
before the Court, there is sufficient basis for the Court to deem Petitioner’s application as an
unopposed motion for summary judgment. See Trs. of the NYC Dist. Council of Carpenters
Pension Fund, Welfare Fund, Annuity Fund, & Apprenticeship, Journeyman Retraining, Educ. &
Indus. Fund v. Bilt NYG, Inc., No. 20-CV-3846, 2020 WL 7211184, at *1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19,
2020) (treating the petition as an unopposed motion for summary judgment where the petitioners
“submitted undisputed evidence showing that the arbitrator was acting within the scope of his
authority, and that the arbitration award was appropriate in this case”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 7183549 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2020).
The arbitration award is supported by the record. Respondent appeared at the arbitration
hearing and did not contest the amounts owed or submit evidence rebutting Petitioner’s
documents, and the arbitrator’s decision addressed the issues presented. (Op. & Award 3–4); see
Trs. of the N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. RNW Electric Corp., No. 22-CV-

8232, 2023 WL 3080776, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2023) (confirming arbitration award where
the violations stemmed from a collective bargaining agreement, the respondent failed to appear
at the arbitration hearing, and there was “no evidence of a genuine dispute as to any material
fact” before the district court); Trs. of the N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. P
& J Wood Floors, Inc., No. 22-CV-9386, 2023 WL 2186341, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2023)
(confirming award where “the record indicate[d] that the [a]rbitrator based his award on
undisputed evidence”).
In addition, the CBAs, Collection Policy, and Arbitration Procedures provide for the
remedies awarded by the arbitrator. (Pet. ¶¶ 19–28; Op. and Award 2–3); see Bilt NYG, Inc.,
2020 WL 7211184, at *3 (confirming arbitration award where “the amount and categories of

damages awarded by the arbitrator correspond generally to those contemplated in the [collective
bargaining agreement] and employer contribution policy — including principal and liquidated
damages, interest, and [attorneys’] fees and costs”). The arbitrator’s award reflects a considered
judgment and there is no genuine dispute of material fact.
Accordingly, the Court grants Petitioner’s motion to confirm the arbitration award in the
amount of $117,381.14, plus interest accrued until entry of judgment. See Latronica v. Loc.
1430 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Pension Fund, 820 F. App’x 12, 14 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming
district court’s grant of prejudgment interest in an ERISA case).
c. Attorneys’ fees
Petitioner requests $725 in attorneys’ fees. (Pet’r’s Mem. 7.) Petitioner asserts that
pursuant to the CBAs and section 502(g)(2) of ERISA, he is “entitled to an award of attorneys’
fees in connection with this action to recover delinquent . . . contributions by Respondent,” and

that his fees are reasonable. (Id. at 4–7.) In support, Petitioner contends that his counsel billed
“for the services of associate [attorneys] at the rate of $290 per hour” a rate which was
“negotiated with a Board of Trustees consisting of members with long business and negotiation
experience and [which], as such, should be viewed as rates that a reasonable client would pay.”
(Id. at 6.) Petitioner also contends that this rate is “within the reasonable range for attorneys
representing ERISA benefit funds within the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.” (Id.)
A district court must award attorneys’ fees and costs in a successful ERISA action that
results in judgment in favor of the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D); Labarbera v. Clestra
Hauserman, Inc., 369 F.3d 225, 226 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[When] the ERISA plan receives a
judgment in its favor . . . the statute renders fees and costs mandatory: ‘the court shall award the

plan’ reasonable fees and costs.” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2))). Trial courts are afforded
“considerable discretion in determining what constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees in a given
case.” Barfield v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 151 (2d Cir. 2008). In
exercising this discretion, trial courts must “bear in mind all of the case-specific variables
that . . . courts have identified as relevant to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees in setting a
reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v.
Cnty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008)). “‘The most critical factor’ in a district
court’s determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees in a given case ‘is the degree
of success obtained’ by the plaintiff.” Id. at 152 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114
(1992)). Other factors a court should consider include but are not limited to:
the complexity and difficulty of the case, the available expertise and
capacity of the client’s other counsel (if any), the resources required
to prosecute the case effectively (taking account of the resources
being marshaled on the other side but not endorsing scorched earth
tactics), the timing demands of the case, whether an attorney might
have an interest (independent of that of his client) in achieving the
ends of the litigation or might initiate the representation himself,
whether an attorney might have initially acted pro bono (such that a
client might be aware that the attorney expected low or non-existent
remuneration), and other returns (such as reputation, etc.) that an
attorney might expect from the representation.
Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 184, 190 (clarifying that district courts should consider, among others,
the factors laid out in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir.
1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)). The fee
applicant bears the burden of “submit[ting] adequate documentation supporting the requested
attorneys’ fees and costs.” Fisher v. SD Protection Inc., 948 F.3d 593, 600 (2d Cir. 2020) (first
citing N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1154 (2d Cir. 1983);
and then citing McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 131 (2d Cir. 1983)).
“A reasonable hourly rate is ‘the rate a paying client would be willing to pay,’ ‘bear[ing]
in mind that a reasonable paying client wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the
case effectively.’” Spain v. Kinder Stuff 2010 LLC, No. 14-CV-2058, 2015 WL 5772190, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015) (quoting Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190) (alterations in original). Such
rates should be based on rates “prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of
reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of Int’l
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1159 (2d Cir. 1994) (first quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984); then citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
“Determination of the prevailing market rates may be based on evidence presented or a judge’s
own knowledge of hourly rates charged in the community.” Spain, 2015 WL 5772190, at *8
(first citing Farbotko v. Clinton Cnty. of N.Y., 433 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2005); and then citing
Chambless, 885 F.2d at 1059). “The ‘community’ is . . . the district where the district court sits.”
Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190 (clarifying “forum rule”) (citing Polk v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr.

Servs., 722 F.2d 23, 25 (2d Cir. 1983)). In the Eastern District of New York, courts “generally
award junior associates an hourly rate of $100 to $200.” Ally Fin. Inc. v. Comfort Auto Grp. NY
LLC, No. 20-CV-1281, 2022 WL 3703955, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2022), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4813505 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2022).
Under the CBAs, the Collection Policy, and 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2), Petitioner is entitled
to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs in a court action to recover delinquent contributions. (Pet.
¶¶ 26, 36; Pet’r’s Mem. 4–5); see also P & J Wood Floors, Inc., 2023 WL 2186341, at *6
(granting attorneys’ fees pursuant to a clause in a collective bargaining agreement). The
Collection Policy specifies that “[o]nce legal action is commenced, [Respondent] shall also be
liable for . . . attorney[s’] fees and costs incurred.” (Collection Policy 5, annexed to Pet. as Ex.

F, Docket Entry No. 1-6); P & J Wood Floors, Inc., 2023 WL 2186341, at *3 (“By entering into
the CBA, [the respondent] agreed to submit all disputes to binding arbitration . . . [and] the CBA
and the [f]unds’ [c]ollection [p]olicy explicitly entitle [p]etitioners to recover reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred while collecting delinquencies . . . Respondent has neither
fully complied with the award nor provided any justification for its failure to do so. For these
reasons, the Court finds that it is just and reasonable to award [p]etitioners reasonable attorneys’
fees and costs pursuant to bringing this action.”).
Petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees is supported by contemporaneous time records
specifying relevant dates, time spent, and work done. (See History Bill, annexed to Pet. as Ex. L,
Docket Entry No. 1-12). The records reflect 2.5 hours of work, which the Court finds to be
reasonable. (Pet. ¶¶ 44–46; History Bill.); see also Trs. of Ne. Carpenters Health, Pension,
Annuity, Apprenticeship, & Labor Mgmt. Coop. Funds v. Excel Installations, LLC, No. 19-CV-
3012, 2020 WL 429135, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2020) (finding 5.9 hours billed to be

reasonable in a motion to confirm ERISA arbitration award); Finkel, 2019 WL 3281012, at *3
(finding 1.7 hours to be “a reasonable amount of time to have spent in preparation of the
petition” to enforce arbitration award).
The records also reflect an hourly rate of $290 for an associate attorney with three years
of experience representing clients in ERISA litigation. (Pet. ¶¶ 43, 45; History Bill.) The
requested hourly rate of $290 is above the prevailing rate within this district for associates. See
Trs. of Bldg. Trades Educ. Benefit Fund v. Culver Elec., LLC, No. 17-CV-3448, 2020 WL
6927618, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2020), report and recommendation adopted in part, 2020 WL
6902364 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020) (finding $200 per hour reasonable for associate attorney in
ERISA litigation); Div. 1181 Amalgamated Transit Union—N.Y. Emps.’ Pension Fund v. D & A

Bus Co., Inc., 270 F. Supp. 3d 593, 621–23 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding $200 per hour reasonable
for associate attorney in ERISA matter).
Petitioner’s counsel, Adrianna R. Grancio, is a 2016 graduate of St. John’s University
School of Law and an associate at her law firm who has “regularly represented multiemployer
benefit plans in ERISA litigation” since 2019, three years prior to the filing of this action. (Pet. ¶
43.) Ms. Grancio has previously been awarded rates of $225–$250 per hour for similar work.
See Trs. of the N.Y.C. Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Land Cruising Props. Inc.,
No. 21-CV-7877, 2022 WL 1125623, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2022) (reducing Ms. Grancio’s
rate from $275 to $250 per hour and noting that “[c]ourts in the Second Circuit have consistently
awarded Ms. Grancio fees at an hourly rate of between $225 and $250”); Trs. of the N.Y.C. Dist.
Council of Carpenters Pension Fund v. Eclipse Constr. Servs., No. 21-CV-7868, 2021 WL
5567752, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2021) (reducing Ms. Grancio’s rate from $275 to $225 per
hour). The Court finds that Ms. Grancio’s requested fee of $290 is more than the prevailing rate

for associates with her level experience and accordingly reduces it to $250. See, e.g., Ally Fin.
Inc., 2022 WL 3703955, at *19 (awarding rates of $325, $300, and $250 for associates with
“nearly two decades,” fifteen years, and seven years of experience, respectively).
The Court finds that 2.5 hours is reasonable for the attorneys’ time expenditure but
reduces Petitioner’s counsel’s hourly rate from $290 to $250. Accordingly, the Court grants
Petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees in part and awards Petitioner $625 in attorneys’ fees.
d. Costs
Petitioner requests “$477.57 in costs arising from the service fee and filing fees.” (Pet’r’s
Mem. 7; Pet. ¶ 47.)
The Court takes judicial notice of this district’s $402 fee to file a petition and awards

such to Petitioner. See Finkel v. G Energy Sol. & Servs. Inc., No. 22-CV-4276, 2022 WL
18859025, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2022) (finding that the court “may take judicial notice of the
$402 filing fee”). Although Petitioner does not provide receipts to substantiate its request for
service fees of $75.57, the Court finds that such amount is reasonable. See id. (finding that
“although [p]etitioner has not submitted any supporting documentation . . . [he] has demonstrated
costs in the amount of $442” for the court’s filing fee and the service charges).
Accordingly, the Court grants Petitioner’s request for costs in the amount of $477.57.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Petitioner’s motion to confirm the arbitration
award but adjusts the attorneys’ fees awarded. The Court awards Petitioner (1) $117,381.14,
plus interest accrued until entry of judgment, pursuant to its confirmation of the arbitration

award, (2) $625 in attorneys’ fees, and (3) $477.57 in costs, for a total damages award of
$118,483.71 plus accrued interest. The Court directs Petitioner to mail a copy of this
Memorandum and Order to Respondent and directs the Clerk of Court to close the case.
Dated: June 12, 2023
Brooklyn, New York
SO ORDERED:

s/ MKB
MARGO K. BRODIE
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10309858. Public record. Not legal advice.