# Guthrie v. Rainbow Fencing Inc

> District Court, E.D. New York · February 24, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10309238

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** February 24, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10309238

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction can be conferred when the state and federal claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”
- explaining 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction can be conferred when the state and federal claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------X

ROBERT GUTHRIE,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff, 21-CV-5929 (KAM)(RML)

- against -

RAINBOW FENCING INC., AND LAWSON BURGE,

Defendants.

---------------------------------------X
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

On October 25, 2021, Plaintiff Robert Guthrie
(“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Guthrie”) commenced this wage and hours
action against Defendants Rainbow Fencing, Inc. and Lawson Burge
(“Defendants”) asserting claims under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq., and the New York Labor
Law (“NYLL”). (ECF No. 1, Compl.) Both Defendants were
properly served with the summons and complaint. (ECF No. 5-6,
Summons Executed.) After Defendants failed to answer or
otherwise move with respect to the complaint, Plaintiff moved
for entry of default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
55(a) as to both defendants on January 28, 2022. (ECF No. 7,
Request for Certificate of Default.) On February 2, 2022, the
Clerk of the Court noted the defaults of both defendants. (ECF
No. 8.) On April 21, 2022, Plaintiff moved for default
judgment. (ECF No. 10, Pl. Mot.) On September 30, 2022, the
Court referred Plaintiff’s motion to Magistrate Judge Levy for a
report and recommendation.
Before the Court are: (1) Magistrate Judge Levy’s

Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”), dated December 13, 2022,
which recommends that Mr. Guthrie’s motion for default judgment
be granted except as to his claim for statutory damages under
NYLL §§ 195 and 198; and (2) Mr. Guthrie’s objections to the
R&R. (ECF No. 14, Pl. Obj.) For the reasons stated below, the
Court adopts Magistrate Judge Levy’s R&R, with the addition that
Plaintiff’s NYLL wage notice and wage statement claims are
dismissed without prejudice, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because Plaintiff lacks Article III standing.
BACKGROUND AND FACTS
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the
extensive facts thoroughly recounted in the R&R. (See generally

ECF No. 12, R&R.) For present purposes, the Court reiterates
only the procedural background and facts relevant to the
Plaintiff’s objections, as set forth in the R&R and Plaintiff’s
complaint.
By order dated September 30, 2022, and after
Defendants were properly served with the entry of default and
notice by Plaintiff, the Court referred Plaintiff’s motion for
default judgment to Magistrate Judge Levy for a report and
recommendation. Plaintiff seeks a default judgment ordering
Defendants to (1) pay him overtime wages under the New York
Labor Law (“NYLL”) and federal Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”); (2) pay him unpaid minimum wages under NYLL; and 3)

pay him statutory damages for notice and wage statement
violations under NYLL §§ 195 and 198. (ECF Nos. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 1-
3, 19-22; 10-1, Pl. Mot.)
On December 13, 2022, Magistrate Judge Levy issued his
report and recommendations (ECF No. 12, R&R) to this Court. On
that day, Plaintiff served the Defendants with the R&R and noted
service on the docket. (ECF No. 13.) For the reasons set forth
in the R&R, he recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be granted and
that a default judgment be entered against both Defendants
Rainbow Fencing, Inc. and Lawson Burge, jointly and severally.
Regarding damages, the magistrate judge recommended that
Plaintiff be awarded a total of $91,243 as follows: $3,200 in

unpaid minimum wages, $42,421.50 in unpaid overtime wages, and
$45,621.50 in liquidated damages. (Id. at 15.)
Magistrate Judge Levy found that the Plaintiff had not
alleged that he suffered any actual and concrete injury due to
Defendants’ failure to provide wage notices or wage statements.
(Id. at pp. 12-14.) As such, he found that Plaintiff’s
allegation of technical violations of New York’s wage notice and
wage statement requirements were insufficient on their own to
confer Article III standing as to those claims and that
Plaintiff was not entitled to statutory damages. (Id.) On
December 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed timely objections to the
specific part of the R&R, that denied Plaintiff’s request for

statutory damages for wage notice and wage statement claims
under NYLL. (See generally ECF No. 14, Pl. Obj.)
Plaintiff seeks $10,000 total in statutory damages for
Defendants’ failure to provide wage notices or wage statements
as required by NYLL §§ 195 and 198. (ECF No. 10-1, Pl. Mot. at
pp. 12-13.) With respect to Plaintiff’s wage notice and wage
statement claims, the Complaint alleged, in relevant part, the
following facts:
21. At all times relevant herein, neither Defendant
provided Plaintiff with the notice(s) required
by NYLL 195(1).

22. At all times relevant herein, neither Defendant
provided Plaintiff with the statement(s)
required by NYLL 195(3).

(ECF No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 21-22.)
The Plaintiff’s declaration in support of his motion for
default judgment provided the following facts with respect to
his wage notice and wage statement claims:
22. During my employment with Defendants, I was not
provided with any type of pay stub or wage statement.

23. During my employment with Defendants, Defendants never
provided me with a wage notice setting forth my hourly
rate, overtime rate, etc.

(ECF No. 11, Guthrie Decl. ¶¶ 22-23.)
LEGAL STANDARD
When a party objects to an R&R, the Court must review
de novo those recommendations in the R&R to which the party
objects. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. Male
Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997). Where a party does

not object to a portion of the R&R, the Court “‘need only
satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the
record.’” Galvez v. Aspen Corp., 967 F. Supp. 2d 615, 617
(E.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Reyes v. Mantello, No. 00-cv-8936, 2003
WL 76997, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2003)). The Court may
“accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive
further evidence; or return the matter to the Magistrate Judge
with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Objections “must be specific and clearly aimed at
particular findings in the magistrate judge's proposal.” Green
v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., No. 18-CV-10817, 2020 WL

5814187, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020) (quoting McDonaugh v.
Astrue, 672 F. Supp. 2d 542, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)); Barratt v.
Joie, No. 96-CV-0324, 2002 WL 335014, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4,
2002) (“Parties filing objections to recommendations are
required to ‘pinpoint specific portions of the report and
recommendations to which [they] objec[t]. . . .’” (quoting
Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F.
Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992))). If “the [objecting] party
makes only frivolous, conclusory or general objections, or
simply reiterates [his] original arguments, the Court reviews
the report and recommendation only for clear error.” Velez v.
DNF Assocs., LLC, No. 19-CV-11138, 2020 WL 6946513, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2020) (quoting Chen v. New Trend Apparel,

Inc., 8 F. Supp. 3d 406, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)); see also Colliton
v. Donnelly, No. 07-CV-1922, 2009 WL 2850497, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 28, 2009), aff’d, 399 F. App'x 619 (2d Cir. 2010).
“[E]ven in a de novo review of a party’s specific
objections,” however, “the court will not consider ‘arguments,
case law and/or evidentiary material which could have been, but
were not, presented to the magistrate judge in the first
instance.’” Brown v. Smith, No. 09-CV-4522, 2012 WL 511581, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012) (quoting Kennedy v. Adamo, No. 02-

CV-1776, 2006 WL 3704784, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2006))
(alterations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Magistrate Judge Levy recommended denying damages for
Plaintiff’s wage notice and wage statement claims for lack of
Article III standing, quoting the 2021 Supreme Court case,
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021), which held
“that a technical violation triggering a statutory damage award
only confers Article III standing if the plaintiff demonstrates
an actual and concrete injury resulting from that violation.”
(ECF No. 12, R&R at pp. 13-14.) Magistrate Judge Levy provided
that “courts in this Circuit have ‘found allegations of

technical violations of New York Labor Law’s wage notice and
statement requirements to be insufficient, on their own, to
confer Article III standing.’” (Id.) (quoting Beh v. Cmty.
Care Companions Inc., No. 19 CV 1417, 2022 WL 5039391, at *7
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2022).
Plaintiff objects only to the R&R’s denial of damages
for his wage notice and wage statement claims for lack of
Article III and requests that this Court modify the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendations to grant Plaintiff judgment in the
maximum sum of $10,000 for the wage notice and wage statement
claims. (ECF No. 14, Pl. Obj. at pp. 11-12.) Plaintiff
primarily argues that 1) the Court has supplemental

jurisdiction, despite any failure to establish lack of Article
III standing; and 2) in any case, injury and Article III
standing have been established for Plaintiff’s wage notice and
wage statement claims. (ECF No. 14, Pl. Obj.)
I. Plaintiff’s Supplemental Jurisdiction Argument
The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s argument that
this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the New York wage
notice and wage statement claims. Plaintiff asserts “[w]here a
claim does not independently satisfy the requirements of Article
III, it will be deemed to satisfy the requirements of Article
III and part of the same case and controversy as another claim
that independently satisfies the requires of Article III.” (ECF

No. 14, Pl. Obj. at p. 3.) Plaintiff’s counsel specifically
asserts that “Plaintiff need not show Article III injury as to
his wage notice and wage statement claims because these claims
are considered part of the same case as the federal overtime
claims over which the Court undisputedly has federal subject
matter jurisdiction.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff also asserts that
a dismissal for lack of standing must be without prejudice.
(Id. at p. 2.)
The Court finds this portion of Plaintiff’s arguments
unavailing, because a Plaintiff must establish Article III
standing for all of his claims, whether or not the Court also
has supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s counsel is correct

that federal courts may hear state claims if they “derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact.” See United Mine Workers of
Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); see also Shukla v.
Sharma, 586 Fed. Appx. 752, 753 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a) supplemental jurisdiction can be conferred when
the state and federal claims “derive from a common nucleus of
operative fact.”). The Court, however, cannot discern or
speculate which of the “operative facts” establish an injury to
Mr. Guthrie on his NYLL wage notice and wage statement claims,
simply because Plaintiff’s counsel did not do so. See Citizens
for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 971 F.3d 102, 118 (2d
Cir. 2020) (“Whether that [district] court was right or wrong,

at least it fulfilled its obligation to identify an injury for
all claims and plaintiffs.”) As discussed further below, even
if Plaintiff satisfied the statutory requirements for this Court
to exercise subject matter jurisdiction and supplemental
jurisdiction, he has not fulfilled the constitutional
requirement of Article III standing for this Court to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over the NYLL wage notice and wage
statement claims.
The Supreme Court has construed Article III standing
to require that plaintiffs must allege facts showing that they
“have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3)

that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.” Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85,
89 (2d Cir. 2019)(quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330,
(2016)). An injury in fact, sufficient to confer standing is
“an invasion of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete
and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1992) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Most
importantly, the Court must reject the Plaintiff’s insistence
that supplemental jurisdiction serves in lieu of Article III
standing, because “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for
each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is
sought.” Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S.

433, 439 (2017).
Specifically, with respect to Article III standing,
the Supreme Court stated in Town of Chester:
Our standing decisions make clear that “‘standing is not
dispensed in gross.’” Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n,
554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 358, n. 6 (1996); alteration omitted). To the
contrary, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each
claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is
sought.” Davis, supra, at 734 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, supra, at 352 (“[A]
plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each
form of relief sought”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
185 (2000) (same); Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–
106, and n. 7 (1983) (a plaintiff who has standing to seek
damages must also demonstrate standing to pursue injunctive
relief).

581 U.S. at 439.

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s argument that
this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s wage
notice and wage statement claims, without alleging any “concrete
and particularized” injuries, is not sufficient to overturn the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the damages for wage
notice and wage statement claims be denied. Further, those
claims are dismissed for lack of Article III standing.
II. Plaintiff’s New Arguments that Article III Standing Exists
Plaintiff also proffers new arguments in his objection
to the R&R, disputing the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of the
Supreme Court Transunion case. Plaintiff’s counsel asserts
“failure to pay wages such as overtime wages in this case, is an
integral part of the wage notice and wage statement claims and
monetary harm in the failure to pay these wages is obviously
concrete and sufficient to establish Article III standing,” but
provides no further basis for this contention. (Id. at 9.) Nor
does Plaintiff address his failure to support his claim with

facts establishing concrete and particularized harm.
Alternatively, Plaintiff’s counsel contends that there
is an “informational inquiry” that can establish concrete harm
for standing purposes. (Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff’s objections
describe various circumstances in which the lack of wage notices
and wage statements can lead to injuries to an employee, such as
an employee’s ability to seek relief for violations they may not
have information about, or an employee’s lack of proper
documentation to apply for public benefits. (Id. at 10-11.)
The Court does not disagree with these possible
injuries Plaintiff’s counsel posits in his objections, but

Plaintiff’s counsel did not raise these examples, let alone
provide evidence of Mr. Guthrie’s personal experience with these
examples, prior to his objection to the R&R. Aside from simply
stating that Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with a written
wage notice or wage statement (ECF No. 10-1, Pl. Mot. at pp. 12-
13), Plaintiff did not link any injury-in-fact that he

personally experienced to Defendants’ failure to provide
statutory notices under the NYLL. Even if the Court were to
consider Plaintiff’s “‘arguments, case law and/or evidentiary
material which could have been, but were not, presented to the
magistrate judge in the first instance,’” Brown v. Smith, 2012
WL 511581, at *1, Plaintiff’s counsel still fails to link the
general harms an employee might experience to any harms that Mr.
Guthrie did, in fact, experience. (ECF No. 14, Pl. Obj. at pp.
9-11.)
To be sure, courts in the Second Circuit have reached
different conclusions when weighing the sufficiency of a
plaintiff’s allegations to show Article III standing to pursue

NYLL wage notice and wage statement claims in federal court.
Some cases have found that the denial of the right to
information1 about one’s wages tied to an entitlement to one’s
unpaid wages is sufficient to satisfy Article III. See
Imbarrato v. Banta Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 18 Civ. 5422 (NSR),

1 The Court notes again that Plaintiff’s counsel asserts for the first time in
his objections to the R&R that he “did not ‘receive [] required information,’
and as such, Plaintiff also has informational standing in this case.” (ECF
No. 14, Pl. Obj. at pp. 9.) Plaintiff’s counsel then discusses generally
what harms might result from lacking required information about wages, but
not whether Plaintiff himself experienced these harms and how. (Id. at 10-
11.)
2020 WL 1330744, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020) (finding that
the requirement that employers provide wage notices and
statements was meant to protect an employee’s concrete interest
in being paid what he is owed under the NYLL); Hicks v. T.L.
Cannon Mgmt. Corp., No. 13 Civ. 6455 (EAW), 2018 WL 2440732, at

*5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2018) (finding that “violation of the
procedures created by the relevant provisions of the NYLL . . .
are specifically designed to guard against the concrete harm
that workers are subject to when they are mis- or uninformed
regarding their rights and the responsibilities of their
employers”).
Other courts have found that plaintiffs have not
alleged or cannot allege an adequate concrete injury to satisfy
Article III with respect to the New York wage notice and wage
statement claims. See Sevilla v. House of Salads One LLC, No.

20 Civ. 6072 (PKC) (CLP), 2022 WL 954740, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
30, 2022) (holding that “it is not clear that [such] policies
led to an ‘injury’ that can be recognized by a federal court”
(citations omitted)); Wang v. XBB, Inc., No. 18 Civ. 7341 (PKC)2

2 Though Plaintiff’s counsel states that Judge Chen “reversed course” (ECF No.
14, Pl. Obj. at p. 7) in Marine v. Vieja Quisqueya Rest. Corp., No.
20CV4671PKCRML, 2022 WL 17820084, (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2022), by “exercising
supplemental jurisdiction” over the wage notice and wage statement claims,
the Court notes that the First Amended Complaint in Marine alleged concrete
and particularized harms the Marine plaintiff experienced from the lack of
wage notice and wage statements. (See Dkt. 20-cv-04671-PKC-RML, ECF No. 21,
First Amended Complaint (“Upon information and belief, these [violations of
the wage notice and statement statutes] by Defendants were done willfully to
disguise the actual number of hours Plaintiff Marine (and similarly situated
(ST), 2022 WL 912592, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022)
(“Plaintiff has not linked any injury-in-fact to [the
d]efendants’ failure to provide statutory notices under the

NYLL, so she lacks standing to recover on that claim.” (citation
omitted)); Francisco v. NY Tex Care, Inc., No. 19 Civ. 1649
(PKC) (ST), 2022 WL 900603, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022)
(“While those may be technical violations of the NYLL, neither
[p]laintiff nor the record demonstrate how those technical
violations led to either a tangible injury or something akin to
a traditional cause of action[.]”); Perez v. Postgraduate Ctr.
for Mental Health, No. 19 Civ. 931 (EK) (PK), 2021 WL 3667054,
at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2021) (finding that the plaintiff
lacked Article III standing for a claim alleging that the
content of his wage notices violated the NYLL because of an
inaccuracy because “not all inaccuracies cause harm or present
any material risk of harm” (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at

1550)).
The Court finds the reasoning of these cases
applicable and persuasive, given that Plaintiff has not provided
any factual allegations relative to his standing or actual
injuries suffered as a result of the alleged NYLL wage notice

individuals) worked, and to avoid paying Plaintiff Marine properly for his
full hours worked.”) The Court also notes that in the Marine case,
Magistrate Judge Levy recommended the recommendation that the NYLL wage
notice and wage statement violation claims and damages be granted, and Judge
Chen adopted—because neither judge found a lack of Article III standing.
and wage statement violations. Plaintiff’s counsel’s objection
to the R&R, after he failed to present adequate facts in his
complaint or motion for default judgment, suggest that various

harms could potentially stem from wage notice inadequacies, but
he has not shown concrete harm from said deficiencies, such as
the inability to identify his employer to remedy compensation
problems, or lack of knowledge about the rates or conditions of
his pay. Although Plaintiff now seeks to recover damages
related to wage and hour violations, he has still yet to link
such alleged harms or deprivations to the claimed violations of
NYLL §§ 195 and 198.
Though the deficiencies in Defendants’ provisions of
hiring notices may amount to violations of the labor law,
neither Plaintiff nor the record demonstrates how those
technical violations led to either a tangible injury or

something akin to a traditional cause of action, as required by
the Supreme Court. See Francisco, 192022 WL 900603 at *7
(citing TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2205). Consequently,
Plaintiff’s lack of standing to his NYLL wage notice and wage
statement claims warrants denial of the recovery of damages for
those claims, which are dismissed.
Lastly, the Court does agree with Plaintiff’s argument
that a dismissal for lack of standing must be without prejudice.
(ECF No. 14, Pl. Obj. at p. 2.) The Second Circuit stated in
Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 54–55 (2d Cir.
2016):
[W]here a complaint is dismissed for lack of Article III
standing, the dismissal must be without prejudice, rather
than with prejudice. Such a dismissal is one for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., Davis v. Federal
Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724, 732–33 (2008); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992); Amidax
Trading Group v. S.W.I.F.T. SCRL, 671 F.3d 140, 145 (2d
Cir. 2011); and without jurisdiction, the district court
lacks the power to adjudicate the merits of the case, see,
e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523
U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). Accordingly, where there is a lack
of Article III standing, “Article III deprives federal
courts of the power to dismiss a case with prejudice,”
Hernandez v. Conriv Realty Associates, 182 F.3d 121, 123
(2d Cir. 1999). Thus, if we were to agree with the
district court's conclusion that the Complaint failed to
show Article III standing, we would nonetheless be
constrained to have the [judgment] amended to provide that
the dismissal is without prejudice.

The Court modifies the R&R to dismiss Plaintiff’s NYLL
§§ 195 and 198 statutory claims without prejudice, for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and otherwise adopts Magistrate
Judge Levy’s well-reasoned R&R to the extent that he has
recommended granting the award of specified categories of
damages and denying damages for the NYLL wage notice and wage
statement claims.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s objections
are overruled, and the R&R is adopted, with the addition that
Plaintiff’s NYLL wage notice and wage statement claims are
dismissed without prejudice, for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction because Plaintiff lacks Article III standing. The
Court adopts Magistrate Judge Levy’s thorough and well-reasoned
recommendation that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be

granted and that a default judgment be entered against both
Defendants, Rainbow Fencing, Inc. and Lawson Burge, jointly and
severally. Regarding damages, the Court adopts the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation that Plaintiff be awarded a total of
$91,243 in damages as follows: $3,200 in unpaid minimum wages,
$42,421.50 in unpaid overtime wages, and $45,621.50 in
liquidated damages. The Court also adopts the Magistrate
Judge’s recommendation to deny Plaintiff’s motion for statutory
damages on Plaintiff’s NYLL wage notice and wage statement
claims, which the Court dismisses without prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to enter
judgment as provided by this Memorandum and Order and close this

case. The Clerk of Court is also respectfully requested to
serve both Defendants with this Memorandum and Order and the
judgment and note service on the docket by February 28, 2022.

SO ORDERED.
/s/ Kiyo A. Matsumoto_______
Hon. Kiyo A. Matsumoto
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
February 24, 2023

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10309238. Public record. Not legal advice.