# Kane v. City of New York

> District Court, E.D. New York · December 9, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10308941

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** December 9, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10308941

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that at the pleading stage, a court must assume “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint to be true”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------
NICKIE KANE,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
22-CV-1339 (KAM)(LB)
v.
CITY OF NEW YORK; NEW YORK POLICE
DEPARTMENT; SARGENT PUMELLA;
OFFICER JOHN DOE; OFFICER JANE
DOE,

Defendants.
-----------------------------------
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:

On March 1, 2022, pro se Plaintiff filed the instant action1
alleging violations of the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause based on an encounter with police during a July
17, 2020 incident on a bus in Queens, New York.2 (ECF No. 1, Complaint
(“Compl.”). She named as defendants (1) the City of New York; (2) the
New York City Police Department (“NYPD”); (3) Sergeant Pumella; and (4)
Officers John and Jane Doe (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff moved
to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 6.) For the reasons set forth

1 Plaintiff brought the action in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, which subsequently transferred the
case to this Court. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.)

2 Because “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held
to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,”
the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim as
arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
1
below, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, Plaintiff’s request to proceed
in forma pauperis is GRANTED, the complaint is DISMISSED for failure to
state a claim, and Plaintiff is GRANTED 30 days leave from the date of
this Order to file an amended complaint regarding her ADA claim.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the complaint and assumed to be

true for the purposes of this Memorandum and Order. See Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that
at the pleading stage, a court must assume “all well-pleaded,
nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint to be true”).
Plaintiff alleges that on July 17, 2020, she boarded a bus with a
service dog. (Compl. at 7.) The service dog helps with her “PTSD with
depression and anxiety”: it “wakes her up in the morning, reminds her
to take her medication, diverts her attention when she is experiencing
a panic attack and barks at individuals who trigger” her. (Id.) After
boarding, the bus driver repeatedly told Plaintiff to leave the bus,
due to her service dog, despite her assertions that the law permitted

her to travel on the bus with the animal. (Id.) When Plaintiff refused
to leave, the driver parked the bus and refused to continue driving.
(Id.) Plaintiff called the police, and NYPD Officers Jane and John Doe
responded. (Id.) Officer John Doe “instructed [Plaintiff] that she
was not allowed to board the bus with her dog.” (Id.) After the
incident, Plaintiff filed a claim with the New York City Comptroller.
2
(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that a 50-h hearing was held on August 26,
2021, but does not allege any further information regarding the hearing
or its outcome. (Id.)
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that she was harassed by a
passenger on the bus, who “began complaining” when the bus was stopped
and who made an offensive comment regarding Plaintiff’s gender

expression. (Id. at 8.) The passenger also allegedly “slammed into
[Plaintiff] and her dog with a shopping cart” after all passengers—
including Plaintiff—disembarked from the parked bus. (Id.) Officers
John and Jane Doe recorded a statement from Plaintiff regarding this
incident. (Id.) When Plaintiff later contacted the NYPD to “inquire
about the status” of her police report, she realized that the report
filed by Officers John and Jane Doe “did not state an assault had
occurred.” (Id.) To correct the allegedly deficient police report,
Plaintiff went to a police station, where Sergeant Pumella took her
statement regarding the bus passenger. (Id.) After “time passed”
without contact from the NYPD, Plaintiff received a copy of the amended

report and realized that it “still did not accurately reflect that an
assault had occurred.” (Id.) She alleges that the NYPD’s failure to
“accurately record the crime” contrasts with their response to the “many
attacks on the Asian community” that were reported during “the pandemic
of 2020,” wherein “[a]ssailants often made comments as to the
race/ethnicity of the victim prior to the assault” and where the
3
“assaults were classified as hate crimes and referred . . . for
prosecution.” (Compl. at 8-9.)
Plaintiff asserts that Officers John and Jane Doe violated the
ADA, causing her emotional distress, and that the City of New York
failed to adequately train Officers John and Jane Doe. (Id.) She also
asserts that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

Protection Clause by failing (1) to “accurately record the crime”
committed against her by the bus passenger; and (2) to “investigate and
refer the crime for prosecution as a hate crime,” based on her sex.
(Id. at 2, 8.) She requests as relief damages, the amendment of the
police report, an investigation by the NYPD, and referral of the assault
for prosecution. (Id. at 9.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court must dismiss an in
forma pauperis action if it determines that the action “(i) is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” The submissions of a pro se plaintiff
are “held to less stringent standards” than those drafted by attorneys,
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), and “construed liberally and
interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)
4
(per curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “This
is particularly so when the pro se plaintiff alleges that her civil
rights have been violated.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537
F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Even so, to survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must plead enough facts, “accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cohen v. Rosicki,

Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but a pleading that
tenders “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” or
“a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant NYPD

As an agency of the City of New York, the NYPD cannot be joined as
a party to this suit. N.Y.C. Charter § 396 (“All actions and proceedings
for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be
brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any
agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); see Jenkins v. City
of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The district court
5
correctly noted that the NYPD is a non-suable agency of the City.”)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s
claims against the NYPD.
II. § 1983 Claims
A colorable Section 1983 claim requires two elements: (1) the
conduct challenged “must have been committed by a person acting under

color of state law,” Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted); and (2) the conduct complained of “must have
deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Officer John
Doe, Officer Jane Doe, and Sergeant Pumello. Although Plaintiff’s
factual allegations likely establish that all three defendants were
acting under color of law, Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d
Cir. 2003) (“We have no doubt that when an officer identifies himself
as a police officer . . . he acts under color of law.”), Plaintiff fails
to establish that their actions deprived her of a constitutional right.

Plaintiff asserts that by failing to include her allegation of an
“assault” committed by the bus passenger in their report, Officers John
and Jane Doe and Sergeant Pumello violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is
essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.” White v. City of New York, 206 F. Supp. 3d 920, 930
6
(S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburn Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 439 (1985). Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she was
“not granted equal protection as similarly situated individuals due to
her sex,” thus asserting a selective enforcement claim. (Compl. at
9.); see Zahra v. Town of Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 683 (2d Cir. 1995)
(analyzing selective enforcement claim where plaintiff alleged local

ordinance was not enforced against similarly situated individuals).
When alleging selective enforcement claims, a plaintiff must plausibly
allege that “(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated,
was selectively treated, and (2) the selective treatment was motivated
by an intention to discriminate on the basis of impermissible
considerations . . . to punish or inhibit the exercise of constitutional
rights, or by a malicious or bad faith intent to injure the person.”
Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted).
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged facts establishing that others
were similarly situated to Plaintiff. Cf. Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-

On-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 439 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Any equal
protection claim is grounded on a comparison between the treatment the
state gives similarly situated individuals.”). To satisfy this
standard, Plaintiff’s circumstances “must bear a reasonably close
resemblance” to her comparators’ alleged circumstances. Hu, 927 F.3d
at 96, 97 (“A plaintiff can prevail by showing that she was similarly
7
situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks
to compare herself.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff generally asserts that assaults against Asian Americans
during 2020 were reported and prosecuted as hate crimes, whereas the
alleged assault against her was not. (Compl. at 8-9.) Such generalized
allegations, however, do not suffice to establish that Plaintiff’s

circumstances bore “a reasonably close resemblance” to assaults that
were prosecuted. Hu, 927 F.3d at 96; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(a pleading that tenders “naked assertions” does not state a claim
(alterations omitted)). Indeed, Plaintiff does not make any factual
allegations about the circumstances of the assaults against members of
the Asian American community beyond the allegation that they occurred,
such as where or when the assaults took place; the severity of the
assaults; or how quickly the police addressed the victims’ complaints.
(Compl. at 8-9.)
Nevertheless, construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, her
claim may not rest on the fact that she “was singled out as a target

against whom the law was enforced,”—i.e., that she was subject to
selective enforcement—but rather that the police allegedly refused to
act on her complaint because she was a woman. White, 206 F. Supp. 3d
at 931. For such “‘traditional’ equal protection claims,” a plaintiff
is not required to plead similarly situated comparators. Id.; see Pyke
v. Cuomo, 258 F.3d 107, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that Native American
8
plaintiffs did not need to establish “the disparate treatment of
otherwise similarly situated non-Native American individuals” if
plaintiffs established that “defendants discriminatorily refused to
provide police protection because the plaintiffs [were] Native
American”). In such cases, however, a plaintiff must still allege facts
establishing that “discriminatory intent was a motivating factor” in a

defendant’s actions. Okin, 577 F.3d at 438.
Plaintiff alleges no such facts here, beside legal conclusions.
Drimal v. Tai, 786 F.3d 219, 223 (2d. Cir. 2015) (“Courts are not bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, the complaint’s only
allegation related to Plaintiff’s sex is that the passenger made an
offensive comment concerning her gender expression. (Compl. at 8.)
This does not suffice to establish purposeful animus on behalf of the
individual police officer defendants. Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d
200, 216 n.50 (2d Cir. 2019) (to establish a sex-based equal protection
violation, a plaintiff “must prove that she suffered purposeful or

intentional discrimination on the basis of gender.”). Accordingly,
Plaintiff fails to state an equal protection claim against the
individual defendants under § 1983.
Plaintiff also fails to state an equal protection claim against
the City of New York. “To hold a municipality liable under § 1983 for
the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a plaintiff is required
9
to plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or custom
that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a
constitutional right.” Lucente v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297
(2d Cir. 2020) (alteration, internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Plaintiff does not allege any facts establishing that the
City has a policy or custom of discrimination based on sex in police

reporting, and her § 1983 claims are dismissed.
C. ADA Claims
Plaintiff also asserts claims against Officer John Doe and the
City of New York under the ADA, alleging that Officer John Doe violated
the ADA by preventing her from riding a bus with her service animal
and that the City failed to adequately train Officers John and Jane
Doe. (Compl. at 7-8.) Although she alleges a violation under Title
I of the ADA, which solely relates to employment-based discrimination
based on disability, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s claim
as arising under Title II, which concerns discrimination by public
services.3

3 The ADA has two different sections which relate to discrimination on
public transit: Title II, Section 12182, which prohibits discrimination
on publicly owned and operated transit services, and Title III, Section
12184, which prohibits discrimination on public transit services
provided by private entities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, 12184. Plaintiff
does not allege any facts establishing that the bus was operated by a
private entity. Accordingly, for purposes of this Memorandum and Order,
the Court liberally construes her claims as arising under Title II of
the ADA.
10
Title II of the ADA requires that “no qualified individual with
a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination
by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also Wright v. N.Y. State
Dep’t of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016). To establish a claim

under Title II, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that she is a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) that she was excluded from
participation in a public entity’s services, programs or activities
or was otherwise discriminated against by a public entity; and (3)
that such exclusion or discrimination was due to her disability.”
Tardif v. City of New York, 991 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2021) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
“Only public entities are subject to Title II.” City & Cnty. of
San Francisco, Cal. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 610 (2015). Accordingly,
to the extent that Plaintiff asserts an ADA claim against Officer John
Doe in his individual capacity, the claim is dismissed. See also

Blaylock v. Doe, No. 14-CV-5363 (SJF), 2016 WL 1069073, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 17, 2016) (noting that, under Title II, “individuals may not be
sued in their individual or personal capacity”). To the extent that
Plaintiff asserts an ADA claim against John Doe in his official
capacity, the Court analyzes the claim concurrently with her claim
against the City.
11
An individual has a disability under the ADA if she has “a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities,” or if she has a “record of such impairment.”4 42 U.S.C. §
12102(1)(A), (B). The complaint alleges that Plaintiff “suffers from
PTSD with depression and anxiety” and that she experiences “panic
attacks.” (Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff does not allege, however, any

details supporting how this impairment substantially limits any major
life activities. (Id.); see Cain v. Mandl Coll. of Allied Health, No.
14-cv-1729 (ER), 2017 WL 2709743, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2017)
(“Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts connecting her symptoms
to any limitation of her major life activities.”). Even at the pleading
stage, therefore, Plaintiff’s “failure to plausibly allege a
substantial limitation to a major life activity precludes her from
asserting that she has a record of disability.” Kelly v. N.Y. State
Off. of Mental Health, 200 F. Supp. 3d 378, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)
(citation omitted).
However, under the more lenient standard set out in Congress’ 2008

amendments to the ADA, a plaintiff may be “regarded as” having a
disability if she “establishes that [s]he . . . has been subjected to
an action prohibited [by the ADA] because of an actual or perceived

4 Major life activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating,
thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
12
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or
is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(3)(A);
see also Woolf v. Strada, 949 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2020) (discussing
the 2008 amendment to the ADA). To state a claim under the “regarded
as” prong, a plaintiff “need only establish that defendant regarded
[her] as having a mental or physical impairment.” Rodriguez v. Verizon

Telecom, No. 13-CV-6969 (PKC), 2014 WL 6807834, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3,
2014). Although Plaintiff does not allege any facts establishing that
Officer John Doe regarded her as having PTSD, the Court liberally
construes the complaint to allege that his reference to her service
animal establishes that she was “regarded as” having a disability.
Next, the Court must consider whether Plaintiff established that
she was “excluded from participation in a public entity’s services,
programs or activities or was otherwise discriminated against by a
public entity.” Tardif, 991 F.3d at 404. District courts in the Second
Circuit have found that it is “clear” that “the ADA can apply to police
activity in some situations.” Reyes v. Galpin, No. 18-CV-831 (JBA),

2019 WL 959680, at *8 (D. Conn. Feb. 27, 2019). “In the policing
context, courts typically treat Title II claims under either the
wrongful arrest or failure to reasonably accommodate umbrellas.” Felix
v. City of New York, 344 F. Supp. 3d 644, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Neither of these scenarios apply here. First, Plaintiff does not
allege that she was arrested. Second, for reasonable accommodation
13
claims, police officers “fail to reasonably accommodate [a plaintiff’s]
disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing [him or
her] to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than other
arrestees.” Bobbit v. Marzan, No. 16-cv-2042 (AT), 2020 WL 5633000, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2020). Such a claim “must be assessed in light
of the totality of the circumstances of the particular case.” Williams

v. City of New York, 121 F. Supp. 3d 354, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Most
reasonable accommodation claims against police officers relate to a
failure to provide accommodations during an investigation or arrest.
See, e.g., id. (police officers failed to provide ASL interpreter during
arrest); Felix, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 650 (police officers failed to
account for suspect’s paranoid schizophrenia when investigating
suspect, leading to physical altercation); Morales v. City of New York,
No. 13-CV-7667 (RJS), 2016 WL 4718189, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2016)
(wheelchair-bound plaintiff alleged that police mishandled his
transport after arrest); Reyes v. Town of Thomaston, No. 18-CV-831
(JBA), 2020 WL 5849529, at *2 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2020) (police

department had “no protocols or procedures regarding how to properly
log information on addresses with persons who are mentally disturbed”).
Here, however, Plaintiff does not allege that Officer John Doe
failed to provide her with reasonable accommodation in his or the NYPD’s
“services, programs or activities,” nor that she was “otherwise
discriminated against” by Officer John Doe based on her disability.
14
Tardif, 991 F.3d at 404. Instead, she asserts only that Officer John
Doe failed to counter the bus driver’s alleged discrimination. (Compl.
at 8.) While the Court does not excuse Officer John Doe’s alleged
failure to understand the law regarding service animals, his actions as
alleged do not amount to a discrimination claim under the ADA. Further,
although Plaintiff asserts that the City of New York failed to train

Officers John and Jane Doe, she alleges no facts concerning police
training on the ADA, or lack thereof. See Reyes, 2020 WL 5849529, at
*4-5. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged an ADA claim
against the City or against Officer John Doe in his official capacity,
and the ADA claim is dismissed.
III. Leave to Amend
When a complaint falls short and is dismissed for failure to state
a claim, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend the
complaint if a “liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication
that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99,
112 (2d Cir. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has not identified the type of bus she rode on July 17,
2020, and did not name the transit authority or private transit company
as a defendant. With that information, in combination with additional
factual allegations, Plaintiff may be able to allege a viable ADA claim
against the municipal transit authority or the private entity operating
the bus, based on the bus driver’s alleged failure to let her board
15
with a service animal. Accordingly, and given Plaintiff’s pro se
status, the Court grants Plaintiff thirty (30) days from the date of
this Memorandum and Order to amend her complaint regarding the ADA
claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The Court declines to grant leave
to amend as to the Section 1983 claim because the Court concludes that
doing so would be futile. As explained above, no factual allegations

suggest that Plaintiff was discriminated against by Defendants based on
her sex. See, e.g., Terry v. Inc. Vill. of Patchogue, 826 F.3d 631,
633 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Although district judges should . . . liberally
permit pro se litigants to amend their pleadings, leave to amend need
not be granted when amendment would be futile.”)
Should Plaintiff file an amended complaint, she must satisfy the
minimal pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, providing the
defendant(s) with notice of the claim(s) and a short, plain statement
of the relevant facts supporting her claim or claims. Plaintiff must
provide facts pertinent to each claim and cannot rely on generalized or
conclusory allegations of misconduct. If Plaintiff elects to file an

amended complaint, she should label it as an “Amended Complaint” and
forth specifically what injury each defendant did to cause her to
suffer, when and how it occurred, and who was responsible for it.
Conclusory allegations will not suffice to state a claim. See Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. Finally, Plaintiff must name the individuals who were

16
personally involved as defendants or provide detailed physical
descriptions to assist with identifying them.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the complaint is dismissed for
failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff is
granted thirty days from the date of this Memorandum and Order to file

an amended complaint with respect to her ADA claims only. Plaintiff is
advised that an amended complaint replaces her original complaint. If
Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within the 30-day period
or fails to cure the deficiencies identified in this Memorandum and
Order, judgment shall enter dismissing this action with prejudice.
Plaintiff may wish to consult the City Bar Justice Center’s Federal
Pro Se Legal Assistance Project at (212) 382-4729 for free, limited-
scope legal assistance.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, in forma
pauperis status is denied for purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to serve a copy of this Memorandum and Order on
pro se Plaintiff and note service on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
December 9, 2022
Brooklyn, New York _______________________
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
17

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10308941. Public record. Not legal advice.