# Brown Bey v. State of New York (Inc)

> District Court, E.D. New York · October 28, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10308799

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** October 28, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JAYDE BROWN BEY,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff, 22-CV-03408 (HG)

v.

STATE OF NEW YORK, KATHLEEN
COURTNEY HOCHUL, LETITIA JAMES,
and ERIC ADAMS,

Defendants.

HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Jayde Brown Bey, proceeding pro se, filed this action seeking to challenge in
federal court a pending criminal prosecution in Queens County Supreme Court, People v. Brown,
Index No. Cr-026658-21-QN. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF No. 2. The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis solely for purposes of this Order and dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims without
granting Plaintiff leave to amend. As further explained below, the Court is required to abstain
from deciding Plaintiff’s claims seeking injunctive relief pursuant to the abstention doctrine
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny.
Plaintiff’s claims for damages fail against all of the various Defendants she has named due to a
combination of judicial immunity as applied to some Defendants, sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment as applied to other Defendants, and Plaintiff’s failure to allege that the
remaining Defendants personally participated in the events that have allegedly caused her harm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff’s complaint is nearly impossible to decipher. See ECF No. 1. Plaintiff identifies
herself as a “Moorish American National[] of the Moroccan Empire,” see id. at 1, a group which
this Court has previously recognized as a variant of the sovereign citizens movement—i.e., “‘a
loosely affiliated group who believe that the state and federal governments lack constitutional
legitimacy and therefore have no authority to regulate their behavior.’” Ali v. Wuchte, No. 22-
cv-1532, 2022 WL 3708844, at *3 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2022) (quoting United States v. Ulloa,

511 F. App’x 105, 107 (2d Cir. 2013)). Her complaint is replete with pseudo-legal jargon of the
kind typically used by litigants who affiliate themselves with that movement. ECF No. 1.
The gist of Plaintiff’s complaint is that she wants the Court to dismiss a criminal
proceeding pending against her in Queens County Criminal Court and to award damages of
$382,000, in the form of a purported default judgment, “payable in lawful money of .9999 fine
silver bullion coins or bars.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff names as Defendants on the first page of her
complaint the State of New York, Governor Kathleen Hochul, Attorney General Letitia James,
and Mayor Eric Adams. Id. at 1. Later in Plaintiff’s complaint, however, she further explains
that she wants a default judgment against the following additional people: (i) George Grasso, the
former Administrative Judge of the Queens County Criminal Court; (ii) William Reyes, the

current Chief Clerk of that court; (iii) Keechant Sewell, the current New York City Police
Commissioner; and (iv) Michael Lipetri, a member of the New York City Police Department. Id.
at 9. Although Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify the nature of Lipetri’s position, the Court
takes notice that he is the department’s “Chief of Crime Control Strategies,” and not a line-level
police officer who would likely have participated in Plaintiff’s arrest.1
Plaintiff’s complaint does not specify a cause of action. She does, however, list various
“[f]ederal [q]uestion(s)” based on the U.S. Constitution, various articles and rights contained

1 See Crime Control Strategies, N.Y. CITY POLICE DEP’T,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/bureaus/investigative/crime-control-strategies.page (last visited
Oct. 28, 2022).
therein, the Moroccan Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1786, and unspecified “Supreme Court
Rulings.” ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff’s recitation of these rights arising under federal law, coupled
with her naming as defendants various state and city officials, leads the Court to construe her
complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a cause of action against

any person who deprives an individual of federally guaranteed rights ‘under color’ of state law.”
Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 383 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Other courts in this
District have interpreted similar unspecified claims by pro se plaintiffs as arising under Section
1983. See, e.g., Powell v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., No. 18-cv-7022, 2022 WL 900605, at *5–6
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (treating claims invoking various treaties and constitutional provisions
as “aris[ing] under Section 1983”); Bey v. Westbury Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 21-cv-2048,
2022 WL 900615, at *7–8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (treating similar claims as “arising under
Section 1983”).
Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis at the same time that she filed her
complaint. See ECF No. 2. She left almost entirely blank the District’s standard application

requesting information about an applicant’s income, debts, and expenses, see id. at 1–2, but she
attached a purported affidavit containing more pseudo-legal jargon, see id. at 3–6. Plaintiff
asserts that she should not be required to pay the Court’s $402 filing fee because, among other
reasons: (i) The Moroccan Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1786 established that if a vessel
from either the United States or Morocco should enter the other country’s port, then the vessel is
entitled to be resupplied with “provisions or other supplies” “without any interruption or
molestation”; (ii) “[t]he Pope can abolish any Law in the United States”; and (iii) the United
States “has not had a treasury since 1921” due to the passage of the Independent Treasury Act of
1920, which transferred certain responsibilities from the Department of Treasury to the Federal
Reserve. Id. at 5 (citing Independent Treasury Act, ch. 214, 41 Stat. 654 (1920)).
LEGAL STANDARD
A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim is plausible ‘when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d
Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations
contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A pro se complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). The Court’s obligation “to construe a pro se complaint liberally”
continues to apply “[e]ven after Twombly” established the plausibility standard for assessing

pleadings. Newsome v. Bogan, 795 F. App’x 72, 72 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Harris v. Mills, 572
F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009)).
Despite this leniency afforded to pro se plaintiffs, when a plaintiff seeks permission to
proceed in forma pauperis, “the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines
that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). When conducting this review, courts must be careful “not to conflate
[e]asy cases with inarguable or fanciful ones, as only the latter warrant dismissal” as frivolous.
Alvarez v. Garland, 33 F.4th 626, 637 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(alteration in original). The Court therefore may not dismiss a complaint filed by a plaintiff
proceeding in forma pauperis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), “simply because the [C]ourt
finds the plaintiff’s allegations unlikely.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). The
Court may, however, dismiss a complaint as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of

the irrational or the wholly incredible,” and the Court need not restrict itself to facts capable of
judicial notice when reaching that conclusion. Id.
Although the Second Circuit has warned that dismissing claims sua sponte without giving
the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard “is, at a minimum, bad practice in numerous contexts and
is reversible error in others,” such dismissals “may be appropriate . . . in cases involving
frivolous in forma pauperis complaints or frivolous habeas petitions” if “it is unmistakably clear
that the court lacks jurisdiction, or that the complaint lacks merit or is otherwise defective.”
Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Those exact circumstances justify the sua sponte dismissal here of Plaintiff’s
complaint for the reasons explained below.

DISCUSSION
The abstention doctrine established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), requires the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief related to her
state court criminal proceeding. In Younger, the Supreme Court explained that “although federal
courts have the power to enjoin state criminal proceedings ‘when absolutely necessary for
protection of constitutional rights . . . this may not be done, except under extraordinary
circumstances, where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate.’” Johnson v.
Horowitz, No. 22-cv-325, 2022 WL 683755, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (quoting Younger,
401 U.S. at 45). If the criteria for Younger abstention are satisfied, then “federal courts must
decline to exercise jurisdiction.” Trump v. Vance, 941 F.3d 631, 637 (2d Cir. 2019), aff’d, 140 S.
Ct. 2412 (2020). Dismissing the criminal proceeding against Plaintiff with prejudice “would
surely constitute the type of ‘federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal proceedings’ that
Younger proscribed.” Johnson, 2022 WL 683755, at *3 (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v.

Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 70 (2013)).
Plaintiff’s damages claims against many of the Defendants also fail because they are
protected by multiple forms of immunity—starting with the judicial immunity that shields the
Defendants associated with the Queens County Criminal Court. “It is well settled that judges
generally have absolute immunity from suits for money damages for their judicial actions.”
Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 2020). “Judges are therefore subject to suit only
for (1) ‘nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity’; and (2)
‘actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.’” Brady v.
Ostrager, 834 F. App’x 616, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12
(1991)). The complete absence of jurisdiction requirement means that “[a] judge will not be

deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in
excess of his authority.” Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2009). This immunity applies to
Chief Clerk Reyes as well because “[a]bsolute judicial immunity extends to non-judicial officers
who perform acts that are ‘functionally comparable to that of a judge’ or ‘are integrally related to
an ongoing judicial proceeding.’” Raghubir v. Cogan, No. 21-cv-6705, 2022 WL 1085298, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2022) (quoting Mitchell v. Fishbein, 377 F.3d 157, 172 (2d Cir. 2004))
(collecting cases dismissing claims against clerk’s office personnel in both state and federal
courts). Since Plaintiff has not alleged that Judge Grasso or Chief Clerk Reyes wronged her by
doing anything other than carrying out their normal functions related to the operation of the
Queens County Criminal Court, see ECF No. 1, Plaintiff’s claims for damages against them must
be dismissed.
The State of New York and the remaining Defendants affiliated with it—i.e., Governor
Hochul and Attorney General James—are immune from Plaintiff’s damages claims because of

the Eleventh Amendment. “The Eleventh Amendment confirms that states, state entities, and
state officials acting in their official capacities have sovereign immunity from suit.” Kelly v.
N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., No. 21-1633-cv, 2022 WL 1210665, at *1 (2d Cir. Apr. 25, 2022).
“[T]he State of New York is plainly entitled to sovereign immunity” from Plaintiff’s damages
claims on this ground. Bythewood v. New York, No. 21-cv-4628, 2022 WL 4661568, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022); see also Arafa v. New York, No. 22-cv-4475, 2022 WL 3867650, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2022) (explaining that “Congress did not abrogate New York’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity by enacting Section 1983”).
Eleventh Amendment immunity similarly bars Plaintiff from suing Governor Hochul and
Attorney General James in federal court “[t]o the extent that any of Plaintiff’s claims for money

damages are being brought against any of [them] in their official capacities.” Kelly v. New York,
No. 19-cv-2063, 2020 WL 7042764, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2020). The Court interprets the
claims against Governor Hochul and Attorney General James to be based on actions that they
took in their official capacities because Plaintiff has made no allegation that they—or any of the
individual Defendants—were “personally involved” with her prosecution. See Joseph v. Cuomo,
No. 20-cv-3957, 2021 WL 200984, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2021) (treating claims against
Governor and Attorney General as official capacity claims for same reason and dismissing such
claims). The Court therefore dismisses those claims.
Although the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to the claims against the Defendants
affiliated with New York City—i.e., Mayor Adams, Commissioner Sewell, and Chief Lipetri—
Plaintiff’s damages claims against them must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. To bring a
claim against any of these high-ranking New York City officials, Plaintiff may not simply rely

on their status as officials with supervisory authority, but instead “must plead and prove that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Plaintiff has not even attempted to meet this standard because her complaint
includes no allegation that the City Defendants were personally involved in her criminal
prosecution. See Christian v. Adams, No. 22-cv-1780, 2022 WL 2237421, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
22, 2022) (dismissing claims against New York City Mayor because plaintiff did not “allege
facts showing the individual defendant’s direct and personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional deprivation”); Herrera v. Shea, No. 20-cv-3665, 2021 WL 1550488, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2021) (dismissing claims against NYPD Commissioner because plaintiff

“fail[ed] to allege any deliberate, intentional acts on [his] part”).
Given the many defects in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Court denies leave to amend, as other
courts within the Second Circuit have done in similar circumstances, because any such
amendment would be futile. See Johnson, 2022 WL 683755, at *3 (denying leave to amend
where court abstained based on Younger from intervening in state criminal proceeding); Kelly,
2020 WL 7042764, at *11 (denying leave to amend where court dismissed claims against some
defendants based on the Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity); Donzo v. City of New
York, No. 21-cv-629, 2021 WL 5507027, at *2, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2021) (granting leave to
amend only with respect to a single police officer but denying leave to amend with respect to
current and former police commissioner because the existing complaint contained “no allegation
of [their] personal involvement”).
CONCLUSION
The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, see ECF No.

2, solely for the purpose of this Order and dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint without leave to amend
for the reasons explained above. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any
appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is
denied for purpose of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962). The
Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment, to close this case, and to mail a copy of
this Order to the pro se Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Hector Gonzalez .
HECTOR GONZALEZ
United States District Judge
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
October 28, 2022

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10308799. Public record. Not legal advice.