# Klein v. Lakeview Fire District

> District Court, E.D. New York · September 26, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10308535

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 26, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10308535

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that denial of the entire basic retirement benefit was a deprivation subject to due process protection

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-------------------------------------X

YONATAN KLEIN,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
21-cv-1468 (KAM)(JMW)
-against-

LAKEVIEW FIRE DISTRICT, LAKEVIEW FIRE
DEPARTMENT, FREDERICK G. SENTI, JR.,
FREDERICK G. SENTI, III, JAMES GALIA,
MICHAEL KOPPEL and HEATHER McNEILL,

Defendants.

-------------------------------------X
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Yonathan Klein (“Plaintiff”) commenced the
instant action against Defendants Lakeview Fire District (the
“Fire District”) and Lakeview Fire Department (the “Fire
Department”) (together, “Lakeview”), and Defendants Fredrick G.
Senti, Jr. (“Senti Jr.”), Fredrick G. Senti, III (“Senti III”),
James Galia (“Galia”), Michael Koppel (“Koppel”), and Heather
McNeill (“McNeill”) (together, the “Individual Defendants” and,
collectively with Lakeview, “Defendants”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights
under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (See ECF No.
1 (“Compl.”) at 2-3.) Plaintiff also alleges claims for
retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a
hostile work environment pursuant to New York state law. (See id.
at 3.)
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) with respect to
Plaintiff’s constitutional claims. (See ECF No. 27, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss (“Mot. to Dismiss”).) Defendants further request
this Court, once it dismisses the constitutional claims, to decline
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1376(c)(3) and Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’
motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.
BACKGROUND
For the purpose of deciding Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, the Court accepts as true the well-pleaded factual

allegations in the Amended Complaint and exhibits attached thereto
(see ECF Nos. 20-21) and draws all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiff’s favor. See Sabir v. Williams, 37 F.4th 810, 814 (2d
Cir. 2022); Biro v. Condé Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015).
Generally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district
court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face
of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or
incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which
judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of
N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). Based
on the foregoing, this Court accepts as true the following
allegations.
I. Factual Background

Plaintiff was a volunteer firefighter at Lakeview Fire
Department from February 2011 to January 2021 and served as a
Second Lieutenant from February 2017 through November 2019. (ECF
No. 20, Amended Complaint (“AC”) ¶¶ 10, 61.
Lakeview Fire District is the administrative
establishment overseeing operations for the Lakeview Fire
Department, a volunteer fire department, and serves West
Hempstead, a hamlet in the Town of Hempstead, County of Nassau,
State of New York. (Id. ¶ 11.) The Fire District is governed by
a Board of Commissioners, which consists of five individuals
selected by residents served by the Lakeview Fire District. (Id.)

Three of the Individual Defendants—Koppel, Senti Jr.,
and McNeill—served as Commissioners during the period relevant to
the Plaintiff’s allegations. (See id.) In addition to
Commissioner, Senti Jr. has also served as Chief of the Fire
Department, Records Officer, and Secretary and is paid by the Fire
Districts’ tax-payers. (Id. ¶ 13.) Defendant Senti III, Senti
Jr.’s son, is currently a Lieutenant with the Fire Department and
previously served as the Chief of Department. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.)
Defendant Galia is currently the Chief of the Fire Department,
(id. ¶ 12), and previously, Defendant Galia served as a Captain
and then Assistant Chief. (Id. ¶ 15.) Defendant Koppel, in
addition to being a Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of
Record, previously served as Chief of the Fire Department. (Id.

¶ 16.) Defendant McNeill is Senti Jr.’s daughter, and Senti III’s
sister, and previously served as Chief of the Fire Department and
is currently a Lieutenant and Chair of Lakeview’s Board of Fire
Commissioners. (Id. ¶ 17.) She is also married to non-party
Patrick McNeill, who served as Chief of the Fire Department during
times relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations. (Id. ¶ 31.)
A. The Initial Incident
Plaintiff alleges a “continuous course of unlawful
conduct,” (id. at ¶¶ 1,2) by the Defendants, precipitated by a
physical altercation on November 26, 2017, when Defendant Senti
III assaulted another volunteer member, Jack Ackerman (“Ackerman”)
at the Fire Department’s firehouse. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff, who

had been nominated and elected as Second Lieutenant in February
2017, and other firefighters, including Salvatore Sinatro
(“Sinatro”)—the Chief of the Fire Department at the time—witnessed
the physical assault by Senti III. (Id.) Plaintiff separated the
two men and took Ackerman into another room. (Id.)
Once separated, Ackerman voiced his desire to report the
assault to the Nassau County Police Department. (Id.) Plaintiff
replied by telling Ackerman that he had every right to do so.
(Id.) Ackerman filed a complaint with the Nassau County Police
Department, and Senti III was arrested later that day for assault
and obstruction of airway and suspended by Lakeview for
approximately fifteen days. (Id. ¶ 20.)
B. Harassment at the Firehouse and Initial Reports to
Authority

After Senti III’s assault of Ackerman and his arrest and
suspension, he and his father, Senti Jr., began to harass
Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 21.) After each incident of threatening
violence, assaultive behavior, and/or verbal harassment, Plaintiff
reported the activities to superior authorities in the Fire
District and Fire Department. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 25-28, 31, 36.)
Examples of harassment of Plaintiff by the Senti
Defendants include: Senti Jr. (1) calling plaintiff derogatory
names (e.g., “cunt,” “a piece of shit”); (2) physically charging
at Plaintiff with a broom handle, and threatening Plaintiff with
violence; and (3) driving back and forth past Plaintiff’s family
home in an official vehicle, causing Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s
wife to feel unsafe. (Id. ¶¶ 21-23.) Senti III “promise[d]”
Plaintiff that he would make Plaintiff’s life at work difficult.
(Id. ¶ 24.)

Senti Jr. also harassed other witnesses to the assault,
such as non-party Eli Wein (“Wein”), another firefighter and
paramedic. (Id. at ¶ 25.) On or about November 29, 2017, Senti
Jr. confronted Wein regarding a witness statement Wein signed
reporting Senti III’s assault of Ackerman. (Id.) Not only did
Defendant Senti Jr. say to Wein that he intended to harass

Plaintiff and Wein until the day they left Lakeview, but he also
told Wein that “people can fall downstairs during fires.” (Id. at
¶ 26.) “[I]t would just seem like an accident because accidents
happen during fires.” (Id.)
On November 29 and 30, 2017, respectively, Plaintiff and
Wein each sent an email memorandum detailing the disturbing
behavior of Senti Jr. to Defendant Galia, then the Captain and
Assistant Chief of the Fire Department. (Id. ¶¶ 25-28; see also
ECF Nos. 20-1, Exh. 1, Wein Memorandum; 20-2, Exh. 2, Klein
Memorandum.) Defendant Galia did not respond to either memorandum.
(Id.)
Senti Jr. and Senti III’s harassment continued for

months. On March 22, 2018, Senti Jr. and Senti III continued to
harass Plaintiff, including Senti III threatening to “knock [his]
f—cking head off,” and noting that a soft tissue injury was
“nothing to what [Plaintiff] would get.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Senti Jr.
also threatened to knock Plaintiff’s teeth out, made repeated
comments about Plaintiff’s wife, physically charged at Plaintiff
and verbally threatened Plaintiff’s family. (Id.)
On March 23, 2018, Plaintiff sent another email to
Defendant Galia, non-party Assistant Chief Michael Joyce
(“Joyce”), and Patrick McNeill, who is the husband of Defendant
McNeill and then-Chief of the Fire Department, regarding the
conduct and verbal abuse by Defendants Senti Jr. and Senti III,

and expressed his fear of “imminent and potentially catastrophic
retaliation” from Senti Jr. and Senti III. (Id. ¶ 31; see ECF No.
20-3, Exh. 3, Klein Second Memorandum. Galia failed to respond
despite his duty to do so. (Id. ¶ 32.)
On October 27, 2018, Senti III and Plaintiff got into
another argument, where Senti III came within inches of Plaintiff’s
face and once again, made threats of physical violence to
Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 33.)
Senti Jr. continued threatening Plaintiff, specifically
noting Plaintiff’s involvement with the discipline of Senti III
after Senti III’s assault on Ackerman and called Plaintiff profane
names. (Id. ¶ 34.) Senti Jr. also told Plaintiff that he should

“sleep with [his] gun tonight,” just hours after a mass shooting
at a Pittsburgh synagogue that day.1 (Id.) At a Board of
Commissioners meeting later that evening, Senti Jr., in front of
Lakeview’s Board of Commissioners, also yelled at Plaintiff,

1 The Court takes judicial notice that the mass shooting at the Pittsburgh
synagogue occurred on October 27, 2018 and eleven people were killed and six
people were injured. See Campbell Robertson, Christopher Mele and Sabrina
Tavernise, 11 Killed in Synagogue Massacre; Suspect Charged With 29 Counts,
THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 27, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/27/us/active-
shooter-pittsburgh-synagogue-shooting.html.
stating, “[a]s a Commissioner I can throw you out of here and you
can suck my fucking dick.” (Id. ¶ 35.)
After Senti Jr. screamed at Plaintiff in front of the

Lakeview Board of Commissioners on October 27, 2018, Plaintiff
submitted a “Workplace Violence Notification” to then-Chief
Sinatro on October 28, 2018. (ECF Nos. 20, AC ¶ 36; 20-4, Exh. 4,
Workplace Violence Notification.) Sinatro failed to respond.
(Id.)
On December 5, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a complaint to
the New York State Department of Labor’s Public Employee Safety
and Health Bureau (“PESH”), alleging the lack of a workplace
violence prevention program.2 (ECF Nos. 20, AC ¶ 37; 20-5, Exh.
5, Notice of Alleged Safety or Health Hazards). Plaintiff asserted
violations of 12 NYCRR 800.6(f), 12 NYCRR 800.6(h), and 12 NYCRR
800.6(i). (Id.)
C. Department of Labor Inspection and Aftermath

After PESH received Plaintiff’s report on January 7,
2019, it conducted an onsite partial safety inspection on January
22, 2019 at the Fire Department’s headquarters. (ECF No. 20, AC
¶ 38.) Defendant McNeill participated in the inspection. (Id.)

2 The parties also refer to Plaintiff’s PESH complaint as an OSHA complaint,
but the Court will refer to it as a PESH complaint. (ECF Nos. 20, AC ¶ 73; 20-
12, Exh. 12, Facebook Post.) The Court only has record of Plaintiff’s complaint
to the New York State Department of Labor’s Public Employee Safety and Health
Bureau (PESH), rather than an additional complaint to the federal counterpart
of PESH, U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). (ECF Nos.
20, AC ¶ 37; 20-5, Exh. 5, Notice of Alleged Safety or Health Hazards.)
As a result of the investigation, Plaintiff’s complaint was
sustained and a Notice of Violation and Order to Comply was issued
to Lakeview.3 (Id.)

On February 27, 2019, about a month after PESH’s
inspection of Lakeview, Defendant Senti Jr. posted a form titled,
“Hurt Feelings Report” on four official bulletin boards in the
firehouse. (ECF Nos. 20, ¶ 39; 20-6, Exh. 6, Hurt Feelings
Report.) The “Hurt Feelings Form” form was fashioned to mock a
standard complaint form; it stated reasons for filing a complaint
that included: “I am a pussy”; “I have woman like hormones”; “I am
queer”; and “I am a little bitch.” (ECF No. 20-6, Exh. 6, Hurt
Feelings Report.) The form also included a line to identify the
harasser or assailant, styled as “Name of ‘Real Man’ who hurt your
sensitive little feelings” and “Real-man signature: (person being
accused)”. (Id.)

On May 23, 2019, Defendant McNeill said to Plaintiff, at
the monthly firehouse meeting in front of other members of the
firehouse, “when you go outside of the organization, we have thrown
people out for less.” (ECF No. 20, AC ¶ 40.) Plaintiff cited
this comment as one of the Defendants’ many retaliatory threats.
On June 2, 2019, Lakeview issued its first Workplace
Violence Statement and Policy. (Id. ¶ 41.)

3 Neither party has submitted PESH’s Notice of Violation and Order to Comply
(ECF No. 20, AC ¶ 38) or the Workplace Violence Statement and Policy (id. ¶
41).
D. FOIL Request and Aftermath
On July 9, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a New York Freedom
of Information Law (“FOIL”) request to the Fire District for the

Board of Commissioners’ meeting minutes, agendas, and financial
records for the prior 12 months. (Id. ¶ 42.) Senti Jr. provided
a copy of the June 2019 financial statement and told Plaintiff
that the rest of his request would be forwarded to Lakeview’s
attorney. (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff received no further response to
this request. (Id.)
On July 10, 2019, Senti III “audited” one of Plaintiff’s
training sessions by appearing at the location where Plaintiff was
training other firefighters, despite Senti III lacking authority
to audit Plaintiff’s training, and told Plaintiff it was because
he had submitted a FOIL request to the Fire District. (Id. ¶ 44.)
Defendant McNeill did not intervene despite witnessing Senti III’s

appearance and statement, but Joyce admonished Senti III for this
behavior. (Id. ¶ 45.)
On July 31, 2019, Senti III “audited” another training course
that Plaintiff attended, this time held by Joyce. (Id. ¶ 46.)
Senti III and Plaintiff interacted with one another at this
training culminating in Senti III yelling that he would “love to
fuck [Plaintiff] up” and explicitly cited Plaintiff “using the
system” and submitting FOIL requests as his reason. (Id. ¶¶ 48-
49.) Defendant Koppel was present during this interaction but did
not intervene. (Id. ¶ 50.)
Plaintiff filed a criminal complaint with the Nassau

County Police Department in response to the July 31, 2019 incident,
during which Senti III expressed his desire to harm Plaintiff.
(Id. ¶ 51.) A report was taken by the police, but the police did
not follow up. (Id.)
On August 1, 2019, Plaintiff submitted a Workplace
Violence Incident Report to Defendant Galia regarding Senti III’s
presence at the July 31, 2019 training. (ECF No. 20-7, Exh. 7,
Workplace Violence Incident Report on August 1, 2019.)(“Fred Senti
[III] began making comments towards me such as ‘such a cunt’, ‘I'm
going to cry because they honked the horn’, etc.”) In addition,
Plaintiff informed Defendant Galia that “[m]y FOIL request
submission is a document that exists between me (a taxpayer) and

the fire district (government entity). This issue has nothing to
do with Fred Senti III.” (Id. at 4.)
E. Continued Harassment
On August 4, 2019, Plaintiff was driving to the firehouse
when Senti III began following him. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶ 53.) In
the parking lot, Senti III began cursing and threatening Plaintiff
outside of his car. (Id. ¶ 54.) Fire District Commissioners
Defendant Koppel, Defendant McNeill, and non-party Pasquale Rayano
(“Rayano”) were present and witnessed Senti III’s behavior. (Id.)
Defendant Koppel asked Plaintiff to leave so that the others could
calm Senti III down. (Id. at ¶ 55.) Plaintiff did not leave
immediately as he needed something from the medical cabinet, so he

stayed in the car while Defendant Koppel retrieved the medicine
for him. (Id.)
Plaintiff left the firehouse and told his family to stay
indoors. (Id. ¶ 56.) On August 4, 2019, he filed another report
with the Nassau County Police Department in response to Senti III’s
actions, and out of fear that Senti III would follow him home.
(Id.)
F. The Suspension and Resignation from Lieutenant Role
The next day, on August 5, 2019, Plaintiff was suspended
by then-Chief Sinatro for “conduct unbecoming an officer” due to
the August 4, 2019 incident with Senti III. (Id. ¶ 57.) On August
12, 2019, Plaintiff was afforded a hearing by the Lakeview

disciplinary committee, and they found him guilty of “conduct
unbecoming [of] an officer” due to the August 4, 2019 incident.4
(Id.) Plaintiff was suspended for 15 days and was unable to
achieve the required length of service award points or required
quota to finish the year in good standing. (Id.)

4 It is not clear from the record which individuals the Lakeview disciplinary
committee is comprised of and whether any or all of the Individual
Defendants, in their official capacities as authorities of the Fire District
and Fire Department, might have served on the committee.
On August 12, 2019, Plaintiff wrote Lakeview’s records
access officer appealing Lakeview’s failure to respond to the first
FOIL request. (Id. ¶ 58.) On October 21, 2019, Plaintiff

submitted a second FOIL request, this time, for minutes, agendas,
and financial records for the prior sixteen months. (Id. ¶ 59.)
A week later, Senti Jr. replied with a letter dated July 23, 2019
requesting payment from Plaintiff for the records in his first
FOIL request. (Id. ¶ 60.)
On November 9, 2019, then-Chief Sinatro told Plaintiff
that if Plaintiff did not resign as a Lieutenant, the Individual
Defendants would “continue to ‘bust [his] balls.” (Id. ¶ 60.)
“Under duress”, Plaintiff reluctantly resigned his position as a
Lieutenant but remained a member of the Fire Department. (Id. ¶
61.) Plaintiff’s resignation letter noted the Defendants’ verbal
abuse, threats, and harassment and that he could no longer bear

the stress in the workplace. (ECF No. 20-8, Exh. 8, Klein
Lieutenant Resignation Letter.)
On November 12, 2019, Plaintiff sent two additional
letters to Lakeview’s records access officer: the first stating
that the Fire District’s failure to timely respond to his first
July 16, 2019 FOIL request constituted a refusal of access; and
the second appealing the Fire District’s failure to respond to his
second October 25, 2019 FOIL request. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶ 62.)
Lakeview did not respond to either letter. (Id.)
The Department also failed to provide Plaintiff with the
necessary letter for a tax reduction in real estate and school
taxes that Plaintiff earned as a volunteer firefighter, despite
Plaintiff’s multiple requests. (Id. at ¶ 63.) The Departments’

refusal of the tax reduction letter cost Plaintiff over $1,000 for
the 2020 tax year. (Id.)
G. Social Media Bullying
In or around May of 2020, non-party EMT Renee Farrell
(“Farrell”) created a chat (referred to herein as the “Fire
Department GroupMe” or “GroupMe”) for the Fire Department on
GroupMe, an online group chat platform, in which the Fire
Department used to post policy updates and disseminate Department
information regarding health policy, upcoming Department classes,
and scheduling Department training.5 (Id. ¶ 64.)
On July 29, 2020, as part of the ongoing retaliatory

harassment, Defendant McNeill posted on the Fire Department
GroupMe chat “Attn LONG ISLAND FF’S PESH IS OUT. 1k fine per non
mask wearer. LOCK YOUR STATON AND BAY DOORS; answer when they
ring the bell . . . with your mask on . . . Not for us exclusively

5 The Plaintiff, in his Amended Complaint, refers to messages in the GroupMe
chat as an “official message board”. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶ 74.) The Court will
refer to the GroupMe chat or “Fire Department GroupMe” because it was a de facto
official message board for the Lakeview Fire District and Fire Department as it
“disseminate[d] official Department business” including “requesting available
members to respond to [Fire Department] incidents.” (Id. ¶ 64.)
this time courtesy of . . . ehhh nevermind . . . you ALL know.”
(ECF Nos. 20, AC ¶ 65; 20-9, Exh. 9, GroupMe Chat Screenshot.)
Later that same day, Senti III posted a series of

messages on the Fire Department GroupMe that appeared to refer to
Plaintiff’s first name Yonathan or “Yoni” for short. Senti III
provided a screenshot of a Wikipedia page defining the word “Yoni”
as “womb” in Sanskrit. (ECF Nos. 20, AC ¶ 69.) The Wikipedia
page highlighted that the word may connote female sexual organs
such as “vagina.” (Id. at ¶ 67.) Senti III added:
“Etymology of names is cool”
“Who knew it really meant that and I was right all
along”
“Fuck it, time for fireworks I wouldn’t be me if it
🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
wasn’t .”

(ECF Nos. 20, AC ¶ 66; 20-9, Exh. 9, GroupMe Chat Screenshot.)
Senti III’s post also stated, “Not a coincidence,” and “Blame
Wikipedia and your mom not me.” (Id.) Plaintiff then posted a
GroupMe message saying “Thank you,” to which Senti III replied
“Your [sic] welcome,” and “Now I see you were just living up to
your name all along!” (Id.)
That same day Senti III posted more messages in the
GroupMe chat saying, “I found something that you might find
interesting though” and “[i]t literally explains everything.”
(ECF No. 20-11, Exh. 11, GroupMe Chat Screenshot 2.) He then asked
“[w]hat do you think should I share my findings.” (Id.) Defendant
McNeill responded in the GroupMe chat, “Now now . . . there will
be a lot of paperwork if you do. Letters, tissues, crying . . .”
(Id.) Senti III then said, “Isn’t there always anyway? Mostly
manufactured lies.” (Id.)

On August 11, 2020, Defendant Galia posted a photograph
on Facebook depicting a fire truck ladder basket raised and
extended next to a telephone pole with a hand ladder inside it
leaning against the telephone pole. (ECF No. 20-12, Exh. 12,
Facebook Post.) Text on this photograph states, “SOMEWHERE AN
OSHA MANUAL JUST BURST INTO FLAMES,” appearing to refer to
Plaintiff’s complaint to PESH. (Id.) Defendant McNeill commented
on Defendant Galia’s post, “Watch out for those violations.
Falsified or not.” (Id.)
On August 12, 2020, Defendant Galia emailed Plaintiff
stating that after a meeting of the Board of Fire Commissioners
the previous night, Galia was “tasked” with requesting from

Plaintiff (i) access to the safe program, (ii) return of the 2018
recertification paperwork, (iii) the login and password to
Lakeview’s website. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶ 70.) Plaintiff responded
that he did not have access to the safe or re-certification
paperwork and asked whether he was being terminated as the Fire
Department's webmaster. (Id. ¶ 71.) The record does not reflect
whether Defendant Galia responded.
On August 13, 2020, in the Fire Department’s GroupMe
chat, Senti III sent a message: “By removing him now he can’t see
all the fun and cool stuff he’s missing . . .” (ECF No. 20-13,
Exh. 13, GroupMe Chat Screenshot 3.) Defendant McNeill responded
in the GroupMe, “I’m good with ridding the useless. The board’s

attorney has given the go ahead of swamp draining. Gotta go . .
.” (Id.) Immediately following this message, Defendant Koppel
wrote, “Teamwork baby, families fight but they always end up
righting their mistakes not writing letters or filing false police
reports.” (Id.) Senti III responded, “Amen.” (Id.)
Shortly after this GroupMe exchange between the three
defendants on the Fire Department GroupMe, the Plaintiff and three
others were removed from the GroupMe chat by Defendant McNeill.
(ECF No. 20-14, Exh. 14, GroupMe Chat Screenshot 4.) Immediately
after the removals, Defendant McNeill stated to the rest of the
group, “Write another letter.” (Id.)
On August 17, 2020, Defendant Koppel emailed Plaintiff

advising him that after discussion with the Board of Fire
Commissioners and the Chiefs, Plaintiff was terminated as
Lakeview’s narcotics agent. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶¶ 76-77.) Plaintiff
had emailed Defendant Koppel on August 16, 2020, advising that
controlled substances needed to be ordered and that the Fire
Department’s benzodiazepine supply was expiring. (Id.)
At some point Plaintiff was added back to the Fire
Department GroupMe but was then removed again from the GroupMe
chat on October 4, 2020, this time by Farrell. (Id. ¶ 78.) After
the removal, Farrell privately messaged Plaintiff stating, “I was
asked to remove you from the group due to the fact that you have
no quota and no responses on calls, that’s exactly what I was told

so I’m just letting you know sorry.” (ECF Nos. 20 AC, ¶ 78; 20-
15, Exh. 15, Farrell Screenshot.)
In response to his removal from the Fire Department
GroupMe, Plaintiff complained to Defendant Galia who informed him
that “Groupme is not under my jurisdiction . . . because they are
not sanctioned by the district or department . . . [it’s] just a
group of friends with a common interest . . .” (Id. ¶ 79; ECF No.
20-16, Exh. 16, Galia Screenshot.) Galia also wrote, “In regards
to [Senti III] showing up to your house [on August 13, after Senti
III followed Plaintiff home, rolled down his window and yelled at
Plaintiff] . . . I am told that since he was not on district
property, operating a district vehicle and not sent there to talk
to you by his superiors that is a private matter.” (Id.)6

According to the Department’s official social media
policy, issued on February 14, 2017, “[e]mployees should use their
best judgement in not posting material that is inappropriate nor
harmful to Lakeview Fire Department and/or Lakeview Fire District,
its employees, or civilians of the District.” (ECF No. 20-17,

6 The Court notes that Plaintiff previously reported that Senti Jr. has driven
by Plaintiff’s home in a district vehicle (ECF No. 20-2, Klein Memorandum),
even if his son, Senti III, did not during the incident referenced by Galia in
this message.
Exh. 17, Lakeview Social Media Policy.) The social media policy
goes on to list “commentary, content, or images that are
defamatory, pornographic, proprietary, harassing, libelous, under

criminal/open investigations, or that can create a hostile work
environment” as examples of content that employees are not to
publish. (Id.)
H. The Termination
By letter dated January 12, 2021, Defendant Galia
terminated Plaintiff as a Lakeview volunteer firefighter, citing
the Fire Department’s bylaws and that Plaintiff had not maintained
his quota of meeting attendance and trainings. (ECF Nos. 20, AC
¶¶ 81-82; 20-18, Exh. 18, Termination Letter.) The termination
letter explained that Plaintiff was asked to speak to the officers
of the Fire Department in order to discuss his purported failure
to meet the attendance and training quota, but that Plaintiff did

not schedule the meeting. (ECF No. 20-18, Termination Letter.)
Plaintiff does not state if he complied with the request that he
speak with Fire Department officers regarding his failure to meet
the quota, but alleges there was a “pervasive and hostile
environment created by Defendants” and that he felt that he was
“constructively prevented from fulfilling his duties out of a
legitimate fear for his physical safety.” (Id. ¶¶ 82-83.)
Defendants’ basis for terminating Plaintiff was a sham
and its quota policy was selectively enforced against Plaintiff.
(Id. ¶ 83.) At the Fire Department, in 2019, 58 volunteers,
comprising 56% of the Fire Department volunteers, had lower
attendance than Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 20, AC ¶¶ 83-85; 20-19, Exh.

19, 2019 Quota Report.) In 2020, nearly 22% of the volunteer force
had an attendance rate lower than Plaintiff’s. (ECF Nos. 20, AC
¶¶ 83-85; 20-20, Exh. 20, 2020 Quota Report 2.)
In further retaliation by Defendants, Plaintiff was
terminated from the Fire District Benevolent Association’s
Insurance Program four days after he filed his complaint against
Defendants in this Court. (ECF Nos. 20, AC ¶¶ 86-93; 20-21, Exh.
21, Insurance Company Letter.) Plaintiff discovered he had been
terminated from the Insurance Program after receiving a letter
from the insurance company stating that he would no longer be
receiving benefits from the Fire District. (Id.)
LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although
“detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers labels or conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
(quotation omitted).

When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced in
the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in bringing
suit and that are either in the plaintiff's possession or that the
plaintiff knew of when bringing suit or matters of which judicial
notice may be taken. See Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d
768, 776 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Estevez v. City of New York, No.
16-cv-00073, 2017 WL 1167379, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2017).
DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to plead
viable constitutional claims to support an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff has pleaded abundant facts

to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim and
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim. The Court respectfully
rejects the Defendants’ qualified immunity arguments and
Lakeview’s arguments against Monell liability.
I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
To maintain a section 1983 action, Plaintiff must allege
two elements. First, “the conduct complained of must have been
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Pitchell
v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).
The Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Defendants acted under
color of state law. Second, “the conduct complained of must have
deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Id. Section 1983

“does not create a federal right or benefit; it simply provides a
mechanism for enforcing a right or benefit established elsewhere.”
Morris–Hayes v. Bd. of Educ. of Chester Union Free Sch. Dist., 423
F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 816 (1985)). The Court address Defendants’ alleged
violations of Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged a
plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against all of the
Defendants. “[W]hile the government enjoys significantly greater
latitude when it acts in its capacity as employer than when it

acts as sovereign, the First Amendment nonetheless prohibits it
from punishing its employees in retaliation for the content of
their protected speech.” Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 166 (2d
Cir. 2001). A public employee may establish a First Amendment
retaliation claim against his governmental employer “that: (1) his
or her speech was constitutionally protected; (2) he or she
suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection
exists between the speech and the adverse employment action.”
Washington v. County of Rockland, 373 F.3d 310, 320 (2d Cir. 2004).
1. Protected Speech
The First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech
only when it is “made as a citizen on matters of public concern

rather than as an employee on matters of personal interest.”
Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2003) (quotation
omitted). “Speech by a public employee is on a matter of public
concern if it relates ‘to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community.’” Id. (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). “Whether an employee's speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form,
and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48.
In the Amended Complaint, the Court finds numerous and
sufficiently pleaded examples of Plaintiff’s speech on matters of
public concern. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. On October 27, 2018,

after Senti Jr., a Fire District Commissioner, threatened
Plaintiff at a Board of Commissioners meeting, Plaintiff filed a
workplace violence notification to Fire Department authorities; on
December 5, 2018, Plaintiff filed with the New York Department of
Labor a PESH complaint that Lakeview lacked a workplace violence
prevention program; and on July 9, 2019 and October 21, 2019,
Plaintiff filed FOIL requests seeking Board of Commissioner
meeting minutes, agendas, and financial records. (ECF No. 20, AC
¶¶ 36-37, 42, 59.)
The precipitating event for Defendants’ First Amendment
violations of Plaintiff’s rights was the Plaintiff’s intervention
in attempting to stop the 2017 assault by Senti III on Ackerman,

and Plaintiff’s advice to Ackerman that it would be appropriate to
report Senti III’s assault to the police. (Id. ¶ 19.) Thereafter,
Defendants continually referenced Plaintiff’s intervention in
their written and verbal threats against Plaintiff and other Fire
Department members, retaliating after Plaintiff supported Ackerman
after Senti III’s assault. (Id. ¶ 21.) Defendants negatively
reacted to Plaintiff’s reporting of workplace violence. (ECF Nos.
20-2, Exh. 2, Klein Memorandum (“Since the suspension of Fred
Senti III, Commissioner Fred Senti Jr. has been engaging in
harassment and creating a hostile work environment.”); 20-1, Exh.
1, Wein Memorandum (detailing how Defendant Senti Jr. mentioned
“he would continue to harass [Plaintiff and Wein] until the day we

leave the department.”).) Reporting instances of assault by
employees of a government agency, especially when the assault is
perpetrated by a public official with a supervisory or leadership
position in the presence of other public employees, falls well
within the realm of matters of public concern.
Following multiple events of threats by Defendants Senti
Jr. and Senti III against Plaintiff and other volunteer
firefighters with whom they engaged in additional physical and
verbal altercations, Plaintiff also reported various examples of
workplace violence or harassment that not only related to his own
experiences, but the experience of other Fire Department employees
as well. (ECF Nos. 20-1, Exh. 1, Klein Memorandum (“On 11/29/2017,

Commissioner Fred Senti Jr. told [non-party Wein] that he would
arrange for someone to kick Firefighter Ryan Ackerman and
[Plaintiff] down the stairs in a fire.”; 20-5, Exh. 5, Notice of
Alleged Safety or Health Hazards (“[Ex-Chief Frederick Senti III
and Commissioner Fred Senti Jr.] have both directly threatened the
safety of [Fire Department] members.”).) Matters of workplace
safety, particularly involving firefighters who are undertaking
physical risks when performing their duties to protect the public,
are no doubt matters of concern to the public, which funds the
Fire Department.
The fact that other firefighters spoke out and were
threatened or assaulted and that the Individual Defendants were

aware of the abuse, underscores that the workplace incidents at
Lakeview had a broader, public component. Fellow Fire Department
member Wein also sent a memorandum detailing the behavior of
Defendant Senti III to Defendant Galia, the Captain and Assistant
Chief of the Fire Department at the time. (ECF Nos. 20, AC ¶¶ 25-
28; 20-1, Exh. 1, Wein Memorandum (“[Senti III] went on to make a
not so veiled threat against [Plaintiff] and [another member]
telling me how ‘people can just fall downstairs during fires’ and
it would just seem like an accident because accidents happen during
fires.”).) Reports by Wein and Plaintiff of threats by high-
ranking officials of the Fire Department, including threats of
physical assault while performing firefighting duties, provide

context as instructed by the Supreme Court in Connick in
considering whether speech by firefighters Wein and Plaintiff,
embodied in their memoranda to Captain and Assistant Chief Galia,
was of a purely personal nature, or whether it addressed matters
of concern to the community.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s exercise of speech was
“merely calculated to redress personal grievances,” but this Court
disagrees. See MacFall v. City of Rochester, 495 F. App’x 158,
160 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). As an initial matter, in
considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true the
well-pleaded facts alleged in the Amended Complaint.
Considering “the content, form, and context” of

Plaintiff’s speech, “as revealed by the whole record,” this Court
finds that Plaintiff’s speech is not solely about a personal
grievance and but about matters of public concern including
pervasive violent threats and workplace abuses by supervisory
officials of a public entity charged with protecting the public
safety. The supervisory Individual Defendants, paid by the public,
allegedly used their authority to threaten members of the Fire
Department for truthfully reporting assaults and threats by
supervisors, including a threat to hurt members of the Fire
Department while fighting a fire and harassing them until they
left. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48; Pekowsky v. Yonkers Bd. of
Educ., 23 F. Supp. 3d 269, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“A ‘matter of

public concern’ is one that ‘relates to any matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community.’” (quoting Singer v.
Ferro, 711 F.3d 334, 339 (2d Cir. 2013))); see also Magilton v.
Tocco, 379 F. Supp. 2d 495, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (assuming that an
employee’s complaints to PESH regarding his State employer's poor
workplace safety practices were a matter of public concern and
triggered First Amendment protections). Furthermore, even if
Plaintiff’s internal reports and the New York Department of Labor
PESH complaint were later motivated, in part, by Plaintiff’s
personal concerns for his safety, the Second Circuit has found
that “[a] speaker’s motive is not dispositive in determining
whether his or her speech addresses a matter of public concern .

. . [and] it does not follow that a person motivated by a personal
grievance cannot be speaking on a matter of public concern.” Sousa
v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164, 173 (2d Cir. 2009).
Defendants further argue that a court in this District
found in Gustler, that the filing of workplace violence reports
and the PESH complaint did not amount to speech protected under
the First Amendment because they “concerned Plaintiff’s
personality conflict with a co-worker and Plaintiff’s ability to
continue to work with that individual.” (ECF No. 27, Mot. to
Dismiss at 12.) Unlike the Gustler case, the Individual Defendants
were not co-workers, but were supervisors with authority whose
threats and abuse were frequently perpetrated in front of other

employees. Based on the Plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations, the
Court does not agree that the Defendants’ pervasive and systemic
harassment of Plaintiff and other Lakeview firefighters could
plausibly be a mere personality disagreement with Plaintiff. In
any event, Defendants’ analysis of the Gustler opinion is
incomplete. The court in Gustler found that Plaintiff’s speech
was protected under the First Amendment, because he went to the
police department about the same incidents that he reported on
internally. The Gustler court stated that the complaints about an
intoxicated firefighter to the police department was the “right of
every citizen” and “dealt directly with matters of public safety.”
Gustler at 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). In the present case, Plaintiff

similarly twice reported the supervising Individual Defendants’
threats of violence and abuse to the Nassau County Police
Department, notwithstanding that he first reported the same
incidents internally. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶¶ 51, 56). Even if
Plaintiff’s internal workplace violence reports and PESH complaint
are not protected speech, the Court nonetheless concludes that his
reports to the Nassau County police were protected speech.
In addition to Plaintiff’s speech regarding the
Individual Defendants’ workplace violence, threats, and harassment
at Lakeview, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim has another viable
basis. Plaintiff submitted FOIL requests for the Board of
Commissioners meeting minutes, agendas, and financial records

after he, as a taxpayer, suspected official vehicles were being
used for unofficial business. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶¶ 42, 48, 59.) As
one of Plaintiff’s workplace violence incident reports even
explained, “[m]y FOIL request submission is a document that exists
between me (a taxpayer) and the fire district (government entity).
This issue has nothing to do with Fred Senti III.” (ECF No. 20-
7, Exh. 7, Workplace Violence Incident Report on August 1, 2019 at
4.) Plaintiff’s concern regarding misuse of official vehicles
during non-duty hours was based, in part, on his own observations
and experience, including an incident where Senti III drove to
Plaintiff’s home late in the evening, activated a siren, awakened
Plaintiff’s children. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶¶ 41-48.) Plaintiff’s

requests for information from public entities on how they are
utilizing, monitoring, and spending their publicly funded
resources constitutes citizen speech on matters of public interest
and is wholly within the realm of public concern. See McAvey v.
Orange-Ulster BOCES, 805 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(finding that FOIL requests by a citizen are considered protected
speech). The numerous instances of retaliation to which Plaintiff
was subjected after filing FOIL requests provided additional bases
for Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.
Significantly, Defendants do not contend—and thus have
forfeited for purposes of their motion—that Lakeview had
firefighting interests that conclusively outweigh Plaintiff’s

First Amendment speech interests. If a public employee speaks as
a citizen on a matter of public concern, whether her speech is
protected by the First Amendment must also be evaluated under the
so-called Pickering analysis, which considers “whether the
relevant government entity ‘had an adequate justification for
treating the employee differently from any other member of the
public based on the government’s needs as an employer.’” Pickering
v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). In conducting this
analysis, courts look to whether an employer could reasonably
predict that the employee’s speech would cause a disruption serious
enough to outweigh the value of the speech to matters of public
concern, and whether the potential disruption was the motivation
of the adverse action. Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 629 F.3d
97, 115 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Kelly v. Huntington Union Free

Sch. Dist., 675 F. Supp. 2d 283, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (explaining
that the Pickering analysis is “fact-intensive”).
Defendants, however, offer no justifications for their
actions against Plaintiff, and do not argue that any governmental
need as an employer outweighed Plaintiff’s exercise of his speech
rights, or that his speech was disruptive. At least at this stage,
it is plausible that Defendants’ threatening, harassing, and
retaliatory actions did not arise from any valid governmental
interest and that Plaintiff's speech was protected and caused no
disruption to the Department’s functions. Accordingly, the Court

determines that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that his speech
was protected by the First Amendment and that Defendants violated
his rights.
2. Adverse Employment Action
“In the context of a First Amendment retaliation claim,
[the Second Circuit has] held that only retaliatory conduct that
would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness
from exercising his or her constitutional rights constitutes an
adverse action.” Zelnik v. Fashion Inst. of Tech., 464 F.3d 217,
225–26 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation and alteration omitted). Under
this standard, “adverse employment actions include discharge,
refusal to hire, refusal to promote, demotion, reduction in pay,

and reprimand.” Id. at 226. Even “lesser actions” such as
negative reviews, false accusations, and menial job assignments
may also be considered adverse employment actions.” Id.; see also
Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 1999). Finally, while
de minimis incidents alone will not give rise to a First Amendment
retaliation claim, “a combination of seemingly minor incidents
[may] form the basis of a constitutional retaliation claim once
they reach a critical mass” and create “a working environment
unreasonably inferior to what would be considered normal for that
position.” Phillips v. Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002).
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint paints a detailed picture

in which Plaintiff has been subjected to a sustained, systematic
course of verbal harassment, physical and verbal threats,
ostracism, demotion, termination, and demeaning insults intended,
as Defendants’ statements reveal, to drive him out of the Lakeview
Fire Department. Each of the Individual Defendants, all of whom
held previous or current roles of leadership, directly took part
in, witnessed, or failed to stop the Defendants’ behavior. For
example, the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Senti III
told Plaintiff that he would make Plaintiff’s life at work
difficult and “that [it was] a promise.” (ECF No. 20, AC ¶ 24.)
Defendants arbitrarily audited Plaintiff’s training sessions,
while explicitly citing Plaintiff “using the system” and
submitting FOIL requests as reasons for auditing Plaintiff. (Id.

¶¶ 44-49.) Defendants would drive back and forth or park outside
the Plaintiff’s home in official Fire District vehicles or their
personal vehicles and on at least one occasion, blaring a siren
late in the evening and awakening Plaintiff’s children. (Id. ¶
23.) Defendants posted mock complaint forms on official firehouse
bulletin boards disparaging anyone who would bring a complaint.
(Id. ¶ 39.) Defendant Senti Jr. yelled outside of a Lakeview Board
of Commissioner’s meeting: “[a]s a Commissioner I can throw you
out of here and you can suck my fucking dick.” (Id. ¶ 35.)
Defendants’ actions are sufficient to plausibly state an
adverse employment action under a “critical mass” theory. See
Phillips, 278 F.3d at 109; see also Zelnik, 464 F.3d at 226.

Moreover, Defendants abusive conduct often occurred in front of
both non-supervisory and supervisory members of the Fire
Department which conduct would plausibly deter others from
exercising their constitutional rights. The Amended Complaint
alleges that Plaintiff was asked to “voluntarily” step down as a
Lieutenant—with the Chief of the firehouse expressly stating that
Defendants would continue to “bust his balls” if he did not. (Id.
at ¶ 61.) Plaintiff was stripped of his webmaster duties and his
duties involving the Fire Department’s medications. (Id. ¶¶ 71,
77.) Finally, Plaintiff was ultimately terminated by the Fire

District for failing to meet an apparent quota that numerous other
firefighters did not meet, as shown in the Fire Department records.
(Id. at ¶¶ 82, 84-85.) As demotion and termination qualify as
adverse employment actions, see Zelnik, 464 F.3d at 225, Plaintiff
has plausibly alleged an adverse employment action.
3. Causation
The last category of plausible facts which must be
alleged for a Plaintiff to establish a First Amendment retaliation
claim is a causal relationship between the protected speech and
the adverse employment action. “The causal connection must be
sufficient to warrant the inference that the protected speech was
a substantial motivating factor in the adverse employment action,

that is to say, the adverse employment action would not have been
taken absent the employee’s protected speech.” Morris, 196 F.3d
at 110 (citation omitted). “Causation can be established either
indirectly by means of circumstantial evidence, for example, by
showing that the protected activity was followed by adverse
treatment in employment, or directly by evidence of retaliatory
animus.” Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, “[w]ith respect
to the “causal connection” requirement, a plaintiff must plead
facts from which it can be reasonable be inferred that the
defendant was aware of the purportedly protected speech. Wrobel
v. Cnty. Of Erie, 692 F.3d 22, 32 (2d Cir. 2012).
Here, Plaintiff alleges numerous adverse actions

occurring after his initial report of Senti III’s physical
altercation, including Plaintiff’s termination on January 12,
2021. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶¶ 21-24, 26, 30, 33-35, 39-40, 44-49, 61,
67-68, 75, 81-82, 92.) The allegations in the Amended Complaint
allege that Defendants were also aware of, or at least suspected,
that the Plaintiff had filed the workplace violence reports, PESH
complaint, Nassau County police reports, and the FOIL requests,
and that the Defendants’ relentless and systematic course of
harassment was the direct result of Defendants’ knowledge or
suspicion regarding Plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment
rights. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants themselves referenced
to Plaintiff’s exercise of his rights when Individual Defendants

threatened and harassed him. For example, on February 27, 2019,
a few weeks after Lakeview received word of the PESH complaint,
Senti Jr. posted a form titled, “Hurt Feelings Report” on four
official bulletin boards in the firehouse. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶ 39;
ECF No. 20-6, Exh. 6.) On May 23, 2019, Defendant McNeill said to
Plaintiff, at the monthly firehouse meeting in front of witnesses,
“when you go outside of the organization, we have thrown people
out for less.” (Id. ¶ 40.) On November 9, 2019, a few weeks after
Plaintiff submitted his second FOIL request, then-Chief Sinatro
said if Plaintiff did not resign as a Lieutenant, Individual
Defendants would “continue to ‘bust [his] balls.’” (Id. at ¶ 60.)
The Court also finds the Individual Defendants’ social

media comments to be probative of the causal link between
Defendants’ retaliatory conduct in response to Plaintiff’s speech.
On August 11, 2020, Defendant McNeill mocked Plaintiff’s complaint
to the Department of Labor when she posted on Facebook, “[w]atch
out for those violations. Falsified or not.” (Id. ¶ 73.) On
August 13, 2020, Defendant Senti III spoke of removing Plaintiff
from the Fire Department GroupMe, so he would “see all the fun and
cool stuff he’s missing” and Defendant McNeill responded, “I’m so
good with ridding the useless. The board’s attorney has given the
go ahead of swamp draining.” (Id. ¶ 73-74.) Defendant Koppel
responded on the Fire Department GroupMe, “Teamwork baby, families
fight but they always end up righting their mistakes not writing
letters or filing false police reports.” (Id.) Defendant Senti
III followed with, “Amen.” (Id.) Shortly after this exchange

between Individual Defendants McNeill, Koppel, and Senti III on
the Fire Department GroupMe, the Plaintiff and three others were
removed from the GroupMe chat by Defendant McNeill. (Id. at ¶ 75;
ECF No. 20-14 Exh. 14, GroupMe Chat Screenshot 4.) Immediately
after the removals, Defendant McNeill appeared to warn the rest of
the group, “Write another letter.” (Id.) Accordingly, based on
Defendants’ admissions to Plaintiff that they intended to drive
him out of the Fire Department under threats of physical harm, and
Defendants’ written posts and emails, Plaintiff has plausibly
alleged that Defendants' adverse actions were motivated by

retaliatory animus.
B. Fourteenth Amendment
The Plaintiff contends that the City deprived him of his
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights.7 To prevail

7 Plaintiff alleged a Fifth Amendment claim in his complaint (ECF No. 20, AC ¶¶
4, 6), but he did not defend, much less mention, any basis for his Fifth
Amendment claim in his opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court
treats Plaintiff’s failure as an abandonment of his Fifth Amendment claim and
dismisses Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim because Defendants correctly note
that the Fifth Amendment claim only applies to federal actors, and here, the
Defendants are state actors. Sylla v. City of New York, 04–cv–5692, 2005 WL
3336460, at * 2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.8, 2005) (“The Fifth Amendment is applicable only
to the federal government.”); citing Public Utilities Comm'n of Dist. of
on this claim, the Plaintiff must show that he “possessed a
protected liberty or property interest, and that he was deprived
of that interest without due process.” Hynes v. Squillace, 143
F.3d 653, 658 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam); see Kapps v. Wing, 404

F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2005). When a public employee is
terminated, procedural due process is satisfied if the government
provides notice and a limited opportunity to be heard prior to
termination, so long as a full adversarial hearing is provided
afterward.” Locurto v. Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 171 (2d Cir. 2001)
(citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-
46 (1985)).
Property interests are not created by the Constitution,
but “‘stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.’” Ciambriello, 292 F.3d

at 313 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)). To state a due process claim, a “plaintiff must have a
property interest in a benefit that is ‘more than an abstract need
or desire for it. [He] must instead have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it’ under state or federal law.” Finley v.
Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1296 (2d Cir.1996) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S.
at 577).

Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952); see also LoSacco v. City of
Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1995)(appellants can be deemed to have
abandoned issues they fail to raise before the district court).
First, Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of a proper
pre-termination hearing before he was issued a termination letter
on January 12, 2021, dismissing him as a volunteer member of
Lakeview. (Id. ¶ 81.) The parties do not dispute and it is

well-settled that in New York, “volunteer firefighters are
considered public employees and must be afforded due process in
disciplinary proceedings,” which includes the right to a hearing
held upon due notice and upon stated charges. Ratajack v. Brewster
Fire Dep’t, Inc. of the Brewster-Se. Joint Fire Dist., 178 F. Supp.
3d 118, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Reed v. Medford Fire Dep't, Inc., 806
F. Supp. 2d 594, 610 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
When a volunteer firefighter is terminated, the law is
clear that “procedural due process is satisfied if the government
provides notice and a limited opportunity to be heard prior to
termination, so long as a full adversarial hearing is provided
afterwards.” Locurto, 264 F.3d 154, 171 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation

omitted). “The pre-termination process ‘need not be elaborate’ or
approach the level of a ‘full adversarial evidentiary hearing,’
but due process does require that before being terminated such an
‘employee [be given] oral or written notice of the charges against
him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity
to present his side of the story.’” Otero v. Bridgeport Housing
Auth., 297 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Loudermill, 470
U.S. at 545, 546).
Assuming Plaintiff’s allegations to be true, and drawing
inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court finds that
Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendants did not provide him a

pre-termination hearing with respect to the termination of his
volunteer position at Lakeview. On January 12, 2021, Defendant
Galia notified Plaintiff that he had “been relieved of [his] duties
as a member of the Lakeview Fire Department”, referencing the
Department’s bylaws and that Plaintiff had not maintained his quota
of meeting attendance and trainings. (ECF No. 20, AC ¶ 82; ECF
No. 20-18, Exh. 18.) The termination letter to Plaintiff
specifically stated: “Furthermore, a letter was sent to your house
requesting you to discuss your failure to maintain a quota with
the officers. The Captain told you that you needed to schedule a
meeting with the officers and to this date you have not scheduled
that meeting.” (Id.)

Defendants thus assert that they adequately provided “an
opportunity to be heard by offering to meet to discuss the matter
with [Plaintiff] before he was relieved of his duties” (ECF No.
27, Mot. to Dismiss at 15), but the Court cannot conclude that
the request to meet was a proper “opportunity to present
[Plaintiff’s] side of the story,” nor can the Court discern whether
Plaintiff had notice that he would be terminated if he failed to
schedule a meeting. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546. Moreover, the
aforementioned letter to Plaintiff in which Defendant Galia
terminated Plaintiff is not attached to the Amended Complaint, so
the Court cannot conclude that the scheduling letter Defendant
Galia references actually provided “notice of the charges against

Plaintiff” and “an explanation of the employer's evidence” to
Plaintiff. Id. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff was not
provided the limited, but nonetheless requisite, pre-termination
hearing before the termination of his employment at Lakeview Fire
Department.8
In addition to the loss of his salary, Plaintiff alleges
deprivations of additional property interests. Any Lakeview
member in good standing for over five years, as was Plaintiff,
automatically becomes a member of the Fire District Benevolent
Association for Life and is entitled to receive, inter alia,
insurance coverage providing disability benefits. (ECF No. 20, AC
¶¶ 86-87, 90.) Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts that plausibly

establish that the Benevolent Association benefit is provided for
by state and county laws. (Id. ¶ 87.) Plaintiff had qualified
for benefits as a member of the Fire District’s Benevolent
Association for Life and was a member of the Fire Department in

8 Because the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged the lack of a pre-
termination hearing, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff was afforded
or sought a post-termination hearing. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 929
(1997)(“[A] public employee dismissible only for cause was entitled to a very
limited hearing prior to his termination, to be followed by a more comprehensive
post-termination hearing.”) Notwithstanding the absence of a pre-termination
hearing, the Court finds that “[a]n Article 78 proceeding. . . constitutes a
wholly adequate post-deprivation hearing for due process purposes.” Locurto v.
Safir, 264 F.3d 154, 175 (2d Cir. 2001).
good standing for over five years, entitling him to receive
insurance coverage providing disability benefits. (Id. ¶¶ 88-89.)
The Second Circuit has recognized that public employees

have a “property” right to certain disability retirement and
pension benefits. See Russel v. Dunston, 896 F.2d 664, 668–69 (2d
Cir. 1990) (holding that state disability retirement benefits are
a constitutionally protected property interest); Winston v. City
of New York, 759 F.2d 242, 247-49 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
municipal employee retirement benefits are protected); Basciano v.
Herkimer, 605 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding that denial of the
entire basic retirement benefit was a deprivation subject to due
process protection); see also Jackson v. Roslyn Bd. of Educ., 652
F. Supp. 2d 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding that the refusal to pay
an employee any disability retirement benefits was a deprivation
of a protected property interest).

On March 24, 2021, four days after Plaintiff commenced
the instant action on March 19, 2021, Plaintiff was terminated,
without notice, from the Fire District’s Benevolent Association’s
insurance program. (Id. at ¶ 92.) Defendants Senti Jr. and
McNeill were allegedly voting members of Lakeview’s Benevolent
Association at the time of termination. (Id. at ¶ 93.) Plaintiff
only found out his Fire District’s Benevolent Association
insurance was terminated by a letter from the insurance company.
(ECF No. 20-21, Exh. 21) (“We recently learned that your premiums
will no longer be paid through VOLUNTEER FIREARMS BENEVOLENT.”)
Defendants argue that because the Benevolent Association

is a separate entity from Lakeview and because it is not a party
to this action, there can be no basis “to impute its alleged acts
onto Defendants.” (ECF No. 29, Def. Reply at 9.) The Court
disagrees, noting that because Defendants Senti Jr. and McNeill
were voting board members of the Benevolent Association, Plaintiff
has sufficiently plead facts that Defendants Senti Jr. and McNeill
may be held accountable for any improper termination of benefits
from the Benevolent Association without due process. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)(“[A] plaintiff must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”)
The Court thus finds that Plaintiff possessed protected

property interests in his employment as a Lakeview firefighter and
his Fire District’s Benevolent Association disability insurance
coverage, and that he has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim
for deprivation of those interests without due process.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants assert that the Individual Defendants are
shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified immunity.
This Court disagrees.
For any alleged violation, the qualified immunity
analysis proceeds in two parts. First, “[t]aken in the light most
favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged

show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also Garcia v. Does,
779 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Russo v. City of
Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196, 211 (2d Cir. 2007)). The second part of
the qualified immunity analysis requires the Court to consider
“whether [the] right is clearly established”— i.e., “whether it
would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202; Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (“The contours of the right
must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right…and that in
light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.”).

“Only Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent existing at the
time of the alleged violation is relevant in deciding whether a
right is clearly established.” Torcivia v. Suffolk Cnty., New
York, 17 F.4th 342, 367 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Moore v. Vega, 371
F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2004)). Defendants correctly note that the
doctrine of qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Mullenix v.
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
731, 743, (2011); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
As discussed, supra, accepting the Plaintiff’s well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, this Court concludes that
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the Individual Defendants

violated Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and
are not shielded by the qualified immunity doctrine in the present
case.
First, as to his First Amendment retaliation claim,
Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendants constantly and
repeatedly threatened physical violence and harassed him for his
reports to the police and New York Department of Labor, his
workplace incident reports, and his FOIL requests. As the Court
explained above, Plaintiff’s police reports, as well as his FOIL
requests and workplace incident reports are protected by the First
Amendment. See Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (“Speech by a
public employee is on a matter of public concern if it relates ‘to

any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.’”) Notwithstanding the internal workplace reports,
Defendants engaged in ongoing and pervasive retaliation for
Plaintiff’s police reports, and there is no question under existing
law that the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to
speak out or report to the police about assaults and other
misconduct by an individual or within a government entity. See,
e.g., San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (“Were
[public employees] not able to speak on [the operation of their
employers], the community would be deprived of informed opinions
on important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the
public's interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the
employee's own right to disseminate it” (citation omitted)); cf.
United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995) (“The

large-scale disincentive to Government employees' expression also
imposes a significant burden on the public's right to read and
hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said”);
see also Gustler, 823 F. Supp. 2d 98, 125 (2011) (finding
plaintiff’s report to police about the organization’s misconduct
was protected). Furthermore, Defendants miss the mark by arguing
that Plaintiff does not have a right to file FOIL requests under
the First Amendment. Plaintiff’s First Amendment right protects
him from being retaliated against for filing FOIL requests and for
appealing those requests. All in all, the Individual Defendants’

protracted campaign of threats and harassment against Plaintiff
falls well outside the bounds of what was or should be clear to a
reasonable official regarding the First Amendment. Plaintiff has
plausibly alleged facts that reasonable public officials knew or
should have known to refrain from engaging in abusive, harassing,
and threatening conduct.
Second, Defendants knew or should have known to provide
notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to terminating
Plaintiff’s employment and insurance disability benefits to which
Plaintiff was entitled by law and had already been receiving. It
is well-established that employment and insurance benefits are
forms of property, and that pre-termination process would be
required under the Fourteen Amendment right to due process. See
Ratajack, 178 F. Supp. 3d 118, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)(“volunteer

firefighters are considered public employees and must be afforded
due process in disciplinary proceedings”); see also Russel, 896
F.2d 664, 668–69 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that state disability
retirement benefits are a constitutionally protected property
interest).
Finally, with respect to all of the constitutional
claims, Defendants argue that some Individual Defendants should be
dismissed because each was not personally involved in each
constitutional violation. The Court reads the complaint
differently. Defendants Senti. Jr, Senti III, Koppel, Galia, and

McNeill were all supervisors and/or held positions of authority,
(Captains, Chiefs, Commissioners) and either actively participated
in the retaliation and threats because of Plaintiff’s exercise of
his free speech rights or stood by and witnessed the Defendants’
egregious behavior without intervening or were made aware of the
conduct through complaints by Plaintiff and other employees. (ECF
No. 20, AC ¶¶ 21-24, 26, 30, 33-35, 39-40, 44-49, 61, 67-68, 75,
81-82, 92.) Defendant Galia issued a letter relieving Plaintiff
of his employment without a pre-deprivation hearing. (Id. ¶ 81.)
Defendants Senti Jr. and McNeill were voting members of the board
overseeing Plaintiff’s insurance coverage at the time of
termination of the benefits and could have provided notice but did
not. (Id. ¶ 88.) There is, therefore, no basis to dismiss the

Individual Defendants on the basis of qualified immunity. The
Court further notes that Senti Jr., Senti III, and McNeil and her
husband, Patrick McNeill, were related by blood or marriage and
used their positions of authority to violate Plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, after Senti III’s physical assault of
another Fire Department employee who was subsequently supported by
Plaintiff.
D. Monell Liability as to the Fire District
Defendants argue that the Fire District and Fire
Department cannot be held liable, because Plaintiff has not
established Monell liability, which requires Plaintiff to

plausibly allege that the two entities are themselves responsible
for the alleged constitutional violations. They argue that
Plaintiff did not adequately plead facts that demonstrate that the
Fire District and Fire Department failed to train its employees or
that there were actions taken by officials or policy makers that
caused the underlying constitutional violations. Again, this
Court disagrees.
Claims against the Fire District9 are analyzed under
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and
its progeny. Ratajack, 178 F. Supp. 3d 118, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 2016);
see Lozada v. Weilminster, 92 F. Supp. 3d 76, 106-07 (E.D.N.Y.

2015) (considering a Monell claim against the fire district);
Fotopolous v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Hicksville Fire Dist., 11 F.
Supp. 3d 348, 372-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (same); see also Klemow v.
City of Kingston, No. 84-CV-1477, 1987 WL 28138, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.
Dec. 17, 1987) (“In [Monell] . . . , the Supreme Court held that
. . . political subdivisions of the state can be held liable as
‘persons’ under § 1983 for civil rights[ ] violations caused by
their official policies, or customs.”).
The existence of a municipal policy that gives rise to
Monell liability can be established in four ways: (1) a formal
policy endorsed by the municipality, Turpin v. Mailet, 619 F.2d

196, 199 (2d Cir. 1980); (2) actions directed by the government’s
“authorized decision makers” or “those who establish governmental

9 Defendants assert that the Fire District, not the Fire Department, should be
held liable as Plaintiff was officially an employee of only the Fire District.
(ECF No. 27, Mot. to Dismiss at 20.) The Court hereby dismisses the Fire
Department as a party due to its status as a “political subdivision” of the
Fire District, but finds that the Fire District remains the proper, liable
party. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Vill. of Bronxville, 805 N.Y.S.2d 651,
652 (2005)(finding that a fire district “possesses virtually total supervision
and control over all aspects of the creation and staffing of fire companies as
well as over the rules and regulations governing firefighting practices and
procedures,” and “is answerable for the negligence of its firefighters committed
in the course of their duties”)(quoting Knapp v. Union Vale Fire Co., 529
N.Y.S.2d 132)); Froelich v. S. Wilson Volunteer Fire Co., 156 N.Y.S.3d 613, 616
(2021)(“A fire district is a ‘wholly independent political subdivision whose
members, including its volunteer firemen, are employees of the district and not
of the town.”)(quotation and citation omitted)).
policy,” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986);
(3) a persistent and widespread practice that amounts to a custom
of which policymakers must have been aware, see Turpin, 619 F.2d

at 199; or (4) a “constitutional violation resulting from
[policymakers’] failure to train municipal employees.” City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989); Naples v. Stefanelli,
972 F. Supp. 2d 373, 387 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
“Official municipal policy [ ] includes the decisions of
a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials,
and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have
the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011)
(discussing Monell); see Hardwick Barrella v. Vill. of Freeport,
43 F. Supp. 3d 136, 183 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 814 F.3d 594 (2d
Cir. 2016) (finding that a decision-maker serving a final-policy
making position can establish the municipality’s policy); see also
Fierro v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 994 F. Supp. 2d 581, 588

(S.D.N.Y. 2014). A policy need not be officially promulgated for
a municipality, or here, the Fire District, to face liability,
however. Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 80 (2d. Cir.
2006) (“The alleged custom or practice need not be embodied in a
rule or regulation, however, the alleged practice must be so
manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior
policy-making officials.”); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183,
192 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Monell’s policy or custom requirement is
satisfied where a local government is faced with a pattern of
misconduct and does nothing, compelling the conclusion that the
local government has acquiesced in or tacitly authorized its

subordinates' unlawful actions.”)
As the Supreme Court instructed, “if the decision to
adopt that particular course of action is properly made by that
government’s authorized decision-makers, it surely represents an
act of official government ‘policy’ as that term is commonly
understood.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. 469, 481. Here, Plaintiff has
plausibly alleged Monell liability because of the involvement of
the Individual Defendants, all of whom were authorized, high-level
decision makers, who directly participated in, witnessed, or
turned a blind eye after being made aware of the violations of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and who failed to train the
officials who engaged in the violations of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights. Individual Defendants are three of the
five Lakeview Fire District Commissioners, and are also former and
current Chiefs and Lieutenants, who are alleged to have
persistently participated in constitutional violations and
retaliatory conduct and/or voted to terminate Plaintiff’s
employment and insurance disability benefits without a hearing.
Plaintiff has plausibly pled that the Defendants—Commissioner
Koppel, Commissioner Senti Jr., Commissioner McNeill, Lieutenant
and former Chief Senti III, and current Chief Galia—are municipal
policymakers with “final policymaking power” on behalf of the Fire
District in areas involving work place conduct and safety,
suspension, removal, disciplinary penalties, policy setting, and

termination of Fire District employees such as Plaintiff. (ECF
No. 20, ¶¶ 57, 70, 75, 77, 88.) The Amended Complaint’s
allegations lead to the plausible conclusion that Lakeview’s
official policymakers were chiefly involved in harassing and
retaliating against Plaintiff and depriving him of his
constitutional rights, his rank, his employment, and his insurance
benefits.
Plaintiff, moreover, has sufficiently alleged that the
Individual Defendants uniformly acted to harass or otherwise
punish Plaintiff, and other employees who opposed or reported the
Individual Defendants’ wrongdoing, in an open and widespread
manner. Even if none of the Individual Defendants on their own

could be considered a decision maker, such “persistent and
widespread” practices by, between and in support of Individual
Defendants, all of whom were high-level officials of Lakeview can
be attributed to the Fire Department and Fire District as a whole.
Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. Indeed, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged
that the Fire District knowingly allowed three of the five
Individual Defendants, who are related by blood or marriage to
other high-ranking officials, to abuse their authority and the
resources of the District to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint plausibly alleges these
municipal Defendant officers subjected Plaintiff to harassment
after he exercised his right to free speech and terminated his

benefits without affording him due process. Plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient for purposes of Monell, and this Court
denies dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against the Fire District.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for violations of his First Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment rights is DENIED. Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim and the Fire Department
as a party is GRANTED. Because claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
remain, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims
on supplemental jurisdiction grounds is DENIED. The parties are
directed to confer and jointly advise this Court within seven
business days of the date of this Order, whether they will schedule
a settlement conference with Magistrate Judge James Wicks and/or
proceed to discovery in this case.

SO ORDERED
Dated: September 26, 2022
Brooklyn, New York

/s/
HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10308535. Public record. Not legal advice.