# Duran v. Commissioner of Social Security

> District Court, E.D. New York · August 1, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10308252

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 1, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------X

RAFAEL DURAN,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against-
20-cv-4542 (KAM)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

--------------------------------------X
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Rafael Duran (“Plaintiff”) appeals the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or
the “Commissioner”) finding him not disabled within the meaning of
the Social Security Act (the “Act”) and not entitled to disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Act. Plaintiff and the
Commissioner have cross moved for judgment on the pleadings. For
the reasons herein, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED, the
Commissioner’s motion is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.
BACKGROUND
The parties have filed a joint stipulation of relevant
facts, which the court has reviewed and incorporates by reference.
(See generally ECF No. 21, Joint Stipulation of Facts.) Here, the

court briefly recounts the facts relevant to the instant motions.
On October 3, 2016,1 Plaintiff filed an application for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), alleging disability since
October 1, 2016. (ECF No. 17, Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”),
at 21.) Plaintiff claimed that he was disabled due to a heart
condition, diabetes, depression, learning problems, knee pain, and
a swollen foot. (Id. at 85.) His application was denied on
December 6, 2016. (Id. at 81.)
On December 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed a written request
for a hearing before an administrative law judge. (Id. at 87.)
Administrative Law Judge Ifeoma N. Iwuamadi (the “ALJ”) held a

hearing on December 4, 2018, during which Plaintiff appeared and
testified. (Id. at 49.) By a decision dated July 2, 2019, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 15.)
Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council.
(Id. at 193.) On July 22, 2020, the Appeals Council denied review
of the ALJ’s decision, rendering it the final decision of the
Commissioner. (Id. at 1.)

1 Plaintiff’s memorandum of law in support of his motion for judgment on the
pleadings mistakenly notes this date as October 6, 2016. (Pl. Mem. at 2.)
Plaintiff initiated the instant action on September 24,
2020. (ECF No. 1, Complaint.) On September 29, 2020, the court
issued a scheduling order. (ECF No. 4, Scheduling Order.) On

October 14, 2021, Defendant filed the Administrative Transcript.
(Tr.)
On June 25, 2021, Plaintiff served his notice of motion
and memorandum of law in support of his motion for judgment on
the pleadings. (ECF Nos. 18, Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings; 18-1, Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in
Support of his Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (“Pl.
Mem.”).) On September 22, 2021, Defendant served its notice of
cross-motion and memorandum of law in support of its cross-motion
for judgment on the pleadings and in opposition to Plaintiff’s
motion. (ECF Nos. 19, Defendant’s Notice of Cross-Motion; 19-1,
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Cross-Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings, (“Def. Mem.”).) Plaintiff then
served a reply memorandum of law in further support of his motion
for judgment on the pleadings on October 13, 2021. (ECF No. 20,
Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum of Law.) The entire set of motion
papers was filed on October 14, 2021.
LEGAL STANDARD
To receive disability benefits, a claimant must be
“disabled” within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a),

(d). A claimant qualifies as disabled when he is unable to “engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id. §
423(d)(1)(A). The impairment must be of “such severity” that the
claimant is unable to do his previous work or engage in any other
kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). “The Commissioner must
consider the following in determining a claimant’s entitlement to
benefits: ‘(1) the objective medical facts [and clinical
findings]; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such facts;

(3) subjective evidence of pain or disability . . . ; and (4) the
claimant’s educational background, age, and work experience.’”
Balodis v. Leavitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(quoting Brown v. Apfel, 174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999)
(alterations in original)).
Unsuccessful claimants for disability benefits under
the Act may bring an action in federal district court seeking
judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits “within
sixty days after the mailing . . . of notice of such decision or
within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security
may allow.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “A district court may set aside
the Commissioner’s determination that a claimant is not disabled

only if the factual findings are not supported by substantial
evidence or if the decision is based on legal error.” Burgess v.
Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla,” and must be relevant
evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d
Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 420 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
If there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the Commissioner’s factual findings, those findings must
be upheld. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Inquiry into legal error requires

the court to ask whether “the claimant has had a full hearing
under the [Commissioner’s] regulations and in accordance with the
beneficent purposes of the [Social Security] Act.” Moran v.
Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). The
reviewing court does not have the authority to conduct a de novo
review, and may not substitute its own judgment for that of the
ALJ, even when it might have justifiably reached a different
result. Cage v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.
2012).
Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the
Commissioner, a five-step sequential evaluation process is used
to determine whether the claimant’s condition meets the Act’s
definition of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. This process

is essentially as follows:
[I]f the Commissioner determines (1) that the
claimant is not working, (2) that he has a
‘severe impairment,’ (3) that the impairment
is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations] that conclusively requires a
determination of disability, and (4) that the
claimant is not capable of continuing in his
prior type of work, the Commissioner must find
him disabled if (5) there is not another type
of work the claimant can do.
Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
During this five-step process, the Commissioner must
consider whether the combined effect of all of the claimant’s
impairments, including those that are not severe (as defined by
the regulations), would be of sufficient severity to establish
eligibility for Social Security benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523,
404.1545(a)(2). At steps one through four of the sequential five-
step framework, the claimant bears the “general burden of
proving . . . disability.” Burgess, 537 F3.d at 128. At step
five, the burden shifts from the claimant to the Commissioner,
requiring that the Commissioner show that, in light of the
claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), age, education,
and work experience, the claimant is “able to engage in gainful
employment within the national economy.” Sobolewski v. Apfel,
985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

Lastly, federal regulations explicitly authorize a
court, upon reviewing decisions of the Commissioner, to order
further proceedings when appropriate. “The court shall have power
to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is warranted
where “there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has
applied an improper legal standard.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d
72, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34,
39 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Remand is
particularly appropriate where further findings or explanation
will clarify the rationale for the ALJ’s decision. Pratts, 94

F.3d at 39. However, if the record before the court provides
“persuasive proof of disability and a remand for further
evidentiary proceedings would serve no purpose,” the court may
reverse and remand solely for the calculation and payment of
benefits. See, e.g., Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir.
1980); Kane v. Astrue, 942 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
DISCUSSION
I. The ALJ’s Disability Determination
Using the five-step sequential process, the ALJ

determined at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of
October 1, 2016. (Tr. at 23.) At step two, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of coronary
artery disease, status-post stents, hypertension, diabetes
mellitus, bilateral knee derangement, major depressive disorder,
generalized anxiety disorder, and panic disorder. (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in
20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
404.1525, and 404.1526). (Tr. at 24.) Specifically, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet the criteria of major
dysfunction of a joint under Listing 1.02, disorders of the
cardiovascular system under Listing 4.00, depressive, bipolar, and
related disorders under Listing 12.04, and anxiety and obsessive-
compulsive disorders under Listing 12.06. (Id. at 24-27.)
Regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ
considered whether the “paragraph B” criteria of the
aforementioned mental impairment listings were satisfied. (Id. at
24.) To satisfy the “paragraph B” criteria, Plaintiff’s mental
impairments must result in at least one “extreme” or two “marked”
limitations in the following areas of mental functioning: (1)
understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)

interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining pace; and (4) adapting or managing oneself. (Id. at
24.) Based on her review of Plaintiff’s medical records, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in the first
and third areas of mental functioning, and mild limitations in the
second and fourth areas. (Id. at 24-27.)
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a moderate
limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information,
based on: (1) the October 28, 2016 consultative psychiatric
examination by Dr. Michael Kushner, who opined that Plaintiff had
no limitations in understanding and following simple instructions,
and carrying them out independently, though he may have mild to

moderate limitations in doing the same for complex tasks and in
learning new tasks; and (2) Plaintiff’s November 1, 2016 Adult
Function Report, in which he noted that he was unable to follow
written instructions and had trouble remembering things. (Id. at
24-25.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had a mild limitation
in interacting with others, based on the October 2016 consultative
examination, Plaintiff’s treatment records, both physical and
mental, the November 2016 Adult Function Report, and Plaintiff’s
hearing testimony. (Id. at 25.) As for the third area of mental
functioning, concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, the
ALJ found that, based on the evidence as a whole, Plaintiff had,
at most, a moderate limitation. (Id.) Finally, the ALJ determined

that Plaintiff had a mild limitation in adapting or managing
oneself, having observed that Plaintiff consistently demonstrated
normal demeanor and behavior, and the ability to engage in personal
care and grooming, and did not appear to have any limitations in
making appropriate decisions. (Id. at 25-26.)
The ALJ also considered whether the “paragraph C”
criteria of Listings 12.04 and 12.06 were satisfied, and concluded
that “the evidence fails to establish the presence of the
‘paragraph C’ criteria.” (Id. at 27.)
At step four of the five-step sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light
work, with the following conditions: (1) sitting for 6 hours and

standing/walking for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, (2) occasionally
lifting and carrying 20 pounds, (3) frequently lifting and carrying
10 pounds, (4) occasionally climbing ramps or stairs, (5)
occasionally kneeling, crouching, and crawling, (6) occasionally
driving a motor vehicle, (7) never using foot controls with either
foot, (8) never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, (9) making
simple work-related decisions, and (10) performing simple, routine
tasks. (Id. at 27.)
In determining that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform
light work, with special conditions, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s
hearing testimony and medical records, which included pharmacy

records, hospital records, consultative examination reports of Dr.
Iqbal Teli (internist) and Michael Kushner, Ph. D. (psychologist),
and treatment records from Drs. Lubov Sychikov (internist) and
Nagmo Fatakhova (psychiatrist). (Id. at 36-38.) The ALJ concluded
that although Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms, Plaintiff’s
statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of these symptoms were not entirely consistent with the
medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (Id. at 36.)
Finally, at step five of the sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ found, based on Plaintiff’s RFC, that he was
capable of performing his past relevant work as a poultry dresser.
(Id. at 38.) In arriving at this conclusion, the ALJ relied on

the vocational expert’s testimony that Plaintiff retains the RFC
to perform the functional demands and job duties of a poultry
dresser. (Id.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not
“disabled” and thus not entitled to DIB under the Act. (Id.)
II. The ALJ’s Assessment of Opinion Evidence
Under the treating physician rule, the opinion of a
claimant’s treating physician as to “the nature and severity of

the [claimant’s] impairment is given ‘controlling weight’ if the
opinion is ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the
other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’” Greek v.
Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Burgess, 537 F.3d
at 128; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)).2
An ALJ who does not accord controlling weight to a
treating physician’s medical opinion must consider the following
non-exclusive Burgess factors in determining how much weight to
give to the opinion: (1) the frequency, length, nature, and extent
of treatment; (2) the amount of medical evidence supporting the
opinion; (3) the consistency of the opinion with the remaining

medical evidence; and (4) whether the physician is a
specialist. Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95‒96 (2d Cir.
2019) (citation omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); but see
Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We require
no such slavish recitation of each and every factor where the ALJ’s
reasoning and adherence to the regulation are clear.”). “The ALJ

2 In 2017, new regulations were issued that changed the standard for evaluating
medical opinion evidence for claims filed on or after March 27, 2017. See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c. However, because Plaintiff filed his claims on October 3,
2016, the previous regulations, including the treating physician rule, still
apply.
must then ‘comprehensively set forth [her] reasons for the weight
assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.’” Cichocki v. Astrue,
534 F. App’x. 71, 75 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Burgess, 537 F.3d at

129). “The failure to provide ‘good reasons for not crediting the
opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is a ground for
remand.’” Greek, 802 F.3d at 375 (quoting Burgess, 537 F.3d at
129-30).
However, “a treating physician’s conclusion that a
claimant is disabled is not entitled to controlling weight, as
this determination is reserved to the Commissioner.” Quiles v.
Saul, No. 19-cv-11181(KNF), 2021 WL 848197, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
5, 2021); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1). “[W]hen an ALJ discounts
a treating physician’s opinion that a claimant is disabled, the
ALJ is obligated to give good reasons for doing so.” Id.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not properly apply

the treating physician rule in assessing the opinions of
Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Lee, and treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Fatakhova. (Pl. Mem. at 4-7.) The court
discusses each of their opinions in turn.
A. The ALJ’s Assessment of Dr. Lee’s Opinion
The ALJ gave “[n]o weight” to Dr. Lee’s December 2018
opinion that Plaintiff could never stoop or bend, only occasionally
reach, only occasionally, or up to two hours in an eight-hour day,
lift and carry 5 to 10 pounds, sit for less than 6 hours per day,
and stand and/or walk for less than 2 hours per day. (Tr. at 30,
37, 451‒53.) The ALJ deemed Dr. Lee’s assessment of Plaintiff’s
limitations “excessive,” finding that “the medical evidence and

clinical findings of record do not support such extreme
limitations.” (Id. at 37.) In particular, the ALJ found that the
limitations Dr. Lee ascribed to Plaintiff were not consistent with
Plaintiff’s hearing testimony, conservative treatment for his
bilateral knee impairments, and daily activities. (Id.)
Although the ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Lee was
“reportedly a treating source,” the ALJ did not analyze Dr. Lee’s
opinion using the Burgess factors nor provide good reasons for not
according it controlling weight. (Id. at 30, 37.) In particular,
the ALJ failed to explain the supportability and consistency of
Dr. Lee’s opinion; her conclusory statements that Dr. Lee’s opinion
is not consistent with the medical evidence and clinical findings

in the record are not enough to allow the court to assess whether
the opinion was properly rejected. (Id.) See Rugless v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 548 F. App’x 698, 700 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)
(finding that the ALJ’s “conclusory explanation” for assigning
little weight to a treating physician’s opinion, namely, that the
opinion is “inconsistent with the record and not supported by any
facts or findings” is a cause for remand for further proceedings).
Further, the ALJ did not consider the frequency, nature, and extent
of Dr. Lee’s treating relationship with Plaintiff.3 (Id.) Though
“[i]t is not necessary that the ALJ recite each factor explicitly,”
her decision must “reflect[] application of the substance of the
[treating physician] rule.” Martinez-Paulino v. Astrue, No. 11-

cv-5485(RPP), 2012 WL 3564140, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2012).
Here, because the ALJ did not apply the treating
physician rule properly, remand is appropriate. See Kennedy v.
Astrue, 343 F. App’x 719, 721 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order)
(“Where an ALJ fails properly to acknowledge [the treating
physician rule] or to provide ‘good reasons’ for the weight given
to the treating physician’s opinion, we do not hesitate to
remand.”) (citation omitted). On remand, the ALJ is directed to
comprehensively apply the Burgess and regulatory factors to
determine the weight to be given to Dr. Lee’s opinion. If the ALJ
determines that a treating physician’s opinion is not entitled to

controlling weight, the ALJ “must nonetheless articulate a basis
for the alternative weight assigned.” Knight v. Comm’r, No. 18-
cv-2474(KAM), 2020 WL 3085778 at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020).

3 Defendant contends that “[a]lthough Dr. Lee indicated that she treated
Plaintiff for more than three years, the record contained no clear evidence of
a treating relationship as required to be entitled to deference as a ‘treating
source’ under the regulations.” (Def. Mem. at 8.) The ALJ’s decision, however,
does not reflect any determination on the ALJ’s part, express or implied, that
the treating physician rule did not apply to Dr. Lee’s opinion due to the
purported lack of a treating relationship between Dr. Lee and Plaintiff.
Accordingly, the court respectfully declines to adopt Defendant’s post-hoc
rationalization of the ALJ’s decision to accord no weight to Dr. Lee’s opinion
of Plaintiff’s physical functionality without properly applying the treating
physician rule.
B. The ALJ’s Assessment of Dr. Fatakhova’s Opinion
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “summarily rejected” Dr.
Fatakhova’s opinion. This argument is meritless. The ALJ gave

“considerable weight” to Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion related to
Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember, and apply
information, and concentration, persistence, and ability to
maintain pace. (Tr. at 37.) In assigning such weight, the ALJ
appropriately considered and gave deference to Dr. Fatakhova as a
treating source.4 (Id.) Indeed, the ALJ’s mental functioning
assessment that Plaintiff should be limited to performing simple,
routine tasks, and making simple work-related decisions is
consistent with the portions of Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion to which
the ALJ gave considerable weight.
The ALJ gave “less weight” to Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion
that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in adapting and managing

himself, and that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would
“substantially interfere with his productive work for more than
20% of the workday.” (Id.) The ALJ may “only credit portions of
a medical source opinion, or weigh different parts of the opinion
differently” so long as the ALJ “provid[es] sound reasons for the
discrepancy.” Destina v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-2382(ADS), 2018 WL
4964103, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2018). Here, the ALJ

4 The ALJ noted that Dr. Fatakhova had treated Plaintiff since December 2016,
and that Plaintiff had been receiving outpatient psychiatric treatment from Dr.
Fatakhova on a bimonthly basis since January 2017. (Tr. at 32‒35.)
appropriately examined the administrative record, explained which
portions of Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion were accorded less weight, and
explained why the selected portions were weighed differently. (Tr.

at 37.)
Regarding Plaintiff’s ability to adapt and manage
himself, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified to being able to
perform certain daily activities such as cooking, cleaning, and
buying groceries, and that he was “able to travel on vacation,
with minimal anxiety due to forgetting his psychiatric
medications.” (Id.); see also Kelly Ann C. v. Saul, No. 18-cv-
468(DJS), 2019 WL 3321923, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2019) (finding
substantial evidence supporting the assessment of mild limitations
adapting and managing oneself where the plaintiff was able to
“handle self-care and personal hygiene and prepare meals, pay
bills, go to doctors’ appointments, take medications, shop, and
read”); Dayle B. v. Saul, No. 20-cv-00359(TOF), 2021 WL 1660702,

at *13 (D. Conn. Apr. 28, 2021) (finding substantial evidence
supporting the assessment of mild limitations adapting and
managing oneself where the plaintiff “retained the capacity to
care for her personal needs, cook, clean, grocery shop, and drive”)
(internal quotation omitted). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff
had never been hospitalized for his psychiatric conditions and
that the results of Dr. Fatakhova’s mental health examinations of
Plaintiff stated that he was well groomed, cooperative, with calm
motor behavior, adequate insight, and good judgment. (Tr. at 32‒
35.) Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has mild
limitations in adapting and managing himself is supported by

substantial evidence, and the ALJ properly applied the treating
physician rule in according less weight to Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion
that Plaintiff has moderate limitations.
Similarly, the ALJ determined that Dr. Fatakhova’s
opinion that Plaintiff’s mental impairments would “substantially
interfere with his productive work for more than 20% of the
workday” should be assigned less weight, based on Dr. Fatakhova’s
own treatment notes indicating that Plaintiff was responding well
to treatment, his symptoms were less prominent, and the results of
his mental status examinations were normal. (Tr. at 37.)
Therefore, the court finds that the ALJ properly applied the
treating physician rule in assigning less weight to this portion

of Dr. Fatakhova’s opinion, and that the decision to give less
than controlling weight is supported by substantial evidence. See
also Heaman v. Berryhill, 765 F. App’x 498, 501 (2d Cir. 2019)
(summary order) (approving the ALJ’s decision to partially
discount a treating provider’s opinions because those opinions
“were inconsistent with the moderate findings” reflected in the
notes); Ruff v. Saul, No. 19-cv-01515(SRU), 2020 WL 6193892, at
*11 (D. Conn. Oct. 22, 2020) (finding that the ALJ’s decision to
give partial weight to a treating source’s opinion based on
evidence of plaintiff’s symptom improvement with medication was
supported by substantial evidence); Muratovic v. Saul, No. 19-cv-
2290(SPM), 2020 WL 5642294, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 22, 2020)

(finding that the ALJ’s decision to discount part of a treating
source’s opinion based on conflicting evidence of plaintiff’s
appearance, daily activities, lack of inpatient treatment, and
improvement of symptoms with medication was supported by good
reasons based on substantial evidence).
III. ALJ’s Classification of Plaintiff’s Prior Work as “Poultry
Dresser,”
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ’s finding that
he can return to his past relevant work constitutes legal error
because his past work was incorrectly classified. (Pl. Mem. at 7-
10.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that his previous work
should have been classified as a composite job, combining “poultry
dresser,” Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 525.687-070,
and “poultry dresser worker,” DOT 525.687-082. (Id. at 8-10.) A
composite job “combines significant elements of two or more
positions . . . .” Izzo v. Saul, No. 18-cv-09681(NSR), 2020 WL
1189095, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2020). According to Plaintiff,
because the DOT job description for “poultry dresser” does not
capture the frequent lifting and carrying of up to 50 pounds, which
was an important part of his past job, (id. at 8; Tr. at 216), the

ALJ erred in classifying his previous employment according to its
“least demanding function.” (ECF No. 20, Plaintiff’s Reply
Memorandum of Law, at 5.)
At step four of the sequential five-step framework, a

“claimant has the burden to show an inability to return to her
previous specific job and an inability to perform her past relevant
work generally.” Jasinski v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 182, 185 (2d Cir.
2003) (citations omitted). The “inquiry requires separate
evaluations of the previous job and the job as it is generally
performed.” Id.
According to the DOT, the job of a poultry dresser
involves:
Slaughter[ing] and dress[ing] fowl in
preparation for marketing, performing any
combination of following tasks: Chop[ping] off
bird’s head or slit[ting] bird’s throat to
slaughter bird, using knife. Hang[ing] bird
by feet to drain blood. Dip[ping] bird into
scalding water to loosen feathers. Hold[ing]
bird against projecting rubber fingers of
rotating drum to remove feathers. Cut[ting]
bird open, remov[ing] viscera, and wash[ing]
bird and giblets. May pluck chickens by hand.

DOT 525.687-070. Relying on the testimony of the vocational
expert, ALJ determined that the demands of Plaintiff’s past
relevant work do not exceed his RFC and, therefore, Plaintiff could
perform “his past relevant work” as a poultry dresser, the way it
is “generally performed” in the national economy. (Tr. at 38.)
In determining whether a claimant can perform his past
relevant work as generally performed, “[t]he inquiry . . . is not
whether a claimant is able to perform the duties of [his] previous

job, but whether the claimant is able to perform the duties
associated with [his] previous ‘type’ of work.” Halloran, 362
F.3d at 33 (finding that plaintiff could perform her prior work as
a computer operator because she could perform the sedentary work
required of her “previous ‘type’ of work,” even though she could
not sit continuously for eight hours as specifically required by
her previous job (citing Jock v. Harris, 651 F.2d 133, 135 (2d
Cir. 1981) (finding that plaintiff could perform her past relevant
work as a cashier because she could perform the sedentary work
required of cashier positions that could be performed in the
sitting position, even though her previous cashier position at a
supermarket required extended periods of standing))).

Accordingly, because the job of a poultry dresser as generally
performed does not involve lifting and carrying of up to 50 pounds,
as Plaintiff prior work did, the ALJ did not err when she found
that Plaintiff remains able to perform his “previous ‘type’ of
work.” Halloran, 362 F.3d at 33.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED, Defendant’s cross-motion for

judgment on the pleadings is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for
further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum and Order.
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment remanding this
case, and to close the case.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 1, 2022
Brooklyn, New York
__________/s/_______________
HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10308252. Public record. Not legal advice.