# Burton v. U.S. Rego Park Postal Service

> District Court, E.D. New York · April 13, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10307868

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** April 13, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
X

ANN BURTON,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
- against - AND ORDER
21-CV-6938 (LDH)
U.S. REGO PARK POSTAL SERVICE,

Defendant.
X
BRIAN M. COGAN, United States District Judge:
On December 13, 2021, plaintiff Ann Burton (“Burton”), proceeding pro se, filed this
action against a post office located in Queens County, New York. Plaintiff’s request to proceed
in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is granted, but for the reasons set forth below,
the action is dismissed in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s brief complaint. Plaintiff, a resident of
Florida, alleges that the defendant that the United States Postal Service’s (“USPS”) Rego Park
Queens post office “failed and refused to honor [her] inquiries in re[gards] to her pension from
2010” and “failed to comply with U.S. Postal Service Retirement record keeping policies.” She
further alleges that she has reported defendant’s alleged failures to the FBI and the New York
City Police Department “which evoked an increase in domestic terrorism thr[ough] the present
hypno (involuntary) sex slavery and kidnapping.” She seeks “an order of protection from daily
domestic terrorism” which, she alleges, includes fraud, forgery, damage of property and other
“evil acts.”

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Plaintiff is no stranger to this Court. In 2010-2011, she filed thirteen actions against her
former employers, her union, an employment agency, and individuals associated with these

defendants. Burton v. Shinseki, No. 10-cv-5318; Burton v. American Federation of Government
Employees et al., No. 11-cv-1416; Burton v. Silvercrest Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation et
al., No. 11-cv-1417; Burton v. White Glove Placement, Inc. et al., No. 11-cv-1649; Burton v.
Shinseki et al., No. 11-cv-2030; Burton v. Silvercrest Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation et
al., No. 11-cv-2757; Burton v. New York Police Department et al., No. 11-cv-4071; Burton v.
White Glove Placement, Inc. et al., No. 11-cv-4072; Burton v. United Stated Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission et al., No. 11-cv-4074; Burton v. State Education Dept. et al., No. 11-
cv-4218; Burton v. N.Y.S. Department of Labor et al., No. 11-cv-4274; Burton v. City of New
York et al., No. 11-cv-5345; Burton v. Civil Court of the City of New York et al., No. 11-cv-
5606. Although the actions principally alleged employment discrimination, they also alleged that

various individuals have entered her apartment, removed, and returned documents and other
items, hacked her computer, and otherwise harassed her, allegedly in retaliation for previous
complaints she had filed.
Recently, she has filed four actions, two of which also concerned her pension: an action
against the Office of Personnel Management, a federal agency, concerning accounting and
distribution of her pension account, Burton v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 21-cv-5323 (LDH)(filed
Sept. 22, 2021); an action against the United States and hundreds of federal and state elected
officials, Burton v. USA, 21-cv-6238 (LDH) (filed Nov. 1, 2021); and on December 7, 2021, two
actions, one against a municipal court regarding her name change request, Burton v. Civil Court
of the City of New York, 21-cv-6728 (LDH) (filed Dec. 7, 2021); and the other against another

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Security Administration, 21-cv-6727 (LDH) (filed Dec. 7, 2021), seeking copies of her records.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied the action
"(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. §
l 915(e)(2)(B). An action is frivolous when "either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly
baseless, such as when allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141
F.3d 434,437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). "[A] finding of factual
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly
incredible." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). In addition, if the Court “determines
at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.À.R.L., 90 F.3d
411, 416–17 (2d Cir. 2015) (A district court may dismiss an action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) when the court “lacks he statutory or constitutional power
to adjudicate it . . ..” (quoting Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113(2d Cir. 2000)).
In performing the review required under § 1915(e)(2)(B), this Court is mindful that "[ a]
document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, ... and a pro se complaint, however inartfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers .... "
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A
court must "read the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them 'to raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest.'" McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir.

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complaint "gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated," the court must grant leave to
amend the complaint. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); Gomez v. USAA

Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff names an office of the USPS as the sole defendant to this lawsuit. Under the
Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 101, et seq., the USPS is "an independent establishment
of the executive branch of the Government of the United States." 39 U.S.C. § 201. Accordingly,
the USPS, like the United States, has sovereign immunity from suit. United States v. Bormes,
568 U.S. 6, 10 (2012) ("Sovereign immunity shields the United States from suit absent a consent
to be sued that is 'unequivocally expressed."') (quoting United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503
U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992)); Dolan v. USPS, 546 U.S. 481,484 (2006). "The doctrine of sovereign
immunity is jurisdictional in nature, see FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), and

therefore, to prevail, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that her claims fall within
an applicable waiver." Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Nothing in
her complaint suggests a claim for which the USPS’s sovereign immunity is waived. Therefore,
the complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Even if the Court had subject matter jurisdiction, some of plaintiff's allegations are
"wholly incredible." See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. at 33. The allegations that she has been
a victim of “sex slavery and kidnapping” appear particularly irrational. Second, even assuming
that plaintiff had been the victim of such crimes, the complaint does not allege any facts to
suggest that the USPS was in any way involved in such actions. Upon review of this action, this

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Co., 141 F.3d at 437.
CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and as
frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The Court has considered affording plaintiff a chance to
amend the complaint, see Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000), but declines to
do so given plaintiff’s litigation history and viewing such an opportunity as futile. A review of
the complaint does not suggest that Burton has inadequately or inartfully pleaded any potentially
viable claims.
Further, the Court warns plaintiff that it will not tolerate frivolous litigation and that if
she persists in filing frivolous actions, the Court may enter an Order, after notice and an
opportunity to be heard, barring the acceptance of any future complaint for filing without first
obtaining leave of the Court to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 1651; Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dept of Motor

Vehicles, 396 F.3d at 529 (2d Cir. 2005); Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2000)
(per curiam) (a district court has the authority to issue a filing injunction when “a plaintiff
abuse[s] the process of the Courts to harass and annoy others with meritless, frivolous, vexatious
or repetitive . . . proceedings.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order
would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for purpose of
an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

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The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to plaintiff by mail, and to note
the mailing on the docket.
Digitally signed by Brian M.
SO ORDERED.
Cogan
_______________________
BRIAN M. COGAN
United States District Judge

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
April 12, 2022

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10307868. Public record. Not legal advice.
