# Quintin v. County Of Nassau

> District Court, E.D. New York · March 25, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10307707

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 25, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------X
LUKAS E. QUINTIN and YEHYA FARES,

Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
18-CV-5852 (JS)(ARL)
-against-

COUNTY OF NASSAU; NASSAU COUNTY
POLICE DEPARTMENT; DETECTIVE
JOSEPH HILL, in his individual and
official capacities; OFFICERS
ROBERT CANDELA, EDWARD MERCEDES,
in their individual and official
capacities,

Defendants.
--------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiffs: Guido Moreira, Esq.
Law Office of Guido Moreira
6804 Bliss Terrace
Brooklyn, New York 11220

Christopher H. Fitzgerald, Esq.
Law Office of Christopher H. Fitzgerald
233 Broadway, Suite 2348
New York, New York 10279

For Defendants: Andrew Robert Fuchs, Esq.
Jeremy James Scileppi, Esq.
Laurel R. Kretzing, Esq.
Office of the Nassau County Attorney
1 West Street
Mineola, New York 11501

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Lukas Quintin (“Quintin”) and Yehya Fares (“Fares”)
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this action against the
County of Nassau (the “County”), the Nassau County Police
Department (“NCPD”), Detective Joseph Hill (“Hill”), Officer
Robert Candela (“Candela”), and Officer Edward Mercedes
(“Mercedes”) (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting claims
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for false arrest,

failure to intervene, and municipal liability. (See generally Am.
Compl., ECF No. 29.) Pending before the Court is Defendants’
motion for summary judgment, which Plaintiffs oppose. (See Defs.
Mot., ECF No. 32; Support Memo, ECF No. 34; Opp’n, ECF No. 38;
Reply, ECF No. 39.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion
is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
On October 10, 2016 at approximately 10:00 a.m., agents
from the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Enforcement Group
met with detectives from the NCPD at a precinct in Westbury, New
York. (See DEA Report of Investigation (“DEA Report”) ¶ 1, ECF
No. 36.) Present at the briefing was DEA agent “CS,” whose

identity is classified. (Id. ¶ 1; Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 8.) At 11:30
a.m., agents and detectives established surveillance in the
vicinity of a Staples parking lot in Jericho, New York, in

1 The facts are drawn from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement
and Plaintiffs’ Local Rule 56.1 Counterstatement. (See Defs. 56.1
Stmt., ECF No. 35; Pls. 56.1 Counterstmt., ECF No. 24-2.) The
Court notes any relevant factual disputes. Unless otherwise
stated, a standalone citation to a Local Rule 56.1 Statement or
Counterstatement denotes that either the parties agree or the Court
has determined that the underlying factual allegation is
undisputed. Citation to a party’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement or
Counterstatement incorporates by reference the document(s) cited
therein.
anticipation of a meet between CS and an unidentified individual
for the purpose of purchasing synthetic cannabinoids. (DEA Report
¶ 3.) CS was also in contact with “other subjects” discussing

drug transactions from September 14, 2016 through October 11, 2016.
(Id.)
Surveillance was re-established at 1:00 p.m. in
anticipation of another meet between CS and an unidentified
individual. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11; DEA Report ¶ 8.) Fifteen
minutes later, Agents Calcano and Abbattiscianni observed a Silver
Ford Escape (the “Silver Ford”), with a Virginia registration and
four male occupants, approach CS’s vehicle. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 12.) The four males were later identified as Plaintiffs Quintin
and Fares, as well as Bakhos Maroun (“Maroun”) and Luis Delvalle-
Vasquez (“Delvalle-Vasquez”). (Id.) Agents Calcano and
Abbattiscianni observed Maroun exit the front, passenger-side door

of the Silver Ford and approach the driver’s door of CS’s vehicle.
(Id. ¶ 13.) After CS and Maroun had a brief conversation, Maroun
returned to the Silver Ford which then began to follow CS’s
vehicle. (Id.) Then, at approximately 1:20 p.m., Defendants
Candela and Mercedes, both NCPD detectives, conducted a DEA-
directed stop of the Silver Ford. (Id. ¶ 14.) Shortly thereafter,
Detective Schmit and Agent Popowicz joined Candela and Mercedes in
the stop. (Id.) It was at this point that law enforcement
identified the Silver Ford’s occupants, with Plaintiff Quintin as
the driver and Plaintiff Fares as a passenger in the rear.
(Id. ¶ 15.)
It is undisputed that all occupants of the Silver Ford

provided the officers with verbal consent to search the vehicle.
(Id. ¶ 16; Pls. 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 16.) During the search,
officers observed a black plastic bag on the floor mat in the
front, passenger-side of the vehicle which contained a large amount
of money. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 17.) Agent Popowicz asked who owned
the money and Plaintiff Fares claimed it, stating there was
approximately $16,000 in the bag and that he had an additional
$6,000 on his person. (Id.) According to the Amended Complaint,
Fares is the owner of a grocery store and gas station called “Stop
and Save” in New Bedford, Massachusetts. (Am. Compl. ¶ 18.) Fares
told Agent Popowicz that he had the money to “purchase clothes,
and other merchandise, to sell back in Massachusetts.” (Defs.

56.1 Stmt. ¶ 17.) Agent Popowicz seized the money as “drug
proceeds,” which was ultimately deposited into the “High Value
Seized Item Vault” at the DEA’s New Jersey Division.2 (Id. ¶ 18.)
All four occupants of the Silver Ford were then arrested,
transported to the NCPD, and charged with conspiracy to distribute

2 Altogether, the DEA seized $25,200.00 from Fares. (Defs. 56.1
Stmt. ¶ 25.) The DEA posted notice of the seized property on
Forfeiture.gov and mailed notice to each occupant of the Silver
Ford; however, nobody filed a claim to the property which resulted
in a forfeiture of the full amount to the United States. (See id.
¶¶ 26-28.)
synthetic cannabinoids. (Id. ¶ 19.) Each of them was released
“pending future federal proceedings”; however, Plaintiffs were
never prosecuted or charged with any federal crimes.

(Id. ¶¶ 19-20.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs commenced this action on October 18, 2018
against the County and numerous John Doe police officers and
supervisory officers. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) With
the Court’s leave, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on August
27, 2020 to amend the caption to include the names of the officers
involved in the allegations at issue. (See Aug. 3 & 18, 2020 Elec.
Orders; Am. Compl.) On September 9, 2020, Defendants filed an
Answer to the Amended Complaint. (See Answer, ECF No. 31.) The
instant summary judgment motion followed.
ANALYSIS

I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Material
facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law, and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Wagner v. Chiari & Ilecki, LLP, 973 F.3d 154,
164 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499
F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The movant bears the burden of establishing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact in dispute. CILP Assocs., L.P. v.

PriceWaterhouse Coopers LLP, 735 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2013).
Once the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must proffer
specific facts demonstrating “a genuine issue for trial.” Giglio
v. Buonnadonna Shoprite LLC, No. 06-CV-5191, 2009 WL 3150431, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Conclusory allegations or denials will not defeat
summary judgment. Id.
In reviewing the record, “the court is required to
resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual
inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is
sought.” Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Vadaris Tech.
Inc., No. 13-CV-5286, 2015 WL 6449420, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,

2015) (quoting McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.
1997)). The Court considers the “pleadings, deposition testimony,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
any other firsthand information including but not limited to
affidavits.” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011).
II. Discussion
Plaintiffs have brought claims for false arrest and
failure to intervene against the individual Defendants as well as
a claim for municipal liability against the County. As an initial
matter, to the extent any of Plaintiffs’ claims are asserted
against the Nassau County Police Department, those claims are
DISMISSED because the NCPD is a non-suable entity that does not

have a legal identity separate and distinct from the County.
Anderson v. Inc. Vill. of Hempstead, No. 15-CV-1485, 2022 WL
267875, at *5, n.4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2022).
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiffs assert claims against
Defendant Hill, those claims are also DISMISSED. Section 1983
provides a civil claim for damages against any person who, acting
under color of state law, deprives another of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or the laws
of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Cornejo v. Bell, 592
F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter
state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive
individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide

relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504
U.S. 158, 161 (1992). Further, it is well-settled that to
establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must “plead
and prove ‘that each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution,’” that is, personally participated in the alleged
constitutional deprivation. Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609,
618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675
(2009)) (rejecting “special rule for supervisory liability” and
holding constitutional violations “must be established against the
supervisory official directly”). The competent evidence before
the Court does not leave any indication that Defendant Hill had

any personal involvement of the “alleged constitutional
deprivations” Plaintiffs complain of, which “is a prerequisite to
an award of damages under § 1983.” See Barnes v. Malavi, 412 F.
Supp. 3d 140, 144 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (citing Colon v. Coughlin, 58
F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)).
The Court turns to Plaintiffs’ remaining claims against
Candela, Mercedes, and the County.
A. False Arrest
1. Applicable Law
To succeed on a Section 1983 claim for false arrest, the
plaintiff must show “(1) the defendant intended to confine the
plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3)

the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the
confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Avant v. Miranda, No.
21-CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021) (quoting
Wheeler v. Kolek, No. 16-CV-7441, 2020 WL 6726947, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 16, 2020)). The existence of probable cause is a complete
defense to a claim for false arrest. Ackerson v. City of White
Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
At the arrest stage, the Second Circuit has described
probable cause as “knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information
of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person
of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested
has committed . . . a crime.” Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84,

89 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 152 (2d
Cir. 2006)). “To assess probable cause, a court considers only
the facts ‘available to the officer at the time of the arrest and
immediately before it.’” Ashley v. City of New York, 992 F.3d
128, 136 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Stansbury, 721 F.3d at 89).
“‘[S]ubjective intentions’ of the arresting officer ‘play no role
in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis.’”
Selvaggio v. Patterson, 93 F. Supp. 3d 54, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
2. Application
In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants do not
contest the first three elements of Plaintiffs’ false arrest claim.

(See Support Memo at 7.) Rather, Defendants argue that this claim
fails because probable cause existed to conduct a traffic stop and
arrest Plaintiffs based upon the representations made to them by
the DEA. (Id.) To rebut Defendants’ probable cause defense,
Plaintiffs contend: (1) the DEA never communicated to Defendants
that probable cause existed; (2) the DEA’s direction for Defendants
to stop the Silver Ford is not the “equivalent of communicating
probable cause for an arrest” because a traffic stop is only
supported by reasonable suspicion; and (3) Defendants did not
“develop probable cause to arrest . . . [P]laintiffs based on the
results of the traffic stop.” (Opp’n at 3-5.) However, each of
Plaintiffs’ arguments misses the mark.

Pursuant to the “collective or imputed knowledge
doctrine, an arrest or search is permissible where the actual
arresting or searching officer lacks the specific information to
form the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion but
sufficient information to justify the arrest was known by other
law enforcement officials initiating or involved with the
investigation.” United States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 135 (2d
Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 230-33
(1985)). “The rule exists because, in light of the complexity of
modern police work, the arresting officer cannot always be aware
of every aspect of an investigation; sometimes his authority to
arrest a suspect is based on facts known only to his superiors or

associates.” United States v. Valez, 796 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir.
1986); see also United States v. Fleming, No. 18-CR-0197, 2019 WL
486073, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2019) (“Under [the collective
knowledge] doctrine, a police officer may act reasonably in relying
on information from other law enforcement officers, even if he is
not personally aware of the facts that provided the probable cause
underlying the information he received.” (citing Colon, 250 F.3d
at 135)).
In view of these principles, Defendants contend that the
instant case is analogous to Williams v. City of New York, which
involved arrests made following a “buy and bust” operation. See

409 F. Supp. 3d 137, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). In Williams, while two
undercover officers were taking a lunch break at a fast-food
restaurant, the plaintiff arrived at the restaurant and gave his
son an envelope containing cash. Id. at 140. The undercover
officers observed the plaintiff “remove a dark, shiny object, which
looked like it was wrapped in a plastic bag, from his pants
pocket.” Id. The plaintiff then gave this object to his son who
placed it in his right waist area, leading the undercover officers
to believe the exchange was a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction.
Id. After the exchange, the plaintiff left the restaurant by foot;
his son left by car. Id. at 141. The undercover officers then
called in their observations to a sergeant, who was riding in an

NYPD vehicle with two detectives and consequently, relayed the
information to the detectives. One of the detectives found the
plaintiff walking, stopped and frisked him and found no contraband,
but executed an arrest. Id. The sergeant and other detective
stopped the son’s vehicle in the restaurant parking lot, found a
firearm and ammunition on his person, and arrested him as well.
Id. No other contraband was found, except that another officer
recovered $4,375 in cash from the vehicle the son was in. Id.
The sergeant then made the decision to arrest the plaintiff and
his son; however, one of the detectives was assigned as the
“arresting officer.” Id. The plaintiff was charged with criminal
possession of a weapon and ammunition, but that charge was

dismissed on speedy-trial grounds. Id. Charges against the son
proceeded separately in federal court. Id. In granting the
“arresting” detective’s motion for summary judgment on the
plaintiff’s false arrest claim, the Williams court held probable
cause for the plaintiff’s arrest existed because the detective was
entitled to rely upon the allegations relayed to him by the
sergeant from the undercover officers. Id. at 142-43.
Here, the Court similarly finds that Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment. The DEA conducted a sting operation
with the assistance of the NCPD regarding the sale of synthetic
cannabinoids at a location where law enforcement had reason to
believe such a sale would take place due to the involvement of an

undercover DEA agent, and individuals, including Plaintiffs, who
met the undercover agent at this location and proceeded to follow
the agent’s vehicle. Then, after observing these events, the DEA
contacted Defendants Candela and Mercedes -- who are NCPD
officers -- and instructed them to stop Plaintiffs’ vehicle.
Plaintiffs contend that the DEA’s operation did not supply probable
cause to arrest them (see Opp’n at 4); however, whether the DEA
had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs or explicitly told
Defendants probable cause to arrest existed is not the pertinent
inquiry. Plaintiffs have not proffered any competent evidence to
create an issue of material fact as to why it could have been
unreasonable for Defendants to rely upon the information provided

to them by the DEA to stop the Silver Ford and consequently arrest
Plaintiffs. In fact, Plaintiffs did not submit a single exhibit
in opposition to Defendants’ motion. Moreover, to the extent
Plaintiffs argue that no illegal contraband was found in their
vehicle (Opp’n at 4), the fact that no drugs “were subsequently
recovered from [Plaintiffs] is immaterial to the probable cause-
analysis, which turns on only ‘those facts available to the officer
at the time of the arrest and immediately before it.’” Williams,
409 F. Supp. 3d at 143 (quoting Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.2d 388,
395 (2d Cir. 2006)). As such, for the reasons the arresting
detective in Williams was entitled to rely upon the information
provided by the undercover officers, Defendants here were entitled

to rely upon CS’s instruction to stop Plaintiffs’ vehicle and
consequently arrest them. In addition, the Court also notes that
prior to arresting Plaintiffs, Defendants recovered a large sum of
cash from Fares which is an another fact that lends further support
to the existence of probable cause. Accordingly, Defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ claim for false
arrest is GRANTED.
B. Failure to Intervene
Plaintiffs’ failure to intervene claim “is grounded in
the widely recognized rule that ‘all law enforcement officials

have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional
rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement
officers in their presence.” Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F.
Supp. 2d 418, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Branen, 17,
F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994)). However, a “failure to intervene
claim is contingent upon the disposition of the primary claims
underlying the failure to intervene claim.” Id. (citing Coleman
v. City of New York, No. 07-CV-1051, 2010 WL 571986, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2010)). In light of the Court’s finding that
probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs existed, their claim for
failure to intervene necessarily fails as well. See Williams, 409
F. Supp. 3d at 143 (citing Simcoe v. Gray, 670 F. App’x 725, 727

(2d Cir. 2016)). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiffs’ failure to intervene claim is GRANTED.3

3 In their Opposition, Plaintiffs fail to address their failure
to intervene claim. As such, even if the Court found that
Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’
false arrest claim, the Court would still dismiss this claim as
abandoned. See Avola v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 2d
381, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Ostroski v. Town of Southold,
443 F. Supp. 2d 325, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Because plaintiff’s
opposition papers did not address defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on this claim, the claim is deemed abandoned and summary
judgment could be granted on that basis alone.”).
C. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government officials from
civil liability resulting from the performance of their

discretionary functions only where their conduct “does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Wallace v. Suffolk County
Police Dep’t, 396 F. Supp. 2d 251, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Seybert,
J.) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To
determine whether qualified immunity applies, courts consider
“whether the facts shown make out a violation of a constitutional
right and whether the right at issue was clearly established at
the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Tankleff v.
County of Suffolk, No. 09-CV-1207, 2017 WL 2729084, at *17
(E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2017) (quoting Estate of Devine v. Fusaro, 676
F. App’x 61, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up)). Whether a right was

clearly established should be analyzed from the perspective of a
reasonable official, and the relevant inquiry is whether “it would
be clear to a reasonable offic[ial] that his conduct was unlawful
in the situation he confronted.” Id. (quoting Devine, 676 F. App’x
at 63).
Because the Court has concluded Plaintiffs’ rights were
not violated, it need not address the issue of qualified immunity.
Bonhag v. Colavita, No. 07-CV-5714, 2010 WL 6243308, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2010). However, even if the Court reached the
opposite conclusion, it would still find that Defendants Candella
and Mercedes were entitled to qualified immunity because it was
objectively reasonable for them to determine probable cause to

arrest Plaintiffs existed based upon the DEA’s direction to stop
Plaintiffs’ vehicle following the “sting operation” coupled with
their discovery of thousands of dollars in cash on Plaintiff Fares’
person and in the Silver Ford that Plaintiffs’ occupied.
D. Municipal Liability
It is well established that a municipality such as the
County cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978); Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d
Cir. 2008). Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate the
municipality, through its deliberate conduct, “was the moving
force behind the alleged injury.” Roe, 542 F.3d at 37. To that

end, a plaintiff must plead and prove three elements: “(1) an
official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be
subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Lucente v.
County of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Wray
v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007)).
As discussed above, Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their
Section 1983 claims against the individual defendants, Candela and
Mercedes. Thus, because “no underlying constitutional violation
was committed, no liability against [the] County under Monell can
exist as a matter of law.” Leogrande v. Suffolk County, No. 08-
CV-3088, 2016 WL 889737, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2016) (citing
Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006)); see

also Hirsch v. New York, 751 F. App’x 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2018)
(“Because the district court properly found no underlying
constitutional violation, its decision not [to] address the
municipal defendants’ liability under Monell was entirely
correct.” (citing Segal, 459 F.3d at 219)). Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to
Plaintiffs’ claim for municipal liability against the County.
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 32) is GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly
and mark this case CLOSED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/_JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: March 25, 2022
Central Islip, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10307707. Public record. Not legal advice.