# Hansen v. The Town of Smithtown

> District Court, E.D. New York · March 28, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10307705

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 28, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
--------------------------------X
SUSAN HANSEN,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
18-CV-2438 (JS)(AYS)
-against-

MICHELE DESANTI; CHRISTINA
DEHOYOS; KAREN SYLVESTER;
JOHN VALENTINE; and JAMES LEE,
in their official and individual
capacities,

Defendants.
--------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff: Matthew Brian Weinick, Esq.
Famighetti & Weinick, PLLC
25 Melville Park Road, Suite 235
Melville, New York 11747

For Defendants: Meghan McGuire Dolan, Esq.
Scott D. Middleton, Esq.
Richard Anthony DeMaio, Esq.
Campolo, Middleton & McCormick, LLP
4175 Veterans Memorial Highway, Suite 400
Ronkonkoma, New York 11779

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Susan Hansen (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against
Defendants Michele DeSanti (“DeSanti”), Christina DeHoyos
(“DeHoyos”), Karen Sylvester (“Sylvester”), John Valentine
(“Valentine”), and James Lee (“Lee”) (collectively, “Defendants”)
and asserts a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)
for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff, the Director of the Town of
Smithtown Animal Shelter, was formally suspended from her position
and during the course of her suspension, entered the Shelter and
was arrested for trespassing -- the criminal charges for which
were later dismissed, giving rise to this action. (See generally
Compl.) Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment against Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim, which
Plaintiff opposes. (See Defs. Mot., ECF No. 42; Support Memo, ECF
No. 43; Opp’n, ECF No. 44; Reply, ECF No. 47.) For the following
reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
I. Plaintiff’s Suspension
This action arises from Plaintiff’s arrest for
trespassing at the Town of Smithtown (the “Town”) Animal Shelter
(the “Shelter”) following her suspension as Director of the
Shelter. (See Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 3, 10.) During the relevant
time period, Defendants were Town employees and served as witnesses
in connection with Plaintiff’s arrest. (Id. ¶ 6.)

Unfortunately, the parties’ respective 56.1 Statements
shed no light as to the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s
suspension. Notwithstanding, Defendants contend that Plaintiff

1 The facts are drawn from Defendants’ Local Rule 56.1 Statement
and Plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1 Counterstatement. (See Defs. 56.1
Stmt., ECF No. 42-18; Pl. 56.1 Counterstmt., ECF No. 42-19.) The
Court notes any relevant factual disputes. Unless otherwise
stated, a standalone citation to a Local Rule 56.1 Statement or
Counterstatement denotes that either the parties agree or the Court
has determined that the underlying factual allegation is
undisputed. Citation to a party’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement or
Counterstatement incorporates by reference the document cited
therein.
was suspended from her position because the Town advised her on
multiple occasions that she was mismanaging and ineffectively
running the Shelter; however, Plaintiff never rectified her

performance. (See Support Memo at 2.) Thus, on February 7, 2017,
the Office of the Town Attorney served Plaintiff with a letter, in
accordance with Section 75 of the New York Civil Service Law, that
formally suspended her and set forth the specific charges (the
“Suspension Letter”). (See Suspension Ltr., ECF No. 42-9.) These
charges asserted, inter alia, that Plaintiff (1) failed to contact
the Department of Public Safety regarding inoperative fire alarms
at the Shelter, (2) terminated the employment of a Shelter employee
without obtaining approval of the Town Board, (3) failed to provide
adequate instruction to employees for “dealing with the public,”
and (4) placed an employee at risk by taking them to the home of
an individual who adopted a dog from the Shelter while having

reason to believe that the employee was entering a potentially
volatile and dangerous situation. (See id. at 1.) Plaintiff, on
the other hand, insinuates that she was suspended in an act of
retaliation by Town Councilwoman Lisa Inzerillo that was related
to Plaintiff’s attempt to unilaterally fire an employee.
(See Opp’n at 3.)
The Suspension Letter was hand delivered to Plaintiff by
three investigators from the Town’s Public Safety Department,
Defendants Lee and Sylvester, and non-party James Garcia.2 (See
Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11.) After Plaintiff read the Letter, these
officers collected Plaintiff’s keys and ID, and escorted her off

of Town property. (Id. ¶ 12.) In addition to notifying Plaintiff
of the charges levied against her, the Suspension Letter also
advised Plaintiff that she is entitled to a hearing and the
procedures related thereto, the potential penalty imposed upon her
should she be found guilty, and that she was suspended with pay
for thirty days, effective February 7, 2017, pending the
determination of the charges. (See Suspension Letter at 1-2.)
Although the Suspension Letter does not state whether Plaintiff
was still permitted to return to the Shelter (or Town property)
during her period of suspension (see id.), Defendants Lee and
Sylvester stated that when they gave Plaintiff the Letter, Lee
told Plaintiff she was unable to do so for thirty days (see Defs.

56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14). Plaintiff disputes that Lee informed Plaintiff
of this fact. (Pl. 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 14.)
Defendant Valentine, Director of Public Safety, stated
there is no “set of rules or specific things that have to be said”
when advising an employee of their suspension nor is there an
official Town policy concerning the delivery of suspension
letters. (See Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 13; Valentine Depo. Tr. at 14-15,

2 Garcia was initially a named defendant but has since been
dismissed from this case.
ECF No. 42-7.) There is, however, a “standard routine with the
[Public Safety] officers,” which includes advising the suspended
employee that they cannot return to the Town property where they

worked. (See Valentine Depo. Tr. at 15-17.)
II. Plaintiff’s Return to the Shelter and the
Contemporaneous Investigation into the Shelter

While Plaintiff was still suspended, on February 18,
2018, she went to the Shelter to attend an orientation class that
is provided to members of the public who want to volunteer at the
Shelter. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 15; Pl. 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 15; Opp’n
at 5-6.) Garcia, who was at the Shelter that day and saw Plaintiff,
questioned her ability to be at the Shelter and called one of his
supervisors, Deputy Chief Kevin McPadden, to apprise him of the
situation. (See Investigative Report, ECF No. 42-10.) Afterwards,
Garcia advised Plaintiff that she was not authorized to be at the
Shelter and escorted her off of the premises. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt.
¶ 16.) Defendant Valentine was at the Shelter that day as well
and did not call the police to report Plaintiff’s presence. (See
Valentine Depo. Tr. at 41.) He did notify Town Supervisor Vecchio
and advised that he would also notify the District Attorney’s
Office because “at that time, there was a bigger investigation
[into the Shelter] going on” (id. at 42) -- an investigation of
which Plaintiff was also aware (Hansen Depo. Tr. at 71-76, ECF
No. 42-5). Valentine also directed Garcia to complete an
Investigative Report to document what had transpired with
Plaintiff. (See Valentine Depo. Tr. at 39-40.) In the
Investigative Report, Garcia noted that Plaintiff complied with

his directive to leave. (See Investigative Report.)
Regarding the contemporaneous investigation into the
Shelter, it was Valentine’s understanding that the Suffolk County
District Attorney’s (“D.A.”) Office received “a tremendous amount
of allegations . . . about the [S]helter not being operated
properly” and that the D.A. was not “looking at a particular
person” but “everybody,” which “was very clear.” (Valentine Depo.
Tr. at 43-45.) Although part of this investigation focused on
some alleged conduct by Plaintiff (see Beyrer Aff. ¶ 3, ECF No.
45-12), Plaintiff believed that only a former supervisor was under
investigation due to an incident involving the euthanasia of
approximately 20 animals in one day (Hansen Depo. Tr. at 71-72).

Despite the fact that Plaintiff’s employment with this supervisor
apparently never overlapped (Hansen Depo. Tr. at 70-71), Plaintiff
retained an attorney as a result of this investigation and advised
the detectives handling the matter that she would only speak to
them with her attorney present (see Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20).
Valentine stated that members of the D.A.’s Office were
“routinely in [his] office[] working on this case.” (Valentine
Depo. Tr. at 44.) In particular, they were completing paperwork,
speaking with Town employees, and executing a subpoena with Town
investigators. (Id.) As such, on February 20, 2017, Valentine
advised Detectives Alex Beyrer and Nancy Paul of Plaintiff’s
presence at the Shelter two days prior. (Id. at 48-49.) He

reported this information to the Detectives as a matter of
transparency because “there [was] an ongoing investigation by a
higher authority” and “in [his] own feelings and professionalism,
it would be inappropriate not to advise the District Attorney’s
Office that something . . . occurred.” (Id. at 47-48.) This topic
was “part of a larger conversation” they had, but Valentine stated
that at no point did he suggest that Plaintiff should be arrested.
(Id. at 49-50.) Valentine could not recall whether he said
Plaintiff “trespassed” but made clear that Plaintiff was not
supposed to be at the Shelter. (Id. at 50.) The Detectives then
advised Valentine that they would confer with the Assistant D.A.
handling the case but did not follow up with Valentine afterwards.

(Id. at 50-51.) However, law enforcement then began to collect
statements from Town personnel. (Id. at 51.) Valentine said he
did not play a role in the investigation regarding Plaintiff, i.e.,
he did not tell the Detectives whom they should take statements
from. (Id. at 51-52.) Contrary to Valentine’s testimony,
Detective Beyrer stated that, during their conversation, Valentine
“did communicate to [her] that the Town wanted to have Ms. Hansen
charged with trespass” and that she “arranged with Mr. Valentine
to take written statements of the several witnesses to the event.”
(Beyrer Aff. ¶ 6.)
III. Plaintiff’s Arrest

Thereafter, Detective Beyrer obtained from Lee and
Sylvester sworn statements describing what transpired as they
served Plaintiff with the Suspension Letter and noting that
Plaintiff was advised she cannot return to the Shelter for thirty
days -- a fact Plaintiff vigorously disputes. (See Pl. 56.1
Counterstmt. ¶ 28; Lee Stmt., ECF No. 42-11; Sylvester Stmt., ECF
No. 42-12.) Detective Beyrer then took sworn written statements
from DeHoyos and DeSanti, both of whom were Shelter employees
(Beyrer Aff. ¶¶ 7-8) and witnessed Plaintiff at the Shelter on
February 18, 2017 (see DeHoyos Stmt., ECF No. 42-13; DeSanti Stmt.,
ECF No. 42-14). Both DeHoyos and DeSanti expressed that they were
surprised to see Plaintiff that day because of her suspension.

(See DeHoyos Stmt.; DeSanti Stmt.) After she obtained these
statements, Detective Beyrer forwarded her file to the Suffolk
County Police Department’s Fourth Precinct Crime Section.
Detective Beyrer then spoke to Police Officer Jeffrey Harkins, who
was assigned to the Crime Section, to “advise[] him of the trespass
allegation and that the Town was seeking to have Ms. Hansen
charged.” (Beyrer Aff. ¶ 10.)
Then, on March 10, 2017, Valentine provided Officer
Harkins with a sworn “Criminal Trespass Affidavit,” an affidavit
that Valentine routinely provides law enforcement for individuals
trespassing on Town properties, which indicates that Plaintiff did
not have permission to enter or remain on the property of the

Shelter on February 18, 2017. (See id. ¶ 11; Criminal Trespass
Aff., ECF No. 42-15; Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 37.) According to
Detective Beyrer, that same day, “it was determined that probable
cause existed to charge Ms. Hansen” with the offense of criminal
trespass in the third degree pursuant to New York State Penal Law
§ 140.10A, which provides that “[a] person is guilty of criminal
trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains
unlawfully in a building or upon real property.” (See Beyrer Aff.
¶¶ 12-13.) The probable cause determination was based upon “the
sworn written statements establishing that Ms. Hansen was advised
on February 7, 2017 that she was suspended from her job and was
not permitted to return to the Shelter for 30 days, that she in

fact returned to the shelter on February 18, 2017, and that she
was not given permission to remain or enter on that property.”
(Id. ¶ 12.) Consequently, Plaintiff was arrested; however, the
D.A. ultimately dismissed the charge. (Pl. 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶ 7.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initiated this action on April 25, 2018
against the Town, DeSanti, DeHoyos, Sylvester, Valentine, Lee,
Garcia, McPadden, and Inzerillo. (See Compl.) Plaintiff asserted
claims pursuant to Section 1983 for violations of her First
Amendment right for freedom of assembly as well as her Fourth
Amendment rights for abuse of process and malicious prosecution.
(See id. ¶¶ 119-24.) Plaintiff also raised a claim for abuse of

process pursuant to New York State law. (Id. ¶ 125.) Defendants
then moved to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). On October 24,
2018, the Honorable Judge Arthur D. Spatt granted Defendants’
motion in part. (See Mem. of Decision & Order, ECF No. 20.) The
Town, Garcia, McPadden, and Inzerillo were dismissed from this
case and Plaintiff’s sole surviving claim was for malicious
prosecution. (Id. at 27.) This case was reassigned to the
undersigned on June 30, 2020. With the Court’s leave, Defendants
filed the instant summary judgment motion on September 17, 2020.
ANALYSIS
I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Material
facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law, and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Wagner v. Chiari & Ilecki, LLP, 973 F.3d 154,
164 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499
F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The movant bears the burden of establishing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact in dispute. CILP Assocs., L.P. v.
PriceWaterhouse Coopers LLP, 735 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2013).

Once the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must proffer
specific facts demonstrating “a genuine issue for trial.” Giglio
v. Buonnadonna Shoprite LLC, No. 06-CV-5191, 2009 WL 3150431, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Conclusory allegations or denials will not defeat
summary judgment. Id.
In reviewing the record, “the court is required to
resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual
inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is
sought.” Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Vadaris Tech.
Inc., No. 13-CV-5286, 2015 WL 6449420, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,
2015) (quoting McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir.

1997)). The Court considers the “pleadings, deposition testimony,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
any other firsthand information including but not limited to
affidavits.” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011).
II. Discussion
As set forth above, the sole remaining claim in this
case is for malicious prosecution against Defendants DeSanti,
DeHoyos, Sylvester, Valentine, and Lee.
A. Applicable Law
1. Section 1983
Section 1983 provides a civil claim for damages against

any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983; Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). “The
purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of
their authority to deprive individuals of their federally
guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such
deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
2. Malicious Prosecution
“In order to prevail on a Section 1983 claim against a
state actor for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show a
violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment . . . and must

establish the elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state
law.” Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 160–61 (2d
Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). Under New York law, a
claim for malicious prosecution requires: “(1) the initiation or
continuation of a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff;
(2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff’s favor; (3) lack
of probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual
malice as a motivation for defendant’s actions.” Id. at 161
(quoting Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 1997)); see
also Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003).
In addition, under Section 1983, the plaintiff must further
demonstrate “a post-arraignment deprivation of liberty that rises

to the level of a constitutional violation.” Bailey v. City of
New York, 79 F. Supp. 3d 424, 448 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Boley v.
Durets, No. 12–CV–4090, 2013 WL 6562445, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10,
2013)).
“[T]he existence of probable cause is a complete defense
to a claim of malicious prosecution in New York.” Savino, 331
F.3d at 72; see also McClellan v. Smith, 439 F.3d 137, 145 (2d
Cir. 2006) (“The absence of probable cause is an essential element
to a claim for malicious prosecution.”) This is the case because
“a malicious prosecution claim is rooted in the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from a baseless criminal prosecution.” Hoyos v.
City of New York, 999 F. Supp. 2d 375, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing

Morse v. Spitzer, No. 07-CV-4793, 2012 WL 3202963, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 3, 2012) (interpreting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994), and Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116 (2d
Cir. 1995))). But importantly, the relevant probable cause
determination depends on the stage of the criminal proceeding.
“Probable cause, in the context of malicious
prosecution, has . . . been described as such facts and
circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe
the plaintiff guilty.” Stansbury, 721 F.3d at 95 (quoting Boyd v.
City of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 2003)); Hoyos, 999 F.
Supp. 2d at 390 (“[T]he relevant probable cause determination is
whether there was probable cause to believe the criminal proceeding

could succeed and, hence, should be commenced.”). As a result,
probable cause in the context of malicious prosecution is measured
“as of the time the judicial proceeding is commenced (e.g., the
time of the arraignment),” not the time of the arrest. Hoyos, 999
F. Supp. 2d at 390 (quoting Davis v. City of New York, 373 F. Supp.
2d 322, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)); id. (“Information obtained ‘after
the arrest, but before the commencement of proceedings, is relevant
to the determination of probable cause’ for a malicious prosecution
claim.”); Stone v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey, No. 11-
CV-3932, 2014 WL 3110002, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014) (“[E]ven
when probable cause is present at the time of arrest, evidence
could later surface which would eliminate that probable

cause. . . .”); Jean v. County of Nassau, No. 14-CV-1322, 2020 WL
1244786, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2020) (citing McDermott v. City
of New York, No. 94-CV-2145, 1995 WL 347041, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May
30, 1995)) (“In the absence of some indication that the authorities
became aware of exculpatory evidence between the time of the arrest
and the subsequent prosecution that would undermine the probable
cause which supported the arrest, no claim for malicious
prosecution may lie.”).
3. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields government officials from
civil liability resulting from the performance of their

discretionary functions only where their conduct “does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Wallace v. Suffolk County
Police Dep’t, 396 F. Supp. 2d 251, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (Seybert,
J.) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To
determine whether qualified immunity applies, courts consider
“whether the facts shown make out a violation of a constitutional
right and whether the right at issue was clearly established at
the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Tankleff v.
County of Suffolk, No. 09-CV-1207, 2017 WL 2729084, at *17
(E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2017) (quoting Estate of Devine v. Fusaro, 676
F. App’x 61, at *1 (2d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up)). Whether a right

was clearly established should be analyzed from the perspective of
a reasonable official, and the relevant inquiry is whether “it
would be clear to a reasonable office[ial] that his conduct was
unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id.
B. Application
In their motion, Defendants contend that summary
judgment must be granted for two reasons: (1) Plaintiff cannot
satisfy the initiation, probable cause, and malice elements for a
malicious prosecution claim; and (2) Defendants enjoy qualified
immunity. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
1. Initiation of a Criminal Proceeding

As to the “initiation” element, “although malicious
prosecution claims are usually made against arresting or
prosecuting officials, they can also be brought against
individuals other than the arresting officer when such a person
actively engaged in a plaintiff’s prosecution.” TADCO Constr.
Corp. v. Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 700 F. Supp. 2d 253,
270 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Shattuck v. Town of Stratford, 233 F.
Supp. 2d 301, 313-14 (D. Conn. 2002)). “A person who tells law
enforcement authorities that he or she thinks that a crime has
been committed and does no more, does not thereby put him- or
herself at risk of liability for malicious prosecution should the
arrest or prosecution later be abandoned or result in an

acquittal.” Rohman v. New York City Transit Auth. (NYCTA), 215
F.3d 208, 217 (2d Cir. 2000). Rather, in order for an individual
to initiate a prosecution for these purposes, “it must be shown
that [a] defendant played an active role in the prosecution, such
as giving advice and encouragement or importuning the authorities
to act.” Id. (quoting DeFilippo v. County of Nassau, 183 A.D.2d
695, 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1992)). However, providing
information “that is known to be false qualifies as the
commencement of a prosecution.” Rivers v. Towers, Perrin, Forster
& Crosby Inc., 07–CV–5441, 2009 WL 817852, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
27, 2009) (citing Lupski v. County of Nassau, 822 N.Y.S.2d 112,
114 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2006)).

As such, to satisfy the “initiation” element, a
plaintiff may proceed along one of two routes, demonstrating
(1) that a defendant urged for a plaintiff to be prosecuted; or
(2) that a defendant provided knowingly false information to law
enforcement. Defendants here contend they did not initiate a
criminal proceeding against Plaintiff, because they merely
reported information to law enforcement and did not provide any
knowingly false statements to ensure Plaintiff was arrested.
Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that Valentine urged Detective Beyrer
to have Plaintiff arrested and that every Defendant provided false
information to law enforcement, i.e., that Plaintiff was advised
she could not be at the Shelter during her suspension. (See Opp’n

at 13-19.)
a. Valentine’s Purported “Urging”
of Plaintiff’s Prosecution
To begin, there is conflicting evidence in the record as
to whether Defendant Valentine even told Detective Beyrer that the
Town sought to have Plaintiff charged with or arrested for
trespassing; however, the Court does not find this issue of fact
material for purposes of resolving the instant motion. Even if
the Court accepts such information as true and finds that Valentine
told Detective Beyrer that the Town sought to have Plaintiff
charged, there is nothing in the record to indicate that
Valentine’s conversation with Beyrer crossed the line from the

mere reporting of a crime to influencing Plaintiff’s prosecution.
According to Detective Beyrer, an unidentified Town
employee contacted her to advise that Plaintiff entered the Shelter
despite being suspended and not permitted to do so. (See Beyrer
Aff. ¶ 4.) Then, “[a]round the same time,” Detective Beyrer had
a telephone conversation with Valentine, during which he also told
her of Plaintiff’s entrance into the Shelter and indicated “that
the Town wanted to have [Plaintiff] charged.” (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.)
Despite Plaintiff’s argument that Valentine “called Detective
Beyrer, urging her to charge Hansen,” (see Opp’n at 13), Detective
Beyrer does not indicate whether she or Valentine initiated that
phone call (see Beyrer Aff. ¶ 5). In addition, there is nothing

in the record to contradict Valentine’s testimony in which he
stated that his notifying Detective Beyrer of Plaintiff’s presence
was part of a larger conversation pertaining to the contemporaneous
investigation in the Shelter. As such, Plaintiff has not created
an issue of material fact to show that the conversation between
Valentine and Beyrer was initiated by Valentine, let alone that
the purpose of the conversation was to encourage the Detectives to
act and charge Plaintiff.
Moreover, the record is bereft of information showing
Valentine urged Detective Beyrer to have Plaintiff charged to the
point where Detective Beyrer did not make the decision to proceed

with an investigation upon her own volition. On this point,
Plaintiff’s efforts to distinguish Barrett v. Watkins are
unavailing. Plaintiff argues that although the defendant in
Barrett provided the police with a trespass complaint detailing
the circumstances of the alleged crime, the plaintiff’s malicious
prosecution claim was dismissed because the prosecutor testified
that she made the decision to pursue the plaintiff’s prosecution
on a good faith basis. (See Opp’n at 12-13 (citing Barrett v.
Watkins, 82 A.D.3d 1569, 1572 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2011)).)
Plaintiff highlights that the Barrett defendants produced
testimony from the prosecutor to disprove a malicious prosecution
claim whereas Defendants here have not. Although Plaintiff is

correct that the record here does not contain any statements from
the prosecutor who handled her underlying criminal matter similar
to the evidence proffered in Barrett, the Court finds Detective
Beyrer’s affidavit provides comparable information. Following her
conversation with Valentine, Detective Beyrer “arranged with”
Valentine to take written statements from witnesses, i.e.,
Sylvester, Lee, DeHoyos, and DeSanti. After undertaking her own
investigation, Detective Beyrer forwarded her investigative file
to the Suffolk County Police Department, at which point Officer
Harkins became involved. Officer Harkins then obtained the
“Criminal Trespass Affidavit” from Valentine, in which Valentine
stated that he did not give Plaintiff permission to enter the

Shelter. Then, “based upon the sworn witness statements” which
showed that Plaintiff was advised not to be at the Shelter due to
her suspension and went anyway without receiving permission to do
so, “it was determined that probable cause existed.” Beyrer Aff.
¶ 12. Officer Harkins’ participation in the investigation leads
to the reasonable conclusion that this probable cause
determination was not made solely by Detective Beyrer. Moreover,
the “Misdemeanor Information” sheet that Officer Harkins filed in
state court indicates that Harkins himself was the “complainant”
and that the trespassing charge against Plaintiff was based upon
his personal knowledge and information from Sylvester, Lee,
DeHoyos, DeSanti, and Garcia. (Misdemeanor Information, ECF No.

42-17.) Notably, the Misdemeanor Information does not even
indicate that any information provided by Valentine led to the
charge.
As such, the Court does not agree with Plaintiff that a
reasonable juror could find Valentine’s judgment was possibly
substituted for that of Beyrer’s own when deciding to pursue
criminal charges against Plaintiff . See Lupski, 822 N.Y.S.2d at
114 (“The defendant must have affirmatively induced the officer to
act, such as taking an active part in the arrest and procuring it
to be made or showing active, officious and undue zeal, to the
point where the officer is not acting of his own volition.”
(quoting Mesiti v. Wegman, 763 N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t

2003))).
b. Defendants’ Alleged Provision of False
Information to Law Enforcement
Plaintiff also attempts to establish the “initiation”
element by arguing that each Defendant provided false or misleading
information to law enforcement. This, however, misstates the
applicable standard, which requires Defendants to have “knowingly”
provided law enforcement with false information, or even to have
created false information or withheld material information. See
Rivers, 2009 WL 817852, at *3 (providing information “that is known
to be false qualifies as the commencement of a prosecution” (citing
Lupski, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 114)); see also Ying Li v. City of New
York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 578, 605 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (“A defendant could
have initiated a prosecution ‘by creating material, false
information and forwarding that information to a prosecutor or by
withholding material information from a prosecutor.’” (quoting
Costello v. Milano, 20 F. Supp. 3d 406, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014))).
While Plaintiff identifies purportedly false statements made by
Lee, Sylvester, DeHoyos, DeSanti, and Valentine, none of these is
sufficient to overcome summary judgment.3
The crux of Plaintiff’s argument on this point is that

Defendants provided law enforcement with sworn written statements
that falsely indicated Plaintiff had been directed not to return
to the Shelter following her suspension, because Plaintiff claims
she was never told not to return. The record, however, is absent
of any indicia that Defendants knew their statements to law
enforcement were false. The portions of Lee’s and Sylvester’s
statements at issue provide that, on February 7, 2017, Lee told
Plaintiff she could not return to the Shelter for thirty days after
her suspension. The Court notes that Lee’s and Sylvester’s
statements provide corroborating accounts as to the terms of
suspension they discussed with Plaintiff that day.4 Plaintiff
simply having a different recollection of what transpired during

that conversation has no bearing on whether Lee and Sylvester
intentionally portrayed a false narrative to the police.

3 Plaintiff also contends that Garcia provided false information
to law enforcement and the “initiation element” is satisfied as to
him. (See Opp’n at 18-19.) The Court is not considering this
argument because Garcia is no longer a defendant to this lawsuit.

4 To the extent Plaintiff argues that Lee did not have the authority
to prohibit her from returning to the Shelter, this argument is
immaterial to the core issue of whether Plaintiff “knew” she was
not authorized to do so.
Plaintiff then points to the Criminal Trespass Affidavit
that was prepared by Valentine, particularly, his statement that
Plaintiff did not have permission to enter the Shelter on February

18, 2017. Admittedly, Valentine was not present when Plaintiff
was given the Suspension Letter by Lee, Sylvester, and Garcia, nor
did he play a personal role in doing so. (Valentine Depo. Tr.
at 12.) However, as the Director of Public Safety, Valentine
oversaw Lee, Sylvester, and Garcia. (See id. at 7-11.) And
Valentine’s employees routinely tell individuals who are
suspended, like Plaintiff, that they “are not to return to the
facility” after their suspensions. (Id. at 16.) Valentine’s
deposition does not suggest that he had reason to believe Lee (or
Sylvester or Garcia) did not tell Plaintiff she could not go back
to the Shelter after her suspension to render his statement
knowingly false.

Next, Plaintiff addresses DeSanti’s statement which
provides, inter alia, that Plaintiff “was told by public safety
she is not allowed to come to the shelter since she was suspended.”
DeHoyos’s statement similarly states that “Plaintiff was told not
to come to the Shelter while she was on suspension,” and notes
that after Plaintiff was escorted from the Shelter on
February 18, 2017, public safety told Plaintiff “not to come back
until told otherwise.” Plaintiff contends both statements are
false based upon her contention that Plaintiff was never told not
to return. In addition, Plaintiff contends DeSanti’s statement is
false or even misleading because DeSanti never heard public safety
tell Plaintiff she could not go back to the Shelter, her “whole

basis of knowledge about what happened that day was based on what
‘somebody’ may have told her,” and that her “recollection of what
Public Safety publicly told the employees about Hansen’s
suspension was solely that she was suspended and escorted out of
the building.” (See Opp’n at 15.)
Similar to Valentine, neither DeSanti nor DeHoyos for
that matter were in the room when Plaintiff was purportedly told
(or not told) she could not return to the Shelter. However, the
Court disagrees with Plaintiff’s characterization of DeSanti’s
deposition testimony to the extent that Plaintiff implies DeSanti
had no knowledge that Plaintiff could not go back to the Shelter.
DeSanti testified that she believed Garcia informed the Shelter

employees that Plaintiff “was suspended and wasn’t allowed back
in” to the Shelter. (DeSanti Depo. Tr. at 29, ECF No. 42-8.)
Putting aside the fact that DeSanti’s statement seems to have been
relied upon by law enforcement to establish that Plaintiff was at
the Shelter on February 18, 2017 rather than Plaintiff’s knowledge
of her ability to enter the Shelter (see Breyer Aff. ¶ 8), there
is no indication DeSanti provided this aspect of her statement
with any knowing falsity. As to DeHoyos, the Court was not
provided with a copy of her deposition transcript and is unable to
examine the veracity of her statement. Thus, in light of the
burden Plaintiff bears to create an issue of fact, she has not
proffered sufficient evidence to call into question DeHoyos’

statement.
Plaintiff also argues that DeSanti gave law enforcement
“the misleading impression that Hansen was present [at the Shelter]
for some nefarious reason” because DeSanti suggested that
employees were “stressed and worried” Plaintiff was there, such
that they “were in the back hiding from her,” and that DeSanti
thought Plaintiff was there to “harass” her. (See Opp’n at 16
(quoting DeSanti Stmt.).) Assuming arguendo that DeSanti knew
this information was false, it is immaterial, because it has no
bearing on the ultimate crime of trespass with which Plaintiff was
charged. See Jorgensen v. County of Suffolk, No. 11-CV-2588, 2021
WL 4144984, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2021) (discussing “the

proposition that [knowingly] conveying non-material false
information to prosecutors is insufficient to establish
initiation”).
In addition to arguing that each of the foregoing
statements were false, Plaintiff also contends that they are
contradictory to the extent that Garcia and Lee indicated Plaintiff
could not return to the Shelter for thirty days after her
suspension whereas Valentine, DeSanti, and DeHoyos simply stated
Plaintiff could not return. This, however, is not an issue of
material fact. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was suspended on
February 7, 2017 and that she returned to the Shelter on February
18, 2017. As such, it is inconsequential whether Plaintiff was

told not to return for thirty days or indefinitely because she
returned to the Shelter eleven days after being suspended, which
falls within the smallest iteration of the potential time frame
Defendants believed she was prohibited from going to the Shelter.
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot create an issue of
material fact with respect to Defendants’ decision to initiate
criminal proceedings against her, as she is unable to demonstrate
that Valentine impermissibly encouraged Detective Beyrer to charge
Plaintiff or that Defendants knowingly provided false information
to law enforcement. Mitchell v. Victoria Home, 434 F. Supp. 2d
219, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). As such, Plaintiff’s claim for malicious
prosecution fails, and the Court need not address the remaining

elements at issue.
2. Qualified Immunity
However, even if Defendants were found responsible for
initiating Plaintiff’s prosecution, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment would still be granted on the grounds of qualified
immunity. To rebut Defendants’ qualified immunity defense,
Plaintiff argues that “[n]o person could find it reasonable to
prosecute Hansen for such a minor petty offense or for trying to
attend a volunteer orientation open to the public in a public
building,” especially so because Plaintiff “peacefully and
immediately left the Shelter without incident . . . and did not
return.” (See Opp’n at 25.) The ultimate legality or success of

Plaintiff’s prosecution, however, does not absolve Defendants’
entitlement to qualified immunity. In other words, Plaintiff’s
argument has no bearing on whether Defendants reasonably believed
their statements to law enforcement were made in violation of
Plaintiff’s right to be free from malicious prosecution,
particularly, that such statements crossed the threshold from the
mere reporting of a crime to the initiation of criminal proceedings
against Plaintiff.
Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, it
was objectively reasonable for Defendants to believe they “came
within the safe harbor for the ‘mere reporting’ of suspected
crime,” thus entitling [them] to qualified immunity. Rohman, 215

F.3d at 217-18 & n.5) (“But even if truth and completeness are
required to avoid liability for malicious prosecution, the issue
for purposes of qualified immunity is not whether the information
that [defendant] gave the police was true and complete, but whether
it was objectively unreasonable for [defendant] to believe that
the information he gave the police was true and complete. There
is nothing in the record to indicate that [defendant] believed
that the information he gave to the police was false or incomplete,
save only the apparent inability of the prosecutors ultimately to
confirm the information sufficiently to warrant ultimate
prosecution. If [defendant’s] assertion was false, as [plaintiff]
claims, that without more would not permit the inference that he

knew or thought that the assertions he made to the police were
false at the time that he made them.”).
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 42) is GRANTED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly
and mark this case CLOSED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/_JOANNA SEYBERT _____
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: March 28, 2022
Central Islip, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10307705. Public record. Not legal advice.