# Windward Bora LLC v. Brown

> District Court, E.D. New York · March 24, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10307664

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** March 24, 2022
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------X
WINDWARD BORA, LLC,

Plaintiff, Memorandum and Order

v. 21-CV-03147(KAM)(RER)

TANIKI A. BROWN,

Defendant.
-------------------------------------X
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Windward Bora
LLC’s (“Plaintiff”) motion for default judgment of foreclosure
and sale. (ECF No. 11.) To date, despite being properly served
with process and notice of the motion for default judgment,
Defendant Taniki A. Brown (“Defendant”) has not defended or
otherwise appeared in the instant action, which seeks
foreclosure of Ms. Brown’s premises and mortgage encumbering a
property at 190 East 91st Street, Brooklyn, New York 11212
(“Subject Property”). For the reasons set forth below,
Plaintiff’s motion for entry of a default judgment is GRANTED.
Background
I. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs’
complaint, supporting affidavits, declarations, and exhibits,
and are undisputed.1 In considering a motion for default
judgment, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual
allegations in the complaint, except those relating to damages.
See Nero v. Law Office of Sam Streeter, P.L.L.C., 655 F. Supp.
2d 200, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[W]hen the court determines that
defendant is in default, the factual allegations of the
complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will
be taken as true.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).
On August 8, 2005, a mortgage (“the Mortgage”) was
executed by Defendant Taniki A. Brown, a resident and citizen of
New York, to First Franklin, a Division of National City Bank of
Indiana (“First Franklin”) in order to secure the sum of

$88,580.00 and interest for the Subject Property. (Compl. ¶¶ 2,
7.) On that date, Defendant executed and delivered a Promissory
Note to First Franklin in the amount of $88,580.00. (Id. at ¶
8; ECF No. 1-1, Ex. C (Exhibit “C” includes a copy of the Note

1 (See ECF No. 1, Compl.; ECF No. 1-1—1-2; ECF No. 11, Mot.; ECF No. 11-1,
Declaration of Regularity in Support of Default Judgement by Alan H. Weinreb,
Esq. (“Weinreb Decl.”); ECF Nos. 11-1, 11-4—11-5, 11-7; ECF No. 11-6, Ex. C,
Affidavit of Amounts Due.)
with endorsements, security agreement, Allonge, and the
Affidavit of Note Possession, evidencing Plaintiff’s possession
of the Note and Mortgage.).) The Mortgage was recorded in the
Kings County Clerk’s Office on August 31, 2005, and covers the
Subject Property at 190 East 91st Street, Brooklyn, New York

11212. (Compl. ¶ 7; ECF No. 1-1, Ex. B, Mortgage.) Plaintiff
is the owner and holder of the Note, and came into possession of
the original Note “on or about December 9, 2019.” (Compl. ¶ 10;
ECF No. 1-1, Ex. C, Affidavit of Note Possession, p. 31, ¶¶ 7-
8.) Plaintiff is a single member Delaware LLC whose sole member
is a citizen of the Kingdom of Morocco and a resident of
Florida. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Accordingly, the Court has diversity
subject matter jurisdiction.
As alleged in the complaint, Defendant has failed to
comply with the terms and provisions of the Mortgage by failing
to make the monthly payments due on January 1, 2017 and
thereafter. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant’s default on payments

continues to date. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that
Plaintiff has complied with the Mortgage’s contractual
provisions, including by sending Defendant all required notices.
(Id. at ¶ 12.) The required Notice of Default was issued on
February 26, 2021, to Defendant. (See ECF No. 1-1, Ex. D, pp.
34-37 (Notice of Default and proof of mailing).) The Notice of
Default advised Defendant of possible acceleration of the loan,
and further advised that continued default and failure to cure
arrears would allow Plaintiff to declare immediately payable the
outstanding principal balance due under the Note and all accrued
interest. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges compliance with the
“90-day notice” (the “90 Day Notice”) provided by New York Real

Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”) Section 1304(1),
and under RPAPL Section 1306(1). (Compl. ¶ 12.) The 90 Day
Notice was issued on February 26, 2021, to Defendant. (See ECF
No. 1-1, Ex. D, pp. 38-44 (copies of the 90 Day Notice with
proof of mailing and registration).) Plaintiff alleges that it
has also complied with the COVID-19 Emergency Eviction and
Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020, (S.9114/A.1181). (See Compl.
¶ 13; ECF No. 1-1, Ex. E pp. 45-53.) Plaintiff also alleges
that it has complied with all applicable provisions of New York
Banking Law Sections Nine-X, 595a, and 6-1; and, RPAPL Sections
1302 and 1304. (Compl. ¶¶ 14-15.)
As of the date of the filing of the complaint,

Defendant had failed to respond to the Default Notice and the 90
Day Notice. (Compl. ¶ 16.) Accordingly, as alleged in the
complaint, Defendant is indebted to Plaintiff pursuant to the
terms of the Note and Mortgage for: (1) the unpaid principal
amount due under the Note and all accrued and unpaid interest
and late charges; (2) attorney’s fees and other costs and
disbursements, payable to Windward Bora LLC under the terms of
the Note, which will accrue until the amount due and payable
under the Note is paid in full;2 and, (3) any and all additional
fees that are due or may become due and payable as provided
under the terms and conditions of the Note and Mortgage.
(Compl. ¶¶ 17-17(c).)
II. Procedural Background

On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this mortgage
foreclosure action. (See ECF No. 1, Compl.) Additionally on
June 3, 2021, a summons was issued to Defendant Taniki A. Brown,
who was served with process on July 7, 2021, as indicated by the
executed return, filed on July 21, 2021. (ECF No. 5; ECF No.
8.) Defendant’s answer was due on July 28, 2021. (See Jul. 21,
2021, Dkt. Entry.) On July 29, 2021, Plaintiff requested a
certificate of default. (ECF No. 9.) On August 4, 2021, the
Clerk of Court entered a Certificate of Default against all
Defendants. (ECF No. 10.)
Plaintiff filed the instant motion for default

judgment of foreclosure and sale on August 17, 2021. (ECF No.
11.) Plaintiff also filed an Affidavit of Service confirming
that a copy of its default judgment motion, along with the
supporting papers and exhibits, had been served on Defendant via

2 Though Plaintiff’s complaint states that Defendant is indebted for
attorney’s fees, Plaintiff’s Declaration of Regularity in Support of Default
Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale states that “Plaintiff does not request to
recover attorneys’ fees associated with the pursuit of this action.”
(Weinreb Declaration, ¶ 7.)
First Class Mail on August 17, 2021.3 (ECF No. 11-7, Affidavit
of Service.) To date, Defendants have not appeared, filed an
answer to the complaint, or filed a response to Plaintiff’s
motion for default judgment of foreclosure and sale.
Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 (“Rule 55”) governs
the applicable procedure for default judgments in civil
litigation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55; see also City of New York
v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 128 (2d Cir. 2011).
Rule 55 provides “a ‘two-step process’ for the entry of judgment
against a party who fails to defend.” Id.; see also GuideOne
Specialty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rock Cmty. Church, Inc., 696 F. Supp.
2d 203, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). First, when a defendant “has
failed to plead or otherwise defend,” the Clerk of Court enters
the defendant’s default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, the
plaintiff must “apply to the court for a default judgment.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).

“[J]ust because a party is in default, the plaintiff
is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right.”
GuideOne Specialty Mut. Ins. Co. at 208. Because a default
judgment is an extreme remedy, “[d]efault judgments ‘are

3 In compliance with Local Civil Rule 55.2(b), the Plaintiff’s supporting
papers and exhibits included copies of (1)the Clerk’s certificate of default,
(2) a copy of the claim to which no response has been made, and (3) a
proposed form of default judgment. (ECF Nos. 11-3—11-5.)
generally disfavored and are reserved for rare occasions.’”
State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada, 374
F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Enron Oil Corp. v.
Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir.1993)). Before entering a
default judgment, the court “must ensure that (1) jurisdictional

requirements are satisfied, (2) the plaintiff took all the
required procedural steps in moving for [a] default judgment,
and (3) the plaintiff’s allegations, when accepted as true,
establish liability as a matter of law.” Jian Hua Li v. Chang
Lung Grp. Inc., No. 16-cv-6722, 2020 WL 1694356, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 7, 2020) (citations omitted).
On a default judgment motion, the defendant is deemed
to have admitted all well-pleaded factual allegations in the
plaintiff’s complaint, except for claims relating to damages.
See Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v.
Metrofoundation Contractors, Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir.
2012); Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d

Cir. 1981); see also Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L.
Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992); see generally
Steginsky v. Xcelera Inc., 741 F.3d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 2014)
(under both a motion to dismiss and a motion for default, the
plaintiff must proffer well-pleaded allegations). Once the
defendant is found to be in default, the plaintiff bears the
burden of showing that she is entitled to recovery. See Danser
v. Bagir Int’l, 571 F. App’x 54, 55 (2d Cir. 2014); Taizhou
Zhongneng Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd v. Koutsobinas, 509 F. App’x 54,
58 (2d Cir. 2013); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kalika, No.
04 Civ. 4631, 2007 WL 4326920, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2007).
When damages for a default judgment are “not

susceptible to simple mathematical calculation, Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) gives courts discretion to determine
whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary or whether to rely
on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence.” Antoine v.
Brooklyn Maids 26, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 3d 68, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2020)
(internal citations omitted)). Therefore, a court may rely on
“detailed affidavits and documentary evidence,” in addition to
the plaintiff’s complaint, to determine the sufficiency of a
default judgment claim. Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency v.
Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997); see Cement
& Concrete Workers, 699 F.3d at 234. The amount of damages
awarded, if any, must be ascertained “with reasonable

certainty.” Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183
F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999); see Cement & Concrete Workers, 699
F.3d at 232.
Discussion

I. Procedural Requirements of Default Judgment
As reflected supra, Plaintiff has complied with all
procedural requirements for seeking a default judgment.
Defendant was served with a copy of the summons and complaint,
and has not answered, appeared, or otherwise moved to defend the
instant action. (ECF No. 8, Summons Returned Executed.) The
Clerk of Court entered a certificate of default on August 4,
2021. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff has also established compliance

with Local Civil Rule 55.2(b), as Plaintiff’s papers and
exhibits in support of its motion for default judgment included
copies of (1) the Clerk’s certificate of default, (2) a copy of
the claim to which no response has been made, and (3) a proposed
form of default judgment. (ECF Nos. 11-3—11-5.) Plaintiff has
also demonstrated, through an Affidavit of Service, that its
motion for default judgment and all supporting papers were
mailed to Defendant. (ECF No. 11-7.)
II. Foreclosure
“Under New York law, a plaintiff seeking to foreclose
upon a mortgage must demonstrate ‘the existence of the mortgage
and mortgage note, ownership of the mortgage, and the

defendant’s default in payment’ on the loan secured by the
mortgage.” Windward Bora LLC v. Baez, No. 19-cv-5698(PKC)(SMG),
2020 WL 4261130, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020) (citing Windward
Bora LLC v. Valente, No. 18-CV-4302 (JS) (SIL), 2019 WL 3872853,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019) (quoting Gustavia Home, LLC v.
Bent, 321 F. Supp. 3d 409, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 2018))). “[O]nce a
plaintiff mortgagee in a foreclosure action has established a
prima facie case by presenting a note, a mortgage, and proof of
default, it has a presumptive right to foreclose that can only
be overcome by an affirmative showing by the mortgagor.” United
States v. Watts, No. 13-cv-3211 (ADS) (WDW), 2014 WL 4275628, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. May 28, 2014) (citations omitted), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 13-cv-3211 (ADS) (WDW), 2014 WL
4293815 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2014).
Plaintiff, through its well pleaded complaint and
supporting documents, has established a diversity subject matter
jurisdiction and a prima facie entitlement to a default judgment
against Defendant. (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 3, 5.) First, Plaintiff has
established the existence of the Mortgage and the Note. (See
ECF No. 1-1, Ex. B, Mortgage; ECF No. 1-1, Ex. C (copy of the
Note with endorsements, security agreement, Allonge, and the
Affidavit of Note Possession.).) The exhibits appended to
Plaintiff’s complaint demonstrate that the Mortgage was recorded
in the Kings County Clerk’s Office on August 31, 2005, and

covers the Subject Property at 190 East 91st Street, Brooklyn,
New York 11212. (ECF No. 1-1, Ex. B, Mortgage.) Second,
Plaintiff has also alleged ownership of the Note prior to June
3, 2021, the date of the commencement of the instant action.
Plaintiff “came into possession of the original Promissory Note
with endorsements and Allonge[...] on or about December 9, 2019.
(ECF No. 1-1, Ex. C, Affidavit of Possession, pp. 30-3.)
Plaintiff’s demonstrated possession of the Note grants Plaintiff
the rights to enforce the corresponding Mortgage and to initiate
the foreclosure action. See In re Escobar, 457 B.R. 229, 240,
n. 10 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust
Co. v. Pietranico, 33 Misc. 3d 528, 928 N.Y.S.2d 818 (2011)

(finding under New York law the owner or holder of the
promissory note holds the rights to enforce the associated
mortgage and to commence a foreclosure action; mere physical
possession of the promissory note endorsed in blank provides
presumptive ownership of the note by the holder, and the holder
of the note is the presumptive owner of the underlying
mortgage); Weaver Hardware Co. v. Solomovitz, 235 N.Y. 321, 331–
32, 139 N.E. 353 (N.Y.1923) (“[A] mortgage given to secure notes
is an incident to the latter and stands or falls with them[.]”);
Smith v. Wagner, 106 Misc. 170, 178, 174 N.Y.S. 205
(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1919) (“[A]ssignment of the debt carries with it the
security therefor, even though such security be not formally

transferred in writing”)).
Third and finally, Plaintiff has established a
default in the contractually required payments by Defendant. As
alleged in the complaint, Defendant has failed to comply with
the terms and provisions of the Mortgage by failing to make the
monthly payments due on January 1, 2017. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Defendant’s default on payments continues to date. (Id.) The
Note provides that Defendant may be required “to pay immediately
the entire amount then remaining unpaid under the Note and under
this Mortgage[,]” if Defendant, the borrower, “fails to keep
promises and agreements[,]” under the Note. (ECF No. 1-1, Ex.
B, Mortgage, p. 11, ¶ 20.) Plaintiff complied with the

Mortgage’s related contractual provisions, including by sending
Defendant all required notices following Defendant’s default.
(Id. at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff further alleges that it has complied
with all of its corresponding statutory obligations, including
under New York Banking Law, New York RPAPL, and the COVID-19
Emergency Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020.4
(Compl. ¶¶ 12-15.)
As demonstrated by the record, Plaintiff complied with
all the procedural requirements for seeking a motion for default
judgment. Defendant has not appeared, answered Plaintiff’s
complaint, or opposed the instant motion. Defendant has failed
to challenge or rebut Plaintiff’s prima facie case that it is

entitled to a default judgment. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion
for a default judgment of foreclosure and sale is granted.
III. Damages and Remedies

4 As referenced supra, Plaintiff has demonstrated that Defendant was issued:
(1) a Notice of Default on February 26, 2021 (see Compl. ¶ 12; ECF No. 1-1,
Ex. D, pp. 34-37 (Notice of Default and proof of mailing)); a 90 Day Notice,
issued on February 26, 2021 (see Compl. ¶ 12; ECF No. 1-1, Ex. D, pp. 38-44
(copies of the 90 Day Notice with proof of mailing and registration)); a
Hardship Declaration pursuant to the COVID-19 Emergency Eviction and
Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 (see Compl. ¶ 13; ECF No. 1-1, Ex. E pp.
45-53 (COVID-19 Hardship Declaration).)
The Court may not accept as true Plaintiff’s factual
allegations related to damages. J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. LX
Food Grocery Inc., No. 15-cv-6505 (NGG) (PK), 2016 WL 6905946,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 2016) (citing Au Bon Pain Corp. v.
Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981)). “The court must

be satisfied that Plaintiff has met the burden of proving
damages to the court with ‘reasonable certainty.’” Id. (quoting
Credit Lyonnais Secs. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151,
155 (2d Cir. 1999)). “Although requests for damages are usually
established by the plaintiff in an evidentiary hearing, the
court can make such a determination without a hearing when
supported by sufficiently detailed affidavits and documentary
evidence.” Id. (citing Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc.
v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997)).
First, Plaintiff seeks a judgment of foreclosure and
sale of the Subject Property at 190 East 91st Street, Brooklyn,
New York 11212. The Court grants the requested relief, as

Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of the Note and
Mortgage and Defendant’s default on the corresponding loan. See
OneWest Bank, N.A. v. Denham, No. 14-CV-5529 (DRH) (AKT), 2015
WL 5562980, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2015) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 14-cv-5529 (DRH) (AKT), 2015 WL 5562981 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,
2015) (“A plaintiff is entitled to foreclose on a property if it
demonstrates the existence of an obligation secured by a
mortgage, and a default on that obligation.”)
Plaintiff relatedly seeks a specific amount due on the
Note and Mortgage, and computes that amount as $117,943.11,
including interest, as of August 12, 2021. (ECF No. 11-3,

Proposed Judgment, p. 1.) In support of its request for
damages, Plaintiff submits an Affidavit of Amounts due to
Plaintiff by Yonel Devico (“Devico Aff.”), the sole Member of
Windward Bora LLC, signed on August 16, 2020.5 (ECF No. 11-6,
Ex. C, Devico Aff.) Here, Plaintiff requests $117,943.11 in
damages (id. at ¶ 8), comprised of: (1) $82,198.83 for the
principal amount due on the Note (id. at ¶ 5); and (2)
$35,744.28 for the total past due interest calculated from
December 1, 2016, through August 12, 2021. (Id. at ¶ 6-7 (the
rate of interest, pursuant to the loan terms, is 9.25%, equaling
$20.83 per diem interest.6) The Court awards $117,943.11 to
Plaintiff for the unpaid principal balance on the Note,

including per diem interest of $20.83 as of August 12, 2021, and

5 Though the Declaration signed by Plaintiff’s counsel (ECF No. 11-1, Weinreb
Decl. ¶ 5) states that the Devico Affidavit was “sworn on the 16th day of
August 2021,” the Court notes that the notarized Acknowledgment accompanying
the Devico Affidavit provides that the Devico Affidavit was sworn on “the 16
day of August in the year 2020[.]” (ECF No. 11-6, Devico Aff., p. 4.) The
Court will accept counsel’s representation, given that the Devico Affidavit
plainly references dates in 2021.
6 As confirmed by the Court’s independent calculations, the amount of interest
is calculated by taking the principal balance of $82,198.83, and multiplying
it by 9.25%, then dividing the number by 365 to obtain the per diem interest
rate of $20.83.
continuing the per diem interest until the date of entry of
judgment.
Plaintiff also appears to request pre- and post-
judgment interest. (Compl. at at p. 6 (requesting that Plaintiff
be “paid with interest and late charges to the time of such

payment and the expenses of such sale”); ECF No. 11-1, Weinreb
Decl. at p. 3 (requesting “that this Court ascertain and compute
the amount due to Plaintiff for principal and interest[.]”).)
The Court awards Plaintiff per diem pre-judgment interest of
$20.83, starting from August 12, 2021 until the date on which
judgment is entered, and post-judgment interest at the statutory
rate under 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a), running from the date judgment
is entered until the judgment is satisfied, presumably by the
foreclosure sale. See Windward Bora LLC v. Sterling, No. 18-cv-
1727 (DRH) (SIL), 2018 WL 5839797, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2018)
(awarding per diem pre-judgment interest and post-judgment
interest at the statutory rate), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 18-cv-1727 (DRH) (SIL), 2018 WL 6706311 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 19, 2018).
Additionally, Plaintiff requests an order that the
Subject Property be sold as one parcel, and that the foreclosure
and sale of the Subject Property be conducted through the
appointment of Referee Susan Ellen Rizos, Esq., by the Court.
(ECF No. 11-3, Proposed Judgment, p. 2.) The Court grants this
relief, and notes that courts regularly appoint referees in
cases of mortgage foreclosures and sales. See Baez, 2020 WL
4261130, at *5 (quoting Valente, 2019 WL 3872853, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2019) (“[c]ourts routinely appoint referees
to effectuate the sale of foreclosed properties.”) (collecting

cases)).
Lastly, Plaintiff seeks payment, from the proceeds of
the sale, of additional costs related to the Subject Property.
(ECF No. 11-3, Proposed Judgment, pp. 2-3 (requesting “the sum
of $750.00 to said Referee for his fees[,]” the “expenses of the
sale and the advertising expenses as shown on the bills
presented to said Referee[,]” and “taxes, assessments, water
rates and sewer rents, with interest and penalties accrued
thereon[.]”).) Plaintiff did not expressly seek this relief in
its complaint, (see Compl. at p. 6 (generally requesting “the
expenses of such sale[.]”)), and when granting default judgment,
courts generally are not permitted “to award damages that exceed

what the plaintiff requested in its complaint.” Castiglione,
2019 WL 2435670, at *5 (citing Finkel v. Universal Elec. Corp.,
970 F. Supp. 2d 108, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)). Here, however, given
that Plaintiff did seek “the expenses of such sale[,]” the Court
finds that this phrase “logically includes” Plaintiff’s stated
costs, and thus grants Plaintiff these expenses as requested in
the proposed judgment. Baez, 2020 WL 4261130, at *6 (granting
reimbursement of foreclosure and sale expenses sought in
proposed judgment that were not explicitly requested in the
complaint where catch-all term “expenses of the sale” was used
in the complaint.) (collecting cases).
Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants
Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. The Court awards
Plaintiff damages consisting of: (1) $82,198.83 for the
principal balance owed by Defendant pursuant to the Loan entered
into by and between Defendant and Plaintiff’s predecessor-in-
interest; (2) $35,744.28 accrued interest from the date interest
is owed (i.e., December 1, 2016) through August 12, 2021; (3)
per diem, pre-judgment interest of $20.83, starting from August
13, 2021 until the date on which judgment is entered; (4) post-
judgment interest at the statutory rate under 28 U.S.C. §
1961(a) from the date judgment is entered until the date the
judgment is satisfied; (5) the appointment of Referee Susan

Ellen Rizos, Esq., to effectuate the foreclosure and sale of the
Subject Property as one parcel; and, (6) other costs related to
the sale of the Subject Property, as specified in the endorsed
Judgment accompanying the instant memorandum and order.
Plaintiff is ordered to serve a copy of this Memorandum and
Order and the forthcoming Judgment on Defendant and file proof
of service on the docket. The Clerk of the Court is
respectfully requested to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff
and close the case.

SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
March 24, 2022

____________/s/______________
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10307664. Public record. Not legal advice.