# Holloway v. Suffolk County Correctional Facility Medical

> District Court, E.D. New York · November 16, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10307154

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** November 16, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
TARELL T. HOLLOWAY, 483024,

Plaintiff,
ORDER
-against- No. 21-CV-5011(JS)(JMW)

SUFFOLK COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY, Medical; JOHN DOE,
Suffolk County Medical Unit;
JOHN DOE, PBMC; JOHN DOE, Stony
Brook Medical;

Defendants.
----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff: Tarell T. Holloway, pro Se
483024
Suffolk County Correctional Facility
110 Center Drive
Riverhead, New York 11901

For Defendants: No Appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

On or around September 27, 2021 and while incarcerated,
pro se plaintiff Tarell T. Holloway (“Plaintiff”) commenced this
action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the
Suffolk County Correctional Facility, Medical (hereafter, “the
Jail”) and three “John Does” (hereafter, the “John Doe
Defendants”), who are alleged to be employed at the Jail’s Medical
Unit, the Peconic Bay Medical Center,1 and the Stony Brook Medical

1 Although Plaintiff names “PBMC”, the Court understands this to
be the Peconic Bay Medical Center which is located at the address
Plaintiff provides for PBMC in the Complaint. (Compl., ECF No. 1
at ¶ I. B.)
Center, respectively. (See Complaint, ECF No. 1.) Together, with
his Compliant, Petitioner filed an application to proceed in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) (hereafter, the “IFP Application”) and a Prisoner

Authorization form pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) (hereafter, the “PLRA Form”). (See IFP Application, ECF
No. 2; PLRA Form, ECF No. 3.) For the reasons that follow,
Plaintiff’s: (1) IFP Application is GRANTED; (2) claims against
the Jail are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and (3) claims against the
John Doe Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff alleges that, on March 31, 2021 at
approximately 1:30 p.m., he sprained his pinky finger while playing
basketball during recreation time. (Complaint at ¶ II (Statement
of Claim).) He alleges that he informed “rec yard staff” that he
needed to “see Medical.” (Id.) Plaintiff describes his hand as

being swollen. (See id.) Plaintiff was seen by the Jail doctor
who determined that Plaintiff’s pinky finger was sprained. (Id.)
Following days of Plaintiff’s complaints of pain and
loss of feeling in his pinky finger, Plaintiff was taken to the
Emergency Room on April 3, 2021, where he was diagnosed with a

2 In commencing this action, Plaintiff used the Court’s form
complaint for Civil Rights actions under Section 1983. The
“BACKGROUND” facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. Excerpts
from the Complaint are reproduced here exactly as they appear in
the original. Errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have
not been corrected or noted.
dislocated pinky finger, rather than a sprain. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from numbness in his
right hand and arm for which he seeks to recover a damages award

in the sum of five million dollars due to “not receiving medical
treatment in a reasonable amount of time and for future side
effects . . . [as well as] pain and suffering and mental anguish.”
(Id. ¶¶ II.A., III.)
Plaintiff has annexed an eight-page handwritten document
to his Complaint entitled “Claim” wherein Plaintiff elaborates on
the information set forth in the Complaint form. (Id. at 6-13.)
There, Plaintiff adds that he did not receive any pain medication
when he visited the Jail doctor and alleges that, at that time,
the doctor examined his fingers and hand but did not take X-rays.
(Id. at 6.) According to Plaintiff, on April 2, 2021 at
approximately 9:15 a.m., he was called to the Jail’s Medical Unit

and, following an X-ray, was again diagnosed with a sprained pinky
finger. (Id. at 8.) On April 3, 2021, Plaintiff was seen by the
Jail doctor twice and, at approximately 4:15 p.m., he was taken to
the Emergency Room due to his complaints of pain and numbness.
(Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiff claims that the Emergency Room doctor
diagnosed his injury as a dislocation, rather than a sprain, and
ordered Plaintiff to see a hand specialist within three days. (Id.
at 9.) Approximately three weeks later, Plaintiff was taken to a
hand specialist at Peconic Bay Medical Center who referred
Plaintiff for physical therapy. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was taken to Stony Brook
Medical Center two times per week for three weeks for hand therapy.

(Id.) However, because Plaintiff was not improving, the treatment
provider at Stony Brook Medical Center allegedly surmised that
Plaintiff had nerve damage and referred Plaintiff for an MRI.
(Id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff describes that the Jail medical staff
sent Plaintiff back to Peconic Bay Medical Center for an MRI but,
once there, the examining doctor opined that Plaintiff was not
suffering from nerve damage and declined to take an MRI. Rather,
Plaintiff contends that the doctor opined that Plaintiff needed
surgery but stated that “he didn’t feel comfortable doing it
because [Plaintiff was] in Jail but if another doctor wanted to do
the surgery he was ok with it.” (Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff claims
that, as of the September 27, 2021 filing of the Complaint, he has

not had an MRI, has not had surgery, and “is still having problems
with [his] hand and pinky finger.” (Id. at 10.)
As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff claims that the
“Suffolk County Medical Staff has violated my Constitutional
Eighth Amendment [right] when they sent me back to my housing unit
in pain instead of sending me to the hospital.” (Id. at 12.)
Plaintiff alleges that he suffered “cruel and unusual punishment
for 3 days because [he] wasn’t giving adequate medical care for 3
whole days. The Medical Staff failed to provide [Plaintiff]
treatment for a diagnosed finger injury.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims
that his injury has “affected me mentally to the point that I can’t
sleep at night because the pain is too much to handle. I wake up

in the night to numbness to my right hand and my pinky finger all
the way up my right arm.” (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff also claims to
suffer physical effects in that he cannot “hold anything heavy for
more than five minutes without my hand shaking or going numb.”
(Id.) Plaintiff also claims that he cannot fully open his hand
and suffers from numbness when gripping or writing. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff’s In Forma Pauperis Application is Granted
The Court finds that Plaintiff is qualified by his
financial status to commence this action without prepayment of the
filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, Plaintiff’s
IFP Application (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.
II. Legal Standards
A. Consideration of the Complaint Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915

Section 1915 requires a district court to dismiss an IFP
complaint if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); 1915A(b). An action is frivolous as a
matter of law when, among other things, it is based on an
“indisputably meritless legal theory” or when it “lacks an arguable
basis in law . . . or [when] a dispositive defense clearly exists
on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage
Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). The

Court is required to dismiss the action as soon as it makes such
a determination. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-
CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2021).
Courts are obligated to construe the pleadings of a pro
se plaintiff liberally and to interpret them to raise the
“strongest [claims] that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “But the
‘special solicitude’ in pro se cases[] has its limits –- to state
a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to
make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Wynn v. Regus Mgmt. Grp. LLC, No. 21-CV-
3503, 2021 WL 2018967, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2021) (quoting
Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475).
B. Section 1983
Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States .
. . to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff
must “allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at
least in part to a person who was acting under color of state law
and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed
under the Constitution of the United States.” Rodriguez v.
Shoprite Supermarket, No. 19-CV-6565, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
III. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915
A. Claims Against the Jail

The Jail is a non-suable entity because, “‘under New York
law, departments that are merely administrative arms of a
municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from
the municipality and therefore, cannot sue or be sued.” Sturgis
v. Suffolk County Jail, No. 12-CV-5263, 2013 WL 245052, *2
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013) (Seybert, J.) (quoting Davis v. Lynbrook
Police Dep’t, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)); Griffin
v. Fludd, No. 19-CV-0107, 2019 WL 3253181, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July
18, 2019)(Seybert, J.) (dismissing Section 1983 claims against the
Nassau County Jail with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and 1915A(b)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims
against the Jail are implausible and are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A.
B. Claims Against Suffolk County
Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court construes the
Complaint against Suffolk County (the “County”). It is well-

established that a municipality, like the County, cannot be held
liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. See
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y. City, 436 U.S. 658, 691
(1978); Agosto v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 982 F.3d 86, 98 (2d Cir.
2020) (“Monell expressly prohibits respondeat superior liability
for municipalities” (citations omitted)). Rather, to state a claim
against a municipality under Section 1983, “the plaintiff is
required to show that the challenged acts were performed pursuant
to a municipal policy or custom.” Tafolla v. County of Suffolk,
No. 17-CV-4897, 2021 WL 3675042, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2021)
(Seybert, J.) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of N.Y., 795 F.3d 297,
314 (2d Cir. 2015)). To establish the existence of a municipal

policy or custom, the plaintiff must allege:
(1) the existence of a formal policy which is
officially endorsed by the municipality; (2)
actions taken or decisions made by municipal
policymaking officials, i.e., officials with
final decisionmaking authority, which caused
the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s civil
rights; (3) a practice so persistent and
widespread as to practically have the force of
law or that was so manifest as to imply the
constructive acquiescence of senior policy-
making officials; or (4) that a policymaking
official exhibited deliberate indifference to
constitutional deprivations caused by
subordinates.
Avant v. Miranda, No. 21-CV-0974, 2021 WL 1979077, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
May 18, 2021) (Seybert, J.) (cleaned up).
Here, when liberally construing the Complaint, there are

no factual allegations that a municipal policy or custom existed
which caused the alleged constitutional deprivations. (See
Complaint, generally.) Indeed, there are no allegations from which
the Court could reasonably construe a plausible Section 1983 claim
against the County. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff asserts any
Section 1983 claims against Suffolk County, those claims are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)
and 1915A(b). Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an Amended
Complaint to address the pleading defects identified herein
regarding his claims against the County.
C. Claims Against the John Doe Defendants
To state a claim for relief under Section 1983 against

an individual defendant, a plaintiff must allege the personal
involvement of the defendant in the alleged constitutional
deprivation. See Farid v. Elle, 593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010).
The Supreme Court held in Iqbal that “[b]ecause vicarious liability
is inapplicable to . . . [Section] 1983 suits, a plaintiff must
plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 at 1948. A complaint based upon a violation
under Section 1983 that does not allege the personal involvement
of a defendant fails as a matter of law and should be dismissed.
See Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App’x 199, 201 (2d Cir. 2010).
Moreover, as set forth above, a plausible Section 1983 claim must

allege that “the challenged conduct was attributable at least in
part to a person who was acting under color of state law.” See
supra at 7 (quoting Rodriguez, 2020 WL 1875291, at *2).
Here, Plaintiff does not include sufficient factual
allegations such that the identities of the intended individuals
could be ascertained. (See Complaint, generally.) Nor are
Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to establish that the
individuals alleged to work at Peconic Bay Medical Center and at
Stony Brook Medical are state actors. A private actor may be
considered to be acting under the color of state law for purposes
of Section 1983 if the private actor was a “‘willful participant
in joint activity with the State or its agents’”, Ciambriello v.

County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Adickes
v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)), or who “conspire[d]
with a state actor to violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
Christin Griskie, LLC v. Big Mach. Recs., No. 15-CV-3186, 2015 WL
3949015, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2015) (Seybert, D.J.) (citing
Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 323–24)). In turn, in order to state a
Section 1983 conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) an
agreement between a state actor and a private party [or actor];
(2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury; and
(3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.”
Ciambriello, 292 F.3d at 324–25 (citing Pangburn v. Culbertson,
200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)).

Moreover, even construing the Complaint liberally,
Plaintiff’s allegations do not set forth a plausible deliberate
indifference claim as a result of the alleged delay and/or denial
of adequate medical attention in violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
(See id.) To state a claim for deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need, a plaintiff must show both that his medical
need was serious and that the defendants acted with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind.3 Paschal-Barros v. Balatka, No. 20-CV-
3150, 2021 WL 5268000, *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2021). Prison
officials and other state actors who act with mere negligence will
not be held liable for constitutional violations because “any

[Section] 1983 claim for a violation of due process requires proof
of a mens rea greater than mere negligence.” Darnell v. Pineiro,
849 F.3d 17, 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Grimmett v. Corizon

3 Although Plaintiff did not indicate in the Complaint whether he
is a sentenced prisoner or a pretrial detainee at the time of the
challenged conduct, he has alleged that his Section 1983 claims
arise under the Eighth Amendment. Because a convicted prisoner’s
deliberate indifference claim arises under the Eighth Amendment,
the Court has considered Plaintiff’s claims accordingly. However,
if Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee, his deliberate indifference
claims would arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
clause. Any Amended Complaint should include such information.
Med. Assocs. of N.Y., 15-CV-7351, 2017 WL 2274485, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 24, 2017) (holding that more than negligence is required to
hold a defendant liable for violating either the Eighth or

Fourteenth Amendment) (citing Darnell, 849 F.3d at 36). Negligence
that would support a claim for medical malpractice does not rise
to the level of deliberate indifference and is not cognizable under
Section 1983, see Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280 (2d Cir.
2006); nor does a difference of opinion regarding what constitutes
an appropriate response and treatment. Ventura v. Sinha, 379 F.
App’x 1, 2-3 (2d Cir. 2010). Accordingly, rather than file an
Amended Complaint in this Court, Plaintiff may elect to pursue any
valid claims, including medical malpractice and/or negligence, in
state court.
Plaintiff’s claims against the John Doe Defendants “must
be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing

that anything that [they] personally did or failed to do violated
Plaintiff’s rights.” Moultrie v. Wright, No. 21-CV-3925, 2021 WL
3372031, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2021). Further, Plaintiff does
not allege that the state of mind of any of the John Doe Defendants
was sufficiently culpable. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims
against the John Doe Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b). Plaintiff
is GRANTED leave to file an Amended Complaint to address the
pleading deficiencies identified herein regarding his claims
against the John Doe Defendants.
V. Leave to Amend
In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, Plaintiff is

GRANTED leave to file an Amended Complaint in accordance with this
Order within 45 days from the date of this Order. In his Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff may continue to name individuals as “John
Doe” or “Jane Doe” if he does not now know their identities.
However, Plaintiff must include factual allegations relating to
the acts or omissions of the John Doe Defendants that give rise to
his claims as well as descriptive information, such as when and
where these acts or omissions occurred, for purposes of
ascertaining the identities of the John Doe Defendants. The
Amended Complaint shall be clearly labeled “Amended Complaint” and
shall bear the case number, No. 21-CV-5011(JS)(JMW). Further,
because the Amended Complaint will completely replace the original

Complaint, it must include all factual allegations and claims that
Plaintiff seeks to pursue in this case.
PLAINTIFF IS WARNED: No extensions of this deadline
will be granted absent extraordinary circumstances. PLAINTIFF IS
FURTHER CAUTIONED: If an Amended Complaint is not filed within 45
days from the date of this Order and/or fails to address the
pleading deficiencies identified herein, the Court may dismiss
this action with prejudice. Alternatively, rather than file an
Amended Complaint in this Court, Plaintiff may elect to pursue any
valid claims, including medical malpractice and/or negligence, in
state court.
CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
(A) Plaintiff’s IFP Application (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED;
(B) Plaintiff’s claims against the Jail are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-
(ii), 1915A(b);
(C) Plaintiff’s claims against Suffolk County and the John
Doe Defendants are dismissed WITHOUT PJREUDICE
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A (b)(1);
(D) Plaintiff is GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED
COMPLAINT in accordance with the guidance set forth
above within 45 days from the date of this Order. The

Amended Complaint shall be clearly labeled “Amended
Complaint” and shall bear the same case number as
identified in this Order, No. 21-CV-5011(JS)(JMW).
PLAINTIFF IS WARNED that if he does not file an
Amended Complaint within 45 days from the date of this
Order, judgment may enter and this case may be
dismissed without further notice;
(E) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court
certifies that any appeal from this Order would not
be in good faith and therefore IFP status is DENIED
for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962); and
(F) the Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Order

to the pro se Plaintiff at his address of record and
include the notation “Legal Mail” on the envelope.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT_____
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: November 16th, 2021
Central Islip, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10307154. Public record. Not legal advice.