# Gurvey v. Garry

> District Court, E.D. New York · September 30, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306957

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 30, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306957

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- affirming district court’s dismissal of claims that were “so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them”
- noting that Plaintiff was “sanctioned for ‘years of vituperative litigation,’ frivolous motion practice, and intentional misrepresentations to the court”
- applying the doctrine equally to attorney disciplinary determinations

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

AMY R. GURVEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
HON(S). JANET DIFIORE, ALAN
SCHEINKMAN (2ND DEPT.), ELIZABETH

GARRY (3RD DEPT.), GERALD WHELAN (4TH
DEPT.), LAWRENCE MARKS (NYS OFFICE
OF COURT ADMINISTRATION), JORGE
DOPICO & ERNEST CALLAZO (1ST DEPT.
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE), MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
19-CV-4739 (LDH) (ST)
and

RICHARD SUPPLE, HINSHAW &
CULBERTSON LLP, O. LEE SQUITIERI, ESQ.,
SQUITIERI & FEARON, LLP, JORGE
DOPICO, ERNEST CALLAZO, ALAN
FRIEDBERG, SHERRY COHEN, THOMAS
CAHILL (deceased), ORLANDO REYES,
JAMES T. SHED, HON(S). LUIS GONZALEZ,
JONATHAN LIPPMAN, PETER TOM,
HERAING PANEL IV, LAUREN HOLMES,
AND DOES 10-10, inclusive,
Defendants.

LASHANN DEARCY HALL, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Amy R. Gurvey, proceeding pro se,1 filed the instant action against current and
former New York State judges Janet DiFiore, Lawrence K. Marks, Alan D. Scheinkman,

1 Though proceeding pro se, Plaintiff states that she was admitted to the practice of law in New York State in 1985.
(See Am. Compl. ¶ 75, ECF No. 10.) Typically, when the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must “construe
liberally” her complaint and any further pleadings, and “interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they
suggest.” Cold Stone Creamery, Inc. v. Gorman, 361 F. App’x 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). However, because Plaintiff is a licensed attorney, the Court declines to apply this liberal
standard. See Breindel & Ferstendig v. Willis Faber & Dumas Ltd., No. 95 CIV. 7905 (SHS), 1996 WL 413727, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 1996) (“Although pleadings by a party proceeding pro se ordinarily are construed extremely
liberally, the same does not hold true where the pro se party is an attorney or law firm.” (internal citations omitted));
Cf. Larsen v. JBC Legal Grp., P.C., 533 F.Supp.2d 290, 295 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he rules afforded pro se
litigants are not relaxed when that litigant is also an attorney[.]”).
Elizabeth A. Garry, Rolando T. Acosta, Jonathan Lippman, Luis A. Gonzalez, Peter Tom, and
Gerald Whelan; current and former attorneys of the New York Appellate Division, First
Department’s Attorney Grievance Committee (“AGC”) Alan W. Friedberg, Ernest J. Collazo,
Jorge Dopico, Sherry Cohen, Thomas Cahill, Orlando Reyes, James Shed, and Lauren Holmes

(collectively, the “State Defendants”); Richard Supple and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP
(“Hinshaw,” and together with Defendant Supple, the “Hinshaw Defendants”); and O. Lee
Squitieri and Squitieri & Fearon, LLP (“Squitieri,” and together with Defendant O. Lee Squitieri,
the “Squitieri Defendants”). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 27, 2019
seeking injunctive relief and money damages. (See Am. Compl.)
BACKGROUND2
I. Plaintiff’s History of Vexatious Litigation
A. Ethics Complaints Against the Cowan Firm
Plaintiff, who was previously admitted to the practice law in California, was admitted to
the practice law in New York in 1985. (Am. Compl. ¶ 75.) In 2001, Plaintiff established a

Delaware company to hold certain intellectual property rights she was developing. (Id.) In
January 2002, Plaintiff was hired as Of Counsel by the New York law firm Cowan Liebowitz &
Latman (the “Cowan firm”). See Gurvey v. Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, PC., 06-CV-1202,
2009 WL 1117278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2009) (citing Plaintiff’s pleading referencing her
employment contract with the Cowan firm). In May 2002, Plaintiff’s employment with the

2 The amended complaint is lengthy, verbose, and poorly organized. It includes entire sections committed to
Plaintiff’s interpretation of state and federal law (many of which involve misapprehensions of law) and conclusory
factual allegations. Nonetheless, the following facts are taken from the amended complaint, and prior filings
incorporated therein, and assumed to be true for the purposes of this memorandum and order. The Court also takes
judicial notice of certain orders entered by state and federal courts relevant to issues resolved by this memorandum
and order. See Kramer v. Time Warner Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[C]ourts routinely take judicial
notice of documents filed in other courts, again not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but
rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related filings.”).
Cowan firm was terminated, but she continued to maintain an office at the firm until August of
that year. Id. Prior to Plaintiff’s termination, the Cowan firm agreed to represent Plaintiff before
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). Id. Plaintiff believed that filings made by
the Cowan firm on her behalf were defective and/or delayed. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 95.) As such,

in or around 2004, she filed a series of ethics complaints with the AGC against the Cowan firm.
(Id. ¶ 91.) Among other things, Plaintiff sought the return of certain files related to her patent
applications. (Id.)
B. SDNY Suit Against the Cowan Firm
On February 15, 2006, Plaintiff brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (the “SDNY Action”) against the Cowan firm and its attorneys in
connection with their representation of her before the USPTO. (Id. ¶ 95.) In that suit, Plaintiff
alleged that, among other things, the Cowan firm abandoned her patent applications and failed to
disclose admitted conflicts of interest. (Id.) Plaintiff sought damages for alleged spoliation of
documents and the return of her complete patent files. (Id.) The Hinshaw Defendants

represented the Cowan firm in the SDNY Action. (Id. ¶ 97.) According to Plaintiff, the
Hinshaw Defendants had previously served on the AGC, and thus, had a conflict of interest in
representing the Cowan firm. (Id.)
C. Supreme Court Suit Against the Squitieri Defendants
The Squitieri Defendants represented Plaintiff in the SDNY Action. Gurvey v. Cowan,
Liebowitz & Latman, P.C., 06-CV-1202 (LGS) (HBP), 2013 WL 3718071, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. July
15, 2013). At some point, Plaintiff’s relationship with Squitieri Defendants soured. See id.
Although the relationship ended, Plaintiff alleged Squitieri did not return her files. Id. As a
result, Plaintiff filed suit against the Squitieri Defendants in New York Supreme Court, New
York County for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. The mater was ultimately
resolved by order of the court directing the Squitieri Defendants “to produce to plaintiff all
available emails and electronic files concerning their representation of plaintiff between 2007
and 2010[.]” See Gurvey v. Squitieri and Fearon, LLP, No. 102516/12, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

Apr. 30, 2013). Nevertheless, Plaintiff moved for a writ of replevin in the SDNY Action seeking
the return of her files from the Squitieri Defendants. See Gurvey, 2013 WL 3718071 at *15.
The court found Plaintiff’s replevin motion was moot in light of the New York Supreme Court’s
decision. Id. The court further noted that “[e]ven if [Plaintiff’s] application for a writ of
replevin were not moot, it would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata, because an identical
motion has also been made and ruled upon in her lawsuit . . . in the Southern District of
California.” Id. at *15 n.5 (citing Gurvey v. Legend Films, Inc., No. 3:09-CV-00942(AJB), 2013
WL 1883229, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. May 3, 2013)).
D. Housing Litigation
Sometime around 2002, Plaintiff became embroiled in litigation with her landlord

wherein she claimed that she was fraudulently induced to vacate her federally subsidized Battery
Park City apartment (the “Housing Litigation”). See In re Gurvey, 958 N.Y.S.2d 5, 5 (App. Div.
2012) (summarizing litigation). The Housing Litigation resulted in, among other things, three
state court decisions imposing monetary sanctions against Plaintiff totaling $8,783. Id. In
imposing the sanctions, the court concluded that they were warranted due to Plaintiff’s “years of
vituperative litigation, frivolous motion practice, and intentional misrepresentations to the court.”
Id. at 6 (internal quotations marks omitted). Indeed, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s conduct
was “indicative of harassment and an abuse of the judicial process,” “mean spirited and
vexatious,” and that her “inappropriate use of the courts” resulted in “needless expense in the
defense of a frivolous lawsuit.” Id. at 5–6.
E. Disciplinary Proceedings Against Plaintiff
In or about April 2005, the AGC3 commenced a disciplinary proceeding against Plaintiff

for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility allegedly committed by her during the
Housing Litigation. Id. In December 2011, the AGC moved pursuant to 22 New York Codes,
Rules, and Regulations § 605.15 to suspend Plaintiff’s license to practice law for one year,
arguing that “whether [Plaintiff] was in active practice or not, she engaged in a long pattern of
frivolous litigation and willfully disregarded judicial orders imposing sanctions.” Id. In a
decision dated December 4, 2012, the New York Appellate Division, First Department (“First
Department”) granted the AGC’s motion, suspended Plaintiff from practicing law in New York
for six months, and required Plaintiff to submit proof that she had paid the sanctions imposed
during the Housing Litigation before seeking reinstatement. Id. at 7. In turn, Plaintiff filed suit
against the Hon. Luis A Gonzalez, Chief Justice of the First Department, the Hon. Jonathan

Lippman, Chief Justice of the New York Court of Appeals, and several AGC officers (including
Defendants DoPico, Cahill, Reyes, Shed, and Tom) in federal court seeking to vacate the First
Department’s order suspending her from the practice of law; reinstatement; and unspecified
money damages. See Weissbrod v. Gonzalez, 13-CV-2565 (JMF), 2013 WL 12084506
(S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2013), aff’d, 576 F. App’x 18 (2d Cir. 2014). The court found that Plaintiff’s
claims challenging the AGC’s discipline imposed against her were barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. Id. at *2. Further, the court found that Plaintiff’s claims against the

3 Formerly known as the First Department’s Departmental Disciplinary Committee.
individual defendants were precluded under judicial immunity or quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at
*2–3.
II. The Amended Complaint
On September 27, 2019, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in this action incorporating

by reference her prior filings with this Court and filings made in the above-mentioned
proceedings. (See generally Am. Compl.) According to Plaintiff, beginning in 2005, AGC
officers and staff attorneys created “forged and perjured documents and inserted these documents
into [her] . . . bar files.” (Id. ¶¶ 45–46.) She further alleges that the Squitieri Defendants had
access to and altered her files in the attorney discipline proceedings against her. (Id. ¶ 71.)
Plaintiff contends that the Hinshaw Defendants and Squitieri Defendants conspired with the
AGC to corrupt her disciplinary proceedings. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 62, 90.) Plaintiff maintains that this
conduct was done in retaliation because she filed ethics complaints against the Cowan firm. (Id.
¶ 40.)
Plaintiff also challenges the constitutionality of New York’s Judiciary Law § 90 and Part

1240 of Title 22 of the N.Y.C.R.R. (“Part 1240”) related to attorney discipline and
simultaneously complains that these provisions were not adhered to in her disciplinary
proceedings. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 55.) In particular, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hon. Luis A.
Gonzalez failed to supervise AGC attorneys and did not have jurisdiction to preside over
Plaintiff’s ethics proceedings. (Id. ¶ 17.) Finally, Plaintiff challenges the First Department’s
jurisdiction to institute the disciplinary proceedings in the first instance. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 48.)
Plaintiff demands injunctive and declaratory relief as well as unspecified monetary
damages. (Id. ¶¶ xi–xx, 145, 148.) She asks this Court to compel state court judges to vacate
certain state court orders, reopen the disciplinary proceedings against her, produce records from
those proceedings and her bar files, and reopen ethics complaints she filed against the Squitieri
and Hinshaw Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 150, (b), (d), (f)–(g).) She seeks an order compelling the New
York Office of Court Administration to produce the legislative history and drafting notes for
“Judiciary Law (JL) Part 1240.” (Id. ¶ 57.) She asks this Court to intervene in the SDNY

Action, by issuing an order disqualifying Defendants Richard Supple and Hinshaw as the Cowan
firm’s counsel; compelling the Cowan firm to return her patent and inventorship files; and
compelling the Squitieri Defendants to give Plaintiff files related to their representation of her,
including communications between Defendant Squitieri and opposing counsel. (Id. ¶¶ 77–80,
99, (i).) Finally, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that State Defendants “have imposed and continue
to impose unconstitutional protocols against [her] since 2004.” (Id. ¶ (a).)
DISCUSSION
It is impossible to discern with certitude what claims are being advanced by Plaintiff.4
That said, at various points the amended complaint makes opaque references to claims for
violations of: the First and Fourteenth Amendments brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ ii, xii, xiii, 22, 87–88); the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), (Id. ¶¶ x, 40, 62, 70, 146); the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), (Id. ¶¶ xiv, 57,
156); New York Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters, (Id. at ¶¶ iii, iv, vi, viii, ix, xiv); and
state law tort claims, including defamation, (Id. ¶¶ xviii, 61, 140), intentional infliction of
emotional distress, (Id. ¶¶ xix, 25), aiding and abetting fraud (Id. ¶¶ viii), and abuse of process
(Id. ¶¶ xviii, 9).
“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff
has paid the required filing fee.” Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362,

4 The amended complaint does not set forth separate claims for relief as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
364 (2d Cir. 2000).5 An action is frivolous when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal
theory”—that is, when it “lacks an arguable basis in law . . . , or [when] a dispositive defense
clearly exists on the face of the complaint.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d
434, 473 (2d Cir. 1998). Moreover, “[a] complaint will be dismissed as ‘frivolous’ when ‘it is

clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’” Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir.
1999) (per curium) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). There can be no
question—this action is frivolous.
I. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the State Defendants
As best as the Court can glean, Plaintiff generally alleges the State Defendants
improperly carried out their duties (or failed to do so) in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the New York Rules for
Attorney Disciplinary Matters. (Id. ¶¶ iii–iv, vi, viii, xii–xiii, 2–5, 8–12, 17–18, 21–22, 39, 41,
60, 66.) Plaintiff also alleges the State Defendants defamed Plaintiff and intentionally inflicted
emotional distress through “malicious and abhorrent abuse of process[.]” (Id. ¶ xix; see also ¶¶

xviii, 25.) Finally, Plaintiff seeks FOIA orders against certain State Defendants to compel the
production of legislative drafting notes. (Id. ¶¶ xiv, 57, 156.) These claims are barred.
As a matter of law, the State Defendants are immune from suit. Judges are immune from
suit for judicial acts performed in their judicial capacity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991)
(“[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.”
(citation omitted)). This absolute immunity extends to “certain others who perform functions
closely associated with the judicial process.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985).

5 The State Defendants and the Hinshaw Defendants have separately brought motions to dismiss the amended
complaint, which set out some of the bases for dismissal addressed herein. (See ECF Nos. 47, 56.) However,
because the Court can dismiss the claims sua sponte as frivolous, it does not reach a decision on those motions.
Relevant here, courts have recognized that the AGC is “part of the judicial arm of the state of
New York.” Thaler v. Casella, 960 F. Supp. 691, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Accordingly, the
AGC’s staff-counsel are entitled to absolute immunity from suit, because they act in a “‘quasi-
public adjudicatory or prosecutorial capacity.’” Id. (quoting Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exchange,

Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir. 1996)).
According to the amended complaint, the State Defendants: improperly handled
Plaintiff’s ethics complaints (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 46, 52); failed to supervise the AGC staff (Id. ¶
8); improperly exercised jurisdiction over her conduct and filings, at times through forgery and
perjury (Id. ¶¶ 3, 9–10, 46, 48, 59, 60, 67); improperly transferred her complaints to the
purportedly wrong jurisdiction (Id. ¶ 11); improperly disclosed her confidential information and
files (Id. ¶¶ 14, 22, 25, 142); engaged in retaliatory harassment through the issuance of sanctions
(Id. ¶¶ 17, 22, 53); failed to properly discharge their duties under New York Rules for Attorney
Disciplinary Matters (Id. ¶¶ 2, 24, 26, 149); engaged in an “illegal enterprise . . . in furtherance
of a conspiracy” to target her and others who file ethics complaints against New York City

attorneys (Id. ¶ 40; see also ¶¶ 45, 147); and aided and abetted the unlawful taking of her patent
claims without just compensation (Id. ¶ 62). The only reasonable inference that can be drawn
from these allegations is that the State Defendants’ alleged wrongful conduct stems from their
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. That Plaintiff alleges that the State Defendant’s conduct was
malicious or somehow improper is of no consequence. The immunity afforded to judges and
officials “is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, nor can a judge be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error [] or was in excess of his authority.”
Weissbrod, 2013 WL 12084506, at *2 (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991) (per
curiam))). Accordingly, the State Defendants are immune from suit.
Even if the State Defendants were not immune from suit, Plaintiff’s claims regarding past
attorney disciplinary matters would be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Plaintiff
requests intervention in state ethics proceedings that she commenced against Defendants Supple
and Squitieri and that the AGC commenced against her. (See id. at 43–44, ¶¶ (b)–(c), (g), (i),

(k)–(l).) However, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiff is barred from bringing any
claim challenging a state court decision in federal court. See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S.
413, 415–16 (1923). That is, Rooker-Feldman bars federal courts from hearing cases “brought
by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The
doctrine bars federal jurisdiction when: (1) the plaintiff lost in state court or in a state
disciplinary proceeding; (2) his or her alleged injuries were caused by the state courts’ orders; (3)
the state court rendered its determinations before the federal action was commenced; and (4) the
plaintiff challenges the state courts’ decisions. Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir.

2009) (outlining the four requirements for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply); see also
Neroni v. Zayas, 663 F. App’x 51, 53 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying the doctrine equally to attorney
disciplinary determinations).
Each of these elements are easily met here. Plaintiff alleges that she was suspended and
sanctioned by the AGC and alleges that the AGC failed to take action in response to her ethics
complaints against Defendants Supple and Squitieri. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ (b), (g).) Now,
years later, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and damages for the AGC’s alleged wrongdoing.
Against this backdrop, it is undeniable that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies.6

6 The Younger abstention doctrine also requires federal courts to abstain from interfering with certain pending state
court proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1971) (identifying the “primary sources” of the
II. Plaintiff’s Claims Against the Hinshaw and Squitieri Defendants
Plaintiff’s claims against the Hinshaw Defendants and Squitieri Defendants are barred by
the doctrine of res judicata which “protect[s] parties from having to relitigate identical claims or
issues and . . . promote[s] judicial economy.” Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162
F.3d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1998). In particular, res judicata bars subsequent litigation if: “(1) the

previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; (2) the previous action involved the
[parties] or those in privity with them; [and] (3) the claims asserted in the subsequent action
were, or could have been, raised in the prior action.” Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corrs., 214
F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2000).
Giving Plaintiff’s allegations the strongest argument they can make, Plaintiff seeks to
compel the Cowan firm (who is not named as a Defendant in this action) to return her patent and
inventorship files; to compel the Squitieri Defendants to produce to her files related to their
representation of her; an order retroactively disqualifying the Hinshaw Defendants in the SDNY
Action; damages for aiding and abetting fraud and the obstruction of justice; and damages under
common law tort theories of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. These

very claims were raised in prior litigation. Plaintiff brought a motion to disqualify the Hinshaw
Defendants in the SDNY Action and a prior New York Supreme Court action. See Gurvey v.
Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman, P.C., 2014 WL 6491281, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2014);
Weissbrod-Gurvey v. State of New York, No. 100163/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 2016).
Plaintiff’s intentional tort and aiding and abetting claims against the Hinshaw Defendants were
thoroughly litigated and adjudicated in the prior New York Supreme Court action and a separate

“longstanding public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings). Relevant here, attorney
disciplinary proceedings are precisely the type of enforcement action to which Younger applies. Schorr v. Dopico,
205 F. Supp. 3d 359, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Disciplinary proceedings against attorneys fall within the category of
proceedings to which Younger applies.”), aff’d, 686 F. App’x 34 (2d Cir. 2017).
action filed in the Southern District of New York. See Weissbrod-Gurvey, No. 100163/2015;
Weissbrod Gurvey v. Hon. Jonathan Lippman, No. 18-cv-2206 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2018). In both
cases, her claims were dismissed. See Weissbrod-Gurvey, No. 100163/2015, slip op. at 8 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Aug. 29, 2016) (granting the Hinshaw Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for filing

injunction against Plaintiff); Order of Dismissal at 2, Weissbrod Gurvey, No. 18-cv-2206
(S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2018), ECF No. 29 (“[T]he Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations and
arguments are frivolous.”). With respect to the Squitieri Defendants, Plaintiff has already
successfully litigated her claim in a prior New York Supreme Court action. See Gurvey v.
Squitieri and Fearon, LLP, No. 2012-102516, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. April 30, 2013).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Hinshaw and Squitieri Defendants are barred by res
judicata. To the extent Plaintiff attempts to allege new tort claims not previously alleged in prior
actions, the allegations here are impermissibly vague and simply do not state a claim. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Sheehy v. Brown, 335 F. App’x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming district
court’s dismissal of claims that were “so vague as to fail to give the defendants adequate notice

of the claims against them”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Hinshaw Defendants
and Squitieri Defendants must be dismissed.
III. Filing Injunction
State Defendants and the Hinshaw Defendants separately move for a filing injunction,
barring Plaintiff from filing any civil action in this Court against them arising out of the events
alleged in the amended complaint, without prior leave of the Court. (ECF Nos. 52, 56–14.)
“The United States Courts are not powerless to protect . . . litigants [] from the depredations of
those [] who abuse the process of the Courts to harass and annoy others with meritless, frivolous,
vexatious or repetitive [] proceedings.” In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261–62 (2d Cir.
1984) (quoting In Re Hartford Textile Corp., 659 F.2d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 1981)). Indeed, federal
courts have the “inherent authority” to “‘impose sanctions against litigants who abuse the
judicial process,’ and ‘[t]he filing of repetitive and frivolous suits constitutes the type of abuse
for which an injunction forbidding further litigation may be an appropriate sanction.’” Vassel v.

Firststorm Props. 2 LLC, 750 F. App’x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) (quoting
Shafii v. British Airways, PLC, 83 F.3d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1996)). The Second Circuit has
identified five factors relevant to the decision to impose a filing injunction:
“(1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular whether it entailed vexatious,
harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the litigant’s motive in pursuing the
litigation,” including whether the litigant has “an objective good faith expectation
of prevailing[]; (3) whether the litigant is represented by counsel; (4) whether the
litigant has caused needless expense to other parties or has posed an unnecessary
burden on the courts and their personnel; and (5) whether other sanctions would be
adequate to protect the courts and other parties.”

Id. (quoting Safir v. U.S. Lines Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Although the Court is loathe to enjoin a party from filing suit, this litigation cries out
for the application of an injunction. Indeed, each factor counsels in favor of the Defendants’
requests.
First, Plaintiff has a history of vexatious litigation. This Court would not be the first to
make such a finding. See, e.g., In re Gurvey, 958 N.Y.S.2d at 6 (noting that Plaintiff was
“sanctioned for ‘years of vituperative litigation,’ frivolous motion practice, and intentional
misrepresentations to the court”). Second, Plaintiff brought claims already found to be barred by
immunity and res judicata. See Weissbrod, 2013 WL 12084506. Third, Plaintiff, an attorney, is
not entitled to any special solicitude as a pro se litigant. See Larsen, 533 F.Supp.2d at 295 n.2
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he rules afforded pro se litigants are not relaxed when that litigant is also
an attorney[.]”). Fourth, Plaintiff’s repeated frivolous lawsuits are a needless imposition on
State Defendants, the Hinshaw Defendants, and the courts. Fifth, other sanctions cannot
adequately protect the courts and the other parties. Indeed, courts have already imposed
monetary sanctions on Plaintiff, which did not dissuade her from commencing the instant action.
Plaintiff’s arguments advanced opposing the filing injunction are utterly meritless. (See

generally Pl.’s Mem. L. Opp. Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 59.)
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the amended complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. State
Defendants and the Hinshaw Defendants’ motions for a filing injunction are GRANTED.
Defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint are DISMISSED as MOOT. Plaintiff is
barred from filing any civil action in the Eastern District of New York against the State
Defendants or the Hinshaw Defendants arising out of the events alleged in the amended
complaint, without prior leave of the Court.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York /s/ LDH
September 30, 2021 LASHANN DEARCY HALL
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306957. Public record. Not legal advice.