# Tafolla v. S.C.D.A.O

> District Court, E.D. New York · August 19, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306747

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 19, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306747

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting contention that Title III of the ADA imposes a civility code

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------X
KIM L. TAFOLLA,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- 17-CV-4897(JS)(AKT)

COUNTY OF SUFFOLK; EDWARD HEILIG; and
JOSEPH CARROLL,

Defendants.
-----------------------------------X
APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff: Joshua Friedman, Esq.
Joseph Myers, Esq.
Phillips & Associates PLLC
585 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410
Garden City, New York 11530

For Defendants: Hope Senzer Gabor, Esq.
Assistant County Attorney
Suffolk County Department of Law
H. Lee Dennison Building
100 Veterans Memorial Highway
Hauppauge, New York 11788

SEYBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Kim L. Tafolla (“Plaintiff”) initiated this
employment discrimination action against the County of Suffolk
(the “County”), Edward Heilig, and Joseph Carroll (collectively,
“Defendants”) asserting violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)
arising out of her termination as a County employee. Currently
pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. (Defs. Mot., ECF No. 70; Defs. Br., ECF No. 72; Pl.
Opp., ECF No. 74; Defs. Reply, ECF No. 77.) For the following
reasons, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

The following facts, unless otherwise noted, are
undisputed.
I. The Parties
Plaintiff worked as a “clerk typist” at the Suffolk
County District Attorney’s Office (the “Office”) from November 17,
2008 until January 13, 2015. (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’
Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl. 56.1 Resp.”), ECF No. 61-2, ¶¶ 1,
144.) Starting in March 2009, she worked in the Office’s Special
Investigations Bureau (the “Bureau”), initially under then-Bureau
Chief, Defendant Edward Heilig (“Heilig”). (Id. ¶¶ 2, 6.) At
some point Heilig became Division Chief, and Defendant Joseph
Carroll (“Carroll”) took over as Bureau Chief. (Id. ¶¶ 9-11.) As

Division Chief, Heilig oversaw personnel matters at the Office,
and Carroll reported to Heilig regarding personnel-related matters
within the Bureau. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 24.) There is some dispute between
the parties regarding the process for requesting an accommodation
in the Bureau -- whether through Heilig, Carroll, or Jennifer

1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are drawn from the parties’
respective Local Rule 56.1 Statements and Responses. The Court
cites to the parties’ 56.1 responses, which are the most complete.
McNamara, the County’s Director of Labor Relations -- and who had
responsibility to grant an accommodation. (Id. ¶¶ 23-28.)
II. Plaintiff’s Archiving Responsibilities

Plaintiff and two other women, Jennifer Greenzang and
Tara Sikorski, served as clerk typists in the Bureau during the
relevant period, though Sikorski left on June 24, 2013. (Id. ¶
34.) Most of Plaintiff’s responsibilities as a clerk typist are
not in dispute. Plaintiff performed “general office duties,” such
as: answering the telephone; typing memos, correspondence, writs,
and indictments; and photocopying and scanning documents. (Id. ¶
33.) At issue are Plaintiff’s archiving responsibilities and her
request for an accommodation related thereto.
Once a defendant was sentenced and the case was closed,
it was archived. The archiving process in the Bureau was as
follows: the responsible assistant district attorney (“Assistant

DA”) would leave the case file, contained in an “indictment
folder,” in a “suite area” (id. ¶¶ 49-51); then, Plaintiff or one
of her colleagues would “close out” the case file by entering the
requisite information from the file into the Office’s system (id.
¶¶ 50, 57); after which, the case file would be brought downstairs
to the archives room, which neither Plaintiff nor her colleagues
were required to do (id. ¶ 50). According to Plaintiff, “archiving
was a small portion of [her] job,” (Defendants’ Response to
Plaintiff’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement (“Defs. 56.1 Resp.”), ECF
No. 61-3, ¶ 6), which “always came last” or “when you had free
time.” (Pl. Depo. Tr. 63:8-9, Ex. A, ECF No. 73-1, attached to
Friedman Decl.; see also Horney Depo. Tr. 38:12-15, Ex. C, ECF No.
73-3, attached to Friedman Decl.)2 Plaintiff claims Diana Laruche,

a Bureau secretary, “did the majority of archiving.” (Defs. 56.1
Resp. ¶ 5.)
III. Plaintiff’s First Request for an Accommodation
On November 25, 2013, Plaintiff suffered injuries to her
cervical and lumbar spine due to a car accident. (Defs. 56.1 Resp.
¶¶ 10-11.) The following day, Plaintiff informed Carroll that she
would be unable to come into work. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 61.) When
she returned to work on December 2, after the Thanksgiving weekend,
Plaintiff found the case files ready for archiving were piling up.
(Id. ¶¶ 61-62.) After an Assistant DA asked Plaintiff when the
files would be archived, Plaintiff resolved to communicate to

Carroll that she was unable to perform her archiving duties. (Id.
¶¶ 64-65.)
On December 6, 2013, Plaintiff emailed Carroll regarding
her concerns about archiving files. (Id. ¶ 67.) Plaintiff
explained that her neck, back, and ribs were sore from the car
accident and asked whether “Jen [Greenzang] could take care of the
archives for now.” (First Accommodation Request, Ex. E, ECF No.

2 Hereafter, the Court will simply cite to the relevant exhibits
from the Friedman Declaration by their identified letters.
73-5, attached to Friedman Decl.) Before responding, Carroll
conferred with Heilig regarding Plaintiff’s request. (Pl. 56.1
Resp. ¶ 68.) Based on his consultation with Heilig, Carroll told

Plaintiff “I don’t want you to hurt yourself,” and recommended
they wait to learn what Plaintiff’s doctor recommended at her
visit, scheduled for three days later. (First Accommodation
Request, Ex. E.) Carroll added: “If your doctor deems that you
are unable to perform any work related functions please have
him/her provide you with a letter indicating the nature of those
restrictions.” (Id.) He also requested a copy of the “DMV 104
accident report.” (Id.)
On December 9, 2013, Plaintiff saw Eugene King, the
physician’s assistant at her spine surgeon’s office, and obtained
a note from him (the “King Note”). (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 74.) The
King Note stated Plaintiff should not lift over five pounds or

perform “bending [or] pushing activities.” (Id.; see also King
Note, Ex. F, ECF No. 73-6, attached to Friedman Decl.) Plaintiff
left a copy of the King Note in Carroll’s inbox on December 10,
2013. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 75.) A few days later, Carroll emailed
Plaintiff to request a list of cases that had been sent to archives
from June 24, 2013 -- the day Sikorski left -- through December
13, 2013 to “gain an understanding of the nature of how much work
was involved in archiving since Tara Sikorski left.” (Id. ¶ 77.)
Carroll’s request was in response to the First Accommodation
Request, which requested Greenzang relieve Plaintiff of her
archiving duties, since Carroll “wanted to have some idea of what
[such an accommodation would] entail[].” (Id. ¶ 79.)

IV. The January 7 Encounter
From November 21, 2013 to January 7, 2014, no archiving
was done in the Bureau. (Id. ¶ 80.) As a result, Carroll,
believing Plaintiff should have been archiving case files that
weighed less than five pounds, consistent with the King Note,
approached Plaintiff to address the backlog. (Id. ¶ 81.) The
parties dispute what happened next. According to Plaintiff,
Carroll and another Assistant DA, Deirdre Horney, “approached
Plaintiff in a hostile manner” and demanded why the files were not
getting archived. (Defs. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 25.) When Plaintiff raised
the King Note, Carroll acknowledged its limitations but yelled
over her, picked up a file from Plaintiff’s desk, and stated, “I

don’t think this file weighs five pounds.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff
claims Carroll “told her to put the box [of case files] on the
floor, bend over to pick up the files, enter the information into
the computer, from a sitting position, and put the files in the
box,” at which point he or someone else would move the boxes for
Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff further claims Carroll gave her
an ultimatum: archive or go on medical leave. (Id. ¶ 29.)
Conversely, Defendants claim that throughout the exchange Carroll
acted consistent with the King Note and instructed Plaintiff not
to handle any file that weighed more than five pounds. (Id. ¶¶
28-31; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 82.) According to Defendants, Carroll’s
“ultimatum” was a good faith offer to transfer an “unhappy”

employee. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 83.) He also offered to have Greenzang
assist Plaintiff with the archives, which she did. (Id. ¶ 84.)
After the exchange, Plaintiff archived two boxes of case
files. (Id. ¶ 85.) “By the end of the day, Plaintiff was in such
excruciating pain and severe agony that she could barely walk to
her car.” (Defs. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 38.) Because of the pain, she
called out of work the following day and scheduled an appointment
with her spine surgeon, Dr. Robert Galler. (Id. ¶¶ 39-40.) At
her visit, Dr. Galler provided Plaintiff a second note regarding
her physical limitations. (Second Accommodation Request
(attaching Galler Note), Ex. G, ECF No. 73-7, attached to Friedman
Decl.) The Galler Note stated that due to Plaintiff’s previous

surgery and the injuries she sustained from the November 2013 car
accident, Plaintiff was “unable to lift, bend, twist, or push any
object over five pounds. The patient is able to perform
secretarial work but no physical duties at this time . . . .”
(Id.)3

3 Plaintiff also filed a workplace violence complaint in connection
with the January 7 interaction with Carroll, which Heilig, pursuant
to the Suffolk County Workplace Violence Prevention Program’s
procedures and in consultation with the Office’s workplace
violence coordinator, determined was not a proper workplace
violence complaint. (Defs. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 122-34.)
V. Plaintiff’s Second Request for Accommodation
One week after her exchange with Carroll, Plaintiff
renewed her request for an accommodation with the Office’s human

resources department (the “Second Accommodation Request”). Diane
Stankewicz, a human resources representative, called Plaintiff
shortly thereafter and informed her that the County “did not offer
light duty assignments” and that Carroll was responsible for
accommodating her disability. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 95.) Plaintiff
also reached out to Caroline Stolz from “Risk Management,” who
reiterated Stankewicz’s response. (Id. ¶ 107.) It appears that
Stankewicz’s and Stolz’s responses were inconsistent with County
policy. (Id. ¶¶ 95, 107; see also Defs. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 47-54.)
Notwithstanding the miscommunication, however, on January 16,
2014, two days after the Second Accommodation Request, Heilig
responded to Plaintiff via an intraoffice communication. (Heilig

Memo, Ex. H, ECF No. 73-8, attached to Friedman Decl.) Heilig
stated it was his understanding that Plaintiff already had been
granted an accommodation based on the King Note. (Id.) He further
advised Plaintiff that she was “not to ‘lift, bend, twist or push
any object over five pounds’” in connection with her
responsibilities, and that if she believed any file weighed more
than five pounds, she was “not to touch that file,” but rather
advise Carroll, who would make alternative arrangements. (Id.)
The Heilig Memo closed with the following paragraph:
Please be further advised that the county does
not have light duty assignments. If you are
not capable of performing your job duties for
any reason, including medical limitations, you
will have to be out of work on a medical leave
until you can return to work with a Doctor’s
note indicating that you can work with no
restrictions.
(Id.)
Plaintiff claims Defendants acted inconsistently with
the Heilig Memo, and in any event “disputes that this was not a
reasonable accommodation because light duty was not possibly [sic]
per Defendant’s policy.” (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 108.) According to
Defendants, by the final paragraph, Heilig intended to communicate
that, in the event Plaintiff could not perform her job duties even
with the accommodation, she would have to go on medical leave.
(Id.) Regardless, by the time Plaintiff received the Heilig Memo
on January 16 it was a moot point, because Plaintiff had left the
Bureau on January 15 with “no intention of going back to work.”
(Id. ¶¶ 110-11.) After Plaintiff left, Carroll weighed the files
that Plaintiff had archived on January 7 and confirmed that “none
of the files that Plaintiff archived weighed over five pounds.”
(Id. ¶ 121.)
VI. Plaintiff’s Leave and Eventual Termination
On February 27, 2014, Plaintiff applied for and was
granted twelve-week leave under the Family Medical Leave Act. (Id.
¶¶ 134-36.) In addition, Plaintiff applied for and was granted
Long Term Disability benefits for 104 weeks, running through April
12, 2016. (Id. ¶ 137.) Via a January 13, 2015 letter, Heilig
informed Plaintiff that her employment would be terminated

pursuant to New York Civil Service Law § 73, due to her one-year
absence from the County. (Id. ¶ 144.) At that point, Plaintiff
declined to undergo a medical examination to determine whether she
could perform her responsibilities as a clerk typist, a decision
she blames on Defendants for instructing Plaintiff she “must be
out of [sic] disability despite Plaintiff could perform her
sedentary tasks.” (Id. ¶ 146.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initiated this action on August 21, 2017,
within ninety days of receiving a notice of right to sue from the
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. In the operative
Amended Complaint, filed on January 22, 2018, Plaintiff alleges

three causes of action arising under federal law: (1) violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) discrimination under the ADA; and
(3) retaliation under the ADA; she also alleges three causes of
action for violations of the New York State Human Rights Law
(“NYSHRL”). (Am. Compl., ECF No. 15.) At the close of discovery,
Defendants moved for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Material
facts are those which might affect the outcome of the suit under
the governing law, and a dispute is genuine if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party.” Wagner v. Chiari & Ilecki, LLP, 973 F.3d 154,
164 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Coppola v. Bear Stearns & Co., 499
F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The movant bears the burden of establishing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact for trial. Gallo v. Prudential
Residential Servs., L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223 (2d Cir. 1994). There
can be no genuine issue as to any material fact where “a party

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Once the movant shows there are no
genuine issues of material fact for trial, the non-movant must
proffer specific facts demonstrating “a genuine issue for trial.”
Parks Real Estate Purchasing Grp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 472 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
On a motion for summary judgment the Court considers the
“pleadings, deposition testimony, answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file, together with any other firsthand information

including but not limited to affidavits.” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d
147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011). In reviewing the record, “the court is
required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible
factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
judgment is sought.” Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v.
Vadaris Tech. Inc., No. 13-CV-5286, 2015 WL 6449420, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2015) (quoting McLee v. Chrysler Corp., 109
F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997)). When drawing inferences from
evidence in the record in favor of the non-moving party, however,
a court should not accord the non-moving party the benefit of
“unreasonable inferences, or inferences at war with undisputed
facts.” Berk v. St. Vincent's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 380 F. Supp. 2d

334, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting County of Suffolk v. Long Island
Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1318 (2d Cir. 1990)). Moreover,
“[t]hough [a court] must accept as true the allegations of the
party defending against the summary judgment motion, . . .
conclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party
resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.” Kulak v.
City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal citation
omitted) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Wyler v. United States, 725 F.2d 156,
160 (2d Cir. 1983)); accord Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d
Cir. 2010).
II. Analysis

A. ADA Discrimination4
1. Applicable Law
Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from
“discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA requires an employer
to reasonably accommodate an employee’s known disability, unless

4 The Court addresses Plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims in conjunction with
her ADA claims, because the standards of liability under the two
statutes are coterminous. See Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457
F.3d 181, 183 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A claim of disability
discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law . . . is
governed by the same legal standards as govern federal ADA
claims.”). The differences that distinguish the ADA from its New
York counterpart, such as the NYSHRL’s broader definition of
disability or its longer statute of limitations, are irrelevant to
the issues in this case. See Williams v. Geiger, 447 F. Supp. 3d
68. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over NYSHRL claims after dismissing ADA claims
because of NYSHRL’s broader definition of disability); Hernandez
v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-6644, 2015 WL 321830, at *25
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2015) (declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over NYSHRL claims after dismissing ADA claims
because of different statutes of limitations). Thus, the values
of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity support the
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s NYSHRL
claims. Henry v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 396,
413 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the
plaintiff’s NYSHRL claims after dismissing Title VII claims).
the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer.
Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To maintain a claim under the ADA, which is
subject to the burden-shifting analysis originally set forth in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the
plaintiff-employee must show that: “(1) [she] is a person with a
disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an employer covered
by the statute had notice of h[er] disability; (3) with reasonable
accommodation, [the employee] could perform the essential
functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to
make such accommodations.” Noll v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 787
F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods.
Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2009)).
A reasonable accommodation may take many forms,
including modifying an employee’s job duties, McBride, 583 F.3d at
97, but to be reasonable the accommodation must be effective.

Noll, 787 F.3d at 99. While the reasonableness of an employer’s
accommodation is a “‘fact-specific’ question that often must be
resolved by a factfinder,” where “the employer has already taken
(or offered) measures to accommodate the disability, the employer
is entitled to summary judgment if, on the undisputed record, the
existing accommodation is ‘plainly reasonable.’” Id. at 94 (citing
Wernick v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., 91 F.3d 379, 385 (2d Cir.
1996)); see also Staron v. McDonald’s Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 356 (2d
Cir. 1995) (“[T]he determination of whether a particular
modification is ‘reasonable’ involves a fact-specific, case-by-
case inquiry that considers, among other factors, the
effectiveness of the modification in light of the nature of the

disability in question and the cost to the organization that would
implement it.”).
“To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation
it may be necessary for the employer to initiate an informal,
interactive process” with the employee that aims to “identify the
precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.”
Goonan v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., 916 F. Supp. 2d 470, 479–80
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (alterations omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(o)(3)); see also Brady v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d
127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We have held that the ADA contemplates
that employers will engage in an ‘interactive process’ with their

employees and in that way work together to assess whether an
employee’s disability can be reasonably accommodated.”). An
employer who engages in an interactive process with its employee
will not be subject to liability under the ADA for failure to
accommodate, unless the employer is responsible for a breakdown in
the interactive process. Nugent v. St. Lukes-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr.,
303 F. App’x 943, 946 (2d Cir. 2008); Goonan, 916 F. Supp. 2d at
480; Thompson v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-4182, 2006 WL 2457694,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2006) report and recommendation adopted,
2006 WL 6357978 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2006), aff’d sub nom. Thompson
v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Prob., 348 F. App’x 643 (2d Cir. 2009); Bohen
v. Potter, No. 04-CV-1039, 2009 WL 791356, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.

23, 2009). “An employer impedes the process when: the employer
knows of the employee’s disability; the employee requests
accommodations or assistance; the employer does not in good faith
assist the employee in seeking accommodations; and the employee
could have been reasonably accommodated but for the employer’s
lack of good faith.” Bohen, 2009 WL 791356, at *13 (citing Kratzer
v. Rockwell Collins, Inc., 398 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 2005)).
On the other hand, “[a]n employee who is responsible for a
breakdown of [the] interactive process may not recover for a
failure to accommodate.” Nugent, 303 F. App’x at 946. Courts
must deny motions for summary judgement when “presented with
conflicting facts about the provenance of a breakdown.” Goonan,

916 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (citing Bohen, 2009 WL 791356, at *14).
2. Application
Defendants argue they offered Plaintiff a reasonable
accommodation, but “not the accommodation Plaintiff wanted.”
(Defs. Br. at 15-16.) The Court agrees. The undisputed record
shows Defendants granted Plaintiff the precise accommodation
prescribed by her doctors; this was “plainly reasonably.” Noll,
787 F.3d at 94. While Plaintiff may have preferred a different
accommodation, “employers are not required to provide a perfect
accommodation or the very accommodation most strongly preferred by
the employee.” Id. at 95 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630 app’x); see
also Fink v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Personnel, 53 F.3d 565, 567 (2d Cir.

1997). Rather, the accommodation must be effective, and this Court
will not override the opinion of Plaintiff’s physician as to the
nature of the accommodations required for his patient. See Wenc
v. New London Bd. of Educ., No. 14-CV-0840, 2016 WL 4410061, at
*14 (D. Conn. Aug. 16, 2016), aff’d, 702 F. App’x 27 (2d Cir. 2017)
(summary order). In short, Plaintiff fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish Defendants did not offer her a reasonable
accommodation, an element essential to her claim for liability
under the ADA.
A review of the timeline of events supports the Court’s
conclusion. When Plaintiff returned to work after her accident,
she informed Carroll that she was unable to archive files, which
were piling up.5 In response, Carroll conferred with Heilig and

then requested information from Plaintiff that could help
Defendants identify Plaintiff’s limitations. Plaintiff provided

5 Defendants appear to suggest that Plaintiff did not request an
accommodation until her January 14 correspondence with Stankewicz.
(Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 95.) That characterization of the facts is not
supported by caselaw in this Circuit, which recognizes an employer
may be obligated to provide a reasonable accommodation when it
perceives an employee is disabled, whether or not the employee
asked for an accommodation. See, e.g., Brady, 531 F.3d at 135-
36. Thus, the Court recognizes Plaintiff first requested an
accommodation when she emailed Carroll in December 2013 regarding
her limitations.
Carroll some of the requested information, -i-.e-.-, the King Note.
Carroll followed up with an archiving-specific question to better
understand the process involved and how Defendants could

accommodate Plaintiff’s request. This exemplifies the interactive
process the ADA envisions.
The parties dispute what then transpired between
Plaintiff and Carroll on January 7, 2014, when Carroll approached
Plaintiff about her archiving responsibilities. Plaintiff argues
that the January 7 encounter demonstrates that Defendants failed
to abide by the proposed accommodation to limit Plaintiff’s
archiving responsibilities to files weighing less than five
pounds, consistent with her doctors’ notes. (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶
105-06 (disputing Defendants’ offer to limit Plaintiff’s archiving
responsibilities to files weighing less than five pounds as “not
actually the practice” because “Defendant Carroll did make her

lift heavy objects over 5 pounds”).) But the Court finds this
dispute does not preclude summary judgment for the following
reasons.
First, while Plaintiff claims that Carroll forced her to
archive files that weighed more than five pounds, in contravention
of the King Note limitations, Plaintiff has not supported this
claim with competent evidence. Of course, defendants who fail to
honor and abide by a granted accommodation effectually refuse to
accommodate the plaintiff, and on such facts summary judgment for
the employer would not be appropriate. See Lambert v. Trump Int’l
Hotel & Tower, 304 F. Supp. 3d 405, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (stating
that employer is entitled to summary judgment if it has offered to

or taken measures to accommodate plaintiff-employee’s disability
where the undisputed record shows the accommodation is “plainly
reasonable,” and plaintiff-employee’s suggestion defendant-
employer failed to honor the accommodation was “belied by his sworn
testimony”); Wells v. Achievement Network, No. 18-CV-6588, 2021 WL
810220, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2021); Payne v. Cornell Univ.,
No. 18-CV-1442, 2021 WL 39684, at *17 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2021).
However, Plaintiff fails to support such a claim with evidence in
the record, as the foregoing cases require. E.g., Wells, 2021 WL
810220, at *16 (finding plaintiff-employee failed to support
allegation that defendant-employer did not abide by plainly
reasonable accommodation, especially where defendants put forth

sworn testimony and documentary evidence to the contrary). At
most, Plaintiff cites to her own deposition testimony to show
Carroll forced her to archive files weighing more than five pounds.
(Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 105-06 (citing Plaintiff’s deposition
testimony).) “At the summary judgment stage, however, many courts
have deemed it necessary to cite to more than one’s own deposition
testimony to create a genuine dispute of fact.” Caria v. Metro-
North Commuter R.R., 457 F. Supp. 3d 301, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(citing cases).
In any event, here, Plaintiff’s testimony on this point
is inconsistent. Cf. Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp.,
526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999) (observing “virtual unanimity” among lower

courts that “a party cannot create a genuine issue of fact
sufficient to survive summary judgment simply by contradicting his
or her own previous sworn statement . . . without explaining the
contradiction or attempting to resolve the disparity”). For
example, Plaintiff testified at her deposition that Carroll
acknowledged the five-pound limitation during the January 7
encounter. (Pl. Depo. Tr. at 66:14-20; 67:25-68:7; see also Pl.
Opp. at 3.) Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute that Carrol
“indicated to Plaintiff that he was aware of the five-pound
limitation and advised her not to lift anything more than that
weight,” and that “if she thought that anything was heavy, she was
not to touch it.” (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 82). Rather, Plaintiff

asserts Carroll “told her to put the box on the floor, bend over
to pick up the files, enter the information into the computer,
from a sitting position, and put the files in the box,” at which
point Carroll or someone else would move the boxes for Plaintiff.
(Id.) Nothing in this instruction violates the five-pound
limitation, which Plaintiff concedes Carroll acknowledged.
Indeed, Plaintiff does not dispute that Carroll weighed the files
Plaintiff had archived on January 7 to “confirm that none of the[m]
weighed over five pounds.” (Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 121.)
Second, the summary judgement record does not support
the conclusion that Carroll’s conduct on January 7 caused a
breakdown in the interactive process, thus giving rise to ADA

liability, because the undisputed facts show Plaintiff tendered
several follow-up requests for an accommodation that Defendants
promptly granted, thereby undermining any claim of an “objectively
reasonable perception that the process [was] clearly at an end.”
Goonan v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of N.Y., No. 12-CV-3859, 2014 WL 3610990,
at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2014) (indicating as examples of ending
the ADA interactive process (1) repeated denials of a request at
several levels of a defendants’ corporate hierarchy and
(2) statements that defendant was “not going to change its mind”)
(quoting Loulseged v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 178 F.3d 731, 739 (5th Cir.
1999)). Unlike the defendant’s managers in Goonan, here,
Defendants’ human resources and risk management personnel did not

deny Plaintiff’s requests; they simply referred Plaintiff to
Carroll, who granted her an accommodation consistent with her
doctors’ notes within two days’ time. And “even if [Carroll’s]
statements [in response to Plaintiff’s request for accommodation]
might be found to have evinced a degree of hostility towards
[her],” Plaintiff admits that after the exchange with Carroll she
“continued to seek an accommodation from [Stankewicz, Defendants’]
Director of Human Resources.” Gingold v. Bon Secours Charity
Health Sys., 768 F. Supp. 2d 537, 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(concluding the plaintiff “unilaterally and prematurely terminated
the reasonable accommodation process” when he (1) pursued an
accommodation with human resources after being informed by his

supervisor that the defendant would not accommodate his
disability, and (2) resigned before the defendant’s human
resources personnel could investigate his request). Moreover, it
is undisputed that, after Plaintiff formally requested an
accommodation on January 14, Plaintiff left work on January 15
“with no intention of going back.” Thus, similar to the facts in
Gingold, under these circumstances, no reasonable jury could find
that Defendants, rather than Plaintiff herself, terminated the
interactive process for discussing accommodations. See id.; see
also Nugent, 303 F. App’x at 946.
To be certain, to the extent Defendants suggest that
when Carroll spoke to Plaintiff on January 7, Defendants already

had granted Plaintiff’s request for a reasonable accommodation,
consistent with the King Note limitations, the Court is
unpersuaded. The undisputed facts do not indicate Defendants
communicated this accommodation to Plaintiff, even if Carroll and
Heilig understood the accommodation to have been provided. Thus,
when Carroll encountered Plaintiff on January 7, Defendants had
not granted Plaintiff an accommodation. See E.E.O.C. v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., No. 98-CV-2270, 2002 WL 31011859, at *22
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2002) (concluding employer’s purported offer
could not be considered a reasonable accommodation where there was
no evidence at trial the employer ever made the offer to the
plaintiff).6 However, a little more than a week later and only

two days after Plaintiff submitted a renewed request, Defendants
extended Plaintiff an accommodation, as shown in the Heilig Memo.
Plaintiff admits she received the Heilig Memo but disputes whether
it granted her a reasonable accommodation. “In cases where a
plaintiff claims she was offered or given an unreasonable
alternative accommodation, the court looks to the alternative
accommodation to determine whether it was plainly reasonable.”
Durick v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 202 F. Supp. 3d 277, 292 (E.D.N.Y.
2016). “If the accommodation proposed by defendants was
reasonable, then, defendants may not be held liable under the ADA,
since plaintiff has no right to insist on her own preferred
accommodation instead.” Bielski v. Green, 674 F. Supp. 2d 414,

424 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
In this instance, as the Heilig Memo demonstrates,
Defendants granted Plaintiff a plainly reasonable accommodation
that was consistent with her doctors’ notes. Wenc v. New London

6 While Plaintiff does not raise the argument, the Court finds that
any delay in granting Plaintiff an accommodation does not
constitute disability-based discrimination, because any delay was
the product of “mere negligence,” not “motivated by the employer’s
discriminatory intent.” Clark v. Jewish Childcare Ass’n, Inc., 96
F. Supp. 3d 237, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Logan v. Matveevskii,
57 F. Supp. 3d 234, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (collecting cases)).
Bd. of Educ., 702 F. App’x 27, 30-31 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order)
(affirming district court’s conclusion that the defendants’
provision of an accommodation that was consistent with the

recommendation of a neutral physician was plainly reasonable).
Plaintiff’s spine surgeon advised Plaintiff was “unable to lift,
bend, twist, or push any object over five pounds.” (Second
Accommodation Request, Ex. G; see also King Note, Ex. F (“no
lifting over 5 pounds; no bending, pushing exercises”).) Per the
Heilig Memo, Defendants granted Plaintiff that accommodation,
advising she was not to “‘lift, bend, twist or push any object
over five pounds’ and if you believe any file you had to ‘lift,
bend, twist or push’ in connection with your job function weighs
in excess of five pounds you are not to touch that file.” (Heilig
Memo, Ex. H.) Because this accommodation adhered to the five-
pound limitation prescribed in Plaintiff’s doctors’ notes, it was

plainly reasonable. See Bielski, 674 F. Supp. at 426 (finding
accommodations that were consistent with “the medical evidence and
opinions of the physicians who treated and examined plaintiff”
were plainly reasonable, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s
insistence on a preferred accommodation). While Plaintiff may
have preferred a different accommodation -- namely, relief from
all archiving responsibilities -- “employers are not required to
provide a perfect accommodation or the very accommodation most
strongly preferred by the employee.” Noll, 787 F.2d at 95. “All
that is required is effectiveness.” Id. In this case, the Court
finds Defendants’ accommodation was effective since it embodied
the limitations prescribed in Plaintiff’s doctors’ notes.

Finally, as the Second Circuit has recognized under
separate provisions of the ADA, “the ADA does not impose a civility
code.” Krist v. Kolombos Restaurant Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 97 (2d
Cir. 2012) (rejecting contention that Title III of the ADA imposes
a civility code); Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 157
(2d Cir. 2008) (vacating dismissal order of plausible Title III
denial-of-service claim, while “not disagree[ing] . . . that
legislation such as the ADA cannot regulate individuals’ conduct
so as to ensure that they will never be rude or insensitive to
persons with disabilities”). Thus, even assuming Carroll yelled
at Plaintiff and mistreated her on January 7, viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-moving party,

summary judgment is appropriate because Defendants offered
Plaintiff the accommodation her doctors prescribed. As a result,
the parties’ remaining disputes as to what happened that day --
i.e., the manner in which Carroll addressed Plaintiff; whether
Carroll approached Plaintiff alone or with Assistant DA Hornig; or
whether Carroll’s proposal to transfer Plaintiff was an
“ultimatum” or good faith offer to a disgruntled employee -- are
immaterial.
Plaintiff advances a few additional arguments, all of
which are unavailing. Plaintiff contends that the five-pound
limitation prescribed by her doctors was distinct from the “lift,

bend, twist, or push” limitation. She also takes issue with the
final paragraph of the Heilig Memo, which advised Plaintiff that,
in the event she was unable to perform her job responsibilities,
even with the accommodation, she would have to take medical leave.
However, “the interactive process is a two-way street.” Dillard
v. City of Austin, 837 F.3d 557, 563 (5th Cir. 2016). Thus, to
the extent there was any ambiguity as to what her doctors
recommended, the proper course was for Plaintiff to raise that
issue with Defendants during the interactive process. Instead,
Plaintiff abandoned that process without clarifying Defendants’
proposed accommodation, as noted supra. The same reasoning applies
to the final paragraph in the Heilig Memo: if Plaintiff did not

understand the terms of the accommodation, then she had an
obligation to seek clarification. See Nugent, 303 F. App’x at 946
(holding plaintiff-employee responsible for breakdown of
interactive process where defendant-employer signaled
receptiveness to her proposed accommodation but plaintiff-employee
“failed to follow up”). But by the time she received the Heilig
Memo, Plaintiff had resolved to take medical leave. Further, the
parties dispute whether archiving is an essential function of
Plaintiff’s job as a Clerk Typist. However, “the plain
reasonableness of the existing accommodation ends the analysis.”
Noll, 787 F.3d at 94.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as

to Plaintiff’s ADA and NYSHRL discrimination claims is GRANTED,
and Plaintiff’s ADA and NYSHRL discrimination claims, which are
governed by the same standard, see Noll, 787 F.3d at 94, are
DISMISSED.
B. ADA Retaliation7
To make out a prima facie claim of retaliation, the
plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in ADA-protected activity
(2) of which defendants were aware, (3) she was subjected to an
adverse employment action, and (4) a causal connection existed
between the adverse employment action and her protected activity.
See Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002).
Defendants then must proffer a non-discriminatory rationale for

the challenged action, whereupon the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to show that defendants’ rationale is pretextual. See
id. at 721; see also Ragusa v. Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., 381
F. App’x 85, 89 (2d Cir. 2010).

7 Again, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s NYSHRL retaliation claims
in conjunction with her ADA retaliation claim, because the
standards of liability under the two statutes are coterminous.
See Caputo v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 218 F. Supp. 3d 186,
194 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (applying Title VII retaliation standard to
ADA and NYSHRL claims).
Defendants do not contest that Plaintiff’s requests for
accommodation are protected activities. See Gorbea v. Verizon
N.Y., Inc., No. 11–CV–3758, 2014 WL 917198, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.

10, 2014) (“Requests for disability accommodation and complaints,
whether formal or informal, about working conditions related to
one’s alleged disability are protected activities.”). Nor do they
dispute the second and third elements of a prima facie retaliation
case. Rather, Defendants maintain that there is no causal
connection between any protected activities and the adverse action
of Plaintiff’s termination, which occurred one year after her
absence on medical leave. (Defs. Br. at 21.)
“Contrary to Defendants’ assertion, however, Plaintiff’s
termination is not the only potential adverse employment action
for purposes of her retaliation claim.” Wagner v. County of
Nassau, No. 11-CV-1613, 2014 WL 3489747, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 11,

2014) (Seybert, J.). Rather, “the key inquiry is whether the
effect of defendants’ decision was ‘materially adverse,’ i.e.,
‘harmful to the point that [it] could well dissuade a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”
Ragusa, 381 F. App’x at 90 (quoting Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159,
165 (2d Cir. 2010) (alterations in original)). Similar to this
Court’s analysis in Wagner, the Court focuses its analysis on
Plaintiff’s claim that “Defendants retaliated against [Plaintiff]
by forcing her to take leave . . . .” (Pl. Opp. at 15); see also
Wagner, 2014 WL 3489747, at *9 (“[I]nvoluntary leave or unjustified
charging of sick days can be a sufficient adverse action.”
(citations omitted)).

However, the undisputed record does not support the
argument that Plaintiff was forced to take medical leave. In
essence, Plaintiff argues that because she preferred a different
accommodation -- relief from all archiving responsibilities -- her
decision to go on leave when Defendants declined to extend that
accommodation was forced. But as noted supra, an employer has
discretion to choose a reasonable accommodation for its disabled
employees, and the proposed accommodation based on Plaintiff’s
doctors’ notes was plainly reasonable here. Fink, 53 F.3d at 567;
Noll, 787 F.2d at 95. As a result, the accommodation does not
constitute an adverse employment action because it did not
disadvantage Plaintiff in a materially significant way. Wenc,

2016 WL 4410061, at *17 (finding plaintiff could not show he
suffered an adverse employment action to survive summary judgment
on his ADA retaliation claim based on arguments that the
defendants, who offered the plaintiff reasonable accommodations,
had forced him to take medical leave). Plaintiff “confuses the
allegedly discriminatory action of failing to accommodate [her]
disability with retaliation for seeking an accommodation.” Id.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as
to Plaintiff’s ADA and NYSHRL retaliation claims is GRANTED, and
Plaintiff’s ADA and NYSHRL retaliation claims, which are governed
by the same standard, are DISMISSED.8
C. Section 1983

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim for Monell liability
fares no better. In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff block quotes
Section 1983 and states simply that “Defendants denied Plaintiff
her rights under [the ADA].” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 88-89.) Four years
into this litigation, it remains unclear what theory of Monell
liability Plaintiff advances. However, reviewing the parties’
briefing, the Court construes Plaintiff as asserting a claim for
Monell liability based on Defendants’ alleged failure to
accommodate Plaintiff. (See Pl. Opp. at 16 (arguing “Defendants’
failure to accommodate Plaintiff was the product of an established
policy or custom”).)9 But “[t]o the extent that [Plaintiff] also
asserts claims under § 1983 to vindicate h[er] ADA rights, those

8 Moreover, summary judgment on Plaintiff’s aiding and abetting
claim under the NYSHRL is appropriate, because the predicate to
imposing individual aider and abettor liability is impermissible
discrimination. Boonmalert v. City of New York, 721 F. App’x 29,
34 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (“Since there is no underlying
NYSHRL . . . violation, there was no aiding or abetting of acts
forbidden by the NYSHRL.”).

9 While Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is asserted against all
Defendants, in her opposition, Plaintiff confines her arguments to
the County, and therefore a Monell theory of liability. As a
result, Plaintiff has waived the argument that Carroll or Heilig
are liable under Section 1983 for failing to accommodate Plaintiff.
See Stryker Sheet Metal II Corp. v. Harleysville Ins. Co., No. 16-
CV-05916, 2018 WL 654445, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2018).
claims should be dismissed as [s]he has not shown an underlying
violation of the ADA.” Wiltz v. New York Univ., No. 18-CV-0123,
2019 WL 721658, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2019), report and

recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 720700 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2019);
see also E.H. v. Bd. of Educ., No. 05-CV-0972, 2008 WL 3930028, at
*14 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2008) (dismissing Section 1983 claim
premised on ADA violations where the plaintiff failed to state ADA
claim).
Even if the Court were to conclude that Plaintiff’s
reasonable accommodation claim under the ADA survived summary
judgment, it would still grant summary judgment as to her Monell
claim. It is well established that a municipality such as the
County cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978); Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d

Cir. 2008). Rather, “[w]hen a defendant sued for discrimination
under §§ 1981 or 1983 is a municipality, ‘the plaintiff is required
to show that the challenged acts were performed pursuant to a
municipal policy or custom.’” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795
F.3d 297, 314 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Patterson v. County of
Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 229 (2d Cir. 2004)). The plaintiff can
satisfy the municipal policy requirement by alleging:
(1) a formal policy officially endorsed by the
municipality; (2) actions or decisions made by
municipal officials with decision-making
authority; (3) a practice so persistent and
widespread that it constitutes a custom
through which constructive notice is imposed
upon policymakers; or (4) a failure by
policymakers to properly train or supervise
their subordinates, such that the policymakers
exercised ‘deliberate indifference’ to the
rights of the plaintiff.

Ying Li v. City of New York, 246 F. Supp. 3d 578, 636 (E.D.N.Y.
2017) (citing Second Circuit decisions).
Plaintiff attempts to satisfy the municipal policy
requirement by showing a formal policy officially endorsed by the
County or a widespread practice or custom. (See Pl. Opp. at 16.)
“To demonstrate a de facto policy or custom through a widespread
practice, a plaintiff must ‘show that the policymaker was aware of
a subordinate’s unconstitutional actions, and consciously chose to
ignore them, effectively ratifying the actions.’” Buari v. City
of New York, No. 18-CV-12299, 2021 WL 1198371, at *22 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 30, 2021) (quoting Amnesty America v. Town of West Hartford,
361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004)). To do so, the plaintiff can
“cit[e] to complaints in other cases that contain similar
allegations,” provided those complaints “involve factually similar
misconduct, [are] contemporaneous to the misconduct at issue in
the plaintiff’s case, and result in an adjudication of liability.”
Jackson v. Nassau County, No. 18-CV-3007, 2021 WL 3207168, at *17
(E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2021) (quoting Buari, 2021 WL 1198371, at *22).
Here, Plaintiff has not adduced evidence developed through
discovery of similar lawsuits, grievances, or complaints against
the County for failing to accommodate individuals with
disabilities. Without such information, the Court is unable to

conclude that failing to accommodate disabled individuals, as
required under the ADA, is a practice “so widespread as to have
the force of law.” Board of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 404 (1997); see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485
U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (“[T]he Court has long recognized that a
plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of a widespread
practice that, although not authorized by written law or express
municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and well settled as to
constitute a “custom or usage” with the force of law.’”) (quoting
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167–168 (1970)).
“Although Plaintiff alleges that policymakers ‘tolerated’ a policy
or custom of [ADA] violations, [s]he provides no examples beyond

what occurred in h[er] own case, which is insufficient.” Paulin
v. City of Beacon, No. 17-CV-5105, 2019 WL 4274211, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 10, 2019). Thus, Plaintiff’s widespread practice or custom
theory fails.
Nor can Plaintiff’s Monell claim proceed under a formal
policy theory. In support of this theory, Plaintiff relies on
Defendants’ statements that the County does not offer light duty,
including in the final paragraph of the Heilig Memo. (See Defs.
56.1 Resp. (arguing final paragraph “represented there was a
systematic, custom, policy and/or practice, that routinely denied
Defendant County’s disabled employees of rights afforded to them
under the federal law”).) However, the Court disagrees that this

paragraph demonstrates a formal policy of discrimination under the
ADA, because the policy was not “officially endorsed” by the
County. To the contrary, Plaintiff concedes that this was not
County policy, as the County Director of Labor Relations testified.
(Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 95.)
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as
to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claim is DISMISSED.
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to mark
this case CLOSED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT_________
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: August 19 , 2021
Central Islip, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306747. Public record. Not legal advice.