# Nixon v. Inquisitr, LTD.

> District Court, E.D. New York · August 17, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306652

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** August 17, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------X
JUSTIN NIXON,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff, 20-CV-1819(JS)(SIL)
-against-

INQUISITR LTD.,

Defendant.
------------------------------------X

APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff: Richard Liebowitz, Esq.
Liebowitz Law Firm, PLLC
11 Sunrise Plaza, Suite 305
Valley Stream, New York 11580

James H. Freeman, Esq.
Liebowitz Law Firm, PLLC
1333A North Avenue, Suite 762
New Rochelle, New York 10804

For Defendant: Nolan Keith Klein, Esq.
Law Offices of Nolan Klein, P.A.
5550 Glades Road, Suite 500
Boca Raton, Florida 33431
SEYBERT, District Judge:
Plaintiff Justin Nixon (“Plaintiff”) commenced this
action against defendant Inquisitr Ltd. (“Defendant” or
“Inquisitr”) asserting a claim for copyright infringement under
the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101. Pending before the Court is
Defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).
(Mot., ECF No. 19.) Plaintiff opposes the motion and requests the
opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. (Pl. Opp., ECF
No. 20.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s request for
limited discovery is denied and Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND1
I. Factual History

Plaintiff is a professional photographer with a usual
place of business located at 806 Fig Tree Lane, Brandon, Florida
33511. (Am. Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff took a photograph
of the rapper Lil Wayne (the “Photograph”) and registered it with
the United States Copyright Office. (Id. ¶¶ 15-17.) The
Photograph’s Copyright Registration Number is VA 2-180-735, and
Plaintiff is the sole owner of the Photograph. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17.)
Defendant owns and operates the website
www.inquisitr.com (the “Website”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 8.) On December
19, 2017, Defendant published an article (the “Article”) on its
Website entitled Rick Ross Questions Birdman’s Net Worth After
Cash Money Boss Defaults On $12 Million Loan. (Id. ¶ 18.) Embedded

in the Article was an Instagram link that displayed the Photograph.
(Ex. C, ECF No. 13-3, attached to Am. Compl.) The Article featured
the Photograph, though Defendant did not license or obtain
permission from Plaintiff to publish the Photograph on the Website.
(Id. ¶ 19.)

1 The following facts are drawn from the Amended Complaint and
the parties’ submissions.
Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that
this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant “because
Defendant resides and/or transacts business in New York.” (Am.

Compl. ¶ 3.) He makes the following allegations regarding
jurisdiction:
•
The Website uses the English language and a
“.com” domain name “(which is based in the
United States)” (Am. Compl. ¶ 10);
•
Defendant “publishes news content that is
directed to audiences within this State and
Judicial District” on such topics as
“Jennifer Lopez, Rush Limbaugh, Hailey
Baldwin, the NBA, and WWE -– all of which are
United States-based celebrities and
organizations,” (id. ¶ 11); and
•
Defendant “has previously been sued within
this Judicial District and has resolved such
disputes” (id. ¶ 14).
The Amended Complaint further contains allegations, all made upon
information and belief, that:
•
Defendant maintains its principal place of
business in Brooklyn, New York. (Am. Compl.
¶ 6.) In support of this allegation,
Plaintiff attaches a screenshot from the
website glassdoor.com indicating that
Inquisitr’s Headquarters is in Brooklyn, New
York. (Id., Ex. A.)
•
Defendant’s Chief Executive Officer, Dominick
Miserandino (“Miserandino”), resides in
Oceanside, New York. (Id. ¶ 7.)
•
Defendant “employed and/or contracted with
individuals who reside within this Judicial
District for the purpose of operating,
managing, and supervising the photographic
content uploaded to the Website, including the
infringing content at issue in this case.”
(Id. ¶ 9.);
•
Defendant “received a financial benefit
attributable to the infringing activity
described herein as a result of transacting
business in this State and within this
Judicial District.” (Id. ¶ 12.) and
•
Defendant’s primary server is located in New
York. (Id. ¶ 13.)
II. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action on April 15, 2020,
stating a single claim of copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106 and 501. After being served with a motion to dismiss by
Defendant, on June 16, 2020 (see ECF No. 9), Plaintiff filed the
Amended Complaint, which added the jurisdictional allegations set
forth above.2 Currently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to
dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack
of personal jurisdiction.

2 By Order dated June 26, 2020, a court in the Southern District
of New York, in another copyright infringement case, imposed
sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel Richard Liebowitz and also
ordered him to file a copy of that Order in all currently pending
cases. See Usherson v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt., No. 19-CV-6368,
2020 WL 3483661, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2020), aff’d sub nom.
Liebowitz v. Bandshell Artist Mgmt., No. 20-2304-CV, 2021 WL
3118938, at *1 (2d Cir. July 23, 2021). Mr. Liebowitz has complied
with that directive in this case. (See ECF No. 16.)
In support of its motion, Defendant has provided an
affidavit from Daniel Treisman, the “Director and owner” of
Inquisitr, by which Defendant contends that it is an Israeli

limited company, incorporated in Israel without any real estate,
offices, mailing addresses, telephone numbers or bank accounts in
the State of New York. (Treisman Aff., ECF No. 19-3.) In response,
Plaintiff argues that jurisdictional discovery is warranted to
show whether Defendant has substantial ties with employees and/or
third-party contractors in New York.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Rule 12(b)(2)

To survive a motion to dismiss at the pleading stage
“for lack of personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff must make a prima
facie showing that jurisdiction exists.” Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law
Offices, 799 F.3d 161, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted);
see also Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha (“Penguin I”), 609
F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating personal jurisdiction over a person or entity
against whom it seeks to bring suit.” (citation omitted)). “A
prima facie showing of jurisdiction does not mean that plaintiff
must show only some evidence that defendant is subject to
jurisdiction; it means that plaintiff must plead facts which, if
true, are sufficient in themselves to establish jurisdiction.”
Tamam v. Fransabank Sal, 677 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As a result, “a
complaint will survive a motion to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction so long as its allegations, taken as true, are

‘legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction.’” Troma Ent.,
Inc. v. Centennial Pictures Inc., 729 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Penguin I, 609 F.3d at 35).
“In evaluating whether the requisite showing has been
made, the Court must construe the pleadings and any supporting
materials in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Hillel
v. Obvio Health USA, Inc., No. 20-CV-4647, 2021 WL 229967, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). “The Court will not, however, ‘draw argumentative
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor’ or ‘accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Id. (quoting In re
Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir.

2013); see also Bracken v. MH Pillars Inc., No. 15-CV-7302, 2016
WL 7496735, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2016)(“conclusory non-fact-
specific jurisdictional allegations or a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation will not establish a prima facie showing
of jurisdiction” (citation omitted)).
Under the plausibility standard in civil cases,3 a
plaintiff is not prevented from pleading facts upon information

3 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
and belief “where the facts are peculiarly within the possession
and control of the defendant,” or “where the belief is based on
factual information that makes the inference of culpability

plausible.” Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d
Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “However, even in those
circumstances, the plaintiff still bears the burden of alleging
the facts upon which her or his belief is founded.” Minnie Rose
LLC v. Yu, 169 F. Supp. 3d 504, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal
quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted); see also Guo
Jin v. EBI, Inc., No. 05-CV-4201, 2008 WL 896192, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2008) (“Conclusory allegations showing the presence of
jurisdiction, particularly those stated only upon ‘information and
belief,’ are insufficient to establish that the court has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).

A determination that a court has personal jurisdiction
over a defendant requires two findings. First, the court must
determine whether the laws of New York provide for jurisdiction.
If they do, then the court must determine whether the exercise of
jurisdiction comports with the federal requirements of due
process. See Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d
158, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2010).
When addressing the question of jurisdiction, the Court
may consider matters beyond the face of the complaint. See Lugones
v. Pete & Gerry’s Organic, LLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 226, 234 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (“Where a court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
jurisdictional question, it may, nevertheless, consider matters

outside the pleadings.” (citation omitted)). In this context, the
court “has considerable procedural leeway. It may determine the
motion on the basis of affidavits alone; or it may permit discovery
in aid of the motion; or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing on
the merits of the motion.” Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco
BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
II. Personal Jurisdiction in New York
Plaintiff suggests that Defendant is amenable to
jurisdiction under sections 301 and 302 (a)(1) of New York’s Civil
Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”). Under section 301, “a court in
New York may exercise general jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant if the defendant ‘engaged in continuous, permanent, and

substantial activity in New York.’” George Moundreas & Co SA v.
Jinhai Intelligent Mfg. Co., No. 20-CV-2626, 2021 WL 168930, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2021) (quoting Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000)). “The paradigmatic forums
where a corporate defendant is essentially at home are ‘where it
is incorporated’ and where it ‘has its principal place of
business.’” Kerman v. InterContinental Hotels Grp. Res. LLC, No.
20-CV-1085, 2021 WL 930253, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2021) (quoting
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014)). “[G]eneral
jurisdiction extends beyond an entity’s state of incorporation and
principal place of business only in the exceptional case where its
contacts with another forum are so substantial as to render it ‘at

home’ in that state.” Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding
A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 223 (2d Cir. 2014).
New York’s long arm statute allows a New York court to
exercise specific personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary
who, inter alia, “transacts any business within the state or
contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state. . . .”
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1).4 “To determine the existence of
jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1), a court must decide
(1) whether the defendant ‘transacts any business’ in New York
and, if so, (2) whether this cause of action ‘aris[es] from’ such
a business transaction.” Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d
239, 246 (2d Cir. 2007). A party’s “[p]urposeful availment is the

overriding criterion necessary to establish personal jurisdiction
pursuant to § 302(a)(1), and requires more than random, fortuitous,
or attenuated contacts.” Philpot v. Kos Media LLC, No. 16-CV-
1523, 2017 WL 2270248, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2017) (internal

4 Plaintiff does not invoke section 302(a)(3), which, in copyright
infringement cases, would allow a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary defendant only where the
copyright holder is located in New York. See Penguin Grp. (USA)
Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 16 N.Y.3d 295, 302, 946 N.E.2d 159, 921
N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. 2011).
quotation marks and citation omitted), report and recommendation
adopted, 2017 WL 2269531 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017).
DISCUSSION

I. General Jurisdiction under New York law
In asserting general jurisdiction over Defendant under
section 301, Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that
Defendant’s principal place of business is in Brooklyn, New York,
an allegation that relies upon a webpage from the website
glassdoor.com indicating that Inquisitr’s “Headquarters” is in
Brooklyn, New York. (Ex. A, ECF No. 13-1. attached to Am. Compl.)
Defendant has submitted Treisman’s sworn affidavit stating that
Inquisitr is an Israeli limited company incorporated in Israel,
and that he does not operate an office, maintain a mailing address
or phone number, or have any bank accounts in the United States,
including in New York. (Treisman Aff. ¶ 3.)

The Glassdoor website submitted by Plaintiff constitutes
hearsay and is not admissible as support for his claim. See, e.g.,
Miami Prods. & Chem. Co. v. Olin Corp., 449 F. Supp. 3d 136, 179
(W.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[D]ocuments from the third-party website
submitted by Plaintiffs are inadmissible hearsay, and [the Court]
does not consider them for purposes of the personal jurisdiction
analysis.”); DeLorenzo v. Ricketts & Assocs., Ltd., No. 15-CV-
2506, 2017 WL 4277177, at *7 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2017)
(“Plaintiff may not rely on a LinkedIn profile to establish
jurisdiction, as such an online profile is hearsay and does not
qualify as admissible evidence.”), aff’d sub nom. DeLorenzo v.
Viceroy Hotel Grp., LLC, 757 F. App’x 6 (2d Cir. 2018). Plaintiff

has alleged no facts to support a plausible inference that
Defendant is “at home” in New York, nor has he provided any
admissible evidence to rebut Treisman’s affidavit. Thus,
Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant’s principal place of business
is in Brooklyn, New York is a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation and does not make a prima facie showing that general
jurisdiction exists.
II. Specific Jurisdiction under New York law
Plaintiff also contends that this Court has specific
jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to section 302(a)(1).
The first prong of that statute requires that the out-of-state
defendant either transact business within New York or contract to

supply goods or services in the state.
Where a non-domiciliary is sued in New York based on its
operation of a website, specific inquiries are warranted. “Because
websites are generally speaking, equally accessible everywhere,
the mere availability of the site to users in New York, standing
alone, does not amount to transacting business in the state for
purposes of section 302(a).” Royalty Network Inc. v. Dishant.com,
LLC, 638 F Supp. 2d 410, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “When analyzing whether a defendant’s
internet activity rises to the level of purposeful activity
sufficient to satisfy Section 302(a)(1), courts apply a ‘sliding
scale’ test based on the level of a website’s interactivity.”

Audiovox Corp. v. S. China Enter., Inc., No. 11-CV-5142, 2012 WL
3061518, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2012). Accordingly, the issue
is where a particular website lies on the “spectrum of
interactivity,” Royalty Network, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 418, ranging
from passive websites “which merely make information available to
viewers,” Philpot, 2017 WL 2270248, at *10, to fully interactive
websites, “which are used to purposefully sell goods or services
in New York, or charge membership fees to registered users in New
York.” Id.
The Amended Complaint is devoid of any plausible
allegation that moves Inquisitr’s website anywhere beyond
“passive” on the spectrum. Plaintiff alleges that the Website

provides news content to its viewers, including those in New York.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 11.). Such passive websites have “been analogized
to an advertisement in a nationally-available magazine or
newspaper, and [do] not without more justify the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant.” Citigroup Inc. v. City Holding
Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 549, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Beyond the conclusory and unsupported allegation that,
upon information and belief, Defendant “received a financial
benefit attributable to the infringing activity” (Am. Comp. ¶ 12),
there is no suggestion of any commercial activity conducted through
the Website. Plaintiff does not allege that Inquisitr’s viewers
are required to pay to access the content or that they can purchase

goods or services via the Website. A website that merely provides
information does not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of
conducting business activities in the state. See, e.g., ISI
Brands, Inc. v. KCC Int’l, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 2d 81, 86 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (“Internet websites that are not of a commercial nature and
do not permit the purchase of products on-line are not sufficient
to confer personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 302(a)(1).”);
Aqua Prods., Inc. v. Smartpool, Inc., No. 04–CV–5492, 2005 WL
1994013, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2005) (“Passive websites which
primarily make information available to viewers, but do not permit
an exchange of information, fail to justify the exercise specific
jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary.”). Even a broad reading of

the allegation construing “financial benefit” to mean “commercial”
activity is unavailing in light of the complete lack of any factual
support rendering the allegation plausible. See Savage Universal
Corp. v. Grazier Constr., Inc., No. 04-CV-1089, 2004 WL 1824102,
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2004) (“It stretches the meaning of
‘transacting business’ to subject defendants to personal
jurisdiction in any state merely for operating a website, however
commercial in nature, that is capable of reaching customers in
that state, without some evidence or allegation that commercial
activity in that state actually occurred.”).
Plaintiff points to other allegations that he claims

support a prima facie showing that Defendant transacted business
in New York. He clearly relies upon Defendant’s relationship with
Miserandino, a New York resident, to suggest that Defendant
transacts business in the state, but his allegation and arguments
are inadequate to the task. The allegation in the Amended
Complaint, made upon information and belief, simply identifies
Miserandino as Inquisitr’s Chief Executive Officer without any
factual basis for that belief. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff
in his opposition papers again fails to articulate any basis for
this allegation; to the contrary, those papers walk back the
allegation in the Amended Complaint, describing Miserandino only
as a “senior-level executive.” (Pl. Opp. at 7.)

Defendant states that Miserandino is not an employee or
owner of Inquisitr, but rather works for Dysleximedia, LLC
(“Dysleximedia”), a third-party contractor of Inquisitr’s.
(Treisman Aff. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff has seized upon Treisman’s
statement that Inquisitr contracted with Dysleximedia “to provide
a number of services including operational and executive support
service” (id.) and jumps to the conclusion that the contract was
“to upload photographic content to the Website within this Judicial
District.” (Pl. Opp. at 13.) Plaintiff presents no basis for
this inference, and “[t]he mere fact that a defendant purchases
goods or services from New York does not mean that it is doing
business here.” Arbitron Co. v. E.W. Scripps, Inc., 559 F. Supp.

400, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int’l,
Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 227 N.E.2d 533 (1967)
(jurisdiction may be established through an agent if the agent
“does all the business which [Defendant] could do were it here by
its own officials.")).
Even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff had successfully
alleged that Inquisitr transacted business in New York, either
through the allegations regarding Defendant’s financial gain or by
Dysleximedia’s performance of services for Defendant in New York,
the Amended Complaint fails to satisfy the second prong for
specific jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1) -- that the specific
cause of action asserted arose out of the party’s transaction of

business in New York. In other words, Plaintiff must plausibly
allege that the infringing publication of the Photograph took place
in New York, involved Defendant’s personnel in New York, or
“otherwise arose out of any of its activities in New York.”
Philpot, 2017 WL 2270248, at *9. He has failed to meet that
burden.
Plaintiff alleges two facts regarding Defendant’s
alleged infringement: (1) that Defendant ran an article on its
Website that featured the Photograph (Am. Compl. ¶ 18) and (2) that
Defendant did not license the Photograph from Plaintiff, nor did
it have his permission or consent to publish it (id. ¶ 19). He
does not plausibly claim that the infringing conduct occurred in

New York, but rather makes the conclusory allegation that “the
operative facts which form the basis of Plaintiffs claim from [sic]
copyright infringement occurred in the State of New York.” (Id.
¶ 20.) Plaintiff again fails to provide any hint whatsoever
regarding the source of his “information and belief” offered in
support of this allegation.
In opposition to the motion, Plaintiff argues that
Defendant “employed and/or contracted” with unspecified
individuals in this District “for the purpose of operating,
managing, and supervising the photographic content uploaded to the
Website, including the infringing content at issue in this case.”
(Pl. Opp. at 7-8 (citing Am. Compl. ¶ 9.)) Again, he gives no

factual support or context for this statement. Absent factual
information that makes the inference of culpability plausible, his
suggestion that the Photograph was uploaded from New York is
insufficient to satisfy Plaintiff’s burden.
Moreover, even assuming that one of Dysleximedia’s
“operational” services was the uploading of material to the
Website, that company’s relationship with Inquisitr did not begin
until March 2018, a few months after the publication of the
Photograph that forms the basis of Plaintiff’s claim. (See
Treisman Aff. ¶ 4.) Thus, Dysleximedia employees could not have
been involved with the particular transaction at issue here and
the second prong of section 302(a)(1) is not satisfied.

After construing the record in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, the Court finds that he has not made the requisite
prima facie showing of either general or specific personal
jurisdiction over Defendant.5
III. Plaintiff’s Request for Jurisdictional Discovery
In this Circuit, it is well settled that “even where
plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction, a court may still order discovery, in its discretion,
when it concludes that the plaintiff may be able to establish
jurisdiction if given the opportunity to develop a full factual
record.” Leon v. Shmukler, 992 F. Supp. 2d 179, 194 (E.D.N.Y.
2014) (citations omitted). Jurisdictional discovery is warranted

only “where the plaintiff has made a threshold showing that there
is some basis for the assertion of jurisdiction[,] facts that would
support a colorable claim of jurisdiction.” Id. at 195 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original); see

5 As the Court finds that there is no specific jurisdiction under
New York law on the facts alleged, it need not address whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant would satisfy the
constitutional requirements of due process. See generally Penguin
I, 609 F.3d at 35 (“[A]nalysis under Due Process principles is not
necessary unless there is long-arm jurisdiction under the
applicable state statute.”).
also Molchatsky v. United States, 778 F Supp. 2d 421, 438 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (“A party seeking jurisdictional discovery, like a party
seeking other kinds of discovery, bears the burden of showing

necessity.”), aff’d 713 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff requests the opportunity to conduct discovery
“to meaningfully examine the contractual relationship between
Defendant and residents of the forum state as it relates to the
infringement in question.” (Pl. Opp. at 15.) While Plaintiff may
not be in full possession of the facts relating to the relationship
between Inquisitr and Dysleximedia or Miserandino, Plaintiff has
utterly failed to provide any factual basis to support the
allegations he has made. A plaintiff cannot open the doors to
discovery simply by filing a complaint replete with broad,
conclusory, allegations about what might be, without providing any
factual basis for those allegations or articulating how he came to

formulate them. To permit discovery in that situation turns the
process on its head and would merely encourage the filing of
complaints filled with “guesses” disguised as allegations.
In addition, as to Dysleximedia, further discovery is
unnecessary. Jurisdictional discovery is not warranted where
defendant “submits an affidavit that provides all the necessary
facts and answers all the questions regarding jurisdiction.”
A.W.L.I. Grp., Inc. v. Amber Freight Shipping Lines, 828 F. Supp.
2d 557, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Defendant has, through Treisman’s
sworn affidavit, established that any relationship with
Dysleximedia commenced after publication of the Photograph. As
discussed supra, the conduct forming the basis of Plaintiff’s

copyright infringement claim predates Defendant’s relationship
with Dysleximedia and thus the publication at issue did not arise
from any acts by the third-party contractor. Accordingly,
discovery into the nature of the relationship between the entities
would not assist Plaintiff in establishing jurisdiction.
In an exercise of its discretion, the Court declines to
grant Plaintiff’s request for jurisdictional discovery.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion (Mot., ECF
No. 19) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close
the case.
SO ORDERED.

/s/_JOANNA SEYBERT __
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.
Dated: August 17 , 2021
Central Islip, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306652. Public record. Not legal advice.