# Atkinson v. In the matter of the State of New York

> District Court, E.D. New York · April 19, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306088

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** April 19, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306088

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding a plaintiff must show “a tangible connection between the acts of a defendant and the injuries suffered” to prevail on a Section 1983 cause of action against an individual
- holding that a plaintiff proceeding under Section 1983 must allege facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation
- noting that under sections 1915 and 1915A, sua sponte dismissals of frivolous prisoner complaints are not only permitted but mandatory
- holding that government attorneys such as assistant attorneys general are immune from suit

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------X
ANTHONY ATKINSON,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against- 20-CV-4497(JS)(ST)

GRACE OKOCHA; MICHAEL CONNOLLY;
CHRISTOPHER LALINE; C.O. LAROCK;
JASON D. EFFMAN; BRIAN BELFI, PH.D.;
DONNA HALL; JIMMIE C. MCCURDY; JOHN A.
THOMASSEN, PH.D.; TESLA CARRASQUILLO
ESQ.; ANN MARIE T. SULLIVAN; DEBBIE
WANCE; ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI; ANNE MARIE
MCGRATH; JONATHAN MILJUS, PH.D.;

Defendants.
------------------------------------X
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff: Anthony Atkinson, pro se
96-A-4870
Central New York Psychiatric Center
Building 41, Unit 218
C# 63231
9005 Old River Road
Marcy, New York 13403-0300

For Defendants: No appearances.

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Before the Court is the Second Amended Complaint
timely filed by pro se plaintiff Anthony Atkinson (“Plaintiff”)
pursuant to the Court’s January 5, 2021 Memorandum and Order.
(See Jan. 5, 2021 Order, ECF No. 24; Second Amended Complaint
(“SAC”), ECF No. 25.) For the reasons that follow, the Second
Amended Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).
BACKGROUND1
I. Procedural History
Plaintiff is no stranger to this Court.2 The Court

assumes familiarity with the facts and procedural history and only
addresses those facts relevant to the Court’s screening of the
Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A.
By way of brief background, Plaintiff was convicted of first-
degree rape on June 21, 1996 in the New York State Supreme Court,
Suffolk County, and was sentenced to twenty-three years in prison
with a maximum release date of September 28, 2018. (See Jan. 5,
2021 Order at 2.) Prior to his release date, the state moved to
further detain Plaintiff under Article 10 of the Mental Hygiene
Law, also known as the Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act
(“SOMTA”). (Id. at 5-6.) On September 14, 2018, the state court
judge ordered that Plaintiff be detained past his maximum release

date pending a probable cause hearing under Article 10. (Id. at

1 All material allegations in the Second Amended Complaint are
presumed to be true for the purpose of this Order. Rogers v. City
of Troy, 148 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1998).

2 See Atkinson v. Broesler, No. 93-CV-1346, ECF No. 14 (E.D.N.Y.)
(voluntarily dismissing complaint with prejudice); Atkinson v.
Geraci, No. 98-CV-1609, ECF No. 82 (E.D.N.Y.) (granting summary
judgment to defendants and dismissing Section 1983 complaint);
Atkinson v. Portuondo, 269 F. Supp. 2d 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying
habeas corpus petition on the merits), reconsideration denied, No.
00-CV-3573, 2009 WL 2983006, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009)
(detailing Plaintiff’s efforts to reopen the habeas corpus
proceedings and entering a litigation injunction).
6.) On January 4, 2019, Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice
Richard Ambro ordered Plaintiff’s civil confinement and Plaintiff
was transferred to the Manhattan Psychiatric Center on January 31,

2019. (Id.) Following a bench commitment trial on October 10,
2019, Justice Ambro found in favor of the state psychiatrists and
held that Plaintiff has a mental abnormality as defined by New
York Mental Hygiene Law section 10.03(e). (Id.) On or about
March 8, 2020, Justice Ambro held a hearing, during which Plaintiff
was represented by appointed counsel. (Id.) Justice Ambro
considered Plaintiff’s eligibility for Strict and Intensive
Supervision and Treatment (“SIST”) and again ordered Plaintiff’s
civil confinement. (Id.)
Plaintiff initially brought claims seeking his release
from custody and challenging the conditions of confinement and
deprivation of property. (See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 9.)

On August 14, 2020, this Court dismissed these claims for failure
to state a claim without leave to amend. (Order to Show Cause,
ECF No. 10, at 6, 11-12.) Thus, the only remaining claims were
those arising out of the alleged failure to provide Plaintiff with
a timely probable cause hearing under Article 10. (Id.)
However, as discussed in this Court’s January 5, 2021
Order, Plaintiff failed to properly allege claims based on the
alleged failure to timely provide a probable cause hearing.
Specifically, the Amended Complaint failed to allege “facts
showing how any defendant personally caused the delay in the
probable cause hearing.” (Jan. 5, 2021 Order at 10.) The
undersigned apprised Plaintiff that his “failure to allege any

Defendants’ personal involvement [in the alleged delay of the
probable cause hearing] is fatal to [his] claims,” and that
Plaintiff’s description of “the general roles the Defendants
played in the civil commitment process” will not suffice. (Id.)
Further, the Court explained that “Plaintiff cannot establish
liability solely based on the supervisory positions these
Defendants hold,” noting that “many of the named Defendants are
either immune from suit or are otherwise not proper Defendants
under § 1983.” (Id. at 11.) Finally, the Court observed that
“although Plaintiff seeks a fifteen million dollars in damages
award from each Defendant, Plaintiff has not alleged how the brief
delay in holding the probable cause hearing harmed Plaintiff,

particularly given the fact that his continued detention was
ordered.” (Id. at 11-12.) The Court continued, “Wholly absent
from the Amended Complaint are any allegations concerning how
Plaintiff’s continued civil commitment as ordered on January 4,
2019 -- rather than within seventy-two hours from his maximum
release date of September 28, 2018 -- harmed Plaintiff.” (Id. at
12.)
Nevertheless, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file
a Second Amended Complaint limited only to curing the defects in
such claims. (See id. at 12-13.) The Court directed Plaintiff
to “include facts concerning each named Defendant and shall allege
how each Defendant violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”

(Id. at 13.)
II. The Second Amended Complaint
Although the Second Amended Complaint is twenty-one
pages exclusive of exhibits, only the first three pages are new.
(Compare SAC, with Am. Compl.) Plaintiff has appended the Amended
Complaint he had filed on June 15, 2020 to his Second Amended
Complaint with minor annotations. (SAC at 4-21.) Like his
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff broadly alleges that his ongoing
civil confinement is unconstitutional, that he is being denied
adequate mental health treatment, and that his personal property
has been lost. 3 (See generally SAC.) However, because

3 Although the Second Amended Complaint does not identify the
Defendants in the caption, it appears from the substance that
Plaintiff continues to hold the following individuals liable:
Grace Okocha, Acting Treatment Team Leader at Manhattan
Psychiatric Center (“MPC”); Michael Connolly, Civil Commitment
Bureau Chief of the Office of the Attorney General; Christopher
Laline, Assistant Attorney General; Corrections Officer LaRock,
Draft Officer at Gouverneur Correctional Facility; Brian Belfi,
Ph.D., Executive Director of MPC at Wards’ Island Complex; Donna
Hall, Associate Commissioner, Forensic Services at the Office of
Mental Health; Jimmie C. McCurdy, Assistant Attorney General; John
A. Thomassen, Ph.D., psychologist; Tesla Carrasquillo, attorney at
Creedmoor Psychiatric Center; Ann Marie T. Sullivan, Office of
Mental Health Commissioner; Debbie Wance, Supervisor, MPC; Anthony
J. Annucci, Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”); DOCCS Associate
Commissioners Jason D. Effman and Anne Marie McGrath; and Jonathan
Miljus, Ph.D., Psychiatric Examiner at the Office of Mental Health,
Plaintiff’s claims seeking his release from custody and his
conditions of confinement and deprivation of property claims were
previously dismissed for failure to state a claim and without leave

to amend (see Order to Show Cause), the only remaining claims are
those arising out of the alleged failure to provide Plaintiff with
a timely probable cause hearing under Article 10.4
The allegations Plaintiff added in his Second Amended
Complaint provide few new facts and are largely comprised of
conclusory allegations. For example, the Second Amended Complaint
begins: “State of New York Attorney General and O.M.H. Commissioner
Ann Marie T. Sullivan kn[e]w or should have known the legal
procedures of M.H.L 10.06(h), and (g)-(k).” (SAC ¶ 2.) Further,
“State of New York Attorney General and O.M.H. along with DOCCS
Commissioner Anthony Annucci, and DOCCS Associate Commissioner
Anne Marie McGrath, acted . . . with deliberate indifference and

callous disregard for Plaintiff’s Constitutional Right of his
liberty protected by the Due Process clause who has a liberty
interest in being released on his Maximum Expiration date of
September 28, 2018.” (Id. ¶ 4.) The Second Amended Complaint
continues: “The State of New York Attorney Generals neglect to

Division of Forensic Services.

4 Moreover, insofar as Plaintiff challenges the conditions of his
confinement at the Manhattan Psychiatric Center and/or the Central
New York Psychiatric Center, this Court is not the proper venue.
hold a timely probable cause hearing pursuant to M.H.L.
10.06(h),(g)-(k) resulted in false arrest and imprisonment, and
abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress,

where the statute defines or creates a duty, which was breached by
the official. Where, officials know or should know the rules of
law.” (Id. ¶ 15.)
Plaintiff’s only alleged injury is “extreme emotional
distress.” (Id. ¶ 8.) As a result of the foregoing, Plaintiff
seeks to recover, inter alia, a damages award against each
Defendant in the sum of fifteen million dollars. (Id. ¶ 87.)
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
Courts are obliged to liberally construe the pleadings
of a pro se plaintiff. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant,
537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d

197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004). However, a complaint must plead
sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
The plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678; accord Wilson
v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 671 F.3d 120, 128 (2d Cir. 2011). While
“detailed factual allegations” are not required, “[a] pleading
that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court must dismiss
an in forma pauperis action that is frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), 1915A(b); Liner v. Goord,
196 F.3d 132, 134 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that under sections
1915 and 1915A, sua sponte dismissals of frivolous prisoner
complaints are not only permitted but mandatory).
II. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim
Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint seeks damages arising out of an alleged denial of due
process due to a delay in the probable cause hearing mandated by
New York Mental Hygiene Law section 10.06(h). As a preliminary
matter, any claims for money damages against the Defendants, who
are largely state employees, in their official capacities are
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Abernathy v. Comm’r
of Corr., No. 20-CV-00628, 2021 WL 1240018, at *3 (D. Conn. Apr.
2, 2021) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985));
Roache v. Attorney General’s Office, No. 12-CV-1304, 2013 WL
5503151, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (holding that government
attorneys such as assistant attorneys general are immune from
suit).

As the Court recognized in its January 5, 2021 Order,
“[c]ivil commitment for any purpose requires due process
protection.” (See Jan. 5, 2021 Order at 8-9 (quoting Best v.
Schneider, No. 12-CV-6142, 2015 WL 5567062, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
21, 2015) (further citations omitted)).) Indeed, “[i]ndividuals
who have been civilly committed retain substantive due process
rights.” Aiello v. Lamitie, No. 16-CV-0053, 2020 WL 918989, at
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2020) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, 315-16 (1982)). “In deciding a due process claim under §
1983, however, federal courts must independently assess whether
the state’s application of these procedures to the plaintiff’s
case violated a constitutional right.” Id. (citing Charles W. v.

Maul, 214 F.3d 350, 357 (2d Cir. 2000)).
The Second Amended Complaint adds no new facts in support
of Plaintiff’s due process claims. (See generally SAC.)
Plaintiff conflates the requirements of state law with the
requirements of the due process clause. Article 10 of the Mental
Hygiene Law (“MHL”) creates a statutory scheme prescribing the
procedures to be followed with respect to convicted sex offenders
who the state seeks to commit or supervise following completion of
their prison terms. See Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Spitzer,
No. 07-CV-2935, 2007 WL 4115936, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2007),
aff’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Paterson, No. 07-
CV-5548, 2009 WL 579445 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2009). Pursuant to the

MHL, a detained individual is entitled to a probable cause hearing
“no later than seventy-two hours from the date of [his] anticipated
release date.” See NY MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(h); Roache, 2013 WL
5503151, at *5 (detailing statutory scheme for protecting due
process rights of civil detainees, including right to timely
probable cause hearing). “Though the probable cause hearing is
initially scheduled to be held within 72 hours of the filing of a
securing petition, the probable cause hearing may be delayed due
to (i) delay caused or consented to by the individual, or (ii) a
showing by the Attorney General, to the satisfaction of the court,
of ‘good cause why the hearing could not . . . commence.’”
Spitzer, 2007 WL 4115936, at *8 (quoting NY MENTAL HYG. LAW §

10.06(h)). Further, MHL provides that in the event of the filing
of a securing petition, “there shall be no probable cause hearing
until such time as the case review team may find that the
respondent is a sex offender requiring civil management.” NY
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(f). Thus, although Article 10 mandates that
a probable cause hearing be held within seventy-two hours, the
fact that Plaintiff’s probable cause hearing under Article 10 was
held on January 4, 2019, i.e., more than seventy-two hours after
the September 14, 2018 order of detention, does not necessarily
implicate the due process clause.
To begin a due process analysis, on the other hand, the
Court first determines whether Plaintiff had a protected liberty

interest in remaining free from the confinement that he challenges,
and then determines whether the Defendants deprived plaintiff of
that liberty interest without due process. Giano v. Selsky, 238
F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2001). Undoubtedly, Plaintiff has a liberty
interest in remaining free from involuntary commitment to a mental
hospital. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980). The
issue here is whether Plaintiff was afforded the appropriate
procedural safeguards in connection with his civil commitment
given the approximate three-month delay in his probable cause
hearing.
The Court finds it unnecessary to reach this issue,
however, because Plaintiff has not alleged the personal

involvement of any Defendant. The Court made clear that a Section
1983 claim against an individual defendant must allege the personal
involvement of the defendant in the alleged constitutional
deprivation.5 (See Jan. 5, 2021 Order at 9 (citing Farid v. Elle,

5 A plaintiff properly asserts personal involvement by alleging:
“(1) actual direct participation in the constitutional violation,
(2) failure to remedy a wrong after being informed through a report
or appeal, (3) creation of a policy or custom that sanctioned
conduct amounting to a constitutional violation, or allowing such
policy or custom to continue, (4) grossly negligent supervision of
subordinates who committed a violation, or (5) failure to act on
information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.”
593 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010)). “It is well settled that, in
order to establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit
brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the

defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional
deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d
Cir. 2013). Thus, “a Section 1983 plaintiff must ‘allege a
tangible connection between the acts of the defendant and the
injuries suffered.’” Austin v. Pappas, No. 04-CV-7263, 2008 WL
857528, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (quoting Bass v. Jackson, 790
F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986)).
Moreover, as the Second Circuit recently made clear,
“there is no special rule for supervisory liability” and, in order
“[t]o hold a state official liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must
plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional
violation directly against the official without relying on a

special test for supervisory liability.” Tangreti v. Bachmann,
983 F.3d 609, 619-20 (2d Cir. 2020). Where a Section 1983 claim
fails to allege the personal involvement of the defendant, it fails
as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Barney, 360 F. App’x 199, 201
(2d Cir. 2010).
Here, as is readily apparent, Plaintiff has not alleged
any facts regarding conduct or inaction by any of the Defendants

Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2003), cited in
Jan. 5, 2021 Order at 9, n.6.
with regard to the civil commitment process and specifically the
scheduling and/or delay of the probable cause hearing. Rather,
Plaintiff includes wholly conclusory and speculative allegations

against several of the Defendants. (See generally SAC.) For
example, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Sullivan “kn[e]w or
should have known the legal procedures” and that several of the
Defendants “acted with deliberate indifference and callous
disregard for Plaintiff’s Constitutional Right of his liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause. . . .” (SAC ¶¶ 2, 4.) The
failure to allege any facts demonstrating any Defendants’ personal
involvement is fatal to Plaintiff’s claims. See Spavone v. N.Y.
State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013)
(holding that a plaintiff proceeding under Section 1983 must allege
facts showing the defendants’ direct and personal involvement in
the alleged constitutional deprivation); see also Roache, 2015 WL

1442963, at *10 (dismissing MHL Article 10 claim for failure to
name personally involved defendants who were not immune from suit);
Roache, No. 12-CV-1034, Adoption Order, ECF No. 63 (adopting Report
and Recommendation recommending dismissal of due process claim
arising from a delayed probable cause hearing under the MHL because
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that each defendant knew or
should have known that he was being improperly held in violation
of MHL Article 10 were insufficient). On this basis, the Second
Amended Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).
Finally, although Plaintiff seeks a fifteen million
dollars in damages award from each Defendant, Plaintiff has not

alleged how the brief delay in holding the probable cause hearing
harmed Plaintiff, particularly given the fact that his continued
detention was ordered. Bass, 790 F.2d at 263 (holding a plaintiff
must show “a tangible connection between the acts of a defendant
and the injuries suffered” to prevail on a Section 1983 cause of
action against an individual). Like the Amended Complaint, the
Second Amended Complaint omits any factual allegations concerning
how Plaintiff’s continued civil commitment as ordered on January
4, 2019 -- rather than within seventy-two hours from his maximum
release date of September 28, 2018 -- harmed Plaintiff given that
his continued detention was ultimately ordered.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege a plausible claim

for relief and the SAC is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b).
III. Leave to Amend
The Court should ordinarily grant a pro se plaintiff the
opportunity “to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the
complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.”
Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “an
opportunity to amend is not required where the plaintiff has
already been afforded the opportunity to amend.” Roache, 2019 WL
6827296, at *5 (citing Shuler v. Brown, No. 07-CV-0937, 2009 WL
790973, at *5 & n.25 (N.D.N.Y. March 23, 2009) (“Of course, an

opportunity to amend is not required where the plaintiff has
already amended his complaint.”)); see also Yang v. N.Y.C. Trans.
Auth., No. 01-CV-3933, 2002 WL 31399119, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24,
2002) (denying leave to amend where plaintiff had already amended
complaint once); Advanced Marine Tech. v. Burnham Sec., Inc., 16
F. Supp.2d 375, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (same).
Here, Plaintiff was afforded that opportunity and the
Court clearly set forth, at a minimum, what is required to
plausibly allege his due process claims against the Defendants.
Rather than attempt to cure his allegations, Plaintiff simply
appended his deficient Amended Complaint to his Second Amended
Complaint and resubmitted it. Accordingly, it appears that leave

to further amend would be futile.
Moreover, given that Plaintiff has not suffered any
physical injuries as a result of the alleged delay in his probable
cause hearing, leave to amend this claim would be futile. See 28
U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a
prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury. . . .); see Oneil v.
Rodriguez, No. 18-CV-3287, 2020 WL 5820548, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2020) (dismissing Section 1983 claim where allegations were
insufficient to meet the “physical injury” requirement of Section
1997e(e)); Dash v. Doe, No. 19-CV-0414, 2020 WL 3057133, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2020) (“[I]n the absence of a showing of physical
injury, a prisoner cannot recover compensatory damages for mental
or emotional injury.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)). Accordingly, LEAVE TO FURTHER AMEND THE COMPLAINT IS
DENIED.
[REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK]
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). The Clerk of the Court shall ENTER
JUDGMENT and mark this case CLOSED.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is DENIED for the purpose
of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-
45 (1962).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of
this Order to the pro se Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT______
Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: April _19_, 2021
Central Islip, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306088. Public record. Not legal advice.