# Green v. Saul

> District Court, E.D. New York · April 8, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306041

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** April 8, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306041

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding the standardized form only “marginally useful” for assessing the record

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
IVORY GREEN,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
19-cv-4704 (KAM)
v.

ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER OF
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.
----------------------------------X
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g), Ivory Green
(“Plaintiff”) appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security (“Defendant”), which found that Plaintiff was
not eligible for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under
Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”) on the basis
that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.
Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled under the Act and is thus
entitled to receive the aforementioned benefits. (ECF No. 1,
Complaint.) Plaintiff is alleging disability for the period
from August 1, 2014 through August 1, 2016. (Id.; ECF No. 15,
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Pl. Mem.”) at 1.)
Presently before the court is Plaintiff’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings, (ECF No. 14, Notice of Motion; ECF
No. 15, Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion (“Pl.
Mem.”)), Defendant’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings,
(ECF No. 16, Cross-Motion; ECF No. 17 Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendant’s Cross-Motion (“Def. Mem.”)), and
Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 18, Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum of

Law (“Pl. Reply”).) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s
motion is GRANTED, Defendant’s motion is DENIED, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Memorandum
and Order.
BACKGROUND
The parties have submitted a joint stipulation of
facts detailing Plaintiff’s medical history and the
administrative hearing testimony, which the court incorporates
by reference. (See generally ECF No. 18-1, Joint Stipulation of
Facts (“Stip.”).) On December 21, 2015, the Plaintiff filed an
application for DIB Benefits. (Pl. Mem. at 1.) On July 21,
2014, Plaintiff inhaled dye from an explosion during an at-work

accident. (Stip. at ¶ 2.) Shortly thereafter, plaintiff sought
respiratory treatment, and was diagnosed with asthma, allergic
rhinitis, obesity, and a hernia. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 23 60.)
On April 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a written request
for a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Pl.
Mem. at 1.) On February 9, 2018, the ALJ, Paul Greenberg,
presided over Plaintiff’s video conference. (ECF No. 19,
Transcript (“Tr.) at 30.) A vocational expert (“VE”), Susanna
Roche, testified at the hearing. (Id. at 56-60.) At the
hearing, the ALJ presented Ms. Roche with numerous hypothetical
questions. (Id.) The ALJ posed hypothetical questions to Ms.
Roche as to whether Plaintiff could perform light exertional
work. (Id.) Ms. Roche provided that there were significant

limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to work, as well as
testifying to the limited types of jobs given plaintiff’s
limitations. (Id.) When the ALJ asked Ms. Roche whether those
limited jobs were available, Ms. Roche answered that no jobs
were available. (Id.) The ALJ also asked whether there were
jobs where an individual would be off task for one hour per day,
to which Ms. Roche responded in the negative. (Id.) Lastly,
the ALJ inquired whether there were jobs where an individual
would be absent from work two days per month and Ms. Roche
answered in the negative. (Id.)
In a decision dated August 29, 2018, the ALJ found
Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 14.) On October 12, 2018,
Plaintiff requested a review of the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at

144-145.) On June 14, 2019, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review and adopted the ALJ’s decision as
the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security.
(Id. at 1-5)
On August 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant action
in federal court. (See generally ECF No. 1, Complaint
(“Compl.”).) On November 20, 2019, this court issued a
scheduling order. (ECF No. 9, Scheduling Order.) On May 5,
2020, Plaintiff filed her notice of motion and memorandum of law
in support of Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

(ECF Nos. 14 and 15.) On that same day, Defendant filed his
cross-motion and memorandum of law in support of Defendant’s
cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings and in opposition of
Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. (ECF Nos. 16
and 17.) Later that same day, Plaintiff filed her reply
memorandum of law. (ECF No. 18.)
LEGAL STANDARD

Unsuccessful claimants for disability benefits under
the Act may bring an action in federal district court seeking
judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of their benefits
“within sixty days after the mailing . . . of notice of such
decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of
Social Security may allow.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). A
district court, reviewing the final determination of the
Commissioner, must determine whether the correct legal standards
were applied and whether substantial evidence supports the
decision. See Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 504 (2d Cir.
1998).
A district court may set aside the Commissioner’s
decision only if the factual findings are not supported by
substantial evidence or if the decision is based on legal error.
Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008).
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla,” and must
be relevant evidence that a “reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362
F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 420

U.S. 389, 401 (1971)) (internal quotation marks omitted). If
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
Commissioner’s factual findings, those findings must be upheld.
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Inquiry into legal error “requires the
court to ask whether ‘the claimant has had a full hearing under
the [Commissioner’s] regulations and in accordance with the
beneficent purposes of the [Social Security] Act.’” Moran v.
Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009). The reviewing court
does not have the authority to conduct a de novo review, and may
not substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ, even when
it might have justifiably reached a different result. Cage v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 692 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012).

To receive disability benefits, claimants must be
“disabled” within the meaning of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§
423(a), (d). A claimant is disabled under the Act when she is
unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment
which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d
126, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2000). The impairment must be of “such
severity” that the claimant is unable to do his previous work or

engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work. 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(A). “The Commissioner must consider the following
in determining a claimant’s entitlement to benefits: ‘(1) the
objective medical facts [and clinical findings]; (2) diagnoses
or medical opinions based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence
of pain or disability . . . ; and (4) the claimant’s educational
background, age, and work experience.’” Balodis v. Leavitt, 704
F. Supp. 2d 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Brown v. Apfel,
174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the
Commissioner, a five-step sequential evaluation process is used
to determine whether the claimant’s condition meets the Act’s
definition of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. This

process is essentially as follows:
[I]f the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant
is not working, (2) that he has a ‘severe impairment,’
(3) that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix
1 of the regulations] that conclusively requires a
determination of disability, and (4) that the claimant
is not capable of continuing in his prior type of work,
the Commissioner must find him disabled if (5) there is
not another type of work the claimant can do.
Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.152(a)(4).
During this five-step process, the Commissioner must
consider whether “the combined effect of any such impairment . .
. would be of sufficient severity to establish eligibility for

Social Security benefits.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. Further, if
the Commissioner does find a combination of impairments, the
combined impact of the impairments, including those that are not
severe (as defined by the regulations), will be considered in
the determination process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(2). At steps
one through four of the sequential five-step framework, the
claimant bears the “general burden of proving . . . disability.”
Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128. At step five, the burden shifts from
the claimant to the Commissioner, requiring that the
Commissioner show that, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age,
education, and work experience, the claimant is “able to engage
in gainful employment within the national economy.” Sobolewski
v. Apfel, 985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).

Lastly, federal regulations explicitly authorize a
court, when reviewing decisions of the SSA, to order further
proceedings when appropriate. “The court shall have power to
enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is
warranted where “there are gaps in the administrative record or
the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard.” Rosa v.
Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts v.
Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Remand is particularly appropriate where further
findings or explanation will clarify the rationale for the ALJ’s
decision. Pratts, 94 F.3d at 39. However, if the record before
the court provides “persuasive proof of disability and a remand
for further evidentiary proceedings would serve no purpose,” the
court may reverse and remand solely for the calculation and
payment of benefits. See, e.g., Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225,
235 (2d Cir. 1980); Kane v. Astrue, 942 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314
(E.D.N.Y. 2013).
DISCUSSION
I. The ALJ’s Disability Determination
Using the five-step sequential process to determine

whether a claimant is disabled as mandated by 20 C.F.R. §
416.971, at step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity from August 1, 2014 to
August 1, 2016. (Tr. at 19; Def. Mem. at 5.) At step two, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s vision disturbance, joint pains,
and gastrointestinal complications were not sufficiently severe
impairments. (Tr. at 19–20.) The Plaintiff asserts that the
ALJ found that the impairments “were not severe,” the Defendant
asserts that the ALJ found that the impairments “were severe,”
but in the end the ALJ found that the impairments “were not
expected to last at a ‘severe’ level for a continuous period,”
to warrant benefits. (Pl. Mem. at 10; Def. Mem. at 5; Tr. at

21.) At step three, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff’s
impairments did not meet the requirements of any listed
impairment to warrant a determination of disability. (Tr. at
21.) At step four, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff’s residual
function capacity (“RFC”) and found that Plaintiff retained RFC
to perform light work. (Id.) At step five, the ALJ determined
that Plaintiff retained the ability to continue her prior work.
(Id. at 21-23.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
could work as a cashier supervisor, bank teller, and operations
supervisor. (Id. at 22–25.) As a result, the ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff was not disabled, from August 1, 2014 to August
1, 2016, within the meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
II. Treating Physician Rule

Under the treating physician rule1, a “treating
source’s opinion on the issue of the nature and severity of a
[claimant’s] impairment(s) will be given ‘controlling weight’ if
the opinion is ‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical

1 Because plaintiff’s application for disability and disability insurance
benefits was filed before March 27, 2017, the recent changes reflected in
C.F.R. § 404.1520c do not apply, and under C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2)(c), the
treating source’s opinion is generally assigned added or possibly controlling
weight.
and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent
with the other substantial evidence in the case record.’”
Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008)); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(c)(2). See Molina v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-4701, 2014 WL

3925303, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2014) (finding the opinion of a
treating physician “need not be given controlling weight where
[it is] contradicted by other substantial evidence in the
record.”).
An ALJ who does not accord controlling weight to the
treating physician’s medical opinion must consider various
factors to determine how much weight to give to the opinion,
including: “(i) the frequency of examination and the length,
nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (ii) the amount
of medical evidence in support of the treating physician's

opinion; (iii) the consistency of the opinion with the record as
a whole; and (iv) whether the opinion is from a specialist.”
Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d. Cir. 2019)
(quoting Burgess, 537 F.3d at 128); see 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2); see also Adukpo v. Berryhill, 19-cv-2709 (BMC)
2020 WL 3410333, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 22, 2020).
“The ALJ must then ‘comprehensively set forth his
reasons for the weight assigned to a treating physician’s
opinion.’” Cichocki v. Astrue, 534 F. Appx. 71, 74 (2d Cir.
2013) (quoting Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129). The regulations also
require that the ALJ set forth “good reasons” for not crediting
the opinion of the treating provider. Cervini v. Saul, 17-CV-
2128 (JMA) 2020 WL 2615929 at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2020) (citing
Schaal, 134 F.3d 496, 503 (2d Cir. 1998)). Good reasons

“reflect in substance the factors as set forth in [Section]
404.1527(d)(2), even though the ALJ declines to examine the
factors with explicit reference to the regulation.” Abate v.
Comm’r, 18-CV-2040 (JS), 2020 WL 2113322, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 4,
2020); Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App'x 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“We require no such slavish recitation of each and every factor
where the ALJ's reasoning and adherence to the regulation are
clear.”). Further, “[t]he failure to provide ‘good reasons for
not crediting the opinion of a claimant's treating physician is
a ground for remand.’” Greek, 802 F.3d 802 F.3d at 375
(quoting Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129-30).

Here, the ALJ gave only “little weight to the opinion”
of treating physician, pulmonologist, Dr. Wilfredo Talavera.
(Tr. at 24.). The ALJ reasoned that Dr. Talavera’s opinion
required only little weight because it was provided in a
“checklist-type form” and failed to provide a narrative. (Id.)
For this reason, the ALJ deemed the assessments of the other
physicians “more persuasive.” (Id.) It is true that a
checklist-type form does not provide a great deal of medical
evidence and may warrant giving the opinion less weight. See
Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 n. 2 (2d Cir.
2004)(finding the standardized form only “marginally useful” for

assessing the record). However, along with the standardized
form, Dr. Talavera also included some handwritten notes. (Tr.
at 344-347.) The ALJ did not comment on the inclusion of these
handwritten notes. (Id. 24.)
The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Talavera has “expertise
in the relevant medical specialty.” (Id.) Plaintiff had been
treated by Dr Talavera multiple times in the past and Dr.
Talavera was familiar with plaintiff’s ailments. (Id. at 23.)
Despite plaintiff’s long-standing relationship with Dr. Talavera
as a treating physician, the ALJ provided “great weight” to the
opinions of other physicians who had evaluated the Plaintiff
less frequently and were significantly less familiar with her
ailments. (Id.)
The ALJ failed to consider the Burgess factors, such as

the length, frequency, nature or extent of Dr. Talavera’s
relationship with the plaintiff, or provide a persuasive
rationale supporting the weight given. See Burgess v. Astrue,
537 F.3d 117, 128 (2d Cir. 2008); Greek v. Colvin, 802 F.3d 370,
375 (2d Cir. 2015); Balodis v. Leavitt, 704 F. Supp. 2d 255, 268
(E.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Risitano v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 06–
CV–2206(FB), 2007 WL 2319793, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007)
(remanding the case and directing the ALJ to “identify the
evidence [the ALJ] did decide to rely on and thoroughly explain
... the reasons for his decision” if the ALJ did not intend to

rely on the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians);
Torregrosa v. Barnhart, No. CV–03–5275(FB), 2004 WL 1905371, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2004) (remanding because “(1) there is a
reasonable basis to doubt whether the ALJ applied the correct
legal standard in weighing the opinions of [the treating
physicians], and (2) the ALJ failed to give good reasons for the
weight, or lack thereof, given to those opinions”).)
Accordingly, remand is warranted because the ALJ did
not any provide “good reasons” for giving the treating
physician’s opinions less weight. Instead, the ALJ solely
relied on the format in which the treating physician’s opinion
was rendered. At the very least, ALJ should provide reasons why

Dr. Talavera’s opinion, in whichever format, should not be given
controlling weight. On remand, Plaintiff is entitled to express
consideration of Dr. Talavera's opinions on the form and in his
notes and other records, a statement of the weight given to
those opinions, and good reasons for the ALJ's decision.
III. Credibility Determinations
A claimant’s statements of pain or other subjective
symptoms cannot alone serve as conclusive evidence of
disability. Felix v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-3697, 2012 WL 3043203,
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2012) (citing Genier v. Astrue, 606
F.3d 46, 49 (2d. Cir. 2010) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 1529(a)); see
Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 179, 183 (2d Cir. 2010). If the

plaintiff offers statements about pain or other symptoms not
substantiated by the objective medical evidence, the ALJ is
required to engage in a credibility inquiry. Felix, 2012 WL
3043203, at *8 (citing Meadors v. Astue, 370 F. App’x 179, 183
(2d Cir. 2010) (summary order)).
The Commissioner has established a two-step process
that an ALJ must follow in evaluating a claimant’s credibility
with regard to her assertions about pain and other symptoms and
their impact on claimant’s ability to work. Felix, 2012 WL
3043203, at *8 (citing Genier, 606 F.3d at 49); Cabassa, 2012 WL
2202951, at *13; Williams, 2010 WL 5126208, at *13 (internal
citation omitted). First, the ALJ must determine if the

plaintiff has a medical impairment that could reasonably be
expected to produce the alleged symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(b); Felix, 2012 WL 3043203, at *8 (internal citations
omitted); Williams, 2010 WL 5126208 at *13 (citing Genier, 606
F.3d at 49 (2d Cir. 2010)). Second, if the claimant does suffer
from an impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce
the pain and symptoms alleged, the ALJ “must then evaluate the
intensity and persistence of [the claimant’s] symptoms so that
[the ALJ] can determine if [the claimant’s] symptoms limit [her]
capacity for work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(1), 416.929(c)(1);
see Cabassa, 2012 WL 2202951, at *13; William, 2010 WL 5126208,
at *13 (internal citation omitted). If the claimant’s

statements are not substantiated by the objective medical
evidence, the ALJ must engage in a credibility inquiry.
Meadors, 370 F. App’x at 183 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
Plaintiff’s credibility will be given considerable
weight if her statement about pain is consistent with objective
clinical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4); Kane v.
Astrue, 942 F. Supp. 2d 301, 313 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). When the
plaintiff’s symptoms are at a greater severity than indicated by
the objective medicine alone, the ALJ should consider the
following factors: (1) plaintiff’s daily activities; (2)
location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the symptoms;
(3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) type, dosage,

effectiveness, and side effects of any medication taken; (5)
other treatments; (6) other measures taken to relieve symptoms;
and (7) any other factors concerning the plaintiff’s functional
limitations due to pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vii); see Kane, 942 F. Supp. 2d at 314;
Williams, 2010 WL 5126208 at *14 (internal citation omitted).
The ALJ, however, is not required to discuss all seven
factors as long as the decision “includes precise reasoning, is
supported by evidence in the case record, and clearly indicates
the weight the ALJ gave to the claimant’s statements and the
reasons for that weight.” Felix, 2012 WL 3043203 at *8 (citing
Snyder v. Barnhart, 323 F. Supp. 2d at 546-47 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y.

2004)). The ALJ’s rationale must be sufficiently specific for a
reviewing court to determine that the ALJ’s decision was based
on substantial evidence. Cabassa, 2012 WL 2202951, at *13
(citing Morrison v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-2048, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 115190, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)); Williams, 2010 WL
5126208, at *20 (citing Alcantara, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 278);
Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 260-61 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
Here, the ALJ found that “the claimant’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical
evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons

explained in this decision.” (Tr. at 22.) Plaintiff’s
statements included her inability to work because of respiratory
issues, her inability to sleep because of the burning in her
chest and throat, and details about her consistent
breathlessness. (Id.) The ALJ’s decision, however, does not
assess, directly or indirectly, the medical evidence and the
symptoms and complaints by applying any of the factors described
above. Consequently, the decision does not properly assess
plaintiff’s symptoms and complaints. Specifically, the ALJ
failed to state which of plaintiff’s symptoms and complaints, if
any, she found to be credible, in light of the medical evidence,
the weight given to plaintiff’s statements, and the reasons for
affording such weight. Villani v. Barnhart, No. 05-CV-5503

(DRH), 2008 WL 2001879, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 8, 2008)(remanding
for determination of plaintiff’s credibility, which must contain
specific findings based upon substantial evidence in a manner
that enables effective review). The ALJ’s abbreviated
credibility analysis did not clearly evaluate the Plaintiff’s
credibility according to the factors, nor did it set forth the
ALJ's findings with sufficient specificity under Williams ex re.
Williams. See Williams ex. rel Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255,
261 (2d Cir. 1988). On remand, the ALJ must thoroughly evaluate
Plaintiff's credibility, and specifically apply the seven
factors.

CONCLUSION
Federal regulations explicitly authorize a court, when
reviewing decisions of the SSA, to order further proceedings
when appropriate. “The court shall have power to enter, upon
the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment
affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Remand is
warranted where “there are gaps in the administrative record or
the ALJ has applied an improper legal standard.” Rosa v.
Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82–83 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Pratts, 94
F.3d 34, 39) (internal quotation marks omitted). Remand is

particularly appropriate where further findings or explanation
will clarify the rationale for the ALJ’s decision. Pratts, 94
F.3d at 39. However, if the record before the court provides
“persuasive proof of disability and a remand for further
evidentiary proceedings would serve no purpose,” the court may
reverse and remand solely for the calculation and payment of
benefits. See, e.g., Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 235 (2d
Cir. 1980); Kane v. Astrue, 942 F. Supp. 2d 301, 314 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
For the reasons previously set forth, the court grants
Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; denies
Defendant’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings; and

remands this case for further proceedings consistent with this
Memorandum and Order. The Clerk of Court is respectfully
directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and close this
case.
SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 8, 2021
Brooklyn, New York
________//s//________________
HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10306041. Public record. Not legal advice.