# State Of New York v. Donald Trump

> District Court, E.D. New York · November 14, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10305647

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** November 14, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MARTIN JONATHAN BATALLA VIDAL, et al.,
Plaintiffs, MEMORANDUM & ORDER
against: 16-CV-4756 (NGG) (VMS)
CHAD WOLF, et al.,
Defendants.
STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Plaintiffs, 17-CV-5228 (NGG) (RER)
-against-
DONALD TRUMP, et al.,
Defendants.

NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS, United States District Judge.
This is the most recent proceeding in the ongoing dispute over
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program
and the Trump Administration’s efforts to end it. On July 28,
2020, Defendant Chad F. Wolf issued a memorandum that effec-
tively suspended DACA pending the Department of Homeland
Security’s (“DHS”) review of the program, following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Regents of the
Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). Plaintiffs in two re-
lated cases, Batalla Vidal v. Wolf, 16-cv-4756, and State of New
York v. Trump, 17-cv-5228,' moved for leave to challenge the
memorandum on the grounds (1) that Mr. Wolf was not lawfully
serving as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security and therefore
did not have authority to issue the memorandum; and (2) that
the memorandum was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The court directed the
| Plaintiffs in the Batalla Vidal case are individual DACA recipients. Plain-
tiffs in the New York case are 16 states and the District of Columbia.

parties to first brief their cross-motions for partial summary judg-
ment on the first question, (see Scheduling Order (Dkt. 307)),?
and those motions are now before the court. (See Batalla Vidal
Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pls.’ Mem.”) (Dkt.
311); States’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (“States’
Mem.”) (States Dkt. 275); Govt Mem. in Opp. and in Supp. of
Cross Mot. for Summ. J. (“Gov't Opp.”) (Dkt. 323); Batalla Vidal
Pls.’ Reply and Mem. in Opp. to Cross Mot. (“Pls.’ Reply’) (Dkt.
330); States’ Reply and Mem. in Opp. to Cross Mot. (“States’ Re-
ply”) (Dkt. 291); Gov't Reply “Gov't Reply’) (Dkt. 335).) Also
before the court is the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs’ motion to certify a
class. (See Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Certify Class (“Class
Cert. Mem.”) (Dkt. 309); Govt Mem.in Opp. to Mot. to Certify
Class (“Class Cert. Opp.”) (Dkt. 326); Pls.’ Reply (“Class Cert. Re-
ply”) (Dkt. 331).)
For the following reasons, the court holds that Mr. Wolf was not
lawfully serving as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security under
the Homeland Security Act (“HSA”) when he issued the July 28,
2020 memorandum. Plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment
are therefore GRANTED as to their claims under the HSA, and
Defendant’s cross-motions are DENIED. As to Plaintiffs’ claims
under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (“FVRA”), to the extent
they are not mooted by an appropriate remedy for the HSA vio-
lations, the court finds that the FVRA does not apply. Finally,
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is GRANTED.
The parties are DIRECTED to contact the court’s Deputy by No-
vember 15, 2020 to schedule a conference to advise the court of
any forthcoming motions for a preliminary injunction or sum-
mary judgment, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(C), in light of the

2 For the sake of convenience, references to the docket (“Dkt.”) cite to the
docket in the Batalla Vidal matter. References to the docket in the New
York matter are labelled as “States Dkt.”.

court’s decision with regard to the HSA. (See States’ Mem. at 15,
n. 9.)
I. BACKGROUND
The court assumes familiarity with the DACA program, the re-
scission of which it enjoined, on APA grounds, in an earlier phase
of this litigation in February 2018. See 291 F. Supp. 3d 260
(E.D.N.Y. 2018). The Supreme Court reviewed that order and af-
firmed its reasoning under the APA, along with similar decisions
of other district courts, in Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Regents of
the Univ. of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). In the wake of the
Regents decision, Mr. Wolf suspended portions of the DACA pro-
gram and made certain other amendments to the program via a
memorandum (the “Wolf Memorandum”) issued in July 2020.
(See Wolf Memorandum (“Wolf Mem.”) (Dkt. 297-1) at 1-2.)
Specifically, Mr. Wolf instructed DHS personnel to (1) reject all
pending and future initial requests for DACA; (2) reject all pend-
ing and future applications for advance parole—necessary for
DACA recipients to leave and re-enter the United States—absent
exceptional circumstances; and (3) require DACA recipients to
renew their status under the program annually rather than every
two years. (See Wolf Mem. at 1-2, 5.)
The question before the court is whether Mr. Wolf was lawfully
serving as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security when he issued
the Wolf Memorandum, or if any subsequent action taken cured
its alleged deficiencies. There are five agency actions primarily
relevant to the court’s analysis and discussed below. The first
three are amendments to DHS’s order of succession made (or at-
tempted) in February, April, and November of 2019. The fourth
is the issuance of the Wolf Memorandum in July 2020. The fifth

is DHS’s effort following the Wolf Memorandum to cure the de-
ficiencies alleged in this case and in others like it currently
pending in courts around the country.*
A. “February Delegation” of February 15, 2019
According to the HSA and FVRA, when the office of Secretary of
Homeland Security is vacant, an Acting Secretary is designated
via an order of succession that begins with the Deputy Secretary
of Homeland Security, followed by the Under Secretary for Man-
agement. See 6 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1)(A), (F); 5 U.S.C. §
3345(a)(1). Beyond that and “[n]otwithstanding [the FVRA],
the Secretary may designate such other officers of the Depart-
ment in further order of succession to serve as Acting Secretary.”
6 U.S.C. § 113(g)(2).
In December 2016, former Secretary Jeh Johnson issued Revi-
sion 8 to DHS Delegation No. 00106, titled “DHS Orders of
Succession and Delegations of Authorities for Named Positions.”
(DHS Delegation No. 00106, Revision 8 of Dec. 15, 2016 (“John-
son Delegation”) (Dkt. 324-1) at ECF pp. 21.) On February 15,
2019, Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen issued Revision 08.4 (the “Feb-
ruary Delegation”) amending the Johnson Delegation. (See Gov't
Resp. to Pls.’ Rule 56.1 Statement (“56.1 Resp.”) { 13.) The Feb-
ruary Delegation, consistent with the Johnson Delegation, set

3 See, e.g. of Casa de Maryland, Inc. v. Wolf, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 20-cv-2119,
2020 WL 5500165 (D. Md. Sept. 11, 2020) (challenging DHS rules that
overhaul the criteria for work authorizations for asylum applications); Im-
migrant Legal Res. Ctr. v. Wolf, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 2020 WL 5798269 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 29, 2020) (challenging DHS rule that substantially raised fees
for various immigration status and benefit applications); Nw. Immigrant
Rights Project v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs., No. 19-cv-
3283, 2020 WL 5995206, at *18 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2020) (challenging the
same as Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr.); see also New York v. Wolf, 20-cv-1127,
2020 WL 6047817 at *1, n. 1 (S.D.NLY. Oct. 13, 2020) (“there is some
doubt whether Wolf was then (and is now) lawfully exercising the author-
ity of Acting Secretary of Homeland Security”).

two separate tracks for delegating authority to an Acting Secre-
tary in the event that the office of the Secretary became vacant,
depending on the circumstances that led to the vacancy. The first
track was for vacancies caused by the Secretary’s death, resigna-
tion, or inability to perform the functions of the office. In that
case, succession was set by Executive Order 13753 (“E.O.
13753”) as follows: (1) the Deputy Secretary; (2) the Under Sec-
retary for Management; (3) the Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”); and (4) the Director
of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(“CISA”).* id. 14-15.) The second track applied when the Sec-
retary was unavailable to act during a disaster or catastrophic
emergency. (Id.) In that case, succession was governed by “An-
nex A” to the February Delegation. ([d.) At the time of the
February Delegation, Annex A provided an identical order of suc-
cession as E.O. 13753, meaning that for succession purposes
there was no practical difference, as of February 2019, how a
vacancy occurred. (Id.)
B. Secretary Nielsen’s Resignation and “April
Delegation” of April 10, 2019
Secretary Nielsen resigned her position, effective April 7, 2019,
in a letter to President Trump. (See Nielsen Resignation (Dkt.
310-3) at ECF p. 181.) At the time, the office of Deputy Secretary
was vacant. (56.1 Resp. { 20.) Claire Grady was serving as the
Under Secretary for Management and would have been next in
the line of succession. However, on April 7 at 6:02 pm, President
Trump announced via a tweet that Kevin McAleenan, who was
serving as the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol
(“CBP”), would become Acting Secretary. (Id. { 18.) At 10:36

4 The text of E.O. 13753 refers to the “Under Secretary for National Pro-
tection and Programs,” which is the predecessor office to the Director of
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (“CISA”). (See 56.1 Resp. 4
16.)

pm, Secretary Nielsen tweeted that she would remain as Secre-
tary until April 10, 2019.
On April 9, Secretary Nielsen signed a Memorandum from John
Mitnick, DHS’s General Counsel, titled “Designation of an Order
of Succession to the Secretary,” explicitly approving the docu-
ment attached (the “April Delegation”). (See Memorandum of
John Mitnick (“Mitnick Memorandum”) (Dkt. 324-1) at ECF p.
2.) The April Delegation amended Annex A, such that the order
of succession under it was, as relevant: (1) the Deputy Secretary;
(2) the Under Secretary for Management; (3) CBP Commis-
sioner; (4) FEMA Administrator; and (5) Director of the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”). (Id.
at ECF p. 3.) Immediately thereafter, Ms. Grady announced that
she would resign as Under Secretary. (56.1 Resp. § 21.) Thus,
under the modified Annex A, Commissioner McAleenan would
have been the lawful Acting Secretary, in line with the President’s
announcement, because both the Deputy Secretary and Under
Secretary positions were vacant. However, the April Delegation
did not change when Annex A, rather than E.O. 13753, gov-
erned. Annex A was, at that point, still only applicable in the
event of the Secretary’s unavailability during a disaster or cata-
strophic emergency.° Under E.O. 13753, Christopher Krebs,
Director of CISA, would have been the Acting Secretary because
the office of the FEMA Administrator was also vacant. (Id. {4 28-
30.) On April 10, Secretary Nielsen and Under Secretary Grady
officially resigned, and Mr. McAleenan began to perform the du-
ties of Acting Secretary. (Id. {4 20-22.)

° The Government maintains that the April Delegation changed the order
of succession in all cases. The court disagrees, for reasons discussed below.

C. “November Delegation” of November 8, 2019 and
Mr. McAleenan’s Resignation
On November 8, 2019, 212 days after he took the reins as Acting
Secretary, Mr. McAleenan again changed DHS’s order of succes-
sion (the “November Delegation”). (See McAleenan Mem. of
Nov. 8, 2019 (“November Delegation”) (Dkt. 324-1) at ECF p.
16.) Under the November Delegation, Annex A replaced E.O.
13753 as the operative document when the Secretary died, re-
signed, or became unable to perform the functions of the office,
in addition to its application when the Secretary was temporarily
unavailable in an emergency. (See November Delegation at ECF
p. 16.) Further, the November Delegation changed Annex A’s or-
der of succession to be: (1) the Deputy Secretary; (2) the Under
Secretary for Management; (3) the CBP Commissioner; and (4)
the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans. (Id.) In effect,
the Undersecretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans—who had
been 11" in the line of succession in the previous version of An-
nex A—now leapfrogged the FEMA Administrator, the CISA
Director, and five others, in the order of succession. Five days
later, on November 13, 2019, Mr. McAleenan resigned. (56.1
Resp. { 33.) Mr. Wolf, then Undersecretary for Strategy, Policy,
and Plans, assumed the role of Acting Secretary because the of-
fices of the Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary for
Management, and the CBP Commissioner were vacant. (56.1
Resp. {| 34-35.)
D. Wolf Memorandum of July 28, 2020
On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held in Regents that DHS’s
rescission of the DACA program via a September 2017 memoran-
dum issued by then-Acting Secretary Elaine Duke (the “Duke
Memorandum”) was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the
APA, for two reasons. First, the Court held that DHS failed to
consider whether forbearance from removal proceedings for
DACA recipients—one of the program’s two key pillars—could

survive even if DACA’s second pillar, eligibility for federal bene-
fits, violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, as the Fifth
Circuit held in Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 181-182 (5th
Cir. 2015). Second, the Court held that the Duke Memorandum
failed to consider the reliance interests that the DACA program
engendered in the five years it was operable, prior to the Trump
Administration’s attempt to rescind it. See Regents, 140 S. Ct. at
1915.
With the rescission vacated, Plaintiffs argued that DHS was obli-
gated to fully reinstate the DACA program, without delay. (See
Pls.’ Letter of July 21, 2020 (Dkt. 295).) Instead, Mr. Wolf, pur-
portedly in his capacity as Acting Secretary, issued a new
memorandum on July 28, 2020 (the “Wolf Memorandum”). (See
Mem. of Chad Wolf (“Wolf Mem.”) (Dkt. 297-1).) The Wolf
Memorandum directed DHS to “reject all pending and future in-
itial requests for DACA, to reject all pending and future
applications for advance parole absent ‘exceptional circum-
stances,’ and to shorten DACA renewals” from two years to one
year, pending DHS’s “thorough consideration of how to address
DACA in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.” (Wolf Mem. at
1-2.) Soon after, Plaintiffs informed the court of their intention
to move for summary judgment on the theory that the Wolf
Memorandum was void ab initio because Mr. Wolf was not law-
fully serving as Acting Secretary and that it violated the APA
because it was arbitrary and capricious. (See Pls.’ Letter of Aug.
6, 2020 (Dkt. 302).) The court directed the parties to begin by
briefing their cross motions for partial summary judgment on
whether Mr. Wolf had lawful authority to issue the Wolf Memo-
randum. (See Scheduling Order.) Meanwhile, the Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) reported to Congress on August
14, 2020 that Mr. Wolf was named to his position “by reference
to an invalid order of succession” and referred to the Inspector
General of DHS the question of who should be serving as Acting
Secretary and what the fate should be of actions taken by Mr.

Wolf while he was serving unlawfully. (See 56.1 Resp. 47-49;
GAO Decision B-331650 of Aug. 14, 2020 (“GAO Decision”)
(Dkt. 310-3) at ECF p. 165.)
E. Gaynor Order and Wolf Ratification of September
2020
On September 10, 2020, FEMA Administrator Peter Gaynor ex-
ercised “any authority vested in [him] as Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security” to designate a new order of succession (the
“Gaynor Order”), identical to the November Delegation issued by
Mr. McAleenan on November 8, 2019, under which Mr. Wolf
purportedly became Acting Secretary. (See Order Designating the
Order of Succession for the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (“Gaynor Or-
der”) (Dkt. 324-1) at ECF p. 18.) Administrator Gaynor issued
the order “out of an abundance of caution and to minimize any
disruption occasioned by a recent Government Accountability Of-
fice opinion and recent challenges filed in Federal court alleging
that the November 8, 2019, order of succession issued by then-
Acting Secretary Kevin McAleenan was not valid.” (id. (citations
omitted).) The logic of the Gaynor Order was that if the Novem-
ber Delegation was invalid, then E.O. 13753 would have been
the operative document to fill the vacancy caused originally by
Secretary Nielsen’s resignation. Under E.O. 13753, Administrator
Gaynor would have been in line to become Acting Secretary. Un-
der that authority, which Administrator Gaynor “may have been
granted,” he purported to once again change the order of succes-
sion, reinstating Mr. Wolf as the lawful Acting Secretary. (Id.)
On September 18, 2020 in a “Ratification of Actions Taken,” Mr.
Wolf either (a) exercised his newly endowed authority from Ad-
ministrator Gaynor to ratify or (b) redundantly affirmed—
depending on one’s view of the lawfulness of the November Del-
egation—each prior action he had taken as Acting Secretary
including, as relevant here, the Wolf Memorandum suspending
and modifying DACA. (See Ratification of Actions Taken by the

Acting Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (“Wolf Ratification”) (Dkt. 327-
1).) On October 7, 2020, Mr. Wolf issued a second ratification,
also based on any authority he may or may not have received
from the Gaynor Order, affirming a number of actions taken by
Mr. McAleenan, as well as an August 21, 2020 Memorandum
from Joseph Edlow, USCIS Deputy Director for Policy, that im-
plemented the Wolf Memorandum. (See Ratification of Oct. 7,
2020 (Dkt. 337-1).)
DHS contends that Mr. Wolf was lawfully serving as Acting Sec-
retary when he issued the Wolf Memorandum in July 2020. (See
Govt Reply at 16.) In the alternative, it argues that any deficiency
at the time was subsequently cured by the Gaynor Order and the
Wolf Ratification. (See Id. at 16.)°
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment must be granted when there is “no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant[s] [are] entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a rea-
sonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).7 At
summary judgment, the movants bear the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Feingold v.
New York, 366 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2004).

6 President Trump nominated Mr. Wolf to serve as Secretary of Homeland
Security on September 10, 2020 and his nomination is currently pending
before the Senate. See https://www.congress.gov/nomination/116th-con-
gress/2235?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22chad + wolf%22%5D%7
D&s=1&r=1 (last accessed Nov. 13, 2020).
7 When quoting cases, and unless otherwise noted, all citations and quota-
tion marks are omitted and all alterations are adopted.

10

III. DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Statutes
1. Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA)
The Federal Vacancies Reform Act (“FVRA”), 5 U.S.C. § 3345 et
seq., replaced the Vacancies Act in 1998. See Pub. L. 105-277, §
151, 112 Stat. 2681(1998); NERB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929,
936 (2017). As the Supreme Court has explained, relying largely
on the expertise of Morton Rosenberg who has submitted an ami-
cus brief in this case, the FVRA was a response to a perceived
“threat to the Senate’s advice and consent power.” SW Gen., 137
S. Ct. at 936. At the time of passage, approximately 20 percent
of offices requiring a Presidential appointment and Senate con-
firmation (“PAS” offices) were held by temporary designees who
had been in office beyond the Vacancies Act’s 120-day limit. Id.
In the decades before Congress adopted the FVRA, the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel took the position that the
“housekeeping” statutes of individual agencies provided agency
heads “independent authority apart from the Vacancies Act to
temporarily fill vacant offices.” Id. at 935; see also Amicus Br. of
Morton Rosenberg (“Rosenberg Br.”) (Dkt. 317-1) at 3. In re-
sponse, the FVRA provides “the exclusive means for temporarily
authorizing an acting official to perform the functions and duties
of any office of an Executive agency . . . for which appointment
is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.” 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a). The terms of the
FVRA apply unless (1) an express statutory provision either “(A)
authorizes the President, a court, or the head of an Executive de-
partment, to designate an officer or employee to perform the
functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting
capacity; or (B) designates an officer or employee to perform the
functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting
capacity;” or (2) the President fills a vacancy with a recess ap-
pointment. Id.

11

The FVRA provides the default framework for who may tempo-
rarily fill PAS vacancies in acting capacities and under what
constraints. See L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1, 24
(D.D.C. 2020). As relevant here, the FVRA provides that, “[i]f an
officer of an Executive agency . .. whose appointment to office is
required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to per-
form the functions and duties of the office . . . the first assistant
to the office of such officer shall perform the functions and duties
of the office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time
limitations of section 3346.” 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a). Alternatively,
the “President (and only the President)” may appoint somebody
other than the “first assistant” provided that person is already
serving in a PAS office, or if that person had held a position of
the GS-15 pay rate, or higher, for at least 90 days within the pre-
vious year. 5 U.S.C. § 3345(a)(2), (3). In turn, Section 3346
provides that, other than for vacancies caused by sickness, “the
person serving as an acting officer as described under section
3345 may serve in the office . . . for no longer than 210 days
beginning on the date the vacancy occurs;” or, during the pen-
dency of a Senate nomination, subject to certain limitations. 5
U.S.C. § 3346(a).8 If an action is taken by a person who purports
to act with the authority of an office to which the FVRA applies
but who is not serving in accordance with the FVRA, that action
“shall have no force or effect” and “may not be ratified.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 3348(d).
2. Homeland Security Act (HSA)
The FVRA replaced a patchwork of agency-specific “housekeep-
ing statutes” with consistent default rules for temporarily filling
vacant PAS positions with acting officeholders. (Rosenberg Br. at

8 Notably, “a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under
this section, if... the President submits a nomination of such person to the
Senate for appointment to such office.” 5 U.S.C. § 3345(b)(1)(B).

12

3.) However, on its face, the FVRA allows Congress to expressly
compliment or displace those default rules with agency-specific
provisions. 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1). In DHS’s case, the Homeland
Security Act expressly addresses agency vacancies. Under the
HSA, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security “shall be the
Secretary's first assistant for purposes of’ the FVRA and the Un-
der Secretary for Management “shall be first assistant to the
Deputy Secretary” for FVRA purposes. 6 U.S.C. § 113(a)(1) (A),
(F).
In addition, in 2016, Congress amended the HSA to add Section
113(g), which provides as follows:
(g) Vacancies
(1) Absence, disability, or vacancy of Secretary or Deputy
Secretary
Notwithstanding chapter 33 of Title 5 [the FVRA], the Under
Secretary for Management shall serve as the Acting Secretary
if by reason of absence, disability, or vacancy in office, nei-
ther the Secretary nor Deputy Secretary is available to
exercise the duties of the Office of the Secretary.
(2) Further order of succession
Notwithstanding chapter 33 of Title 5, the Secretary may
designate such other officers of the Department in further
order of succession to serve as Acting Secretary.
(3) Notification of vacancies
The Secretary shall notify the Committee on Homeland Se-
curity and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Repre-
sentatives of any vacancies that require notification under
sections 3345 through 3349d of Title 5 (commonly known
as the “Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998”).

13

See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub.
L. No. 114-328, § 1903(a), 130 Stat. 2001 (Dec. 23, 2016).
B. Application
1. FVRA
The court finds persuasive the reasoning of Casa de Maryland,
Inc. v. Wolf, -- F. Supp. 3d --, 20-cv-2119, 2020 WL 5500165 (D.
Md. Sept. 11, 2020) and Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr. v. Wolf, -- F.
Supp. 3d --, 2020 WL 5798269 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020). Be-
cause Mr. Wolf was designated Acting Secretary under the HSA
and not the FVRA, the FVRA’s 210-day limitation, and its enforce-
ment provisions, do not apply.
Section 3345 contains the core framework of the FVRA. See 5
U.S.C. § 3345. Where there is a vacant PAS position, the first as-
sistant to the office becomes the acting officer unless the
President—and only the President—instead directs another PAS
officer to perform the role, or so directs another person at the
agency, who has served at a GS-15 level or above for at least 90
days. Any person “serving as an acting officer as described under
section 3345” is limited to 210 days of service, with some allow-
ances for Senate nomination processes and recesses not relevant
here. 5 U.S.C. § 3346 (emphasis added). Section 3347 provides
that “[slections 3345 and 3346 are the exclusive means for tem-
porarily authorizing an acting official to perform the functions
and duties of [a PAS office] . . . unless—a statutory provision ex-
pressly .. . (A) authorizes the President, a court, or the head of
an Executive department, to designate an officer or employee to
perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily
in an acting capacity; or (B) designates an officer or employee to
perform the functions and duties of a specified office temporarily
in an acting capacity[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 3347(a)(1) (emphasis
added). Section 3348 contains the FVRA’s enforcement provi-
sions which Plaintiffs urge the court to apply. Under subsection

14

(b)(1), if an acting officer fails to serve “in accordance with sec-
tions 3345, 3346, and 3347,” then “the office shall remain
vacant.” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(b) (1). And an “action taken by any per-
son who is not acting under section 3345, 3346, or 3347... shall
have no force or effect.”
Thus, according to the plain text of Section 3347, a statutory pro-
vision that expressly “authorizes . . . the head of an Executive
department[] to designate an officer or employee to perform the
functions and duties of a specified office temporarily in an acting
capacity,” displaces Sections 3345 and 3346, and necessarily dis-
places the limitations and enforcement mechanisms associated
therewith. Here, the HSA constitutes such a provision, as it au-
thorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to “designate such
other officers of the Department in further order of succession to
serve as Acting Secretary” beyond the Deputy Secretary and Un-
der Secretary for Management, who are “first assistants” for
FVRA purposes. See 6 U.S.C. § 113(g). Although the HSA ex-
pressly invokes the FVRA to designate the Deputy Secretary and
Under Secretary for Management as “first assistants,” it also ex-
pressly grants the Secretary the power, should the “first assistant”
offices both be vacant, to designate the “further order of succes-
sion” notwithstanding the FVRA. See S.W. Gen., 137 S.Ct. at 939
(explaining that the “ordinary meaning of ‘notwithstanding’ is ‘in
spite of, or ‘without prevention or obstruction from or by”).
Mr. Wolf assumed the Acting Secretary role because he was Un-
der Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans and, under the
November Delegation, fourth in line to assume the role behind
the Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary for Management, and
the CBP Commissioner, which were all vacant at the time. There-
fore, reading the statutes together, Mr. Wolf was designated
pursuant to the Secretary's power under the HSA, notwithstand-
ing the FVRA, to designate further succession beyond the “first
assistants” who exist under the auspices of the FVRA. Because

15

Mr. Wolf did not assume the Acting Secretary role under Section
3345, Sections 3346 and 3348 do not apply to him. See Casa de
Maryland, 2020 WL 5500165 at *18; Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr.,
2020 WL 5798269 at *10-11.°

° A plain reading of the statutory text produces a counterintuitive result: a
210-day limitation on the acting service of the Deputy Secretary and the
Under Secretary for Management, who are designated by statute, but no
limitation on those further down the line of succession, designated by the
Secretary. The Casa de Maryland court surmised that perhaps Congress
wished “to instill continuity in the functioning of the agency” in cases
where DHS’s top leadership positions were all vacant. Casa de Maryland,
2020 WL 5500165 at *19,. Whatever the case, the court must “interpret the
statute as it was written, not [] rewrite it as [Plaintiffs] believe Congress
could have intended to write it.” Palisades Collections LLC v. Shorts, 552
F.3d 327, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).
To be sure, allowing acting officers to serve without time limitations and
other enforcement mechanisms raises serious constitutional concerns.
“The ‘manipulation of official appointments’ had long been one of the
American revolutionary generation's greatest grievances against executive
power because ‘the power of appointment to offices’ was deemed ‘the most
insidious and powerful weapon of eighteenth century despotism.” Freytag
v. Comm’ of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991), quoting Gordon
Wood, The Creation of The American Republic 1776-1787, p. 79 (1969)
(internal citation omitted). As of November 14, 2020, it has been nearly
600 days since the Department of Homeland Security was led by a Senate-
confirmed Secretary. (See 56.1 Resp. § 17.) President Trump has validated
concerns about the effects of circumventing the appointments process by
saying of PAS vacancies: “I’m in no hurry ... I have ‘acting’ [sic]. And my
‘actings’ are doing really great. I sort of like ‘acting.’ It gives me more flex-
ibility.” Gd. { 11.) Without the time limitations of the FVRA, it could be
possible to install a series of acting officers in order to avoid constitution-
ally required Senate approval.
One possible solution, offered by Plaintiffs, is to construe the power to issue
further orders of succession under the HSA to reside only with a Senate
confirmed “Secretary” and not with “Acting Secretaries.” (See Pls.’ Reply at
13.) The Nw. Immigrant Rights Project court reached that conclusion when
considering the likelihood of success on the merits on an application for a
preliminary injunction: “based on the text, structure, and purpose of the
statute, the Court reads § 113(g)(2) as vesting in only the PAS Secretary

16

For these reasons, the court finds that Mr. Wolf was not elevated
to the role of Acting Secretary under the FVRA, and therefore,
the FVRA’s limitations and enforcement provisions do not apply
to him.
2. HSA
Congress gave the Secretary of Homeland Security the power to
designate a further order succession for Acting Secretaries be-
yond the two statutory “first assistants.” Secretary Nielsen
exercised that power in the February and April Delegations. DHS
failed to follow the order of succession as it was lawfully desig-
nated. Therefore, the actions taken by purported Acting
Secretaries, who were not properly in their roles according to the
lawful order of succession, were taken without legal authority.
When Secretary Nielsen resigned on April 10, 2019, the order of
succession was set by the April Delegation and was straightfor-
ward. (See April Delegation at ECF p. 2-3; DHS Delegation
Number 00106, Revision 08.5 of April 10, 2019 (“Revision 08.5”)
(Dkt. 324-1) at ECF p. 64; see also GAO Decision at ECF p. 169.)
Under Section II of DHS’s succession order, as amended by the
April Delegation:
A. In case of the Secretary’s death, resignation, or inabil-
ity to perform the functions of the Office, the orderly

the authority to ‘designate such other officers of the Department in further
order of succession to serve as Acting Secretary.’ And that reading has the
additional benefit of avoiding any constitutional concerns.” 2020 WL
5995206, at *23. Because the court now finds that Mr. Wolf was not law-
fully serving as Acting Secretary of DHS based on the plain text of the HSA
and DHS’s governance documents as they were written, it need not con-
sider, at this moment, whether an Acting Secretary possesses the power to
designate a further order of succession.

17

succession of officials is governed by Executive Order
13753, amended on December 9, 2016.
B. [hereby delegate to the officials occupying the identi-
fied positions in the order listed (Annex A), my
authority to exercise the powers and perform the func-
tions and duties of my office, to the extent not
otherwise prohibited by law, in the event I am una-
vailable to act during a disaster or emergency.
(Revision 08.5 at ECF p. 64; April Delegation at ECF p. 3.)
Plainly, Secretary Nielsen’s resignation fell under Section IILA.,
not II.B., and therefore E.O. 13753, not Annex A, applied. Under
E.O. 13753, the order of succession was:
1) Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security [vacant on April
10, 2019];
2) Under Secretary for Management [vacant on April 10,
2019];
3) Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency [vacant on April 10, 2019];
4) Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency
(“CISA”) [occupied by Christopher Krebs on April 10,
2019].
(See E.O. 13753 of Dec. 9, 2016 (Dkt. 310-3) at ECF p. 48; GAO
Decision at ECF pp. 170-172.) Based on a straightforward appli-
cation of E.O. 13753, Director Krebs should have assumed the
role as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security. Instead, Mr.
McAleenan purported to be Acting Secretary, although he pos-
sessed no statutory authority to do so. (See 56.1 Resp. § 30.)
Because Mr. McAleenan had no authority, the November Delega-
tion—which had the effect of implanting Mr. Wolf as Acting
Secretary of Homeland Security—was not an authorized agency
action. Indeed, the fact that Mr. McAleenan attempted to replace

18

E.O. 13753 with Annex A in Section IIA. in the November Dele-
gation is strong evidence that E.O. 13753 was the operative law
at the time, and therefore that Mr. McAleenan was without au-
thority to make the amendment. (See November Delegation at
ECF p. 16.) Accordingly, Mr. Wolf did not possess statutory au-
thority when he assumed the role of Acting Secretary in
November 2019. See Casa de Maryland, 2020 WL 5500165 at
*23; Immigrant Legal Res. Ctr. 2020 WL 5798269 at *9; GAO De-
cision at ECF p. 175.
The Government Defendants now contend that the April Delega-
tion meant something other than what it says. They argue that
Secretary Nielsen signed only the April 9, 2019 Memorandum of
DHS General Counsel John Mitnick, in which she stated, “I
hereby designate the order of succession for the Secretary of
Homeland Security” (see Mitnick Memorandum at ECF pp. 2-3)
and that, therefore, Annex A should apply to vacancies, which
implicate the “order of succession” that Secretary Nielsen sought
to change. In their view, under the two tracks of the February
Delegation, E.O. 13753 supplied the “order of succession” in the
case of a vacancy, and Annex A supplied the order for “delega-
tions of authority,” relevant in the case of emergencies. (See Gov't
Opp. at 9.) According to the Government, amending Annex A
was actually intended to alter the order of succession in all cases,
not just the delegations of authority covered by Annex A. (See
Govt Opp. at 7.) As further evidence, the Government offers a
sworn declaration from Associate General Counsel Neal J.
Swartz, from June 2020, in which he states that Annex A, as
amended by Secretary Nielsen in April 2019, “controlled the suc-
cession order for every vacancy in the office of the Secretary, no
matter the reason for the vacancy.” (Decl. of Neal J. Swartz (Dkt.
324-1) at ECF p. 6.) Therefore, the Government urges the court
to ignore official agency policy documents and invalidate the
plain text of the April Delegation because it does not comport
with her supposed intent, although it comports perfectly with the

19

text of her official order. The Government’s reading of the docu-
ments is tortured. On the plain text, Secretary Nielsen amended
the order of officials in Annex A but did nothing to change when
Annex A applied, which was “in the event [the Secretary is] un-
available to act during a disaster or catastrophic emergency.”
(Revision 08.5 at ECF p. 64.) The court credits the text of the law
over ex post explanations that the text means something other
than what it says.
Based on the plain text of the operative order of succession, nei-
ther Mr. McAleenan nor, in turn, Mr. Wolf, possessed statutory
authority to serve as Acting Secretary. Therefore, the Wolf Mem-
orandum was not an exercise of legal authority.
3. The Gaynor Order and Wolf Ratification
The Government argues that even if the Wolf Memorandum was
without legal authority when issued, any deficiency was cured
when Administrator Gaynor “exercised ‘any authority he might
have as Acting Secretary and designated an order of succession
for the office under Section 113(g)(2)” which made Mr. Wolf
Acting Secretary, after which Mr. Wolf ratified the Wolf Memo-
randum. (Gov't Reply at 15.) That argument is unpersuasive.
To begin, although litigants can make arguments in the alterna-
tive, the court is not aware of any authority that would allow a
government official to take administrative action in the alterna-
tive. DHS is a large and complex organization with significant
law enforcement and national security responsibilities. Congress
and DHS, via the FVRA and HSA, have provided detailed contin-
gency plans to ensure that somebody is accountable for the
Department’s mission. That purpose would be significantly un-
dermined if DHS allowed two different people—Mr. Wolf and
Administrator Gaynor—to simultaneously exercise the Secre-
tary’s power.

20

Moreover, DHS has not submitted any notice to Congress that
Administrator Gaynor is currently serving as Acting Secretary of
Homeland Security, which is required under 5 U.S.C. § 3349(a),
because Secretary of Homeland Security is an office to which the
FVRA applies. DHS has submitted FVRA notifications in the past
for its Acting Secretaries who have purported to assume the of-
fice via the authority of the Secretary under 6 U.S.C. § 113(g)(2).
(See, e.g., FVRA Submission for Kevin McAleenan of April 11,
2019 (Dkt. 324-1) at ECF pp. 132-133.) There is no indication
that Administrator Gaynor has ever been empowered by the
agency to exercise the powers of the Acting Secretary, and there
is every indication to the contrary. Even if Administrator Gaynor
should be Acting Secretary, DHS cannot recognize his authority
only for the sham purpose of abdicating his authority to DHS’s
preferred choice, and only in the alternative.!°
The Gaynor Order did not make Mr. Wolf the lawful Acting Sec-
retary of Homeland Security, and therefore, Mr. Wolf did not
(and does not) possess the power to ratify any of his former ac-
tions."
IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION
The court now turns to the Batalla Vidal Plaintiffs’ motion for
class certification. The motion is GRANTED for the reasons be-
low. As Defendants concede, all relief ordered by the court in this

10 As discussed above, the court also reserves decision as to whether an
Acting Secretary, rather than a Secretary, can designate an order of suc-
cession under 6 U.S.C. § 113(g). See Nw. Immigrant Rights Project, 2020
WL 5995206, at *23.
" Because the court finds that the Gaynor Order had no legal effect, it does
not find it significant that the Government is now confused as to whether
the order was issued after Mr. Wolf was nominated to be Secretary on Sep-
tember 10, 2020—as it originally claimed—or before. (See Defs.’ Letter of
Nov. 13, 2020 (Dkt. 341).) The court wishes the Government well in trying
to find its way out of this self-made thicket.

21

matter is effective as to all named plaintiffs as well as to all mem-
bers of the certified class. (See Gov't Opp. at 24.)
Plaintiffs seek to certify a DACA Class (“Class”) to include all per-
sons who are or will be prima facie eligible for deferred action
under the terms of the DACA program as they were set out in the
original policy memorandum of Secretary Janet Napolitano in
June 2012 (the “Napolitano Memorandum”). (Class Cert. Mem.
at 2.) They also seek to certify a Pending Applications Subclass
(“Subclass”), to include all persons who had an application for
deferred action through DACA—whether a first-time application
or a renewal—pending at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Ser-
vices (“USCIS”) on any date between June 30, 2020 and July 28,
2020 that have not been adjudicated in accordance with the
2012 Napolitano Memorandum." (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs also seek
to specifically exclude from the Class and Subclass any “individ-
uals who are prima facie eligible for deferred action through
DACA and who bring a federal lawsuit challenging the Wolf
Memorandum.” (Id.)
A. Legal Standard
To qualify for certification, a class must meet the prerequisites
outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), including nu-
merosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a); see, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v.
Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2008). Numer-
osity requires that “the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Commonal-
ity means that “there are questions of law or fact common to the
class.” Id. 23(a)(2). “Typicality requires that the claims or de-
fenses of the class representatives be typical of the claims or
defenses of the class members,” and “is satisfied when each class

!2 The Fourth Circuit issued its mandate following the Regents decision on
June 30, 2020 and the Wolf Memorandum was issued on July 28, 2020.

22

member’s claim arises from the same course of events, and each
class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defend-
ant’ liability.” Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 475 (2d Cir. 2010).
Commonality and typicality “tend to merge into one another, so
that similar considerations animate analysis of both.” Id. The ad-
equacy prerequisite ensures that “the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a) (4).
In addition to the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, “certification of the
class must also be deemed appropriate under one of the three
subdivisions of Rule 23(b).” Brown, 609 F.3d at 476. Finally, the
Second Circuit has “recognized an implied requirement of ascer-
tainability in Rule 23, which demands that a class be sufficiently
definite so that it is administratively feasible for the court to de-
termine whether a particular individual is a member.” In re
Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 260 (2d Cir. 2017).
Where a suit “satisf[ies] the criteria set forth in subdivision (a)
(i.e., numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of rep-
resentation),” including the implied ascertainability requirement,
and “fit[s] into one of the three categories described in subdivi-
sion (b),” then a plaintiff may maintain a class action in federal
court. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559
U.S. 393, 398 (2010). “The moving party must demonstrate com-
pliance with these rules by a preponderance of the evidence.” Hill
v. City of New York, 136 F. Supp. 3d 304, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
B. Rule 23 Prerequisites
1. Numerosity
Both the proposed Class and Subclass are sufficiently numerous
that joinder would be impracticable. Plaintiffs estimate there are
1.1 million undocumented immigrants who are prima facie eligi-
ble for DACA who would comprise the Class. (See Class Cert.
Mem. at 12; 56.1 Resp. {4 2-6.) With regard to the Subclass, the

23

exact number of individuals who had pending applications be-
fore USCIS between June 30 and July 28, 2020 is unknown.
However, a USCIS Quarterly Report shows an average of about
32,000 renewal applications pending at any given time between
March 2018 and June 2020. (Class Cert. Mem. at 13; USCIS
Quarterly Report (Dkt. 309-4) at ECF p. 14.) Further, Plaintiff
Make the Road New York alone had 166 clients with pending
renewal applications on July 28, 2020, when Acting Secretary
Wolf issued the Wolf Memorandum. (See Decl. of Javier Valdez
(Dkt. 309-5) at ECF p. 55, § 11.) The numerosity prerequisite is
therefore met. See Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley
& Co., 772 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2014) (‘Numerosity is pre-
sumed for classes larger than forty members.”).
2. Commonality and Typicality
The proposed Class and Subclass also satisfy the commonality
prerequisite because they present common issues of law and fact,
the resolution of which does not require individual examination
of a given class member’s specific situation. Where an issue “is
capable of classwide resolution—which means that determina-
tion of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke,” the common-
ality prerequisite is satisfied. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564
U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Indeed, “[w]hat matters to class certifica-
tion is not the raising of common ‘questions—even in droves—
but rather, the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate
common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id.
Where a movant “seeks to enjoin a practice or policy, rather than
individualized relief, commonality is assumed.” Westchester In-
dep. Living Ctr., Inc. v. State Univ. of N.Y., Purchase Coll., 331
F.R.D. 279, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). Here, the common issues for
the Class are whether Mr. Wolf and Mr. McAleenan lawfully
served as Acting Secretaries of DHS at the relevant times and
whether the Wolf Memorandum was arbitrary and capricious in

24

violation of the APA. (See Fourth Amend. Compl. (Dkt. 308) 4
183.) The common issues for the Subclass are whether the mem-
bers are entitled to have their applications adjudicated in
accordance with the Napolitano Memorandum and whether
DHS’s failure to do so, as well as its failure to give notice that it
was applying the Wolf Memorandum and the Edlow Memoran-
dum, violated the due process rights of the class members. (See
id. § 184.) All of those questions are well-suited to class adjudi-
cation, as distinct policies that harmed Plaintiffs and for which
they seek relief.
Plaintiffs have likewise satisfied the typicality prerequisite be-
cause the claims of the named plaintiffs “share the same essential
characteristics,” Dial Corp. v. News Corp., 314 F.R.D. 108, 113
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), with those of the proposed members of each
class. “[W]hen each class member’s claim arises from the same
course of events, and each class member makes similar legal ar-
guments to prove the defendant’s liability,” typicality is satisfied.
Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997).
3. Adequacy
Plaintiffs have also satisfied the adequacy prerequisite. To satisfy
that requirement, “the named plaintiffs must possess the same
interests and suffer the same injuries as the class members. Ade-
quacy is twofold: the proposed class representative must have an
interest in vigorously pursuing the claims of the class, and must
have no interests antagonistic to the interests of other class mem-
bers.” In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654
F.3d 242, 249 (2d Cir. 2011). The named plaintiffs have suffered
the same injuries as the proposed class. Those without DACA pro-
tections face difficulties pursuing employment and education, as
well as living with the constant threat of deportation from the
only country they have ever known. (See, e.g., Decl. of M.B.F.
(Dkt. 309-5) at ECF p. 46.) Those with DACA protections are now
in the tenuous position of having to renew their status each year,

25

imposing an air of uncertainty in every long-term decision they
make. (See, e.g., Decl. of Batalla-Vidal (Dkt. 309-5) at ECF p. 2,
"{{ 2-3.) Without advance parole, DACA recipients cannot leave
the country to see family, travel, or pursue career opportunities
abroad. Ud. {{ 4-5; Decl. of Alarcon (Dkt. 309-5) at ECF p. 7, "4
6-8; Decl. of Fernandez (Dkt. 309-5) at ECF p. 12, {" 5-8.)
The proposed classes, all subject to the Wolf and Edlow Memo-
randa, face the same challenges described by the named
plaintiffs. Further, the remedies that Plaintiffs seek would pro-
vide the same relief to each member of the proposed classes.
Plaintiffs assert they “are highly motivated to pursue this action
vigorously to protect their interests and those of other class mem-
bers,” and have no conflicts of interest with the proposed classes.
(See Class Cert. Mem. at 19.) They affirm that they have taken
an active part throughout the litigation, and understand the im-
pact these proceedings could have on DACA recipients writ large.
(Id.) Therefore, the adequacy prerequisite is met.
4. Ascertainability
Plaintiffs have satisfied the ascertainability requirement. The Sec-
ond Circuit “requires only that a class be defined using objective
criteria that establish a membership with definite boundaries.”
Petrobras, 862 F.3d at 264. The Class members may be identified
by relying on the same criteria outlined in the Napolitano Mem-
orandum for determining DACA eligibility. The Subclass
members may be identified based on whether they had pending
DACA requests at any time between June 30, 2020 and July 28,
2020. Further, to ascertain those excluded from the proposed
classes, the court must merely identify plaintiffs who have filed
complaints in separate federal cases. These criteria are suffi-
ciently objective to establish a Class and Subclass with definite
boundaries, satisfying the ascertainability requirement.

26

5. Rule 23(b)
Plaintiffs have also established that class certification is war-
ranted under Rule 23(b)(2), in which “the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally
to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declar-
atory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). By issuing the Wolf Memorandum, Defend-
ants’ actions affected all members of the proposed Class, and
declaratory or injunctive relief to vacate the Wolf Memorandum
would be an appropriate remedy with respect to each Class mem-
ber. Likewise, for the members of the proposed Subclass whose
applications USCIS failed to review according to the Napolitano
Memorandum, the same relief would be appropriate for all of its
members.
C. Government’s Objections to Class Certification
The Government opposes class certification, arguing that it
would interfere with existing parallel litigation, and that the pro-
posed classes are overbroad and not ascertainable. (See Class
Cert. Opp. at 1-2.) Specifically, the Government asserts the pro-
posed classes are not administrable because Plaintiffs’ claims
overlap with related litigation pending in other district courts,
and that the proposed exclusion of such other plaintiffs from the
proposed classes is improper under Rule 23(b)(2). The Govern-
ment also argues that the proposed Class definition is overbroad
because it includes individuals who may never request DACA,
creating standing issues, and that because the Class does not
have a temporal limitation, it is not possible to ascertain potential
class members. These arguments are unpersuasive for the follow-
ing reasons.
First, the proposed exclusion of individuals who are prima facie
eligible for DACA and pursue their own claims in other federal
courts is proper under Rule 23(b). That exclusion also ensures
that class certification in this case will not interfere with ongoing

27

parallel litigation. The Government argues that because Rule
23(b) is a “mandatory” class, it “provides no opportunity
for... (b)(2) class members to opt out.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at
362. Although the Government is correct that Rule 23(b) (2) does
not require district courts to give notice or the opportunity for
class members to opt out, “the language of Rule 23 is sufficiently
flexible to afford district courts discretion to grant opt-out rights
in... (b)(2) class actions.” McReynolds v. Richards-Cantave, 588
F.3d 790, 800 (2d Cir. 2009). Further, the Government conflates
opting out of class membership with a class definition that spe-
cifically excludes certain individuals. When an individual opts
out of class membership, it means she will take no part in the
outcome and is free to pursue, or not pursue, her own claims
separately. Plaintiffs’ proposed Class and Subclass definitions ex-
clude only those individuals who actually bring their own claims
in other federal courts. By excluding such individuals who bring
separate claims, the class definitions ensure administrability and
judicial economy.
Second, the proposed Class definition is not overbroad and is
clearly ascertainable. Plaintiffs define the Class based on who is
or will be eligible for DACA according to the same criteria out-
lined in the Napolitano Memorandum, including individuals
who:

28

1) came to the United States under the age of sixteen;
2) have continuously resided in the United States for at least
five years preceding June 15, 2012 and were present in
the United States on June 15, 2012;
3) are currently in school, have graduated from high school,
have obtained a general education development
certificate, or are honorably discharged veterans of the
Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States;
4) have not been convicted of a felony offense, a significant
misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses,
or otherwise pose a threat to national security or public
safety; and
5) are not above the age of thirty.
(Class Cert. Reply at 7 n. 6.) Contrary to the Government’s con-
tention that the Class is an amorphous “moving target,” these
criteria are sufficiently definite and temporally limited to allow
the court to ascertain which individuals fall within the Class def-
inition. (Class Cert. Opp. at 9.) As Plaintiffs correctly note,
“DACA’s requirements mean that class members will not be
added ad infinitum .. .. The number of individuals who can meet
the requirements is temporally limited and fixed.” (Class Cert.
Reply at 8.)
Third, the Government argues that because the Class includes in-
dividuals who may be eligible for DACA but have not yet applied
(and may never do so), certification should be defeated on stand-
ing grounds. (Class Cert. Opp. at 9.) Although it is true that a
“class must... be defined in such a way that anyone within it
would have standing,” it is also true that “[a]n injury-in-fact may
simply be the fear or anxiety of future harm.” Denney v. Deutsche
Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006). As long as the Wolf
Memorandum remains in effect, Class members who are other-
wise eligible for DACA but have not yet applied share the same

29

kind of “distinct and palpable,” id., injury with the named plain-
tiffs who happen to have already applied for DACA and had their
applications stalled or rejected. Consequently, the Class mem-
bers’ injuries are traceable to Defendant’s conduct, and the relief
sought by Plaintiffs would redress the harm for both the named
plaintiffs and the Class members. Class members’ standing is ac-
cordingly satisfied.
D. Certification Order
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is GRANTED. The court,
having considered Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and
the declarations submitted in support thereof, orders as follows:
Pursuant to Rule 23(a) and (b)(2), the court CERTIFIES the fol-
lowing classes:
1) A “DACA Class” (for the claims challenging the
appointment of Defendant Wolf and the legality of the
2020 Wolf Memorandum and its implementing guidance,
including the Edlow Memorandum): All persons who are
or will be prima facie eligible for deferred action under the
terms of the 2012 Napolitano Memorandum; and
2) A “Pending Applications Subclass” (for the claims
challenging the application of the 2020 Wolf
Memorandum and its implementing guidance, including
the Edlow Memorandum, to certain DACA applications):
All persons who had an application for deferred action
through DACA, whether an initial or renewal, pending at
USCIS on any date between June 30, 2020, and July 28,
2020, that have not been or will not be adjudicated in
accordance with the 2012 Napolitano Memorandum.
Excluded from the DACA Class and the Pending Applica-
tions Subclass are the individuals who are prima facie

30

eligible for deferred action through DACA and who bring
a federal lawsuit challenging the Wolf Memorandum.
The court APPOINTS Martin Batalla Vidal, Antonio Alarcon, Eli-
ana Fernandez, Carolina Fung Feng, Carlos Vargas, Johana
Larios Sainz, Sonia Molina, Ximena Zamora, and M.B.F. as class
representatives for the DACA Class. The court APPOINTS Plain-
tiffs Johana Larios Sainz, Sonia Molina, and M.B.F. as class
representatives for the Pending Applications Subclass. The court
APPOINTS the National Immigration Law Center, Jerome N.
Frank Legal Services Organization at Yale Law School, and Make
the Road New York as class counsel pursuant to Rule 23(g).
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judg-
ment, insofar as it alleges that Defendant Mr. Wolf was not
lawfully serving as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security under
the HSA when he issued the Wolf Memorandum, is GRANTED
and the Government’s cross-motion is DENIED. Plaintiffs’ motion
for class certification in the Batalla Vidal matter is GRANTED.
The parties are DIRECTED to immediately contact the court’s
Deputy to schedule a conference to advise of any forthcoming
motions for relief in light of the court’s decision.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York
November 14, 2020
/s/ Nicholas G. Garaufis
NICHOLAS G. GARAUFIS
United States District Judge

31

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10305647. Public record. Not legal advice.