# Randolph v. Police Officer Brian Noonan

> District Court, E.D. New York · November 2, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10305116

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** November 2, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10305116

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that under PLRA, sua sponte dismissal of frivolous prisoner complaints is “mandatory”

## Opinion text

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------X
JORDAN RANDOLPH,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
-against-
20-CV-4719(KAM)(LB)

ANDREW CUOMO, Governor of New York;
et al.,

Defendants.
---------------------------------X
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
On September 30, 2020, pro se plaintiff Jordan A.
Randolph (“Plaintiff”), incarcerated at the Suffolk County
Correctional Facility, commenced this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights
related to his arrest and prosecution following a car accident
on January 12, 2020 in Suffolk County, New York.1 Plaintiff’s
request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. For the
reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s claims against Governor Andrew
Cuomo, Suffolk County Executive Steven Bellone, Suffolk County
Chief of Police Stuart Cameron, Suffolk County District Attorney

1 Plaintiff named as defendants: New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, Suffolk
County Executive Steven Bellone, Suffolk County Police Chief Stuart Cameron,
Suffolk County District Attorney Timony Sini, Suffolk County Assistant
District Attorney Jacob DeLauter, police officers Brian Noonan, Cassidy
Lessard, and Brian Koch, and detective Denal Hughes. The titles, but not the
names, of Officers Koch and Lessard and Detective Hughes were included in the
case caption. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to correct the
caption to include the names of these defendants.
DISMISSED. Plaintiff’s request that this court dismiss the

criminal charges that are pending against him is also DISMISSED.
The complaint may proceed against the remaining individual
defendants.
Background
The following alleged facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s
complaint, and are assumed to be true for purposes of this
Memorandum and Order. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010) (at the pleading stage of the
proceeding, a court must assume the truth of “all well-pleaded,
nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint).
“On January 12, 2020 at approximately 4:10 a.m. in the

town of Shirley, New York in Suffolk County, [t]he Plaintiff,
Jordan Randolph, was involved in a [deadly] motor vehicle
accident at 1491 William Floyd Parkway.” (ECF No. 1, Complaint
(“Compl.”), at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he hit “an already
overturned vehicle,” driven by an individual who “was impaired
by marijuana, ADHD, and corrective vision” on a rainy night.
(Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff alleges that Suffolk County police
officers Brian Noonan, Cassidy Lessard, and Brian Koch arrived
at the scene and proceeded to punch and kick him repeatedly,
drag him into the street, and, while using a racial epithet, one
of the officers threatened to kill him while kneeling on the
can’t breathe,” and one of the officers responded, “Yes you can,
you’re not dead yet.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff was arrested and

taken to the hospital, where he was sedated while still in the
custody of Officer Noonan. (Id.)
The next day, on January 13, 2020, Plaintiff was
charged with and arraigned on a charge of driving while
intoxicated. (Id. at 6.) On January 29, 2020, Plaintiff was
charged with, inter alia, vehicular homicide. (Id.) Plaintiff
alleges that he was sedated when his Miranda rights were read to
him by Officer Noonan at the hospital on January 13. (Id.)
Plaintiff further alleges that Officer Noonan “falsified his
statement’ to obtain the warrant to extract [Plaintiff’s] blood,

that [Officers] Noonan, Lessard and Koch falsified the police
report, and that, on January 13, 2020 and January 15, 2020
respectively, Detective Danal Hughes knowingly obtained a false
statement from an eyewitness and planted a beer bottle and
marijuana in Plaintiff’s impounded vehicle.” (Id. at 6-8.)
Plaintiff also alleges that Governor Andrew Cuomo’s
March 2020 suspension of Section 30.30 of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law’s speedy trial limitations deprived him of his
constitutional right to liberty, and resulted in an excessive
detention of 230 days (as of the date of complaint). (Id. at
9.) Plaintiff also alleges malicious prosecution by Suffolk
Attorney Jacob DeLauter. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks dismissal of the pending
criminal charges against him, and damages from the defendants.
(Id. at 12-13.)
Legal Standard
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires a
district court to screen a civil complaint brought by a prisoner
against a governmental entity or its agents, and dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint or
a portion of it is “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1); see also Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir.
1999) (noting that under PLRA, sua sponte dismissal of frivolous

prisoner complaints is “mandatory”). Similarly, pursuant to the
in forma pauperis statute, a court must dismiss an action if it
determines that it “(i) is frivolous or malicious, (ii) fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (iii) seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
The court construes pro se pleadings liberally,
particularly where they allege civil rights violations. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v.
Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Still,
solicitude” and interpret them to raise the “strongest arguments
that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474–76 (2d Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and citations
omitted), a complaint must plead enough facts, “accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”
Cohen v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., 897 F.3d 75, 80 (2d
Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). While “detailed factual allegations” are not required,

“[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a complaint is
insufficient to state a claim “if it tenders naked assertion[s]
devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (quotation marks
and alteration omitted).
To sustain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”), a plaintiff must allege that (1) “the conduct complained
of [was] . . . committed by a person acting under color of state
law,” and (2) the conduct “deprived [him] of rights, privileges
or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
Moreover, a plaintiff must allege the direct or personal

involvement of each of the named defendants in the alleged
constitutional deprivation. See Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233,
249 (2d Cir. 2010); Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir.
2006) (“[P]ersonal involvement of defendants in alleged
constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of
damages under [Section] 1983.”) (quotation marks omitted).
Discussion
I. Claims Against Individual Defendants
To sustain a Section 1983 claim against a defendant, a
plaintiff “must demonstrate [each] defendant’s direct or
personal involvement” in the actions that are alleged to have

caused the deprivation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Victory v. Pataki, 814 F.3d 47, 67 (2d Cir. 2016); Holmes v.
Kelly, No. 13-cv-3122, 2014 WL 3725844, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 25,
2014). A plaintiff must also “allege a tangible connection
between the acts of the defendant and the injuries suffered.”
Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986); Andino v.
Fischer, 698 F. Supp. 2d 362, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
Liability under Section 1983 cannot be generally
imposed on a supervisor solely based on his or her position;
there is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability under
Section 1983. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because
suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
violated the Constitution.”) (citing Monell v. New York City
Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).
A. County Executive Ballone and Police Chief Cameron
Plaintiff named as defendants Suffolk County Executive
Steven Ballone and Police Chief Stuart Cameron. As to these two
defendants, Plaintiff asserts only the following allegations:
that Mr. Bellone is aware of the alleged wrongful actions of the
police officers and other officials because he is their
supervisor, that Mr. Cameron is also aware because he is
“responsible for any and all actions whether legal or illegal”

when officers are acting on the behalf of the Suffolk County
Police. (Compl. at 11.)
Plaintiff seeks to hold these two Suffolk County
officials liable for their subordinates’ actions or for their
failure to act. However, an “individual cannot be held liable
for damages under Section 1983 ‘merely because he held a high
position of authority.’” Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free
Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Black v.
Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74) (2d Cir. 1996)). A Section 1983
complaint that does not allege the personal involvement of a
defendant fails as a matter of law. See Johnson v. Barney, 360
1983 claims asserted against Steven Ballone and Stuart Cameron

are not plausible, and are dismissed for failure to state a
claim.2
B. District Attorney Sini
Plaintiff also named Suffolk County District Attorney,
Timothy Sini as a defendant, but does not assert that Mr. Sini
was personally involved in the alleged deprivation of
Plaintiff’s civil rights, and there is no indication that Mr.
Sini was personally involved in the alleged incidents giving
rise to this action. The only basis for Plaintiff’s claim
against Mr. Sini is that the charges filed against Plaintiff
were filed in Suffolk County, and were therefore the

responsibility of District Attorney Sini’s office. That alone
does not qualify as personal involvement. As discussed,
liability under Section 1983 cannot be generally imposed on a
supervisor solely based on his position. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676.
Even if District Attorney Sini were personally
involved in the decision to prosecute Plaintiff, and there is no
indication in the complaint that he was, Mr. Sini would be

2 Plaintiff could also not make out a claim against the County, because he
does not allege County-sanctioned policies or customs that specifically led
to the alleged constitutional violations, or allege any facts that could
support such a conclusion. Nor does he allege a single fact concerning
“inadequate procedures and guidelines” that the police officers followed.
related to their prosecutorial function are protected by

absolute immunity, and thus Plaintiff cannot assert a Section
1983 claim against a district attorney in his individual
capacity. See, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)
(“[P]rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability under
[Section] 1983 for their conduct in initiating a prosecution and
in presenting the State’s case.”) (quotation marks omitted);
Warney v. Monroe Cty., 587 F.3d 113, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2009)
(prosecutors are protected by absolute immunity if “they were
functioning as advocates when they engaged in the challenged
conduct”) (quoting Doe v. Philips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1209 (2d Cir.
1996)); Shmueli v. City of N.Y., 424 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir.

2005) (holding that a prosecutor acting “within the scope of his
duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution is
immune from a civil suit for damages under [Section] 1983”)
(quotation marks omitted); Santulli v. Russello, 519 Fed. Appx.
706, 711 (2d. Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled that a prosecutor
is entitled to absolute immunity for acts undertaken pursuant to
her traditional function as an advocate in the prosecutorial
process.”). In addition, Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages
against Mr. Sini in his official capacity is barred by the
Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Amaker
Cir. 2011).

Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting
District Attorney Sini’s personal involvement, and because Mr.
Sini is immune from suit, Plaintiff’s claims against him are
dismissed.
C. Assistant District Attorney DeLauter
Plaintiff does allege the personal involvement of
Assistant District Attorney Jacob DeLauter in the prosecution of
Plaintiff. However, for the reasons discussed above, claims
against prosecutors are barred. Mr. DeLauter is entitled to
absolute immunity with respect to his alleged involvement in the
decision to prosecute Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s claim against

Assistant District Attorney DeLauter is, therefore, dismissed.
D. Governor Cuomo
Plaintiff named the Governor of New York, Andrew
Cuomo, as a defendant, alleging that his executive orders,
issued in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic,3 have
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by suspending the

3 On March 20, 2020, Governor Cuomo issued Executive Order 202.8, suspending
the speedy trial limitations of Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law.
9 NYCRR 8.202.8 The suspension was continued by subsequent executive orders,
including Executive Order 202.48. 9 NYCRR 8.202.48. By Executive Order
202.60, issued September 4, 2020, Governor Cuomo modified the suspension of
Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure law “to require that speedy trial
time limitations remain suspended in a jurisdiction until such time as petit
criminal juries are reconvened in that jurisdiction.” 9 NYCRR 8.202.60.
30.30.

The entirety of Plaintiff’s allegations against
Governor Cuomo are contained in a single paragraph in the
complaint related to these executive orders, and the only remedy
sought by Plaintiff in connection with his prolonged detention
is damages. (Compl. at 9, 12-13.) A Section 1983 claim for
damages against Governor Cuomo in his official capacity is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ford v. Reynolds, 316
F.3d 351, 354 (2d Cir.2003) (the Eleventh Amendment “bars the
award of money damages against state officials in their official
capacities.”). Plaintiff’s complaint, even liberally construed,
does not bring a claim for damages against Governor Cuomo in his

individual capacity, nor does it seek injunctive relief against
the State of New York. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against Governor
Cuomo is dismissed.4
II. Dismissal of Criminal Charges
In addition to his allegations against the individual
defendants, Plaintiff “seeks a dismissal of all pending charges
that have violated the Plaintiff[’s] constitutional rights.”
(Compl. at 13.) The Supreme Court has established that habeas

4 Moreover, “the court notes that although CPL § 30.30 is entitled a ‘speedy
trial’ statute, the history of its adoption makes evident that it addresses
only the problem of prosecutorial readiness, and is not a speedy trial
statute in the constitutional sense.” People v. Haneiph, 745 N.Y.S.2d 405,
408 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 2002).
prisoner seeking a release from custody. Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (When a prisoner is challenging “the
very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the
relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to
immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment,
his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”); see also
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013) (“When
there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal
courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution.”).
A state prisoner may not circumvent the exhaustion
prerequisites for habeas corpus relief by requesting such relief
under Section 1983. Preiser, 411 U.S. at 489-90. Since

Plaintiff’s complaint does not demonstrate that Plaintiff
exhausted his state remedies in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b) and (c), and in fact he has not yet been convicted of
the crime with which he is charged, a habeas petition would be
dismissed as premature. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510
(1982); Picard v. Conner, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).
Accordingly, this federal court does not have the
authority to dismiss the state charges pending against
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is

GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s claims against Governor Andrew Cuomo,
Suffolk County Executive Steven Bellone, Suffolk County Chief of
Police Stuart Cameron, Suffolk County District Attorney Timothy
Sini, and Assistant District Attorney Jacob DeLauter are sua
sponte dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). The Clerk of Court is
respectfully requested to terminate those parties as defendants.
Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim may proceed against
defendant police officers Brian Noonan, Cassidy Lessard, Brian
Koch, and Detective Denal Hughes. The Clerk of Court is

directed to issue a summons to these defendants, and the United
States Marshals Service is directed to serve the complaint and
the summons on these defendants, without prepayment of fees, as
soon as practicable after the suspension of service by the
United States Marshals Service is lifted.
The court refers this matter to Magistrate Judge Lois
Bloom for pretrial supervision. The court certifies pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Memorandum and
Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma
pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
copy of the complaint and this Memorandum and Order on the

Suffolk County Attorney, and to update the case caption to
reflect the defendants that remain in this case. Lastly, the
Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a copy of this Memorandum
and Order to Plaintiff and note the mailing on the docket.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
November 2, 2020

/s/
Hon. Kiyo A. Matsumoto
United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10305116. Public record. Not legal advice.