# Gribbin v. New York State Unified Court System

> District Court, E.D. New York · June 22, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10304411

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** June 22, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------------------------x
VICTORIA GRIBBIN,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
- against - 18-CV-6100 (PKC) (AKT)

NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT
SYSTEM; 10TH DISTRICT SUPREME CIVIL
MATRIMONIAL COURT OF NEW YORK,
NASSAU COUNTY; SUPREME COURT OF
NEW YORK STATE, APPELLATE
DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT;
EDMUND DANE; VERONICA IRWIN;
HOWARD STURIM; GEOFFERY J.
O’CONNELL; HOPE ZIMMERMAN;
JEFFREY BROWN; LAWRENCE
SCHAEFFER; and NANCY SCHER,

Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------x
PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the Court’s March 31, 2020
Memorandum and Order (“March 31 M&O”) (Dkt. 39), and its corresponding Judgment (Clerk’s
Judgment, Dkt. 40), dismissing Plaintiff’s pro se complaint in its entirety and denying Plaintiff
leave to amend (Dkt. 42). Plaintiff also seeks an order inviting interpretive guidance from the
United States Department of Justice. (Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion to
Vacate (“MTV”), Dkt. 44.) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied in its entirety.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the issues in this litigation and with the
March 31 M&O. Briefly, however, Plaintiff was divorced from her now ex-husband in May 2016
pursuant to a Judgment of Divorce (“JOD”), issued in the Supreme Court of New York, Nassau
County, after a lengthy divorce litigation that began in 2008. (Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. 1, at 5
¶ 12, 19 ¶ 8.) At several points during the divorce litigation, Plaintiff requested various
accommodations under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act for her foot conditions, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and
attention deficit disorder. (See, e.g., id. at 8 ¶¶ 24–25, 9 ¶¶ 27–29, 37 ¶¶ 70–73.) Plaintiff alleges
that these disabilities resulted in some part from her experience of “coercive control” at the hands

of her ex-husband through his “non-compliance with various court orders and frivolous disputes
regarding the equitable distribution, monetary orders[,] and custody orders[] sought by Plaintiff”
in the divorce litigation. (See MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF1 13.) Plaintiff contends that this “coercive
control” amounted to domestic violence but was not recognized as such by New York courts,
which apply an ‘“egregious’ physical DV standard.” (Compl., Dkt. 1, at 4–5 ¶ 11, see also MTV,
Dkt. 44, at ECF 12–13.)
While Plaintiff was represented by counsel for “7.5 years” of her divorce litigation, she
fired her counsel in June 2015 and chose to represent herself pro se at the trial scheduled for
October of that year in New York State Supreme Court, Nassau County. (Id. at 7 ¶ 22, 8 ¶ 25, 20

¶ 12, 33 ¶ 53.) At a June 2015 hearing, Plaintiff requested but was denied additional time to
prepare for the October trial. (Id. at 7 ¶ 22, 8 ¶ 25.) After trial, the divorce court entered the JOD
which, inter alia, ordered the sale of Plaintiff’s marital home. (See id. at 5 ¶ 12.) Plaintiff
challenged the provisions of the JOD repeatedly for the next two years. (See, e.g., id. at 10 ¶¶ 30–
32, 11 ¶ 33, 12 ¶ 37, 36 ¶ 65, 50 ¶ 118.)
Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this case on October 31, 2018, and subsequently and
unsuccessfully sought injunctive relief. (Dkts. 1, 3, 35.) Defendants filed motions to dismiss in

1 “ECF” refers to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing system and
not the document’s internal pagination.
2019 (Dkts. 16, 20), and on February 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking to file an amended
complaint (Dkt. 36). On March 31, 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss in
their entirety, finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
and that the Complaint failed to state a claim because Defendants are immune from suit. (See
March 31 M&O, Dkt. 39, at 6.) The Court also denied Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint,

finding that any such amendment would be futile. (Id. at 17–18.) The Clerk of Court entered a
judgment the same day dismissing the Complaint. (Dkt. 40.) On April 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed
the instant motion seeking to vacate the Court’s dismissal, as well as asking the Court to solicit
guidance from the Department of Justice in interpreting how the ADA should be applied to
matrimonial cases involving allegations of domestic violence.2 (MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 25–27.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Reconsideration is an extraordinary remedy to be employed sparingly in the interests of
finality and conservation of scarce judicial resources.”3 Coventry Capital US LLC v. EEA Life

2 Plaintiff submitted an Amended Memorandum of Law in Support of her Motion to Vacate
correcting various typographical errors on May 8, 2020. The Court considers and cites to the
amended version of her Memorandum of Law.
3 Plaintiff characterizes her motion as a “motion to vacate” “pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e).” (MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 4, 9.) The Court notes that generally, motions for vacatur are
brought under Rule 60(b), while motions for reconsideration are brought under Rule 59(e) and/or
Local Rule 6.3, as well as Rule 60(b). See, e.g., Axar Master Fund, Ltd. v. Bedford, 806 F. App’x
35, 35 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (discussing standards for “reconsideration under Rule 59
or vacatur under Rule 60(b)”); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Craig Scott Capital, LLC, No. 16-CV-
4757 (SJF) (AYS), 2020 WL 435034, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2020) (“Motions for reconsideration
may be brought pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Local Rule 6.3.” (citation omitted)). Since Plaintiff seeks a reevaluation of the reasons her
complaint was dismissed in the hopes that such a reconsideration will lead to vacatur of the
judgment dismissing her complaint, the Court construes Plaintiff’s motion as one seeking
reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). See In re CCS.Com.USA, Inc., No. 18-17-77476
(AST), 2018 WL 4042860, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2018) (construing motion to vacate
as motion to reconsider under Rules 59(c), 60(b), and Local Rule 6.3). Additionally, because a
“document filed pro se is to be liberally construed,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007),
the Court considers Plaintiff’s motion under Local Rule 6.3, even though it was filed outside the
Settlements Inc., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2020 WL 638524, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) (discussing reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and Local Rule 6.3).4
A motion for reconsideration “is not a vehicle for relitigating old issues, presenting the case under
new theories, securing a rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple.”
Analytical Surveys, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, L.P., 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). “The major grounds for justifying reconsideration are an intervening
change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.” Focus Prods. Grp. Int’l, LLC v. Kartri Sales Co., Inc., No. 15-CV-
10154 (PAE), 2020 WL 2115344, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing, inter alia, Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255
(2d Cir. 1992)). “[A]rguments raised for the first time on reconsideration are not proper grounds
for reconsideration.” Pall Corp. v. 3M Purification Inc., No. 97-CV-7599, 03-CV-92 (PKC), 2015
WL 5009254, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2015). “The standard for granting [a reconsideration
motion] is strict, and reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point

to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked—matters, in other words, that might
reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.” Norton v. Town of Islip, No.

14-day period provided for by that rule. See Tang v. Visnauskas, No. 19-CV-508 (PKC) (PK),
2019 WL 6716741, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2019) (“Although filed after the 14-day period
provided for under Local Rule 6.3, given Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court has considered . . .
[plaintiff’s] motion[.]”). Nevertheless, as discussed herein, the Court finds that relief is
inappropriate under all three rules.

4 “The standards for relief under Local [] Rule 6.3 and Rule 59(e) are identical.” Lucio v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ. & Marie Douyon, No. 12-CV-247 (DAB), 2013 WL 12084546, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2013), aff’d sub nom. Lucio v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 575 F. App’x 3 (2d Cir.
2014) (internal alterations and quotations omitted).
12-CV-4463 (PKC), 2016 WL 264930, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2016) (citing Shrader v. CSX
Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995)), aff’d, 678 F. App’x 17 (2d Cir. 2017).
Similarly, relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b) is available in six circumstances:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4)
the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied . . . or [it] is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; and (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

Canale v. Manco Power Sports, LLC, No. 06-CV-6131 (PKL), 2010 WL 2771871, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
July 13, 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Motions for relief under Rule
60(b) are disfavored, and are reserved for exceptional cases.” Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt.,
Corp., No. 08-CV-6293 (JFK), 2013 WL 2951957, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2013) (citation
omitted). “The standard for granting such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will generally be
denied unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court
overlooked—matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion
reached by the court.” In re Sanofi Sec. Litig., No. 14-CV-9624 (PKC), 2016 WL 3566233, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2016) (quoting Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257). “A Rule 60 motion may not be used
‘simply to relitigate matters settled by the original judgment.’” MAVL Capitial, Inc. v. Marine
Transp. Logistics, Inc., 771 F. App’x 56, 57 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (quoting Donovan v.
Sovereign Sec., Ltd., 726 F.2d 55, 60 (2d Cir. 1984)).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not identify any “intervening change in controlling law,” “new evidence,”
“clear error,” or “manifest injustice”5 in seeking reconsideration of the Court’s March 31 M&O.6
See Focus Prods. Grp., 2020 WL 2115344, at *1. Nor does she allege fraud (in the instant
litigation), or a void or satisfied judgment as appropriate for vacatur under Rule 60(b). See Canale,

2010 WL 2771871, at *2. Rather, her motion largely repeats the arguments raised in her opposition
to Defendants’ motions to dismiss (see Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition (“Pl.’s
MTD Br.”), Dkt. 32), which she claims were “overlooked” by the Court (MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF

5 The Court acknowledges the many challenges faced by Plaintiff, which, in addition to her
disabilities, include multiple years of abusive treatment by her husband, loss of her marital home,
financial difficulties, and sole childcare responsibilities for children with multiple disabilities.
(See, e.g., Compl., Dkt. 1, at 30 ¶ 47, 38 ¶ 83, 43 ¶ 96.) However, Plaintiff’s sympathetic
circumstances do not permit the Court to overlook its own limited subject matter jurisdiction or
Defendants’ immunity from suit. (See March 31 M&O, Dkt. 39); Tomczyk v. N.Y. Unified Court
Sys., No. 19-CV-2753 (JS) (AYS), 2019 WL 2437849, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2019) (“[U]nder
the domestic relations exception, ‘divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees” remain outside
federal jurisdictional bounds.’”) (quoting Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006)); see
also Sigmon, Tr. for Hindin v. Goldman Sachs Mortg. Co., No. 12-CV-03367 (ALC), 2019 WL
970943, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2019) (finding that while courts “have not defined precisely what
constitutes manifest injustice,” parties seeking reconsideration for manifest injustice bear a “high
burden”) (internal citation and punctuation omitted). Furthermore, Plaintiff has had the
opportunity, of which she availed herself over the course of the more than seven-year divorce
litigation in state court, to present evidence regarding these challenges in her effort to obtain a
favorable divorce decree.

6 In addition to seeking vacatur of the Court’s March 31 M&O and the corresponding
Judgment, Plaintiff also asks that the Court “invite interpretive guidance” on the issues in the case
from the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and order a DOJ compliance review of
Defendants’ conduct. (See MTV, Dkt. 42-1, at 24; Plaintiff’s Amended Reply Memorandum of
Law in Support of Her Motion to Vacate (“Pl.’s Am. Rep.”), Dkt. 48, at ECF 11.) While Plaintiff
cites 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) for the principle that a district court may grant the Attorney General
leave to intervene in an appropriate case (see MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 25; Pl.’s Am. Rep., Dkt. 48,
at ECF 11), the Attorney General has made no request to intervene in this case. Even if the Court
believed that such intervention or guidance were appropriate, it is unaware of any mechanism by
which it might invite such intervention or guidance from the DOJ, and declines to do so.
14 (insisting that the arguments articulated in both briefs “militate[] in favor of the opposite
conclusion”)).
“[A] motion for reconsideration may not be used as a vehicle for relitigating issues already
decided by the Court,” Dekom v. Mae, No. 17-CV-2712 (RRM) (ARL), 2019 WL 4696289, at *1
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2019) (citation and alterations omitted); see Pearlstein v. Blackberry Ltd., No.

13-CV-7060 (CM) (KHP), 2019 WL 6977157, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2019) (finding that it
would be a waste of the court’s limited judicial resources to merely re-enunciate its findings on
arguments already raised by the party seeking reconsideration, and that “recycled arguments based
on previously-presented case law [do not] establish clear error or manifest injustice”)). Although
the Court does not fully restate its conclusions on issues already discussed in depth in its March
31 M&O, it reiterates the central ones in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status.7
I. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
In its March 31 M&O, the Court found that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. (See March 31 M&O, Dkt. 39, at 6.) Plaintiff’s motion to vacate contends that

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar her “federal civil rights claims arising out of collusion,
discrimination and procedural violations that occurred during state court litigation” because those
claims were not themselves raised and litigated in the prior litigation.8 (MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF

7 While Plaintiff is conducting this action pro se, she was assisted by a “limited scope
attorney” in drafting her briefing on this motion. (See MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 2; Pl.’s Am. Rep.,
Dkt. 48, at ECF 2.)
8 Plaintiff argues that because her claims are not subject to collateral estoppel or res
judicata, they cannot be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 21.)
While the Court does not examine whether either collateral estoppel or res judicata apply to
Plaintiff’s claims, it notes that Rooker-Feldman is distinct from those doctrines and provides an
independent basis for dismissing claims that were previously adjudicated and resolved in state
court. See Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 92 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he narrow
Rooker–Feldman inquiry is distinct from the question whether claim preclusion (res judicata) or
issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) will defeat a federal plaintiff’s suit.”).
21.) This is the same argument Plaintiff made in her opposition to Defendants’ motions to
dismiss—which the Court rejected—and thus provides no basis for reconsideration. (See Pl.’s
MTD Br., Dkt. 32, at 18.) The Court further explains that “the fact that Plaintiff is alleging a new
[civil rights] claim . . . does not change the injury about which she complains,” which resulted
from the decision of the state court. Voltaire v. Westchester Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 11-CV-

8876 (CS), 2016 WL 4540837, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2016) (internal quotation omitted); see
also Lomnicki v. Cardinal McCloskey Servs., No. 04-CV-4548 (KMK), 2007 WL 2176059, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2007) (plaintiff who sought damages for discrimination by the family court,
rather than review of family court’s determination, was barred on Rooker-Feldman grounds
because her injury was “caused by the Family Court judgment”). Even assuming arguendo that
Plaintiff had adequately alleged a violation of her due process rights at the state court level,9 the
Court would be constrained by Rooker-Feldman to avoid reviewing the state court judgment. (See
March 31 M&O, Dkt. 39, at 9 (collecting cases).)

9 Plaintiff claims that she has adequately pled a constitutional violation because her
complaint alleges that “Defendants failed to offer [Plaintiff] a legally required hearing” in violation
of her due process rights. (MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 22.) It appears that the “legally required hearing”
to which Plaintiff refers is the “full fraud hearing” that Plaintiff requested and was denied when
she sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against the enforcement of the state court’s order
to enforce the JOD and marital home sale. (See Compl., Dkt. 1, at 10 ¶¶ 30–32, 11 ¶ 33, 25 ¶ 28.)
While due process requires that state actors “offer a meaningful opportunity to be heard” before
depriving a person of property, see Heckman v. Town of Hempstead, 568 F. App’x 41, 45 (2d Cir.
2014) (summary order), the alleged deprivation in this case occurred after years of litigation and a
full trial (see, e.g., Compl., Dkt. 1, 7 ¶ 22, 10 ¶ 30 (describing trial at which JOD was decided, as
well as a “March[] 2018 Cross Motion . . . [and] an April 6, 2018 motion in the Appellate
Division”)). Plaintiff also notes that she was in fact appointed a “free Contempt attorney” when
the Court denied her TRO. (Id. at 10 ¶ 32.) In light of the extensive process, both at the trial and
appellate level, that Plaintiff has already received in state court, Plaintiff’s allegation that she was
denied a “full fraud hearing” plainly fails to state a claim for deprivation of due process.
II. Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff also makes a number of arguments as to why Defendants are not entitled to
immunity, which again are largely recycled from her briefing on the motions to dismiss. (Compare
MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 14–20, with Pl.’s MTD Br., Dkt. 32, at 19, 24–25.) Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that the Court erred in finding that the Judicial Defendants10 are entitled to Eleventh

Amendment or sovereign immunity, because their failure to comply with the ADA abrogates that
immunity.11 (MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 14–18; see also Pl.’s MTD Br., Dkt. 32, at 19–20.)
As the Court wrote in the March 31 M&O, courts apply one of two tests to determine
whether the ADA abrogates sovereign immunity. “Some courts have found that a ‘Title II claimant
[must] establish the violation of a fundamental right’ in order to abrogate sovereign immunity,
while others have concluded that a ‘Title II violation must be motivated by discriminatory animus
or ill will based on the plaintiff’s disability.’” (See March 31 M&O, Dkt. 39, at 11 (quoting
McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)).) Plaintiff contends that she
has satisfied the conditions for the first test, and that the second test misstates the law. (See MTV,
Dkt. 44, at ECF 15–18.)12 With regards to the first test, Plaintiff alleges that she was constructively

10 The Judicial Defendants include all Defendants except Veronica Irwin. (See March 31
M&O, Dkt. 39, at 10 n.7.)
11 Plaintiff contends that her divorce proceedings and the JOD orders within those
proceedings are “state activities and services for [the] purposes of Title II,” such that they trigger
“immunity-piercing provisions of the ADA.” (MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 23–24.) The cases that
Plaintiff cites for this proposition are inapposite: neither Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S.
206, 209–12 (1998), nor Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), discusses the application of Title
II to courts and their decisions; indeed, Shelley predates the ADA. Even assuming that these
proceedings are “services” for the purposes of the ADA, as discussed above, Plaintiff does not
allege exclusion from or discrimination by the services sufficient to abrogate sovereign immunity.

12 While Plaintiff cites a law review article for the proposition that “neither [the
Rehabilitation Act] nor Title II of the ADA imposes any intent requirements when making a
disability discrimination claim” (MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 17–18 (citation omitted)), courts in this
Circuit have recently held that plaintiffs may be required to show that the alleged Title II violation
denied her fundamental right of access to the courts because (1) the “state court repeatedly denied
her enough time to complete and file needed legal papers despite knowing she was litigating pro
se” and her disability made her unable to file “key legal filings . . . on the court’s schedule,” and
(2) the state court failed to treat her as a victim of domestic violence and thus as disabled under
the ADA and therefore applied the wrong standard to the division of property. (Id. at ECF 12–

14.)
Plaintiff’s allegations that the divorce court failed to grant her extensions despite her pro
se status and disability fail to show that she was denied a fundamental right. While it is
unquestionable that Title II pierces a state’s sovereign immunity in cases implicating a plaintiff’s
fundamental right of access to the courts (see id. at ECF 14–15 (citing, inter alia, Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533–34 (2004))),13 Plaintiff has not alleged anything close to a lack of access
here. “In the courtroom context, ‘meaningful access’ has been held to be consistent with the due
process principle that, within the limits of practicability, all individuals must be afforded a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Amato v. McGinty, No. 17-CV-1280 (GLS) (TWD), 2019

WL 8064011, at *4–5 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2019) (finding it unlikely that a plaintiff with PTSD had

was “motivated by discriminatory animus or ill will based on the plaintiff’s disability.” Russell v.
New York, No. 18-CV-8543 (VSB), 2019 WL 4805687, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). (See also March 31 M&O, Dkt. 39, at 11.) Plaintiff does
not claim to have pled any facts showing animus (see MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 18), and thus, to the
extent that intentional discrimination is required to show a violation of Title II, has failed to make
the requisite showing. The Court, however, does not need to, and does not, resolve this issue,
because of its finding that Plaintiff has simply failed to sufficiently allege a denial of access to
support an ADA claim.

13 Lane involved paraplegic plaintiffs in wheelchairs who were unable to access the courts
to answer criminal charges because the county courthouse had no elevator. Lane, 541 U.S. 513–
14. One of the plaintiffs was forced to crawl up two flights of stairs at his first appearance and
was jailed for failure to appear when he refused to do so a second time. Id. at 514. As discussed
infra, Plaintiff, whose complaint describes years of participation in state court litigation, does not
allege anything similar to the exclusion from court described in Lane.
adequately stated Title II claim where she was denied adjournment of her child custody
proceedings because she “d[id] not allege that she was not permitted a reasonable amount of time
to prepare for proceedings nor provide any specifics about the nature of the adjournment
requested”); id. (“A reasonable accommodation is one that gives the disabled person ‘meaningful
access’ to the services sought.”). As described above and stated in the March 31 M&O, Plaintiff

has a “long history” of litigation, beginning in 2008. (March 31 M&O, Dkt. 39, at 11.) She was
represented during some of that litigation, and requested an extension before her 2015 trial not
merely because of her disability, but also because she had “released her attorney” and “chose to
represent herself pro se at trial to have control over her case.” (Compl., Dkt. 1, at 7 ¶ 22, 8 ¶ 25.)
According to the Complaint itself, Plaintiff had numerous opportunities to be heard, both at trial
and after, and has therefore failed to allege a deprivation of her fundamental right of access to the
courts.14

14 In both her motion to vacate and reply, Plaintiff cites Le Grand v. Evan, 702 F.2d 415
(2d Cir. 1983), for the principle that“[a] litigant who is, due to a disability and to a court’s illegal
refusal to accommodate it, unable to file papers is effectively denied meaningful access to the
courts.” (See MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 15–16; Pl.’s Am. Rep., Dkt. 48, at ECF 8, citing Le Grand,
702 F.2d at 418 (“[t]he refusal of a clerk of a court to accept the papers of a litigant seeking to
commence an action under a state statute may deprive that litigant of federal constitutional
rights.”).) But Le Grand did not involve a failure to accommodate a disability, and has no
relevance to this matter. The plaintiff in Le Grand alleged that New York State court clerks had
refused to accept his habeas corpus petition and in forma pauperis application, and “[had] not
state[d] any ‘legal’ reasons for their refusal,” but instead had done so “in bad faith and with malice
because they knew [plaintiff] was a convicted murderer and had filed other pro se applications in
both state and federal court.” 702 F.2d at 416. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that she was
prevented from commencing an action, but merely that “the state matrimonial court refused to
accept key legal filings because, due to her qualified disability, she was unable to file them on the
court’s schedule.” (Pl.’s Am. Rep., Dkt. 48, at ECF 8 (punctuation omitted).) Plaintiff herself
alleges that the state court had a clear “legal” reason to refuse Plaintiff’s filings: they were
untimely. The state court’s adherence to its schedule is plainly unlike the bad-faith refusal of court
clerks to even accept Plaintiff’s application in Le Grand, and did not deprive Plaintiff of her
constitutional rights.
Moreover, “[Plaintiff]’s contention that applicable standards should be changed in light of
[her] disability . . . is not what Title II requires.” Wiltz v. N.Y. Univ., No. 18-CV-123 (GHW)
(SDA), 2019 WL 721658, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2019), report and recommendation adopted
2019 WL 720700 (Feb. 19, 2019)); see also Amato, 2019 WL 8064011, at *4 (finding that, where
plaintiff “argue[d] that defendants could have accommodated her disabilities by returning custody

to her” and “label[ed] all unfavorable decisions in the underlying child custody proceedings as
failures to reasonably her accommodate her PTSD,” she “ultimately s[ought] to challenge [] not
illegal discrimination against the disabled, but the substance of services provided to h[er]”).
Indeed, Plaintiff’s disability entitles her neither to her preferred outcome nor to a preferential
standard. See Wiltz, 2019 WL 721658, at *9 (“The ADA mandates reasonable accommodation of
people with disabilities in order to put them on an even playing field with the non-disabled; it does
not authorize a preference for disabled people generally.”) (quoting Felix v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.,
324 F.3d 102, 107 (2d Cir. 2003)). “Title II requires the accommodation of a disabled person only
when that person is otherwise entitled, independent of his or her disability, to the public service or

benefit at issue.” Id. at *6 (finding that Plaintiff had failed to state an ADA claim where he had
requested and been denied “representation/legal assistance and a request for a protective order” in
housing court, as plaintiff “ha[d] not shown that, with or without a disability, he was entitled to
[either]”) (citing Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2009)).
Plaintiff asserts that sovereign immunity does not apply to her claims because she seeks
“prospective” declaratory relief stating that the “policies, practices, procedures and standards
Matrimonial Court Defendants apply to her contested JOD lawsuit . . . are ‘program activities’
governed by and required to comply with 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130, 35.139 and 35.103,” and that “JOD
Orders are ‘services’ as defined by [the] ADA such that rights under the ADA attach.”15 (MTV,
Dkt. 44, at ECF 18.) The Court has already addressed Plaintiff’s mischaracterization of this relief
as “prospective” (see March 31 M&O, Dkt. 39, at 13–14), and declines to repeat or elaborate on
its prior reasoning. See Elgalad v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 17-CV-4849 (VSB), 2019 WL
4805669, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2019) (“Mere disagreement with this Court’s interpretation

and analysis of the facts pled is not an appropriate ground for reconsideration.”).
III. Plaintiff’s Other Arguments
The Court has already addressed the remainder of Plaintiff’s contentions at the motion to
dismiss stage. Plaintiff raises in her motion to vacate the same arguments as in her motion to
dismiss briefing regarding Defendant Irwin’s judicial immunity. (Compare MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF
18–19, with Pl.’s MTD Br., Dkt. 32, at 24–25.) The Court, having considered and decided these
arguments, again finds that judicial immunity applies. (March 31 M&O, Dkt. 39, at 16–17.)
Plaintiff further contends that the Court should vacate its March 31 M&O because it failed
to address the “novel nature” of her argument that the state matrimonial courts fail to apply the

correct standard under the ADA to cases in which non-physical domestic violence and disability
are alleged. (MTV, Dkt. 44, at ECF 9.) Plaintiff’s repeated emphasis on the “novelty” of the
issues she raises, however, does not change or implicate the Court’s evaluation of the legal issues
at play. Cf., e.g., Turgeon v. Operating Eng’rs, Local No. 98, 2 F. App’x 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2001)

15 To the extent Plaintiff seeks relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, she fails
to state a claim because that provision applies only to entities that receive federal funding and
Plaintiff does not allege that the divorce courts at issue receive federal money. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a); Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 185 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he standard [for
alleging] Rehabilitation Act claims is generally the same as for ADA claims, with the additional
requirement that defendants must receive federal funding.”) (citation omitted).
(summary order) (finding that a plaintiff’s assertion that issues in the case were “novel and
complex” did not justify nullification of the judgment).
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to make any argument that warrants
the “extraordinary remedy” of reconsideration and vacatur of the Court’s judgment, and therefore
her motion to vacate the Court’s Memorandum, Order, and Judgment must be denied. Speedfit

LLC v. Chapco Inc., No. 15-CV-1323 (PKC) (RLM), 2020 WL 758824, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14,
2020).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the March 31, 2020
Memorandum, Order, and Judgment is denied.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Pamela K. Chen
Pamela K. Chen
United States District Judge
Dated: June 22, 2020
Brooklyn, New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10304411. Public record. Not legal advice.