# Vassel v. Palisades Funding Corp.

> District Court, E.D. New York · May 28, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10304290

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** May 28, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10304290

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “conversion may occur when a valid repossession of collateral results in an incidental taking of other property, unless the loan agreement includes the debtor's consent to the incidental taking”
- discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)
- noting that a plaintiff may seek an order in state court requiring return of a vehicle repossessed in violation of the UCC

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------X
PAUL VASSEL,

Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
-against- 19-CV-3241(EK)(RER)

PALISADES FUNDING CORP., MICHAEL
JORDON, VICTORIA VANDERGRIFT, et
al.,

Defendants.
----------------------------------X
ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Paul Vassel, pro se, filed an Amended
Complaint in this action on October 15, 2019.1 He alleges
various consumer protection and civil rights violations arising
out of the allegedly unlawful repossession of his vehicle on
May 17, 2019 and his arrest during that event. See id. at 28.
Plaintiff seeks $210 million in total damages2 from a number of
defendants: Palisades Funding Corp. (“Palisades”); Palisades

1 By Memorandum and Order dated September 10, 2019, Judge Matsumoto granted
his request to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismissed the complaint with
leave to replead, among other rulings. Dkt. No. 5. The case was
subsequently reassigned to the undersigned judge.

2 Plaintiff also seeks attorney’s fees and costs of the action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988. Am. Compl. at 28. However, “a pro se litigant who is not a lawyer
is not entitled to attorney’s fees” under Section 1988. Kay v. Ehrler, 499
U.S. 432, 435 (1991).

1
employees Willfredo Toro,3 Michael Jordon, Victoria Vandergrift
and Ashlee Chavez; Queens National Auto Group, Corp. (“Queens
National Auto”) and its employee Offer Ben Moshe; the New York
City Police Department; the 105th Police Precinct; Sergeant
Nathaniel, Sergeant Reimbave, and Officer Gregory Nuzzi of the

105th Police Precinct; former Commissioner James Patrick O’Neill
and his successor, and Deputy Inspector Neteis Gilbert of the
NYPD; the City of New York; the County of Queens; “John Does 1
to 10”; and “Police Does 1 to 10.” Dkt. No. 6, Am. Compl. at 1.
For the reasons set forth below, the Amended Complaint
is dismissed in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges, and the court assumes, the
following facts: on May 17, 2019, Willfredo Toro and a tow-truck
driver whose name remains unknown (“John Doe 1”) – both of whom
he says are employees of Palisades – attempted to repossess his
2018 Ford Transit T-350 Van (the “vehicle”). Am. Compl. at 5-6,

10. Plaintiff claims this was a “mistake” because “all proper

3 Where the spelling of an individual’s name differs between the case caption
and the text of the Amended Complaint, the Court adopts the spelling in the
case caption.

2
payments were tendered” on the vehicle.4 Id. at 6. Plaintiff
alleges that defendants Toro and Doe 1 had no court order to
repossess the vehicle, id. at 7, 10, and that he repeatedly
stated he did not consent to the repossession, id. at 6. The
complaint describes how defendants Toro and Doe 1 “were

proceeding to pull” him out of his vehicle as he was
“screaming.” Id. When the effort to remove him was
unsuccessful, he alleges, they called the police. Id.
Sergeant Nathaniel and Officer Nuzzi of the 105th
Precinct arrived at the scene, and Sergeant Nathanial “order[ed]
[him] to come out of the [vehicle] and stated that it will be
repossessed.” Id. at 7. Vassel was then arrested for
obstructing governmental administration in the second
degree. Id. In the course of the arrest, Officer Nuzzi “pushed
[him] against the van, [roughed him] up,” and placed him in
handcuffs that were “very tight” and that “cut[] into [his]
skin.” Id. at 7-8. Officer Nuzzi then allegedly searched his

4 Given this allegation, it bears note that Plaintiff attached to the Amended
Complaint a letter that Palisades sent him on May 10, 2019. Dkt. No. 6 at
47. This letter states: “After several attempts to contact you in regards to
your account with Palisades Funding Corp., you seem unwilling to work with us
to bring your account up to date or make necessary arrangements to do so. It
is imperative you take the first step in contacting our office in regards to
your delinquent account as soon as possible.” Id. The letter lists the
“amount past due” as $920.64. Id. Still, at this preliminary stage of the
proceedings, the Court assumes the veracity of the allegations set out in the
text without qualification.
3
pockets, seized the keys to his vehicle, and gave those keys to
Doe 1. Id. at 9-10. Once he was arrested, Plaintiff states,
Doe 1 towed his vehicle, id at 8, and certain property inside
the vehicle has not since been returned to him, including a
bible, prayer shawl, and other personal items, id. at 10.

Plaintiff claims he was taken to the 105th Precinct,
where he was held for over seventeen hours. Id. at 13. While
at the precinct, Sergeant Reimbave, Officer Nuzzi, Sergeant
Nathaniel, and an unnamed officer (“Police Doe 1”) “grabbed
[him] out of the cell and held [him] down without [his] consent
to take fingerprints and [a] mug shot.” Id. at 12; see also
Dkt. No. 6, Notice of Claim at 3 (stating that the officers
“grabbed me out of the cell and held me down and took my private
[] property”). The next day, May 18, 2019, Plaintiff was
released, and the obstruction charge was later adjourned in
contemplation of dismissal. Am. Compl. at 13.
In this action, Plaintiff brings consumer-protection

claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, id. at 25-
26, Truth in Lending Act, id., and Fair Credit Reporting Act,
id. at 25; what he styles as a state-law claim for “breach of
the peace” under the New York Uniform Commercial Code, id. at
23-25; and a common-law conversion claim, id. at 23-24.
Plaintiff also sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging due process
4
violations, id. at 19, false arrest, id. at 16, use of excessive
force, id. at 18, malicious prosecution, id. at 17, failure to
train, id. at 20-23, and municipal liability, id.; as well as
claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, id. at 16-18.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible “when
the Plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). At this stage, a court must accept a complaint’s
factual allegations as true; however, this tenet is inapplicable
to conclusory statements. Id. Although a court must construe a
pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, a pro se complaint must
still state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
Mancuso v. Hynes, 379 F. App’x 60, 61 (2d Cir. 2010).

Where (as here) a Plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis, the district court must screen the complaint and
dismiss any action that “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
5
DISCUSSION
I. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Fair Credit Reporting
Act, and Truth in Lending Act

The Amended Complaint alleges violations of the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and Truth in Lending Act
(“TILA”) against Palisades, Vandergrift, Jordon, Chaves, Queens
National Auto, and Ben Moshe. Plaintiff also alleges a
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) against
Palisades, Vandergrift, Jordon, and Chaves.
Pursuant to the FDCPA, a “debt collector” may
repossess property through “nonjudicial action” – i.e., without
a court order – only if the creditor has a “present right to
possession of the property claimed as collateral through an
enforceable security interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f-(6)(A).
Whether there is a “present right to possession” turns on the
New York Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”). See Gerbasi v. NU Era
Towing & Serv., Inc., No. 17-CV-553, 2020 WL 1131218, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020). Under the UCC, a debt collector may
repossess property “without judicial process, if it proceeds
without breach of the peace.” N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-609; see also
Barrett v. Harwood, 189 F.3d 297, 300 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Hence,
where repossession cannot be accomplished without a breach of
the peace, a retaking must be effected by legal process.”). The
gravamen of Plaintiff’s consumer protection complaint, when
6
construed liberally, appears to be that a “breach of the peace”
occurred when he was forced out of his vehicle and it was
repossessed without a court order.
The UCC does not define “breach of the peace.” In the
criminal context, New York State courts have described breach of

the peace to be “a disturbance of public order by an act of
violence, or by any act likely to produce violence, or which, by
causing consternation and alarm, disturbs the peace and quiet of
the community.” People v. Smith, 19 N.Y.2d 212, 216 (1967).
Courts have found that “the taking of a vehicle on default from
a public location over the oral objection of the owner, however
strenuous, is not a breach of the peace unless accompanied by
factors indicating that the activities of the repossession agent
are of a kind likely to cause violence, or public distress
and/or consternation.” Gill v. Bd. of Nat'l Credit Union Admin.
for Sikh Fed. Credit Union, No. CV 93-1597, 2018 WL 5045755, at
*10 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2018) (citing cases). Plaintiff claims

that Palisades and its agents resorted to force to effectuate
the repossession – that they were “pulling [him] out of his
car.” Therefore, Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim against Palisades
survives the in forma pauperis (“IFP”) review required by
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

7
Plaintiff does not allege that Queens National Auto is
a “debt collector” (as he must under the FDCPA) or, indeed,
allege any specific facts at all about how Queens National Auto
participated in the events in question. Queens National Auto is
therefore dismissed from this action without prejudice.

The FCRA and TILA claims do not survive IFP review.
The FCRA claim is predicated on the allegation that Palisades
reported “derogatory credit information” that it knew to be
incorrect to three credit bureaus. Am. Compl. at 14. The FCRA
requires those who furnish information to credit reporting
agencies to refrain from knowingly reporting inaccurate
information. See Longman v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 702 F.3d 148,
151 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)). The
Second Circuit, however, has held that there is no private right
of action for a violation of this provision. Id. Therefore,
the claim under Section 1681s-2(a) is dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff alleges that Palisades, Queens National

Auto, and certain of their employees violated TILA by failing to
notify him of his right to rescind the loan contract under that
statute. TILA, however, provides a right of rescission only in
connection with credit transactions that are secured by
“property which is used as the principal dwelling of the person
to whom credit is extended.” 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a). Plaintiff
8
does not allege that the loan in question was secured by his
principal dwelling. Therefore, this claim is dismissed without
prejudice to replead, should Plaintiff be able to allege such a
security interest.
II. New York UCC and Conversion

Plaintiff brings two state-law claims against
Palisades, Toro, John Doe 1, Vandergrift, Jordon and Chaves.
The first appears to be a claim for injunctive relief pursuant
to Section 9-609 of the New York Uniform Commercial Code. Cf.
Barrett, 189 F.3d at 304 (noting that a plaintiff may seek an
order in state court requiring return of a vehicle repossessed
in violation of the UCC). This claim turns on the same
consideration discussed above about whether a breach of the
peace occurred. Therefore, per the discussion above, the
Section 9-609 claim may proceed. The second is a state common-
law claim for conversion arising out of the same repossession of
the car and alleged taking of his personal property. Clark v.

Auto Recovery Bureau Conn., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 543, 548
(D. Conn. 1994) (explaining that “conversion may occur when a
valid repossession of collateral results in an incidental taking
of other property, unless the loan agreement includes the
debtor's consent to the incidental taking”). This claim, too,
may proceed beyond this preliminary stage.
9
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff brings 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against
certain of the public and private defendants for alleged due
process violations, false arrest, use of excessive force,
malicious prosecution, failure to train, and municipal

liability.
1. Due Process
Plaintiff brings a due process claim for unlawful
seizure of property against Sergeant Nathanial, Officer Nuzzi,
Palisades, Victoria Vandergrift, Ashlee Chavez, Willfredo Toro,
and John Doe 1. A debtor may have a due-process claim when
property “in which [he] enjoyed a lawful possessory interest [is
repossessed] by state action in violation of the constitution.”
Barrett, 189 F.3d at 301. Police officers may, of course, keep
the peace in connection with repossessions and respond
appropriately to reports of disturbance. But if a debt
collector wants their affirmative assistance in a repossession

effort, it needs to obtain a court order. See id. (“The
Constitution requires notice and a prior hearing before a state
can assist a secured creditor in the repossession of a debtor's
property.”) (emphasis added).
Given Plaintiff’s contention that he was up to date on
his car payments, the Court draws (at this stage) the favorable
10
inference that Plaintiff had “a lawful possessory interest” in
the vehicle at the time of repossession. Still, there can be no
Section 1983 claim unless the alleged participation by police
officers rendered the dispossession a state action. In Barrett,
“the crucial question [was] whether the police officer was (1)

present simply to stand by in case there was a breach of the
peace, or (2) taking an active role that either affirmatively
assisted in the repossession over the debtor's objection or
intentionally intimidated the debtor so as to prevent him from
exercising his legal right to object to the repossession.” Id.
Based on Plaintiff’s allegations that the officers affirmatively
ordered him out of the vehicle as he was objecting to the
repossession, arrested him, and gave the keys to the vehicle to
Doe 1, this claim, too, survives the sua sponte review required
at this stage.
The Court recognizes that whether the officers have
qualified immunity should be resolved at the “earliest possible

stage in litigation.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
(2001). And the IFP statute does require a court to screen a
pro se complaint for claims seeking “monetary relief against a
defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). However, the Court will await the public

11
defendants’ answer or response to the complaint before
considering this issue.
2. False Arrest
Plaintiff’s false arrest claim against Officer Nuzzi
and Sergeant Nathaniel may proceed from this preliminary stage.

To plead a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must show that
“(1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, (2) the
plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff
did not consent to the confinement, and (4) the confinement was
not otherwise privileged.” Jackson v. City of New York, 939 F.
Supp. 2d 235, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Confinement is privileged if
there was probable cause at the time of the arrest. See Jenkins
v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 84 (2d Cir. 2007). Here,
Plaintiff alleges he was arrested for obstructing government
administration in the second degree. N.Y. Penal Law § 195.05
(“A person is guilty of obstructing governmental administration
when he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the

administration of law . . . or prevents or attempts to prevent a
public servant from performing an official function, by means of
intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any
independently unlawful act.”). Plaintiff pleads that after he
refused to allow Palisades to repossess his vehicle without a
court order, police officers were called to the scene, ordered
12
him out of his car, arrested him, and held him at the station
overnight. While many questions obviously remain outstanding on
this claim, it, too, may proceed past IFP review.
3. Excessive Force
Plaintiff’s excessive force claims against Sergeant

Reimbave, Sergeant Nathaniel, Officer Nuzzi, and Police Doe 1
may also proceed from this preliminary stage. For this cause of
action, a defendant is liable if “the force used exceeded the
force needed for the factual circumstances.” Graham v. City of
New York, 928 F. Supp. 2d 610, 618 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Plaintiff
alleges that Officer Nuzzi “pushed [him] against the van,
[roughed him] up” and placed him in handcuffs that were “very
tight” and “cut[] into [his] skin.” Am. Compl. at 7-8.
Plaintiff also alleges that at the 105th Precinct, Sergeant
Reimbave, Officer Nuzzi, Sergeant Nathaniel, and Police Doe 1
“grabbed [him] out of the cell and held [him] down without his
consent.” Id. at 12. The excessive force claim may proceed

past IFP review.
4. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim against
Sergeant Nathaniel and Officer Nuzzi, however, must be
dismissed. To plead malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
allege: “(1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal
13
proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding
in plaintiff’s favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing
the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a motivation for
defendant’s actions.” Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d
149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Plaintiff received an adjournment in

contemplation of dismissal, which is not a favorable termination
for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. Green v.
Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 2009). Therefore,
Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is dismissed with
prejudice.
5. Failure to Train and Municipal Liability
Plaintiff asserts failure to train and municipal
liability claims against Commissioner James Patrick O’Neill;
Deputy Inspector Neteis Gilbert; the 105th Precinct; the New
York City Police Department; the City of New York; and the
County of Queens. These claims are dismissed for the following
reasons.

First, the claims against Commissioner O’Neill and
Deputy Inspector Gilbert fail because, under Section 1983, a
plaintiff must plead the defendant’s personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional deprivation. Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d
233, 249 (2d Cir. 2010). Personal involvement can be
established through:
14
(1) actual direct participation in the
constitutional violation, (2) failure to
remedy a wrong after being informed through a
report or appeal, (3) creation of a policy or
custom that sanctioned conduct amounting to a
constitutional violation, or allowing such a
policy or custom to continue, (4) grossly
negligent supervision of subordinates who
committed a violation, or (5) failure to act
on information indicating that
unconstitutional acts were occurring.

Hernandez v. Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2003).
Here, Plaintiff alleges no such acts or omissions by
Commissioner O’Neill or Deputy Inspector Gilbert personally. To
the extent Plaintiff names these defendants based simply on
their roles as supervisors, this fails because vicarious
liability is “inapplicable” to Section 1983 suits. Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-
official defendant, through the official’s own individual
actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Commissioner O’Neill
and Deputy Inspector Gilbert are dismissed without prejudice.
Second, Plaintiff cannot sue the 105th Precinct or the
New York City Police Department. Under Rule 17(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a municipal entity’s
“capacity” to be sued in federal court is generally determined
by the law of the state in which the district court is located.
Here, the relevant authority is the New York City Charter, which
provides that actions and proceedings to recover penalties for
15
legal violations shall be brought against the City of New York
and not any agency thereof, except where otherwise provided by
law. See N.Y.C. Charter Ch. 17, § 396. It is well recognized
in this Circuit that agencies of New York City are not “suable”
entities, including in 1983 actions. See Jenkins v. City of New

York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Baily v. New
York City Police Dept., 910 F. Supp. 116, 117 (E.D.N.Y 1996).
The New York City Police Department is an agency of New York
City, and therefore it cannot be sued. The New York City Police
Department and the 105th Precinct are dismissed with prejudice.
Finally, Plaintiff’s claims against Queens County and
the City of New York must be dismissed. In order to sustain a
Section 1983 claim against a municipal defendant, a plaintiff
must show the existence of an officially adopted policy or
custom that caused injury and a direct causal connection between
that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional
right. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York,

436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). The complaint must contain more than
conclusory allegations related to the existence of such policy
or custom. Plair v. City of New York, 789 F. Supp. 2d 459, 466
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). Therefore, Plaintiff’s unsupported statement
that the City of New York failed to train its employees is
insufficient to allege a violation pursuant to Monell. Neither
16
is an allegation of a single incident sufficient, as Plaintiff
alleges here. “[I]solated acts of excessive force by non-
policymaking municipal employees are generally not sufficient to
demonstrate a municipal custom, policy, or usage that would
justify municipal liability.” Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691

F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). Queens County and the City of New
York are dismissed without prejudice.
IV. 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242
Plaintiff also seeks relief pursuant to criminal
statutes 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. Section 241 prohibits a
conspiracy to infringe on a person’s civil rights and Section
242 prohibits the deprivation of civil rights under color of
law. As stated in Judge Matsumoto’s prior Order, Dkt. No. 5 at
6, there is no private right of action under these criminal
statutes. Sheehy v. Brown, 335 F. App’x 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“[C]laims based on the violation of federal criminal statutes,
such as 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242, . . . are not cognizable, as

federal criminal statutes do not provide private causes of
action.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241
and 242 are dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, this action is dismissed in part for
failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
17
§ 1915(e)(2)(B). The following claims are dismissed: TILA;
FCRA; Section 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, failure to
train, and municipal liability; and claims under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 241 and 242. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a
second amended complaint within 30 days from the date of this

Order should he be able to allege plausible claims under TILA.
The FDCPA, N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-609, and tortious
conversion claims shall proceed, as shall the due process, false
arrest, and excessive force claims under Section 1983. These
claims are asserted against some or all of the following
defendants: Palisades, Willfredo Toro, John Doe 1, Sergeant
Nathanial, Sergeant Reimbave, Officer Nuzzi, and Police Doe 1.
Plaintiff alleges no plausible facts whatsoever
regarding the liability of Michael Jordon, Victoria Vandergrift,
Ashlee Chavez, Queens National Auto, Offer Ben Moshe, John Does
2 to 10, or Police Does 2 to 10; therefore, these defendants are
dismissed without prejudice. The following defendants are also

dismissed without prejudice: former Commissioner James Patrick
O’Neill and his successor; Deputy Inspector Neteis Gilbert; the
City of New York; and the County of Queens. The 105th Precinct

18
and the New York City Police Department are dismissed with
prejudice.
Plaintiff must identify “John Doe 1” – the tow-truck
driver – and provide the full name of this defendant and the
address at which this defendant can be served. Plaintiff is

directed to submit this information in writing to the Clerk of
Court within thirty days from entry of this Order.
Pursuant to Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72 (2d Cir.
1997) (per curiam), the Court requests that the Corporation
Counsel of the City of New York ascertain the identity of the
“Police Doe 1” defendant of the 105th Precinct, against whom the
excessive force claim is alleged. Within forty-five days from
entry of this Order, Corporation Counsel shall provide the full
name of this defendant and the address at which this defendant
can be served.
Once the names of these defendants are provided,
Plaintiff’s complaint shall be deemed amended and the Court will

direct service of summonses on these defendants.
The Clerk of Court is directed to issue summonses to
the Palisades Funding Corp. and its employee Willfredo Toro, as
well as Sergeant Nathaniel, Sergeant Reimbave, and Officer
Gregory Nuzzi of the 105th Precinct of the New York City Police
Department. The United States Marshals Service is directed to
19
serve the summonses and complaint upon these defendants without
prepayment of fees.5 The Clerk of Court is directed to serve a
courtesy copy of this Order upon the Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York, Special Federal Litigation Division, and upon
the pro se plaintiff and to note service on the docket.

The court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)
that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith
and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45
(1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee ________
Eric Komitee
United States District Judge

Dated: May 28, 2020
Brooklyn, New York

5 Administrative Order No. 2020-19 suspends service of process by the United
States Marshals Service during the current national coronavirus emergency.
Once service of process is reinstated, the summons, Amended Complaint, and
this Order shall be served.
20

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10304290. Public record. Not legal advice.