# Lugo v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

> District Court, E.D. New York · May 5, 2020

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10304151

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** May 5, 2020
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

--------------------------------------X

NANCY LUGO MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
18-CV-2828 (KAM)

Plaintiff,

-against-

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

--------------------------------------X
KIYO A. MATSUMOTO, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Nancy Lugo (“plaintiff” or “claimant”) appeals
the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) (“defendant” or the “Commissioner”), which
found Plaintiff not disabled and thus not entitled to disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security
Act (“the Act”). Before the court are the parties’ cross-
motions for judgment on the pleadings. For the reasons set
forth below, the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings is DENIED, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED, and this
action is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
Memorandum and Order.
BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural background leading to this
action is set forth in the administrative record (ECF No. 16,
Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”)). The court has reviewed the
parties’ respective motions for judgment on the pleadings and
the administrative record.

The parties entered into a joint stipulation of facts on
March 12, 2019. (ECF No. 15-1.) The court does not incorporate
those facts entirely into the record, as the court finds that
they are not fully accurate. The court discusses the facts
relevant to its determination, as set forth herein.
I. Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for DIB on May 30, 2013, alleging that
she became disabled on June 1, 2012 due to anxiety and
depression. (Tr. at 158-159, 178.)
On October 2, 2013, the Social Security Administration
(“SSA”) denied plaintiff’s application, based on a finding that

plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Id.
at 89-93.) In response, plaintiff requested an administrative
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on November
26, 2013. (Id. at 103-104.) Plaintiff appeared with her
attorney at a hearing on December 3, 2015 and testified before
ALJ Lori Romeo (“ALJ Romeo” or the “ALJ”). (Id. at 40-76.) In
addition to plaintiff’s testimony, ALJ Romeo also reviewed the
testimonial interrogatory responses of Miriam Greene, a
vocational expert (“VE”), which were submitted on December 9,
2015. (Id. at 232-240.)
Prior to scheduling a vocational expert, the ALJ asked the
plaintiff’s attorney to amend the onset date, apparently because
the plaintiff’s condition worsened in July 2015, and offered to

award benefits from that date. “She starts what in July or
August – July of 2015. So that’s what I’m looking at. So what
are we doing?” (Id. at 70.) It was only after the plaintiff’s
attorney refused to amend the onset date that the ALJ stated,
“Very good. We’ll have a supplemental hearing with a vocational
expert.” (Id.) On May 31, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision
finding plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Act and
denying plaintiff’s application for DIB. (Id. at 25-39 (“ALJ
Decision”).).
Plaintiff appealed the ALJ Decision to the Appeals Council on
June 26, 2017. (Id. at 154-156.) At the time that the appeal was

filed, plaintiff’s attorney advised that the hearing office had
misplaced the decision in the matter and had served him on June
23, 2017 with a decision dated June 23, 2017. (Id. at 155.) The
first three pages of the decision, which should include on page
one the date that the decision was issued, are missing from the
decision as it appears in the administrative record. (Id. at 25-
39.) On April 2, 2018, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s
request for review, and the ALJ’s decision became the
Commissioner’s final determination. (Id. at 1-7.) Plaintiff
commenced the instant action on May 11, 2018. (See generally ECF
No. 1, Compl.)
II. Personal, Employment, and Non-Medical Factual Background
Plaintiff was born on December 28, 1964, is 5’3” tall, and

weighs 165 pounds. (Tr. at 78.) Plaintiff is fluent in English
and received a GED in 1982. (Id. at 177, 179.) At plaintiff’s
ALJ hearing on October 19, 2015, plaintiff stated that she lived
with her 18-year-old daughter and her one-year old grandchild
but she did not care for her grandchild. (Id. at 48-49.) She
testified that she was let go from her job in June 2012 because
her work had begun to suffer when she “felt herself unraveling.”
(Id. at 52.) She testified that she had difficulty
concentrating and was forgetting things (id. at 52) and started
therapy in July 2012. She underwent several rounds of
medication but the medications were adjusted and her symptoms

continued to fluctuate; at times she felt better, and other
times did not want to get out of bed. (Id. at 53-54.)
Plaintiff testified that she no longer cooked or cleaned
and could not remember exactly when she stopped. (Id. at 54-
55.) The ALJ asked the Plaintiff if a reference that she was
able to cook and clean in 2015 would have been reliable and she
stated yes. (Id. at 55.)
Plaintiff testified that she was a social person prior to
her illness but now could not even get through a baseball game
on TV and stated that her decline was “gradual.” (Id. at 56.)
She testified that she started to be so forgetful that her
daughters needed to start paying her bills in 2014, but could
not state exactly when. (Id. at 58.)

Plaintiff testified that in June 2015, she was hospitalized
and had stopped taking her medications because she felt that
they were not working. (Id. at 58.) She testified that
following her hospitalization, Dr. Denigris opined that her
medication dosage was not strong enough and increased it, but
her new dosage of medication made her drowsy, restless, jittery
and dizzy. (Id. at 59-60.) Plaintiff testified that she had
stopped smoking marijuana in 2012, but had a three-week relapse
in 2014. (Id. at 61-62, 64-65.) Plaintiff testified that after
losing her job she went on interviews but was anxious and could
not concentrate. (Id. at 67.)

III. Medical and Vocational Facts
The administrative record includes plaintiff’s medical
records dating back to July 2012. (Id. at 324-326.) Thus, all
medical records reflect treatment rendered after the alleged
onset date. Because plaintiff’s appeal focuses on the ALJ’s
findings as to her mental impairments, the court will address
only those records which pertain to treatment for mental
illness.
i. Medical Records
On July 19, 2012, plaintiff was seen at Lutheran Family
Health Center (“Lutheran”) for a psychiatric intake appointment
by social worker Allison Lopez-Galtman, LCSW, in conjunction

with Jean Baily, Ph.D. (Id. at 324-27.) She presented with
symptoms of depression, such as insomnia, lack of energy, crying
spells, irritability, social isolation, and difficulty
concentrating. (Id.) Her thought content was marked by
“anxious pre-occupation.” (Id.) She reported flashbacks about
past traumas from her childhood. (Id.) Plaintiff reported that
she had a boyfriend and was receiving unemployment insurance.
(Id. at 325.) Regarding interpersonal relationships, plaintiff
was described as “socially isolated.” (Id. at 325.) She was
capable of using public transportation, could maintain her own
financial benefits, and socialized. (Id.) Upon mental status

examination, Plaintiff was cooperative, well-related, and
exhibited normal and unremarkable motor activity. (Id. at 324.)
Her mood was depressed, sad, and anxious; thought process was
normal and insight was good despite anxiously preoccupied
thought content. (Id.) Moderate depression and prolonged post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) were diagnosed. (Id. at
325.) Ms. Lopez-Galtman assessed plaintiff had a global
assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score of 60.1
On August 15, 2012, Plaintiff presented to Nurse
Practitioner (“NP”) Diane Cuff-Carney at Lutheran for an initial
medication management session, reporting moderate levels of
depression, anxiety, and insomnia. (Id. at 321-22.) Plaintiff

was well-groomed with good hygiene and was cooperative. (Id. at
321.) She exhibited hypoactive psychomotor activity and normal
speech; her mood was depressed and her affect constricted. (Id.)
Her thought process was intact with unremarkable thought
content, no evidence of perceptual disorder or poor insight,
with good judgment and impulse control. (Id.) NP Cuff-Carney
diagnosed moderate major depressive disorder, single episode,
and PTSD, and prescribed Celexa. (Id. at 321.)
Plaintiff saw Catherine Knopp, LCSW, at Lutheran on January
4, 2013. (Id. at 293.) Plaintiff had broken up with her
boyfriend. (Id.) Her mood was depressed and anxious, her

affect reactive, and her thoughts logical. (Id.)

1 GAF is a rating of overall psychological functioning on a scale of 0 to
100. See American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) (DSM-IV). A GAF of between
51 and 60 indicates moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial
speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social,
occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers
or co-workers). Id. The APA discontinued use of the GAF for mental disorder
diagnoses in the DSM-V published in 2013. See Pelt v. Colvin, No. CV 15-0533
(DRH), 2017 WL 684192, at *5, n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2017).
On January 8, 2014, plaintiff presented to NP Cuff-Carney
reporting no success in treating her depression or insomnia.
(Id. at 292.) Plaintiff was well-groomed with good hygiene and
was cooperative. (Id. at 321.) She exhibited hypoactive
psychomotor activity and normal speech. (Id.) Her mood was
depressed and anxious, and her affect constricted. (Id.)

Thought process was preserved, and thought content was anxious
preoccupation. (Id.) Her insight and judgment were poor and
impulse control was fair. (Id.) NP Cuff-Carney prescribed
Zoloft and Risperdal. (Id.)
On January 11, 2013, plaintiff described to Ms. Knopp
difficulty living with her three daughters and boyfriend. (Id.
at 291.) Plaintiff had depressed and anxious mood and reactive
affect, no evidence of hallucinations, and logical thoughts.
(Id.) Ms. Knopp noted a GAF score of 60. (Id.)
Plaintiff continued treatment with Ms. Knopp and her mental
status examinations continued to show sad/anxious mood,

constricted affect, perseverative thought process2, and anxious
preoccupation. (Id. at 242, 244, 248, 252, 255, 258, 261, 264,
273, 275, 276, 279, 283, 288.) LCSW Knopp also recorded GAF
scores of 60 during this time. (Id. at 279, 283, 288.) On

2 Perseveration is a collective term to characterize the continuous intrusion
of negative recollection of past traumatic events, i.e., flashbacks, or
recurrent intrusive fear of a future event. Dorland’s Medical Dictionary
Online (32nd ed. 2011), available at www.dorlands.com.
February 6, 2016, LCSW Knopp documented that Plaintiff had
inconsistent attendance with medication follow-up. (Id. at
283.) On February 26, 2013 Knopp noted that plaintiff had
hypoactive motor activity, constricted affect, perseverative
thought, agitation and poor insight and judgement. (Id. at
282.) On March 1, 2013, plaintiff expressed negative feelings

toward all family in her household. (Id. at 279.) On March 15,
2013, plaintiff complained that she is “anxious all the time”
and overwhelmed. (Id. at 276.) On March 26, 2013, plaintiff
had constricted affect, depressed mood, perseverative thought
process, anxious preoccupation, and poor insight and judgment.
(Id. at 274.) Dr. Pye found that plaintiff had akatisia3,
anergia, hypomotor activity and thought-blocking since being
prescribed Celexa and the medication was discontinued. (Id. at
273.) The assessment noted that her condition was “unimproved.”
(Id.) On April 5, 2013, plaintiff reported having an “episode”
on the subway into Manhattan on the way to see a movie and

complained that she did not think that her medications were
working. (Id. at 273.) She had begun working as a building
superintendent, and enjoyed the responsibilities associated with
the job. (Id.) On April 11, 2013, plaintiff reported great
improvement which she thought was the result of seeing a

3 Akathisia is a movement disorder characterized by an inability to stay
still. Dorland’s Medical Dictionary Online (32nd ed. 2011), available at
www.dorlands.com.
“wisewoman” who counteracted “black magic.” (Id. at 271.) LCSW
Knopp completed a treatment plan review on April 26, 2013,
noting plaintiff had achieved improved control of her symptoms,
improved her temper and how she expressed anger, and had started
to enjoy cooking with her daughters, although she continued to
ruminate and to experience hypervigilance related to PTSD and

had difficulty travelling to Manhattan on public transportation.
(Id. at 266.) During her May 3 session, Plaintiff stated she
felt that her symptoms had improved because she was working, but
noted that she remained “off-kilter” some days. (Id. at 264.)
On May 14, 2013, plaintiff’s mental status exam remained
unchanged with sad/anxious mood, constricted affect,
perseverative thought process, anxious preoccupation, impaired
attention and concentration, and poor insight and judgment.
(Id. at 263.)
During treatment with NP Cuff-Carney through June 2013,
plaintiff’s recorded mental status examinations continued to

show sad/anxious mood, constricted affect, poor judgement and
insight, impaired attention and perseverative thoughts. (Id. at
257, 263, 269, 272, 274, 282 285, 289.) Medications were
changed at times to address side effects and reported
functioning changes. (Id. at 257, 263, 272, 274, 285, 289.)
On July 5, 2013, plaintiff reported that she enjoyed having
spent the Fourth of July holiday with her sister, boyfriend and
his mother. (Id. at 245.) Her mental status remained
unchanged. (Id.) Plaintiff expressed panic on July 12, 2013
after her unemployment benefits ran out and noted feeling
hypervigilance with cold sweat and racing thoughts outside of
her home. (Id. at 242.) During her therapy session on July 26,
2013, she noted difficulty leaving her house and intrusive

thoughts, though she was working on reconnecting with friends.
(Id. at 244.)
Thereafter, on August 7, 2013, plaintiff reported to NP
Cuff-Carney an increase in insomnia and anxiety with mood swings
into anger during the day. (Id. at 243.) NP Cuff-Carney
observed normal appearance, cooperative attitude, normal
psychomotor activity, and normal speech. (Id.) Plaintiff’s
mood was described as sad, anxious, angry, and uneasy, her
affect labile, thought-content was anxious preoccupation. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s insight and judgment were poor, and her attention
span and concentration were impaired, while her memory was

intact. (Id.) NP Cuff-Carney increased plaintiff’s Wellbutrin
dosage and prescribed Depakote. (Id.)
On August 27, 2013 Melissa Malakoff, Psy.D., conducted a
consultative psychiatric evaluation of plaintiff. (Id. at 294-
98.) Plaintiff was driven to the evaluation by a friend. (Id.)
At the time, plaintiff lived with her two daughters, ages 22 and
16. (Id.) She alleged disability due to severe anxiety,
restless nights, depression, bipolar disorder, and PTSD. (Id.)
She reported difficulty falling asleep, loss of appetite, crying
spells, and concentration difficulties, as well as anxiety,
including excessive apprehension and worrying, flashbacks and
hypervigilence. (Id. at 294-95.) She drank alcohol two to
three times per month and had used marijuana every day from her

teenage years to her late twenties. (Id. at 295.) Plaintiff
was able to: dress, bathe, and groom herself; cook and prepare
food; perform general cleaning and do laundry; and manage her
own money. (Id.) Her daughter usually shopped for her because
she became overwhelmed. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that she did
not use public transportation because she became overwhelmed.
(Id.) She had not socialized with any friends since the prior
year. (Id.) She spent time with her sister and watched
television. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that on good days she spent
all her time cleaning the house. (Id. at 296-97.) On bad days
she did not get out of bed. (Id. at 297.)

Upon mental status examination, Plaintiff’s demeanor and
responsiveness to questions were cooperative. (Id. at 295.)
Her manner of relating, social skills, and overall presentation
were adequate. (Id.) The intelligibility of plaintiff’s speech
was fluent, the quality of her voice was clear, and her
expressive and receptive language was adequate. (Id.)
Plaintiff’s thought process was coherent and goal-directed with
no evidence of hallucinations, delusions, or paranoia. (Id. at
296.) Her affect was depressed, mood was neutral, and sensorium
was clear; she was fully oriented. (Id.) Dr. Malakoff found
that the Plaintiff’s recent and remote memory was intact,
despite the fact that she could recall only one out of 3 objects
after five minutes. (Id.) Attention and concentration were

intact. (Id.) Plaintiff’s cognitive functioning was average
and her general fund of information was appropriate to
experience. (Id.) Plaintiff’s insight and judgment were fair.
(Id.)
Dr. Malakoff diagnosed PTSD and ruled-out bipolar disorder.
(Id. at 297.) She opined that plaintiff was able to follow and
understand simple directions and instructions, perform simple
tasks independently, maintain attention and concentration,
maintain a regular schedule, learn new tasks, make appropriate
decisions, and relate adequately with others. (Id.) Plaintiff
was moderately limited in her abilities to perform complex tasks

independently, but may be able to do so with supervision, and
appropriately deal with stress. (Id.) Dr. Malakoff related
that difficulties were caused by PTSD symptoms. (Id.)
On August 27, 2013, during a consultative orthopedic
examination with Chiam Shtock, D.O., plaintiff related that she
was able to independently cook, clean, do laundry, shower,
dress, and groom. (Id. at 299.) Her daughter assisted with
shopping. (Id.)
On August 30, 2013, Javier Senosiain, M.D., completed a
treatment report in connection with plaintiff’s receipt of
public assistance benefits. (Id. at 329-30.) She was treated
for major depression and PTSD. (Id.) She had symptoms of

anxiety, sleep deficits, anxiety which led to anger outbursts,
severe flashbacks, and intrusive thoughts triggered by current
circumstances. (Id. at 329.) Plaintiff complied with
treatment, but there had been periods when anhedonia and
problems with concentration led to missed appointments. (Id. at
229.) Dr. Senosian noted that an episode in mid-August had led
to a serious relapse. (Id. at 330.) Dr. Senosiain opined that
plaintiff could not work for 12-months and stated that
“hypervigilance, intrusive thoughts, insomnia and most recently
disassociation have become acute.” (Id. at 330.)
On September 30, 2013, M. Graff, Ph.D., a New York State

agency psychological consultant, evaluated the evidence of
record and completed a psychiatric review technique form. (Id.
at 80; see id. at 303.) Dr. Graff determined that plaintiff
had: mild restriction of activities of daily living; mild
difficulties in maintaining social functioning; moderate
difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace;
and had no episodes of decompensation. (Id. at 80.) Dr. Graff
also assessed Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity
and determined that Plaintiff had the mental abilities and
social skills for entry level work. (Id. at 85; see id. at 83-
85.)
On October 15, 2013, NP Cuff-Carney completed a treatment
report for the purposes of plaintiff’s public assistance

benefits noting recurrent treatment for PTSD and major
depression. (Id. at 331-32.) She reported plaintiff was in a
“highly stressed” position prior to receiving treatment. (Id.
at 331.) NP Cuff-Carney additionally reported that within the
past six weeks, plaintiff’s trauma-related symptoms had
increased, causing greater hypervigilance, intrusive memories,
some dissociative episodes, and resurgence of nightmares related
to childhood events. (Id.) NP Cuff-Carney opined that
plaintiff was unable to work for 12-months. (Id. at 332.)
A mental medical source statement dated December 17, 2013,
was signed by NP Cuff-Carney and cosigned by Ms. Knopp and Dr.

Senosiain. (Id. at 333-337.) Plaintiff was seen for weekly
psychotherapy sessions and monthly medication management
starting July 19, 2012, for PTSD and mood disorder. (Id. at
333.) During the past year, plaintiff’s GAF was rated 55/60 and
60 as the highest. (Id.) She was receiving treatment due to
unemployment and PTSD symptoms she had experienced since
childhood. (Id.) Depakote, Wellbutrin, and Buspar were
prescribed which had a positive impact on plaintiff’s
impairments. (Id.) The following signs and symptoms were
identified: anhedonia; appetite disturbance; feelings of guilt
or worthlessness; generalized persistent anxiety; difficulty
with thinking and concentrating; persistent disturbances of mood
or affect; apprehensive expectation; paranoid thinking or

inappropriate suspiciousness; emotional withdrawal or isolation;
intense and unstable interpersonal relationships and impulsive
and damaging behavior; emotional lability; vigilance and
scanning; easy distractibility; sleep disturbance; recurrent
severe panic attacks. (Id. at 334.) At the time of the
opinion, plaintiff’s symptoms had increased due to a recent
incident of domestic violence. (Id. at 333.) NP Cuff-Carney
opined that plaintiff was unable to meet competitive standards
of any mental abilities and aptitudes required of unskilled and
semiskilled work, including following and carrying out simple
instructions and tasks. (Id. at 335-36.) She also found that

Plaintiff was seriously limited in her abilities to: interact
appropriately with the general public; maintain socially
appropriate behavior; adhere to basic standards of neatness and
cleanliness; travel in unfamiliar places; and use public
transportation. (Id. at 336.) To support her opinion NP Cuff-
Carney cited: plaintiff’s complaints of inability to sustain
attention and recall; difficulty meeting her prior standard of
efficiency; reduced concentration and skills; impatience with
self and others; difficulty interacting with others; poor
hygiene; and inability to travel to unfamiliar places or use
public transportation. (Id.) She noted low tolerance for
questioning or expectations from others, infrequent haircuts and
un-ironed clothing, lack of makeup, and panic in crowded trains.

(Id.)
Plaintiff was admitted to Lutheran Medical Center on June
16, 2015, and discharged on June 18, 2015, due to acute
psychotic issues, including mood lability, poor sleep, and
nightmares. (Id. at 338-339.) Discharge diagnoses were:
bipolar I disorder, most recent episode mixed severe with
psychotic features; and PTSD. (Id. at 338.) Antipsychotic
medications were prescribed upon discharge. (Id.)
On July 29, 2015, Michael Kushner, Ph.D., conducted a
consultative psychiatric evaluation. (Id. at 307-10.)
Plaintiff was driven to the evaluation by the father of her

daughter. (Id.) She lived with her two daughters, ages 18 and
24, as well as a grandchild age 11 months. (Id.) Plaintiff
reported trouble falling asleep, loss of appetite, and
depressive symptomatology including difficulty getting out of
bed, feeling weak and tired, and trouble interacting with
people. (Id. at 306-07.) She also reported mood swings. (Id.)
She drank alcohol once or twice a month and used to be a heavy
marijuana smoker. (Id. at 308.) Plaintiff related that she did
not get up and dress every day and that her daughters did
household chores and managed the money. (Id. at 309.) She did
not use public transportation and did not often socialize.
(Id.) She did not get along very well with her family members.
(Id.) She typically spends her day at home. (Id.)

Mental status examination revealed Plaintiff’s demeanor and
responsiveness to questions to be cooperative. (Id. at 308.)
Her manner of relating, social skills, and overall presentation
were fair. (Id.) She maintained appropriate eye contact.
(Id.) Plaintiff’s speech intelligibility was fluent, the
quality of her voice was clear, and her expressive and receptive
language were adequate. (Id.) Her thought processes were
coherent and goal-directed with no evidence of hallucinations,
delusions, or paranoia. (Id.) Plaintiff’s attention and
concentration were intact. (Id. at 309.) Her recent and remote
memory skills were mildly impaired, as she could only recall one

of three items after five minutes. (Id.) Plaintiff’s
intellectual functioning seemed below average and general fund
of information appeared somewhat limited. (Id.) Insight and
judgment were fair. (Id.)
Dr. Kushner diagnosed unspecified bipolar disorder and
ruled-out unspecified psychotic disorder. (Id. at 310.) He
opined that plaintiff had up to moderate limitations following
and understanding simple directions and instructions and
performing simple tasks independently. (Id. at 309.) Plaintiff
had moderate limitations maintaining attention and
concentration, maintaining a regular schedule, learning new
tasks, and performing complex tasks under supervision. (Id. at
309-10.)

Dr. Kushner also completed a medical source statement of
plaintiff’s mental ability for work-related activities. (Id. at
311-312.) Dr. Kushner opined that plaintiff had mild
restrictions in her abilities to: understand and remember simple
instructions; carry out simple instructions; and make judgments
on simple work-related decisions. (Id. at 311.) Plaintiff had
moderate to marked limitations regarding her abilities to:
understand and remember complex instructions; carry out complex
instructions; and make judgments on complex work-related
decisions. (Id.) The basis for these restrictions was
plaintiff’s reports of concentration and memory trouble. (Id.)

Dr. Kushner opined that Plaintiff had moderate to marked
limitations: interacting appropriately with the public,
supervisors, and co-workers; and responding appropriately to
usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting.
(Id. at 312.) The basis for these restrictions was plaintiff’s
reported symptoms of depression and bipolar disorder. (Id.)
On July 20, 2015, Allison Norman, LMSW, of Lutheran,
conducted an initial psychosocial assessment. (Id. at 344-350.)
Plaintiff had been referred by her primary care physician, Dr.
Yar. (Id. at 344.) She had been compliant with her medication
since a recent hospitalization, but reported unexplained mood
swings and sometimes was very aggressive and “bitchy” and

socially isolated, with such “periods” lasting two to three
weeks. (Id.) Plaintiff reported not caring about “anything”
during these periods. (Id.) Other times she lived “floating on
air.” (Id.) Plaintiff lived in an apartment with her two
children, ages 24 and 18, and an 11-month-old granddaughter.
(Id.) She had mild anxiety and mild depression. (Id. at 344-
345.) Plaintiff believed that prior therapy focused too much on
her childhood; rather most of her stressors come from crowds and
was also stressed about her future, noting that she was trying
to find a job. (Id. at 345.) She reported poor concentration,
forgetfulness, and anger management issues. (Id.) Her

relationship with her two daughters was fair. (Id. at 347.)
Upon mental status evaluation, plaintiff was cooperative with
pressured, talkative speech. (Id. at 348-339.) Her mood was
anxious and uneasy and affect was congruent. (Id. at 349.)
Thought process was intact and tangential, content was
unremarkable. (Id.) Insight and judgment was fair. (Id.) Ms.
Norman assessed: bipolar affective disorder, depressed, severe
with psychotic behavior; and PTSD. (Id.) Global assessment of
functioning (GAF) was rated as 52. (Id.)
On July 21, 2015, LCSW Knopp drafted a discharge summary
noting that plaintiff wanted a new provider due to an acute
increase in symptoms following the death of her stepfather,
which had required hospital treatment. (Id. at 328.)

On August 10, 2015, Deborah Denigris, DNP,4 of Lutheran,
conducted an initial psychiatric evaluation, pursuant to
plaintiff’s hospitalization. (Id. at 351-355.) Denigris noted
that plaintiff had a history of using cocaine and marijuana.
(Id. at 352.) She had not used cocaine for the past three to
four years, though she still smoked marijuana. (Id.) Upon a
mental status examination, plaintiff was cooperative with normal
speech. (Id. at 352-353.) Mood was euthymic and affect was
full range and congruent. (Id. at 353.) Thought process was
logical and goal-directed; thought content was anxious
preoccupation related to a possible upcoming eviction and how

she would support herself. (Id.) Plaintiff had no perceptual
disorder. (Id.) Plaintiff’s insight and judgment were fair.
(Id.) She had normal recent memory. (Id.) DNP Denigris’
assessment was bipolar affective disorder, depressed, with
psychotic behavior, PTSD and a GAF rating of 50. (Id.)

4 “DNP” stands for Doctor of Nursing Practice.
Plaintiff’s medications (Risperdal, Divalproex, Trazodone, and
Clonidine) were refilled. (Id. at 356.) On October 5, 2015,
DNP Denigris completed a medical source statement of plaintiff’s
ability to perform mental work-related activities. (Id. at 357-
359). DNP Denigris opined that plaintiff had mild restrictions
in her abilities to: understand, remember, and carry out simple

instructions. (Id. at 357.) Plaintiff had extreme limitations
regarding her abilities to: make judgments on simple work-
related decisions; understand and remember complex instructions;
carry out complex instructions; and make judgments on complex
work-related decisions. (Id.) DNP Denigris opined that
plaintiff had extreme limitations interacting appropriately with
the public, supervisors, and co-workers. (Id. at 358.)
Plaintiff had marked limitations responding appropriately to
usual work situations and to changes in a routine work setting.
(Id.) DNP Denigris opined these limitations started in January
2015. (Id.)

ii. Vocational Interrogatory Response of December 9, 2015
On December 9, 2015 Vocational Expert (“VE”) Mariam Greene
completed vocational interrogatories. (Id. at 233-40.) She
indicated plaintiff had past work as an accounts payable
bookkeeper, an appointment clerk, and an office manager. (Id. at
233.) The ALJ asked the VE to consider a hypothetical
individual with Plaintiff’s vocational profile (age, education,
and work experience) with limitations as follows:

perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and
416.967(b) and can sit, walk and stand in an 8-hour day
with normal work place breaks. The person can kneel,
crouch, bend, and use their arms and hands without
limitation. The person can occasionally squat. The person
has some mental issues and there is some evidence that
alcohol abuse is in sustained partial remission and
cannabis abuse is in sustained partial remission resulting
in the person being able to follow and understand simple
instructions, perform simple tasks independently, maintain
attention and concentration for simple tasks, keep a
schedule and learn new tasks and perform more complex tasks
with supervision. The person can adequately relate to
others but has moderate problems with stress, which must be
accommodated by having goal oriented, rather than
production rate pace tasks. (Id. at 236.)

The VE stated that such an individual could perform
plaintiff’s past work as an appointments clerk (Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”) 237.367-010), a sedentary exertional
position with a specific vocational profile (SVP) of 3 (Id. at
233, 236-37.) VE Greene explained that the position of
appointment clerk was at the lowest of the semi-skilled levels
and did not require production rate pace. (Id. at 234.) VE
Greene noted that such an individual could also perform light
exertional, unskilled occupations, existing in significant
number in the national economy, including: locker room attendant
(DOT 358.677-014), of which there are 60,000 positions in the
national economy; parking lot cashier (DOT 211.462-010), of
which there are 300,000 positions in the national economy; and
price marker (DOT 209.587-034), of which there are 300,000
positions in the national economy. (Id. at 235.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Unsuccessful claimants for disability benefits may bring an
action in federal court seeking judicial review of the

Commissioner’s denial of their benefits. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3). The reviewing court does not have the authority to
conduct a de novo review, and may not substitute its own
judgment for that of the ALJ, even when it might have
justifiably reached a different result. Cage v. Comm’r, 692 F.3d
118, 122 (2d Cir. 2012). Rather, “‘[a] district court may set
aside the Commissioner’s determination that a claimant is not
disabled only if the factual findings are not supported by
‘substantial evidence’ or if the decision is based on legal
error.’” Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 127 (2d Cir. 2008)
(quoting Shaw v. Chater, 221 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2000)).

“Substantial evidence means ‘more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Halloran v.
Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 2004)). If there is
substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s
factual findings, those findings must be upheld. 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as
to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .”). Inquiry into legal error requires the
court to ask whether “‘the claimant has had a full hearing under
the [Commissioner’s] regulations and in accordance with the
beneficent purposes of the [Social Security] Act.’” Moran v.
Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cruz v.

Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)).
DISCUSSION
I. The Commissioner’s Five-Step Analysis of Disability Claims
A claimant must be “disabled” within the meaning of the Act
to receive disability benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), (d). A
claimant qualifies as disabled when she is unable to “engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” Id. §
423(d)(1)(A); Shaw, 221 F.3d at 131–32. The impairment must be

of “such severity” that the claimant is unable to do her
previous work or engage in any other kind of substantial gainful
work. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The regulations promulgated by the Commissioner prescribe a
five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether
a claimant meets the Act’s definition of disabled. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520. The Commissioner’s process is essentially as
follows:
[I]f the Commissioner determines (1) that the claimant is
not working, (2) that [s]he has a ‘severe impairment,’ (3)
that the impairment is not one [listed in Appendix 1 of the
regulations] that conclusively requires a determination of
disability, and (4) that the claimant is not capable of
continuing in [her] prior type of work, the Commissioner
must find [her] disabled if (5) there is not another type
of work the claimant can do.

Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120 (quoting Green-Younger v. Barnhart, 335
F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003)); accord 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
If the answer at any of the previously mentioned steps is “no,”
the analysis stops and the ALJ must find that the claimant does
not qualify as disabled under the Act.
“The claimant has the general burden of proving . . . his
or her case at steps one through four of the sequential five-
step framework established in the SSA regulations.” Burgess, 537
F.3d at 128 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“However, [b]ecause a hearing on disability benefits is a
nonadversarial proceeding, the ALJ generally has an affirmative
obligation to develop the administrative record.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). “The burden falls upon the
Commissioner at the fifth step of the disability evaluation
process to prove that the claimant, if unable to perform her
past relevant work [and considering her residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience], is able to
engage in gainful employment within the national economy.”
Sobolewski v. Apfel, 985 F. Supp. 300, 310 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
“The Commissioner must consider the following in
determining a claimant’s entitlement to benefits: ‘(1) the
objective medical facts [and clinical findings]; (2) diagnoses
or medical opinions based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence

of pain or disability . . . ; and (4) the claimant’s educational
background, age, and work experience.’” Balodis v. Leavitt, 704
F. Supp. 2d 255, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Brown v. Apfel,
174 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1999) (alterations in original)). If
the Commissioner finds a combination of impairments, the
Commissioner must also consider whether “the combined effect of
all of [a claimant’s] impairment[s]” establish the claimant’s
eligibility for Social Security benefits. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1523(c); see also id. § 416.945(a)(2).
II. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Analysis
Using the five-step sequential process to determine whether

a claimant is disabled as mandated by the SSA regulations, the
ALJ made the following determinations:
At step one, the ALJ concluded that claimant had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2012, the
alleged onset date. (Id. at 28.)
At step two, the ALJ found that claimant had four severe
impairments: major depressive disorder; bipolar disorder;
posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”); and substance abuse
disorder. (Id.) Additionally, the ALJ found that plaintiff had
the nonsevere impairments of joint pain; hand pain;
osteoarthritis, NOS in her hand; and locking of fingers. (Id.
at 29.) The ALJ did not, however, adequately perform the
psychiatric review technique as mandated by 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520a.5 (Id. at 32-34.).
At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff did not have
an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equaled the severity of the listed impairments in 20
CFR Part 404, Subpart P, App’x 1. (Id. at 12.) Specifically,
the ALJ found that no treating or examining physician had made
findings that are the same or equivalent in severity to the
criteria of any listed impairment, including listings 12.04,
12.06 or 12.09. (Id. at 29-30.)
The ALJ next concluded that plaintiff has mild restriction
in activities of daily living, noting that the plaintiff’s

complaints that she had problems grooming and getting out of bed
were consistent with mild limitations. (Id. at 29.) The ALJ
next found that plaintiff has moderate difficulties in social
functioning, noting that she has a close relationship with her

5 Though we remand on other grounds, the Commissioner should be mindful on
remand that she must assess Lugo’s mental impairments pursuant to the special
technique, as required by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a.
sister and at times has a boyfriend. (Id.) The ALJ further
found that plaintiff has no difficulties with regard to
concentration, persistence, and pace, noting that one of the
consultative examiners found that the plaintiff had intact
concentration and attention. (Id. at 29-30.) The ALJ next
found that plaintiff had no episodes of decompensation, noting

that plaintiff was hospitalized in June 2015 but stating that
there was no evidence of additional exacerbations. (Id. at 30)
Furthermore, the ALJ found that claimant is able to function
outside of a highly-supportive living environment or is able to
function outside of her home, noting that plaintiff “rides in
cars” and “travels independently.” (Id.)
At step three, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) and can sit, walk and stand in
an 8-hour day with normal work place breaks. The ALJ found that
plaintiff can kneel, crouch, bend, and use her arms and hands

without limitation. Plaintiff can occasionally squat. Plaintiff
was found to have some mental issues and the ALJ found some
evidence that alcohol abuse was in sustained partial remission
and cannabis abuse was in sustained partial remission resulting
in plaintiff being able to follow and understand simple
instructions, perform simple tasks independently, maintain
attention and concentration for simple tasks, keep a schedule
and learn new tasks and perform more complex tasks with
supervision. The ALJ further found that plaintiff can
adequately relate to others but has moderate problems with
stress, which must be accommodated by having goal oriented,
rather than production rate pace tasks. (Id. at 31.)
At step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was capable

of performing her past relevant work as an appointment clerk as
it is generally performed in the national economy. (Id. at 38.)
Based on the foregoing analysis, the ALJ found that the
plaintiff was not under a disability from June 1, 2012 through
the date of the decision. (Id. at 39.)
III. The ALJ’s Error in Applying the Five-Step Analysis

“[A]n ALJ should defer to ‘to the views of the physician
who has engaged in the primary treatment of the claimant.’”
Cichocki v. Astrue, 534 F. App’x 71, 74 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Green–Younger v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003)).6
“However, ‘[a] treating physician’s statement that the claimant
is disabled cannot itself be determinative.’” Id. (quoting Snell
v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999)). “Rather, ‘a

6 The Commissioner has revised its rules to eliminate the treating physician
rule, and ALJs are now to weigh all medical evaluations, regardless of their
sources, based on how well supported they are and their consistency with the
remainder of the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b; 416.920c. Claims filed
before March 27, 2017, however, are still subject to the treating physician
rule, see id. § 404.1527(c)(2), and the Court accordingly applies the rule to
this case, as plaintiff filed her claim on May 30, 2013. See, e.g., Conetta
v. Berryhill, 365 F. Supp. 3d 383, 395 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and
severity of [a claimant’s] impairment(s)’ will be given
‘controlling weight’ if the opinion is ‘well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial
evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.’” Id. (quoting 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)).
“An ‘ALJ who refuses to accord controlling weight to the
medical opinion of a treating physician must consider various
factors to determine how much weight to give to the opinion,’
including: ‘(i) the frequency of examination and the length,
nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (ii) the
evidence in support of the treating physician’s opinion; (iii)
the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; (iv)
whether the opinion is from a specialist; and (v) other factors
brought to the Social Security Administration’s attention that
tend to support or contradict the opinion.’” Id. (quoting

Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004)). “The ALJ
must then ‘comprehensively set forth his reasons for the weight
assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.’” Id. (quoting
Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129).
In this analysis, although an ALJ should generally explain
the weight given to each opinion, remand is not required where
application of the proper legal standards would lead to the same
conclusion previously reached. See Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d
402, 409 (2d Cir. 2010). Failure to consider the opinion of a
treating physician “ordinarily requires remand to the ALJ for
consideration of the improperly excluded evidence, at least
where the unconsidered evidence is significantly more favorable
to the claimant than the evidence considered.” Id. at 409.

“Remand is unnecessary, however, ‘[w]here application of the
correct legal standard could lead to only one conclusion.’” Id.
(quoting Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d 496, 504 (2d Cir. 1998)). For
instance, in Zabala, the court found it was harmless error to
“exclude[] evidence [that was] essentially duplicative of
evidence considered by the ALJ,” as there would be no reasonable
likelihood that consideration of the unconsidered report would
change the outcome. Id. at 409-10 (noting that “[t]he
[unconsidered] report [was] largely identical to a [different]
report by the same doctor, which the ALJ did consider,” and
which set forth substantially identical findings).

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ gave proper weight to
the medical sources and that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. (See Def. Mem. at 10.) Plaintiff argues
that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion of the
plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Senosian, and that of Dr.
Denigris. (Pl. Mem. at 13-15; Tr. at 35.) The court finds the
Commissioner’s argument unavailing for three primary reasons.
First, ALJ Romeo only accorded “little weight,” rather than
“controlling weight,” to claimant’s treating physician, Dr.
Senosian, who opined, among other things, that plaintiff would
not be able to meet competitive standards in every category
regarding her ability to perform unskilled work. (Id. at 35.)
In support of granting “little weight” to Dr. Senosian, the ALJ

explained that Dr. Senosian had frequently assessed plaintiff
with a GAF score ranging between 50 and 60 and that therefore,
his opinion is inconsistent with his treatment notes. (Id. at
35.) The Second Circuit recently held that an ALJ errs when she
assigns little weight to a treating psychiatrist’s opinion based
on GAF scores. See Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90 (2d Cir.
2019). The ALJ must consider, inter alia, “(1) the frequen[cy],
length, nature, and extent of treatment; (2) the amount of
medical evidence supporting the opinion; (3) the consistency of
the opinion with the remaining medical evidence, and (4) whether
the physician is a specialist.” Id. at 95-96. (quoting Selian v.

Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 418 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(citing Burgess, 537 F.3d at 129 (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c)(2))).
As in Estrella, ALJ Romeo’s explanation addresses only the
single factor of “consistency,” and fails to consider the
length, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; the
evidence in support of the treating physician’s opinion; the
consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and
whether the opinion was from a specialist. The ALJ failed to
address the fact that Dr. Senosian, a board-certified
specialist, issued an opinion supported by the weight of
evidence, including mental status examinations regularly noting:
sad and anxious mood, constricted affect, poor insight and

judgment, perseverative thoughts patterns, impaired memory, and
the plaintiff’s involuntary admission to a psychiatric ward in
the summer of 2015.
Failure “to provide good reasons for not crediting the
opinion of a claimant’s treating physician is ground for
remand.” Sanders v. Comm’s of Soc. Sec., 506 F. App’x 74, 77 (2d
Cir.); see also Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32-33 (“We do not hesitate
to remand when the Commissioner has not provided ‘good reasons’
for the weight given to a treating physician[‘]s opinion.”).
The limited rationale offered by the ALJ that Dr. Senosian’s
opinion contrasts the GAF score assigned does not meet the bar

of providing good reasons and is thus insufficient.
Second, the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Denigris’ opinion is
unsupported by the record. In assigning little weight to Dr.
Denigris’ opinion, the ALJ states that “treatment notes indicate
that the claimant did have a boyfriend and is able to spend time
with family and friends (Exhibits 1F at 53, 8F at 6). Thus, the
records would indicate the claimant has only intermittent
problems with people. Also, there is an indication that when
the claimant is on medication her condition is stable. (Exhibit
13F, at 10).” (Tr. at 35.) The ALJ’s reading of the exhibits
is factually deficient, as demonstrated below.
Exhibits 1F at 53 and 8F at 6 do not support a finding that
plaintiff has only intermittent problems with people. Exhibit

1F at 53 indicates that plaintiff was “more depressed” and had
broken up with her boyfriend. The treatment note indicates that
the session also focused on helping plaintiff with her
communication with her mother. (Id. at 293.) Ending or
requiring professional assistance with key relationships is not
evidence that plaintiff is capable of socializing. The
treatment note does not make any reference to plaintiff
socializing with any other family member or friend. Further,
Exhibit 8F at 6 reveals the notation, “Interpersonal
Relationships: Patient is socially isolated.” (Id. at 325.)
Social isolation is plainly inconsistent with any demonstrated

ability to socialize.
Further, Exhibit 13F at page 10 does not evidence a patient
whose condition is stable while on medication. (Id. at 353.)
Plaintiff was described as having risk factors for suicide which
included “anxious/agitated, depression, hopelessness, rational
thinking loss, alcohol and substance abuse, previous attempt and
intermittent ideations.” (Id.) Plaintiff was described as
having “fair” insight, judgment and impulse control. (Id.)
Plaintiff was given the diagnosis of Axis I: Bipolar affective
disorder, depressed, severe, with psychotic behavior and PTSD.
(Id.) The narrative portion of the treatment note states,
“presents with symptoms of depression, anhedonia, anger,
hopelessness, insomnia, racing thoughts, agitation…Patient

experiences flashbacks and nightmares of her abuse.” (Id.) The
report notes in plain language that the plaintiff’s condition
was “severe” despite compliance with medication. Nothing in the
treatment notes indicate plaintiff’s stability.
Third, the ALJ erred in giving weight to the opinion of
Melissa Malakoff, Ph.D., because the opinion was rendered in
2013, two years prior to a worsening of plaintiff’s condition in
2015. The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ properly considered
that the plaintiff’s condition worsened in 2015 in making her
decision. (See Def. Mem. at 8.) Upon review of the oral
hearing transcript, however, the court cannot agree with the

Commissioner’s assertion.
Though the court is aware that it is not an uncommon
practice among ALJ’s to request that a plaintiff amend the onset
date to a later time for which the ALJ finds evidence to support
disability, rarely do such negotiations take place on the
record. As per the hearing transcript:
ALJ: All right. And at this point my feeling is in looking
at the record when she has her break in June of 2015 it
seems that she has some serious problems. Now her own
doctor alleges that these problems, these serious problems
don’t exist until January of 2015. I’m not sure where the
doctor got January of 2015 but that’s her own doctor saying
that.

CLMT: But that’s when she started –

ALJ: No, she starts in August of – she starts what in July
of August – July of 2015. So that’s what I’m looking at.
So what are we doing?

ATTY: Claimant is sticking with her alleged onset date of –

ALJ: Very good. We’ll have a supplemental hearing with a
Vocational Expert. Thank you very much…”

(Tr. at 70.) The ALJ indicated that if plaintiff changed her
alleged onset date, the case would not require a vocational
expert.7 Despite this interchange, and despite the
Commissioner’s assertions that the ALJ considered that there was
a worsening of plaintiff’s condition, the ALJ’s decision fails
to take into account plaintiff’s worsening condition.
Furthermore, there is nothing in the ALJ’s decision to indicate
that the ALJ considered that Dr. Malakoff’s opinions were
rendered prior to plaintiff’s worsening condition in July 2015.
As such, the court cannot state that the ALJ properly assessed
Dr. Malakoff’s opinions, and thus finds error.

7 It is unclear to the court why the ALJ indicated on the record that the
plaintiff’s condition was disabling as of July 2015, but denied the claim
nonetheless without issuing at least a partially favorable decision.
Because the ALJ committed legal error in making her
determination, the court does not find that the ALJ’s decision
is supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
Federal regulations explicitly authorize a court, when
reviewing decisions of the Social Security Administration, to

order further proceedings when appropriate. Remand is warranted
where “there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ
has applied an improper legal standard,” Rosa, 168 F.3d at 82–83
(quoting Pratts, 94 F.3d at 39) (internal quotation marks
omitted), particularly where further findings or explanation
will clarify the rationale for the ALJ’s decision, Pratts, 94
F.3d at 39. In this action, remand is appropriate because ALJ
Romeo: did not appropriately consider Listing 12.15 or explain
why plaintiff did not meet or equal said listing; did not
properly weigh the medical opinions pursuant to the treating
physician rule; and did not explain her rationale for failing to

issue at least a partially favorable decision after stating that
the Plaintiff should be considered disabled as of July 2015.
As the court finds that the ALJ erred in the decision, and
that further development and consideration of the record, and
clarification of the rationale of the ALJ’s decision, are
necessary to facilitate proper review, this case is remanded for
further proceedings in accordance with this Memorandum and
Order.

SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 5, 2020
Brooklyn, New York

_________/s/_________________
HON. KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10304151. Public record. Not legal advice.