# Crews v. The County of Nassau

> District Court, E.D. New York · December 18, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10303491

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** December 18, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that lodestar (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015)

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________

N-o 06-CV-2610 (JFB)(GRB)
_____________________

RAHEEM CREWS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENT OF SHAHEEM CREWS,

Plaintiff,

VERSUS

COUNTY OF NASSAU, ET AL.,

Defendants.
___________________

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
December 18, 2019
___________________

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, Circuit Judge (sitting by claim, in favor of Nassau County on the
designation): Monell claim, and in favor of plaintiff on the
malicious prosecution claims against
Plaintiff Raheem Crews (“plaintiff”) Detective Lemma. The jury awarded
brought this action against the County of plaintiff $175,000 in compensatory damages
Nassau (“Nassau County”), Officer Ronald against Detective Lemma but did not award
Annarumma (“Officer Annarumma”), and punitive damages. Nassau County agreed
various other defendants employed by that it was also liable under the doctrine of
Nassau County (collectively, the “County respondeat superior for the compensatory
Defendants”), as well as Detective Nicholas damages awarded against Detective Lemma
Lemma (“Detective Lemma”), under 42 on the state law malicious prosecution claim.
U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law, for
alleged civil rights violations stemming from Presently before the Court are motions
his arrest, detention, and prosecution for a for fees and costs filed by plaintiff’s former
robbery he did not commit. counsel, Arshad Majid, of Majid &
Associates, who represented plaintiff from
Following discovery and summary the start of the case in May 2006 until January
judgment motions, the case proceeded to trial 2007, and plaintiff’s current counsel, the Law
on plaintiff’s claims against (1) Officer Offices of Frederick K. Brewington (“the
Annarumma for battery, (2) Detective Brewington Law Firm”).
Lemma for malicious prosecution under state
and federal law, and (3) Nassau County for Nassau County argues that it is not liable
municipal liability under Monell and under for attorneys’ fees or costs because the jury
New York state law in connection with the found in its favor on the Monell claim, and
malicious prosecution claim. The jury found because the Nassau County Police
in favor of Officer Annarumma on the battery Indemnification Board (“the Board”)
revoked Detective Lemma’s indemnification County and indemnification from Nassau
in April 2009 (a decision that was ultimately County, provided that the act or omission
affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals). complained of was within the scope of his
duties. On July 28, 2006, the Board found
In response, both plaintiff and Detective
that Detective Lemma was entitled to
Lemma argue that Nassau County should
indemnification for his legal defense under
indemnify Detective Lemma for any awarded
New York General Municipal Law § 50-l.
fees and costs under the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. In addition, Detective Lemma On December 27, 2007, the Court granted
argues that Mr. Majid’s application should be in part and denied in part defendants’ motion
denied in its entirety for failure to submit for judgment on the pleadings under Federal
contemporaneous time records or, in the Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). See generally
alternative, that any award should be Crews v. County of Nassau, No. 06-CV-2610
reduced. Detective Lemma also asserts that (JFB)(WDW), 2007 WL 4591325 (E.D.N.Y.
the Brewington Law Firm’s award should be Dec. 27, 2007).
reduced.
The case proceeded to discovery. As
As explained below, the Court concludes relevant here, during Detective Lemma’s
that Nassau County is not obligated to February 9, 2009, deposition, he testified
indemnify Detective Lemma for attorneys’ that, at some point, he learned that plaintiff
fees and costs. With respect to the award was incarcerated on the day of the charged
against Detective Lemma, the Court robbery, but failed to notify prosecutors
concludes that the fees and costs requested by about that exculpatory information. As a
Mr. Majid and by the Brewington Law Firm result of this new information, Nassau
should be reduced. County reconvened the Board. On April 17,
2009, the Board revoked Detective Lemma’s
I. BACKGROUND
indemnification and withdrew representation
A. Factual Background by the Nassau County Attorney’s Office.
The Court set forth the factual The County Defendants moved for
background of this case in its February 11, summary judgment on July 11, 2011, and
2014 Order denying in part and granting in Detective Lemma moved for summary
part defendants’ motions for summary judgment on July 20, 2011. Plaintiff cross-
judgment and denying plaintiff’s motion for moved for summary judgment against
summary judgment in its entirety, see Detective Lemma on September 15, 2011.
generally Crews v. County of Nassau, 996 F. After hearing oral argument on the motions,
Supp. 2d 186 (E.D.N.Y. 2014), and will not the Court allowed further discovery and
repeat that background here. supplemental briefing by the parties,
followed by additional oral argument. On
B. Procedural History February 11, 2014, the Court granted in part
and denied in part the motions by the County
Plaintiff, represented by Mr. Majid, filed
Defendants and Detective Lemma, and
the complaint on May 25, 2006. On July 21,
denied plaintiff’s motion.
2006, the Nassau County Attorney’s Office
sent Detective Lemma a letter notifying him From March 9 through March 23, 2015,
that he had been named as a defendant in the the Court held a jury trial. The jury found in
case, and advising him that he was entitled to favor of Officer Annarumma and Nassau
legal representation provided by Nassau County on the battery and Monell claims,
respectively, and in favor of plaintiff on the In light of that decision, Detective
malicious prosecution claims against Lemma advised the Court that there was no
Detective Lemma. The jury awarded basis for a summary judgment motion on his
plaintiff $175,000 in compensatory damages crossclaim for indemnification against
but did not award any punitive damages. Nassau County, but requested permission to
submit a statement of his present financial
On May 8, 2015, plaintiff timely moved
condition for consideration by the Court in
to set aside the verdict and for a new trial
connection with the pending application for
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a).
attorneys’ fees and costs against him. The
The Court denied plaintiff’s motion on
Court granted that request, and Detective
December 16, 2015. See generally Crews v.
Lemma submitted the additional information
County of Nassau, 149 F. Supp. 3d 287
on August 15, 2018. On September 10, 2018,
(E.D.N.Y. 2015).
the Brewington Law Firm responded to that
On December 30, 2015, the Brewington supplemental submission.
Law Firm moved for attorneys’ fees and
On January 22, 2019, the Court heard oral
costs. On January 14, 2016, Mr. Majid also
argument on the motions for attorneys’ fees
moved for fees and costs. Nassau County and
and costs, and requested additional briefing.
Detective Lemma opposed the motions on
On February 12, 2019, Detective Lemma
February 12, 2016. On March 4, 2016, the
submitted additional briefing, arguing that
Brewington Law Firm and Mr. Majid
Nassau County should be equitably estopped
submitted replies.
from denying indemnification from the date
On March 16, 2016, Detective Lemma Detective Lemma entered into the
advised the Court that he wished to move for representation agreement with Nassau
summary judgment on his crossclaim for County on July 21, 2006, until it was revoked
indemnification against Nassau County, as it by the Board on April 17, 2009. In particular,
related to attorneys’ fees and costs. On May Detective Lemma argued that equitable
19, 2016, on consent of the parties, the Court estoppel should apply because the Nassau
stayed Detective Lemma’s time for moving County Attorney’s Office failed to advise
until the Appellate Division of the New York him of the inherent conflict of interest posed
State Supreme Court, Second Department, by that Office representing him and Nassau
decided Detective Lemma’s appeal from the County, and because the Nassau County
dismissal of his Article 78 petition for Attorney’s Office failed to exercise due
indemnification from Nassau County. After diligence in properly investigating the
the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal allegations. On February 12, 2019, the
of Detective Lemma’s Article 78 petition, Brewington Law Firm submitted a
Detective Lemma requested that the Court supplemental memorandum of law joining in
continue to stay his time for moving until the Detective Lemma’s arguments and, on
New York Court of Appeals heard his appeal. February 14, 2019, Mr. Majid also joined in
The Court granted that request. On June 14, those arguments. On March 5, 2019, Nassau
2018, the New York Court of Appeals County submitted a supplemental opposition
affirmed the Board’s decision to deny and, on March 22, 2019, the Brewington Law
indemnification. See generally Lemma v. Firm submitted a reply. Finally, on March
Nassau Cty. Police Officer Indemnification 11, 2019, Detective Lemma submitted
Bd., 31 N.Y.3d 523 (2018). updated financial information to the Court.
The Court has fully considered the parties’
submissions and arguments.
II. DISCUSSION indemnification agreement and that Nassau
County is estopped from denying
As noted earlier, presently before the
indemnification.
Court are applications for attorneys’ fees and
costs submitted by both Mr. Majid and the The Court finds these arguments to be
Brewington Law Firm. Mr. Majid requests without merit. As noted, after Detective
$186,937.50 in fees and $2,351.97 in costs. Lemma testified that he learned that plaintiff
The Brewington Law Firm requests was incarcerated on the day of the charged
$411,841.75 in fees and $19,357.60 in costs. robbery, but failed to notify prosecutors
about that exculpatory information, the
As a threshold matter, Detective Lemma
Board revoked its indemnification
and plaintiff argue that Nassau County
determination. The New York Court of
should indemnify Detective Lemma in
Appeals later affirmed that decision. See
connection with any award of attorneys’ fees
generally Lemma v. Nassau Cty. Police
or costs against him. Moreover, Detective
Officer Indemnification Bd., 31 N.Y.3d 523
Lemma argues that the Court should deny
(2018). Notably, the Court of Appeals
Mr. Majid’s fee request in its entirety, and
concluded that the “legislature . . . left the
substantially reduce the Brewington Law
determination of whether the statutory
Firm’s fees, on several grounds. One of the
prerequisites [for indemnification] are met to
grounds for the reduction of an award raised
the discretion of the Board,” id. at 529, and
by Detective Lemma is his financial
that “the Board did not err when it interpreted
situation. The Court addresses each of these
[General Municipal Law § 50-l] as permitting
issues in turn.
it to deny indemnification based on its
A. Indemnification assessment of the propriety of [Detective
Lemma’s] conduct,” id. at 532. In light of
Detective Lemma and plaintiff1 argue that decision, there is no basis for this Court
that Nassau County must indemnify to entertain arguments relating to the Board’s
Detective Lemma under General Municipal interpretation and application of General
Law § 50-l for any attorneys’ fees and costs Municipal Law § 50-l.
awarded from the commencement of the
lawsuit until the Board revoked Detective Notwithstanding the New York Court of
Lemma’s indemnification in April 2009. Appeals decision, Detective Lemma and
Specifically, Detective Lemma contends that plaintiff assert that this Court can and should
Nassau County should be equitably estopped find in favor of Detective Lemma on his
from denying indemnification during that indemnification claim on the basis of
time frame and that the New York State Court equitable estoppel. Detective Lemma did not
of Appeals decision does not preclude this raise an equitable estoppel argument in the
relief. Plaintiff similarly contends that New York state courts, and has not explained
Nassau County’s failure to exercise his failure to do so. Nor did plaintiff, at any
reasonable diligence requires it to honor the point during those proceedings, seek to
intervene to assert his objections on equitable

1 The Court notes that at least one New York State here. In any event, even assuming arguendo that such
court has held that the victim of a county police standing existed, the Court concludes that there is no
officer’s torts does not have standing to challenge the basis for Detective Lemma or plaintiff to challenge
Board’s indemnification decisions. See Galvani v. that indemnification decision on grounds of equitable
Nassau Cty. Police Indemnification Review Bd., 674 estoppel or any other grounds.
N.Y.S.2d 690 (2d Dep’t 1998). Plaintiff has not cited
any authority establishing that he has standing to do so
estoppel grounds, or any other grounds. In infliction of unconscionable injury and loss
any event, even assuming arguendo that this upon one who has relied on the promise of
challenge can be made to this Court in this another.” Am. Bartenders Sch., Inc. v. 105
context, the Court concludes that no grounds Madison Co., 59 N.Y.2d 716, 718 (1983)
for equitable estoppel exist in this case, nor (emphasis added).
are there any other grounds to disturb the
When equitable estoppel is invoked
New York Court of Appeals’ decision on
against the government, the bar is even
indemnification.
higher. “It is axiomatic that the doctrine of
“Equitable estoppel is grounded on equitable estoppel cannot generally be
notions of fair dealing and good conscience invoked against governmental agencies in the
and is designed to aid the law in the exercise of their governmental function.”
administration of justice where injustice Atl. States Legal Found., Inc. v. New York
would otherwise result.” In re Ionosphere State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 991
Clubs, Inc., 85 F.3d 992, 999 (2d Cir. 1996). N.Y.S.2d 151, 153 (3d Dep’t 2014).
“‘Estoppel’ generally means that one party in Accordingly, equitable estoppel against a
a dispute should not be permitted to reap any government agency “is foreclosed ‘in all but
benefit from its own misrepresentations.” the rarest cases,’” N.Y. Med. Transporters
United States v. Schmitt, 999 F. Supp. 317, Ass’n Inc. v. Perales, 77 N.Y.2d 126, 130
360 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 28 F. App’x 63 (1990) (quoting In re Parkview Assocs. v.
(2d Cir. 2002). Thus, to establish a claim for City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274, 282
equitable estoppel under New York law, a (1988)), and requires “a showing of fraud,
party must show: “(1) [a]n act constituting a misrepresentation, deception, or similar
concealment of facts or a false affirmative misconduct, along with
misrepresentation; (2) [a]n intention or reasonable reliance thereon,” In re Enf’t of
expectation that such acts will be relied upon; Tax Liens ex rel. Cty. of Orange, 903
(3) [a]ctual or constructive knowledge of the N.Y.S.2d 60, 70 (2d Dep’t 2010); accord
true facts by the wrongdoers; [and] Yassin v. Sarabu, 727 N.Y.S.2d 620, 621 (2d
(4) [r]eliance upon the misrepresentations Dep’t 2001).
which causes the innocent party to change its
Under the circumstances of this case, the
position to its substantial detriment.” Gaia
elements of equitable estoppel have not been
House Mezz LLC v. State St. Bank & Tr. Co.,
satisfied. Plaintiff and Detective Lemma
720 F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Gen.
have not shown, with respect to the actions of
Elec. Capital Corp. v. Eva Armadora, S.A.,
Nassau County, “[c]onduct which amounts to
37 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994)).
a false representation or concealment of
As a general matter, equitable estoppel is material facts.” BWA Corp. v. Alltrans Exp.
an “‘extraordinary remedy,’ which should be U.S.A., Inc., 493 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1st Dep’t
invoked ‘sparingly and only under 1985). Although the Board could have
exceptional circumstances.’” Twersky v. expected Detective Lemma to rely on its
Yeshiva Univ., 579 F. App’x 7, 10 (2d Cir. initial indemnification decision and he could
2014) (first quoting Clark v. Ravikumar, 935 have, in fact, relied on it, his estoppel claim
N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (2d Dep’t 2011); then fails because there is no evidence (nor is it
quoting In re Gross v. N.Y. City Health & alleged) that the Board made its initial
Hosps. Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 678, 679 (2d decision with knowledge that Detective
Dep’t 1986)). Indeed, “[t]he purpose of Lemma had failed to disclose exculpatory
invoking the doctrine is to prevent the information to prosecutors. To the contrary,
the evidence indicates that Nassau County’s to advise Detective Lemma of the potential
decision to rescind indemnification was conflict support equitable estoppel in this
based on the discovery of this material case on indemnification. Similarly, to the
information (i.e., that Detective Lemma was extent it is argued that Nassau County was
not acting within the proper discharge and negligent in their investigation of plaintiff’s
scope of his duties when he knowingly allegations and thus failed to uncover
withheld exculpatory information), which Detective Lemma’s misconduct sooner, such
Detective Lemma disclosed for the first time negligence would not provide a basis for
at his deposition. In short, there is no basis equitable estoppel.
for equitable estoppel because Nassau
In short, neither Detective Lemma nor
County made no false representations to, nor
plaintiff has demonstrated “fraud,
concealed any material fact from, Detective
misrepresentation, deception, or similar
Lemma or plaintiff, but rather simply
affirmative misconduct” by Nassau County,
reassessed their initial indemnification
In re Enf’t of Tax Liens, 903 N.Y.S.2d at 70,
decision in light of new information
nor an “unconscionable injury,” Am.
uncovered during discovery (which was
supplied by Detective Lemma).2 Bartenders Sch., Inc., 59 N.Y.2d at 718, to
invoke this exceptional doctrine in this case.
None of the arguments raised by Accordingly, this Court finds no basis for
Detective Lemma or plaintiff are persuasive equitable estoppel in this case, or any other
on the issue of equitable estoppel. For grounds to preclude Nassau County from
example, although Detective Lemma argues relying on the Board’s finding that Detective
that Nassau County had an inherent conflict Lemma will not be indemnified. Therefore,
of interest in representing him in this case the motions by Detective Lemma and
under Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d plaintiff to find in favor of Detective Lemma
903 (2d Cir. 1984), that case provides no on his crossclaim for indemnification are
support for equitable estoppel here because denied, and the cross-claim for
the potential conflict that was raised in indemnification is dismissed based on the
Dunton (where the municipality is claiming decision of the Board, as upheld by the New
that the individual officer acted outside the York Court of Appeals.
scope of his official duties) did not exist
B. Attorneys’ Fees
during the period of joint representation here.
In fact, Nassau County did not dispute for “The general rule in our legal system is
purposes of trial that Detective Lemma was that each party must pay its own attorney’s
acting within the scope of his employment fees and expenses.” Perdue v. Kenny A. ex
and agreed to be subjected to respondeat rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 550 (2010). In
superior liability for plaintiff’s state law Section 1983 actions, however, “the court, in
malicious prosecution claim against its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
Detective Lemma. Moreover, the Monell other than the United States, a reasonable
claim here was based on a failure to attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C.
adequately train and supervise detectives, § 1988(b). Here, plaintiff’s original counsel,
and not on a municipal policy. Thus, there Mr. Majid, requests $186,937.50 in
was no inherent conflict nor does any failure

2 For the same reasons, the Court finds plaintiff’s
claim that he also relied on the Board’s 2006 decision
for any award of damages provides no basis for
equitable estoppel.
attorney’s fees and $2,351.97 in costs. interrelated and required essentially the same
Plaintiff’s successor counsel, the Brewington proof.” Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 952
Law Firm, requests $411,841.75 in attorneys’ (2d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, “[t]he district
fees and $19,357.60 in costs. court . . . has the discretion to award fees for
the entire litigation where the claims are
To calculate reasonable attorneys’ fees,
‘inextricably intertwined’ and ‘involve a
the Court uses the “lodestar figure,” which is
common core of facts or [are] based on
determined by multiplying the number of
related legal theories.’” Kerin v. U.S. Postal
hours reasonably expended on a case by a
Serv., 218 F.3d 185, 194 n.6 (2d Cir. 2000)
reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v.
(alterations in original) (quoting Dominic v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983);
Consol. Edison Co., 822 F.2d 1249, 1259 (2d
Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 115
Cir. 1987)).
(2d Cir. 1997). “Both [the Second Circuit]
and the Supreme Court have held that the 1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
lodestar . . . creates a ‘presumptively
A “reasonable hourly rate” is “‘what a
reasonable fee.’” Millea v. Metro–North R.R.
reasonable, paying client would be willing to
Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)
pay,’ given that such a party wishes ‘to spend
(quoting Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens
the minimum necessary to litigate the case
Neighborhood Assoc. v. County of Albany,
effectively.’” Bergerson v. N.Y. State Office
522 F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008)). “[T]he
of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr.,
lodestar figure includes most, if not all, of the
652 F.3d 277, 289 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting
relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’
Simmons v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 575 F.3d
attorney’s fee.” Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553
170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009)). This Court follows
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley
the Second Circuit’s “forum rule,” which
Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S.
“generally requires use of the hourly rates
546, 565-66 (1986)). Thus, the Supreme
employed in the district in which the
Court has recognized that “the lodestar
reviewing court sits in calculating the
method produces an award that roughly
presumptively reasonable fee.” Id. at 290
approximates the fee that the prevailing
(quoting Simmons, 575 F.3d at 174). In
attorney would have received if he or she had
Arbor Hill, the Second Circuit also instructed
been representing a paying client who was
district courts to consider the factors set forth
billed by the hour in a comparable case.” Id.
in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express,
at 551. “The burden is on the party seeking
Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated
attorney’s fees to submit sufficient evidence
on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron,
to support the hours worked and the rates
489 U.S. 87 (1989). See 522 F.3d at 190. The
claimed.” Hugee v. Kimso Apartments, LLC,
twelve Johnson factors are:
852 F. Supp. 2d 281, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
(1) the time and labor required;
The Supreme Court has held that “the
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the
extent of a plaintiff’s success is a crucial
questions; (3) the level of skill
factor in determining the proper amount of an
required to perform the legal service
award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C.
properly; (4) the preclusion of
§ 1988.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.
employment by the attorney due to
However, a “plaintiff’s lack of success on
acceptance of the case; (5) the
some of his claims does not require the court
attorney’s customary hourly rate;
to reduce the lodestar amount where the
(6) whether the fee is fixed or
successful and the unsuccessful claims were
contingent; (7) the time limitations
imposed by the client or the the firm, and the expertise of its attorneys.’”
circumstances; (8) the amount Houston, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 402 (quoting
involved in the case and the results Siracuse v. Program for the Dev. of Human
obtained; (9) the experience, Potential, No. 07-CV-2205 (CLP), 2012 WL
reputation, and ability of the 1624291, at *30 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2012)).
attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of
2. Hours Reasonably Expended
the case; (11) the nature and length of
the professional relationship with the “The party seeking attorney’s fees also
client; and (12) awards in similar bears the burden of establishing that the
cases. number of hours for which compensation is
sought is reasonable.” Custodio v. Am. Chain
Id. at 186 n.3 (quoting Johnson, 488 F.2d at
Link & Constr., Inc., No. 06-CV-7148 (GBD)
717-19). “The burden rests with the
(HBP), 2014 WL 116147, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
prevailing party ‘to justify the reasonableness
Jan. 13, 2014) (citing Cruz v. Local Union
of the requested rate.’” Hugee, 852 F. Supp.
No. 3 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d
2d at 298 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
1148, 1160 (2d Cir. 1994)). “Applications
886, 895 n.11 (1984)).
for fee awards should generally be
Courts in this district have concluded that documented by contemporaneously created
$200 to $450 per hour is a reasonable hourly time records that specify, for each attorney,
rate for partners, $200 to $325 per hour is the date, the hours expended, and the nature
reasonable for senior associates, and $100 to of the work done.” Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd.,
$200 per hour is reasonable for more junior 148 F.3d 149, 173 (2d Cir. 1998). “Hours
associates. See Houston v. Cotter, 234 F. that are ‘excessive, redundant, or otherwise
Supp. 3d 392, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing unnecessary,’ are to be excluded, and in
Sass v. MTA Bus Co., 6 F. Supp. 3d 238, 261 dealing with such surplusage, the court has
(E.D.N.Y. 2014)); Ganci v. U.S. Limousine discretion simply to deduct a reasonable
Service Ltd., No. 10-CV-3027 (JFB)(AKT), percentage of the number of hours claimed
2015 WL 1529772, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, ‘as a practical means of trimming fat from a
2015) (collecting cases); Hugee, 852 F. Supp. fee application.’” Id. (first quoting Hensley,
2d at 298-99; Pilitz v. Inc. Village of 461 U.S. at 434; then quoting N.Y. Ass’n for
Freeport, No. 07–CV–4078 (ETB), 2011 WL Retarded Children, Inc., 711 F.2d at 1146);
5825138, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2011) see also Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d
(citing Builders Bank v. Rockaway Equities, 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994) (“We do not require
LLC, No. 08–CV–3575 (MDG), 2011 WL that the court set forth item-by-item findings
4458851, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011)); concerning what may be countless objections
Olsen v. County of Nassau, No. 05–CV–3623 to individual billing items.”). Finally, when
(ETB), 2010 WL 376642, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. the Court makes this determination, it “does
Jan. 26, 2010); Gutman v. Klein, No. 03–CV– not play the role of an uninformed arbiter but
1570 (BMC), 2009 WL 3296072, at *2 may look to its own familiarity with the case
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2009). and its experience generally as well as to the
evidentiary submissions and arguments of the
Ultimately, however, “in light of the
parties.” Gierlinger v. Gleason, 160 F.3d
numerous factors that courts in this circuit
858, 876 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting DiFilippo v.
consider to determine a reasonable hourly
Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 235-36 (2d Cir.
rate, ‘the range of “reasonable” attorney fee
1985)).
rates in this district depends on the type of
case, the nature of the litigation, the size of
3. Application U.S. at 433). Thus, fee applications must be
supported by contemporaneous records that
a. Mr. Majid
“specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours
Mr. Majid requests an hourly rate of expended, and the nature of the work done.”
$375. Defendants argue that $375 per hour is N.Y. Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc., 711
unreasonable in light of Mr. Majid’s limited F.2d at 1148. This requirement is strictly
experience with civil rights litigation, and enforced, which means that the records must
propose an hourly rate of $200. be made “while the work is being done or,
more likely, immediately thereafter.
In light of the prevailing hourly rates in Descriptions of work recollected in
this district, and all the other factors set forth tranquility days or weeks later will not do.”
in Arbor Hill, the Court concludes that $250 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 727 F. Supp.
per hour is a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. 2d 239, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Majid. Although Mr. Majid is an able
lawyer, he does not have significant In the instant case, Mr. Majid submitted
experience in civil rights litigation. Because records showing that he spent 498.5 hours on
the upper range of rates is “reserved for this matter and a sworn statement that these
expert trial attorneys with extensive records were compiled contemporaneously.
experience before the federal bar, who The Court concludes that Mr. Majid’s sworn
specialize in the practice of civil rights law statement, and the records themselves, are
and are recognized by their peers as leaders sufficient to satisfy the contemporaneous
and experts in their fields,” Hugee, 852 F. time records requirement. To the extent that
Supp. 2d at 300, a reduction is appropriate. Detective Lemma challenges Mr. Majid’s
The Court will use a rate of $250 per hour to submissions on this ground, Detective
calculate the lodestar for Mr. Majid. Lemma’s arguments are insufficient for the
Court to conclude that the records were not
Mr. Majid has submitted a billing contemporaneously made. Thus, Detective
summary of work performed on the case. Lemma’s motion on that ground is denied.
Defendants contend that these hours should
be denied in their entirety because the time However, the Court finds the number of
records submitted were not made hours expended by Mr. Majid to be
contemporaneously. Defendants further unreasonably excessive in several respects as
argue that Mr. Majid’s hours should be discussed below. First, the Court agrees with
reduced because they are excessive, defendants that, apart from fees incurred in
redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. preparing the instant motion, Mr. Majid is not
entitled to any fees after January 30, 2007,
As a threshold matter, the Court when this Court granted Nassau County’s
concludes that Mr. Majid’s time records, motion to disqualify him. As Mr. Majid was
though not exemplary, meet the requirements no longer plaintiff’s attorney, he cannot
for an award of attorney’s fees. As noted recoup fees after that date. Thus, for
earlier, “[t]he burden is on the party seeking example, time that Mr. Majid spent opposing
attorney’s fees to submit sufficient evidence defendants’ motion to implead him as a
to support the hours worked and the rates defendant is not recoverable.3 The Court
claimed.” Id. at 298 (citing Hensley, 461 similarly concludes that time spent on Mr.

3 The Court notes that, not only was this motion after underlying criminal case (and not on his representation
Mr. Majid’s representation of the plaintiff ceased, but of plaintiff in this civil rights case).
it was based on his conduct in connection with the
Majid’s opposition to defendants’ successful 32 hours); see also Romeo & Juliette Laser
disqualification motion is not recoverable. Hair Removal Inc. v. Assara I LLC, No. 08
Mr. Majid did not prevail in opposing that Civ. 442(TPG)(FM), 2013 WL 3322249, at
motion, and the time is severable from the *5-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2013) (reducing fees
work he spent on behalf of his client.4 by 75% that were “grossly excessive relative
to the nature of the work performed”); Lide v.
Second, in its review of Mr. Majid’s
Abbott House, No. 05 Civ. 3790(SAS), 2008
billing records, the Court finds numerous
WL 495304, at *l-2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2008)
instances of excessive time that warrant a
(finding that “excessive and unnecessary
reduction. For example, counsel spent over
hours spent on indisputably straightforward
three hundred hours drafting the complaint. tasks” warranted a thirty percent reduction).
Having reviewed the complaint and billing
entries, and having presided over this case Third, with respect to the remaining work
(and many other Section 1983 cases), the (outside of the work on the complaint), the
Court finds that such time was grossly Court finds that a reduction is also
excessive and warrants a substantial appropriate based on vague and block-billed
reduction. In particular, although the time entries, such that the reasonableness of
complaint is lengthy and (as Mr. Majid noted each entry cannot be easily determined.
at oral argument) required legal research “Courts frequently respond to vague and
before drafting, the Court concludes that any difficult-to-decipher billing statements with
preparation for, or drafting of, the complaint an across-the-board percentage reduction in
beyond 40 hours is unreasonable under the the fees claimed, often in the range of 20-30
circumstances of this case. See, e.g., Hines v. percent.” Calvo v. City of New York, No. 14-
1025 Fifth Ave. Inc., No. 14-CV-3661 SAS, CV-7246 (VEC), 2017 WL 4119280, at *6
2015 WL 4006126, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017) (quoting Thai-Lao
2015) (finding 58.2 hours drafting a 27-page Lignite (Thailand) Co. v. Gov’t of Lao
complaint was excessive even though People’s Democratic Republic, No. 10 CIV.
complaint covered 13 years of events where 05256 (KMW) (DF), 2012 WL 5816878, at
“nothing was achieved by tracing thirteen *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012)); see also, e.g.,
years and adding layers of detail when it Ass’n of Holocaust Victims for Restitution of
[wa]s evident” that that was not needed to Artwork & Masterpieces v. Bank Austria
render claims plausible); Simmonds v. N.Y.C. Creditanstalt AG, No. 04cv3600 (SWK),
Dep’t of Corr., No. 06 CIV. 5298 (NRB), 2005 WL 3099592, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17,
2008 WL 4303474, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2005) (applying 25% reduction to account for
2008) (finding that over 142 hours drafting “block billing, vagueness, and excess”).
complaint was “certainly an excessive
Here, Mr. Majid’s time records are
amount given that it corresponds to over one
riddled with vague and block-billed entries.
month of full time work by a single
For example, Mr. Majid’s entry on February
attorney”); Lynch v. Town of Southampton,
19, 2006 states that he spent 4.75 hours on
492 F. Supp. 2d 197, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
“Conf. w/ clients – Legal research (Malic.
(finding 97.83 hours for 43 page civil rights
Prosec.) – Outline Complaint.” (Majid Reply
complaint unreasonable and reducing time to

4 Detective Lemma also argues that it would be Detective Lemma). However, the Court need not
inequitable to require him to pay for Mr. Majid’s work address this issue because it finds that the time Mr.
on the disqualification motion and the impleader Majid spent on those motions is unrecoverable for the
motion because the Nassau County Attorney’s Office other reasons discussed above.
made the decision to file those motions (rather than
Decl. Ex. A at 2.) On September 6, 2006, Mr. rate to $400 due to the “uncontested facts of
Majid’s entry states that he spent one hour on the case and the results achieved.” (Lemma
“Rev. Def’s letter-Conf. w/ Arthur-Conf. w/ Opp. at 19.)
clients (J. Bianco now has case).” (Id. at 4.)5
In light of the prevailing hourly rates in
Given the frequency of such entries, the
this district, and all other factors set forth in
Court concludes that a 30% across-the-board
Arbor Hill, the Court concludes that $450 is
reduction in hours is warranted in order to
a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Brewington.
“trim the excess from counsel’s billing
As noted, courts in this district “award hourly
entries.” Monette, 2016 WL 4145798, at *8.
rates ranging from $200 to $450 per hour for
Based on the foregoing, the Court partners.” Houston, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 402
calculates the lodestar for Mr. Majid to be (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting
$22,600. The Court sees no reason to depart D’Annunzio v. Ayken, Inc., No. 11-CV-3303
from the lodestar figure in this case. See, e.g., (WFK) (WDW), 2015 WL 5308094, at *4
Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553 (noting that lodestar (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015)); accord Martinez
figure includes “most, if not all,” relevant v. City of New York, 330 F.R.D. 60, 70
factors in setting reasonable attorney’s fee). (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Based on a survey of
cases in the Eastern District of New York,
b. The Brewington Law Firm
experienced Section 1983 attorneys receive,
The Brewington Law Firm has submitted on average, fees calculated at an hourly rate
detailed records and an affidavit attesting to of between $300.00 and $450.00.”). Given
their legal experience and work on this Mr. Brewington’s extensive experience
matter. litigating and trying civil rights cases (which
defendants acknowledge), a rate at the upper
The Brewington Law Firm requests the end of this range is appropriate. See, e.g.,
following rates: Hugee, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 300. The Court
Attorney Role Rate also bases the conclusion to award Mr.
Frederick Brewington Partner $500 Brewington a fee on the high end of the range
Ira Fogelgaren Partner $300 in this district on its own observations of Mr.
Gregory Calliste Jr. Associate $315 Brewington’s excellent performance over the
Mili Makhijani Associate $250 course of this entire litigation. Even though
G. William Germano Jr. Associate $250 the Court does not view the case as
particularly complex, Mr. Brewington did an
Valerie M. Cartright Associate $315
impressive job during extensive motions
Johanna C. David Associate $225
practice and prevailed at trial. Accordingly,
Cathryn Harris Of Counsel $250 for the above reasons, the Court concludes
Cory Morris Associate $200 that an hourly rate near the high end of the
Precilla Lockett Associate $150 range in this district is warranted.
Ulrica Sheridan Paralegal $50
The Court notes that Mr. Brewington’s

regularly charged hourly rate is $500.
Although defendants generally object to
Although that rate “is persuasive evidence of
these proposed rates as unreasonable, they
reasonableness, compensable attorneys’ fees
suggest a reduction of only Mr. Brewington’s
must ultimately conform to market rates.”

5 More examples include an entry for December 19, December 22, 2005 that states, “Legal research
2005 that states, “Conf. with client – Legal research (criminal, civil issues) – Redraft and file NOC.”
(50-h issues) – Outline Complaint,” and an entry for (Majid Reply Decl. Ex. A at 1-2.)
Tatum v. City of New York, No. 06-cv-4290 award here was substantial, and not only
(PGG)(GWG), 2010 WL 334975, at *5 nominal. The cases defendants rely on to
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010). Accordingly, a argue that a reduction is appropriate are
district court is “not bound by the rate which therefore inapposite. E.g., Farrar v. Hobby,
a lawyer charges his other clients.” McCann 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (holding that the
v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 130 (2d Cir. “technical nature of a nominal damages
1983). Here, the Court concludes, based on award or any judgment . . . bear[s] on the
all of the relevant factors, that a rate above propriety of fees awarded under § 1988”). In
$450 would be unreasonable under the fact, the Second Circuit noted in Pino v.
circumstances of this particular case. Locascio that Farrar’s inquiry applies
“whe[re] the plaintiff has won only nominal
As to the rates for the other Brewington
damages.” 101 F.3d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1996)
Law Firm attorneys and their paralegal, the
(emphasis added) (citing Farrar, 506 U.S. at
Court concludes that those hourly rates are
103); c.f., Hines v. City of Albany, 613 F.
appropriate. In particular, the requested rates
App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We are
are in accord with the prevailing rates in this
unpersuaded by Defendants’ attempts to
district and are supported by the other factors
characterize the $10,000 settlement in this
set forth in Arbor Hill and Johnson, including
case as meager. Moreover, the success here
the attorneys’ legal education, training, and
was hardly technical.”).
experience as set forth in the declaration
supporting the motion for fees. (See Decl. of Second, the Court disagrees with
Frederick K. Brewington in Supp. of Mot. for defendants’ argument that the Court should
Fees (“Brewington Decl.”) ¶¶ 27-65, ECF deduct time spent on the false arrest and false
No. 358-2.) imprisonment claims. Defendants are correct
that “[i]n calculating the total number of
The Brewington Law Firm has also
reasonable hours eligible for attorneys’ fees,
submitted a billing summary of work
courts should subtract any ‘hours dedicated
performed on the case. There is no dispute
to severable unsuccessful claims.’” Tatum,
here that the submissions satisfy the
2010 WL 334975, at *10 (quoting
contemporaneous records requirement.
Quarantino v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422,
However, defendants contend that the hours
425 (2d Cir. 1999)). Courts “need not”
should be reduced because the Brewington
reduce the fee award, however, “where the
Law Firm obtained only limited success and
‘successful and the unsuccessful claims were
because the hours are excessive, redundant,
interrelated and required essentially the same
and improperly block billed.
proof.’” Id. (quoting Murphy, 118 F.3d at
i. Limited Success 952). Thus, if a plaintiff’s claims “involve a
common core of facts” or are “based on
Defendants argue that a reduction is related legal theories,” so that “[m]uch of
appropriate because plaintiff’s “degree of counsel’s time [is] devoted generally to the
success was significantly modest in litigation as a whole, making it difficult to
comparison with his original complaint and divide the hours expended on a claim-by-
monetary request for damages.” (Lemma claim basis,” no reduction based on
Opp. at 21-23.) The Court disagrees. unsuccessful claims is warranted. See
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Instead, plaintiff’s
First, the Court disagrees with
counsel “should be compensated even for
defendants’ characterization of plaintiff’s
work done in connection with an
victory in this case. The $175,000 damages
unsuccessful claim if that claim was
intertwined with the claim on which force/battery claims against Officer
[plaintiff] succeeded.” Gierlinger, 160 F.3d Annarumma (although not extensive) were
at 877. factually and legally distinct from the claims
against Detective Lemma. In such situations,
Here, the Court finds that virtually all of
even where the time entries do not delineate
plaintiff’s claims—including his successful
work on the successful claims as compared to
malicious prosecution claims in the form of a
the unsuccessful claims, a court can in its
$175,000 jury award—arose from the same
discretion utilize an across-the-board cut.
facts surrounding his arrest and subsequent
See, e.g., Todaro v. Siegel Fenchel & Peddy,
prosecution. Specifically, there is significant
P.C., 697 F. Supp. 2d 395, 401 (E.D.N.Y.
overlap in the claims that stem from the same
2010) (applying a 30% fee reduction even
facts concerning plaintiff’s arrest,
though the unsuccessful claim had a
imprisonment, and prosecution. Indeed,
significant amount of “overlap” because of
although Detective Lemma argues that the
“how much time [p]laintiff’s counsel would
litigation regarding the facts leading up to the
have saved by not litigating [plaintiff]’s
arrest were unnecessary to prove the
unsuccessful claim”). Although Mr.
malicious prosecution claim against him for
Brewington suggested at oral argument that a
his conduct after the arrest, the Court
modest reduction of 5% in the number of
disagrees. Plaintiff needed to prove, among
hours may be appropriate for work on the
other things, that Detective Lemma’s conduct
unsuccessful claims, the Court concludes that
following the arrest was malicious, and not
a 10% reduction is warranted in light of the
simply an oversight or mistake. Therefore, it
nature of the claims and the nature of the
was critical to explore his involvement in the
work that was required to pursue the claims
investigation (especially as the investigating
against Nassau County and Officer
officer) from its inception and to gather
Annarumma apart from the claims against
information from those who interacted with
Detective Lemma.
him during the investigation, arrest, and
prosecution. In sum, although virtually all of the
claims stem from the same material facts, an
However, notwithstanding the
across-the-board 10% reduction in the
inextricably intertwined facts, there are some
number of hours is appropriate because of the
portions of the unsuccessful claims,
additional legal work performed litigating the
especially the legal work on the Monell claim
unsuccessful claims, especially the Monell
and the claims against Officer Annarumma,
claim and the excessive force/battery claim
that the Court concludes are distinct. For
against Officer Annarumma.
example, the legal research and briefing on
the summary judgment motion with respect ii. Excessive, Redundant,
to the Monell claim, the jury instructions on and Vague Hours
that claim, the trial preparation on that claim,
and other related work were not inextricably The Court further finds that the number
intertwined with the Section 1983 claim of hours expended by the Brewington Law
against Detective Lemma. Moreover, some Firm on the case is unreasonably excessive
small amount of the facts (such as the facts for several reasons. First, the matter was
relating to Detective Lemma’s supervision overstaffed with nine attorneys, one law
and training) were primarily aimed at the school graduate, and one paralegal, who
Monell claim. Similarly, the discovery and spent more than one thousand hours on the
other legal work on the excessive matter. When evaluating fee applications, a
district court has discretion to reduce
requested attorneys’ fees where the Harris spent 10 hours on “File Review,
prevailing party assigned an inordinate document review.” (Id. at 42.) As explained
number of attorneys to litigate the action. above, the Court may, in its discretion,
See, e.g., Lochren v. County of Suffolk, 344 F. determine a reduction is appropriate in light
App’x 706, 709 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming of such deficient entries.
district court’s 25% across-the-board
Based on the foregoing, the Court
reduction because “plaintiffs overstaffed the
concludes that a 20% percent across-the-
case, resulting in the needless duplication of
board reduction to the Brewington Law
work and retention of unnecessary
Firm’s hours is warranted. See, e.g., Kirsch,
personnel”); Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109
148 F.3d at 173 (finding no abuse of
F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[I]t was within
discretion “in the adjustment of the rate to be
the purview of the court’s discretion to
paid for [counsel]’s time or as to the 20%
determine whether or not the actual time
reduction for vagueness, inconsistencies, and
expended by an additional attorney was
other deficiencies in the billing records);
reasonable.”). Moreover, the billing records
Monette, 2016 WL 4145798, at *8 (finding
indicate duplicative and inefficient efforts.
that the court has “discretion simply to deduct
For example, from September 10 to 14, 2011,
a reasonable percentage of the number of
it appears that Mr. Brewington, Ms.
hours claimed ‘as a practical means of
Cartright, Ms. Lockett, and Ms. Harris spent
trimming fat from a fee applications.’”
over a hundred hours on the summary
(quoting Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 173)).
judgment motion. (See Brewington Decl. Ex.
A at 43-45, ECF No. 358-3.)6 More broadly, c. Detective Lemma’s Financial
none of the legal or factual issues in the case Situation
was so complicated or unusual to warrant so
many attorneys and hours. See Husain v. Finally, defendants argue that the Court
Springer, 579 F. App’x 3, 6 (2d Cir. 2014) should impose a fee reduction in light of
(citing DiFillippo, 759 F.2d at 235-36) Detective Lemma’s financial situation. The
(holding that plaintiffs’ “attorney’s claim of Court disagrees.
2,741.4 hours of attorney time was Detective Lemma cites Faraci v. Hickey-
extravagant” in a Section 1983 litigation that Freeman Co., 607 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979)
“established no new principle of law” but to support the argument that the Court should
rather “concerned a ‘straightforward’ consider his financial circumstances in
application of existing law, calling into determining the fee award here. In Faraci,
question their attorney’s enormous the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s
expenditure of time”). Title VII complaint as frivolous and awarded
Finally, the Court concludes that a the defendant the full amount of fees
reduction in hours is appropriate based on requested under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). Id.
vague and block-billed time entries. For at 1027. On appeal, the Second Circuit
instance, there are numerous entries that explained that “successful defendants in Title
mention only “Legal Research” or VII actions are entitled to attorneys’ fees only
“Research.” (E.g., Brewington Decl. Ex. A where the suit is ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or
at 4, 14, 70.) On September 5, 2011, Ms. without foundation.’” Id. at 1028 (quoting

6 Ms. Cartright also spent 16 hours “finaliz[ing]
motions and exhibits.” (Id. at 45.) The Court finds
that this entry is excessive and vague.
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 relevant to the instant fee award
U.S. 412, 421 (1978)). In determining the determination.
amount of that fee, the Second Circuit stated
However, even assuming the Court could
that “courts should not hesitate to take the
consider the parties’ relative wealth or
relative wealth of the parties into account,”
Detective Lemma’s financial circumstances,
given that “fee awards are at bottom an
the Court, in its discretion, concludes that a
equitable matter.” Id. Since Faraci, courts
reduction is not warranted. Detective
in this Circuit have considered the parties’
Lemma’s own submissions demonstrate that
relative wealth almost exclusively when
he has more than sufficient assets to pay any
awarding fees against plaintiffs who bring
mandated attorneys’ fees, particularly in light
frivolous or sanctionable claims. E.g.,
of the previously explained reductions and
Shangold v. Walt Disney Co., 275 F. App’x
his ongoing retirement income. (See ECF
72, 73 (2d Cir. 2008) (affirming district court
Nos. 392, 401.)7 In fact, Detective Lemma’s
consideration of financial status of plaintiffs
most recent submission reported that he sold
who submitted fraudulent evidence);
a home that he owned, and, as a result, his
Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No.
liabilities are significantly diminished. In
00CIV.5780(LAK)(JCF), 2003 WL
short, considering all of the equitable factors
22299203, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2003),
in this particular case, including Detective
adopted by No. 00 CIV. 5780 (LAK), 2003
Lemma’s financial circumstances, the Court
WL 22493855 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2003)
does not believe a reduction is warranted
(reducing award against plaintiffs whose
based on those circumstances or for any other
claims were frivolous in light of their limited
equitable reason.
financial resources and defendant’s
“enormous” resources). Indeed, defendants Accordingly, the Court calculates the
have not cited a single case where a court total lodestar figure to be $298,122.55, based
reduced a successful civil rights plaintiff’s on the following:
fee award based on a defendant’s relative
wealth, and this Court’s research has not Attorney Rate Hours Total
Majid $250 90.40 $22,600
uncovered one. Relatedly, courts have
considered “the wealth of the losing party, in Brewington $450 316.92 $142,614
cases of real or extreme hardship.” Mariani Fogelgaren $350 14.14 $4,949
v. Banat Realty, No. 86 CV 2895, 1993 WL Calliste $315 93.55 $29,468.25
86530, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1993); see Makhijani $250 0.21 $52.50
also Cohen v. W. Haven Bd. of Police Germano $250 4.63 $1,157.50
Comm’rs, 638 F.2d 496, 506 (2d Cir. 1980) Cartright $315 204.02 $64,266.30
(“Ordinarily the court would not focus David $225 0.70 $157.50
exclusively on the financial condition of one
Harris $250 96.60 $24,150
party unless that party appeared to be in
extremis.”). Because this case does not Morris $225 1.40 $315
involve either scenario, it is not clear that Lockett $150 55.44 $8,316
Detective Lemma’s financial condition is Sheridan $50 1.53 $76.50

7 The Court notes that it considers Detective Lemma’s
Deferred Compensation Plan as part of his net assets
even with the potential tax penalty if the funds are
accessed before Detective Lemma turns 59 years and
six months old.
Finally, the Court sees no reason to depart 5431034, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2012)
from the lodestar figure in this case. See, e.g., (quoting Local Civ. R. 54.1{a)), adopted by
Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553 (noting that lodestar 2012 WL 5429521 (S.D.N_Y. Nov. 7, 2012).
figure includes “most, if not ail,” relevant . .
factors in setting reasonable attorney’s fee). . Both Mr, Majid and the Brewington Law
Firm attempted to rectify documentary
C. Costs deficiencies relating to their requests for
i ies. Brewington Ri
As noted, Mr. Majid requests $2,351.97 Deel Ba A Mai 1 Reply Deal tx. BY
in costs and the Brewington Law Firm However, the exhibits attached to those reply
requests $19,357.60 in costs. Defendants declarations do not support the full amount of
object on the ground that many asserted costs costs sought by either Mr. Majid or the
have not been appropriately documented and Brewington Law Firm. After reviewing
are EXCESSIVE. those exhibits, the Court finds that Mr. Majid
“([A] court will generally award ‘those has provided support for an award of
reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred $1,200.14, that the Brewington Law Firm has
by attorneys and ordinarily charged to their provided support for an award of $8,177.30,
clients.’” Pennacchio v. Powers, No. 05-CV- and that none of those costs are excessive.
985 (RRM)(RML), 2011 WL 2945825, at *2 Accordingly, the Court awards $1,200.14 and
(E.D.N.Y, July 21, 2011) (quoting LeBlanc— $8,177.30 in costs to Mr. Majid and the
Sternberg v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 763 (2d Brewington Law Firm, respectively. The
Cir. 1998)). “Such reimbursable costs Court denies plaintiff's other requests for
‘include filing fees, process servers, postage, costs without prejudice, and will afford
travel, and photocopying,’ as well as legal plaintiff's counsel the opportunity to submit
research costs.” Tis. of the Pavers & Rd. further supporting documentation for their
Builders Dist. Council Welfare v. M.C. cost requests.
Landscape Grp., Inc., No, 12 CIV 00834
(CBA) (VMS), 2016 WL 6998640, at *8 HL. CONCLUSION
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016), adopted by 2016 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court
WL 7017336 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2016) awards Arshad Majid $22,600 in fees and
(quoting Capone v. Patchogue-Medford $1,200.14 in costs and awards the
Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 04 Civ. 2947 (JS) Brewington Law Firm $275,522.55 in fees
(MLO), 2011 WL 743573, at *5 (E.D.NLY. and $8,177.30 in costs. Detective Lemma’s
Feb, 23, 2011)). The moving party “bears the crossclaim for indemnification is dismissed.
burden of adequately documenting and
itemizing the costs requested.” Jd; accord SO ORDERED.
First Keystone Consultants, Inc. _ v. alee
Schlesinger Elec, Contractors, Inc., No. 10- ee
CV-696 (KAM\SMG), 2013 WL 950573, at JOSEPH F. BIANCO) \_..
*10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013). In particular, United States Circuit Judge
“the party must include as part of the request (Sitting by designation)
‘an affidavit that the costs claimed are
allowable by law, are correctly stated and Dated: December 18, 2019
were necessarily incurred,”” and “[b]ills for Central Islip, NY
the costs claimed must be attached as
exhibits.” D.J. ex rel. Roberts v. City af New
York, No. 11-CV-5458 (IGK)(DF), 2012 WL
16

* * *
Plaintiff was formerly represented by Arshad
Majid, Majid & Associates, P.C., 300 Rabro
Drive, Hauppauge, NY 11788, and is
currently represented by Frederick K.
Brewington, the Law Offices of Frederick K.
Brewington, 556 Peninsula Boulevard,
Hempstead, NY 11550. Nassau County is
represented by Matthew A. Cuomo, Cuomo
LLC, 9 East 38th Street, New York, NY
10016, and Detective Lemma is represented
by Mitchell Garber, Worth, Longworth &
London, LLP, 111 John Street, New York,
NY 10038.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10303491. Public record. Not legal advice.