# Sanchez v. Oceanside First Class Roofing, Inc.

> District Court, E.D. New York · September 23, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10303099

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, E.D. New York
- **Decided:** September 23, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10303099

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a prevailing party’s decision to send more than one attorney to a deposition or to assist and observe during trial does not bar it from collecting fees

## Opinion text

EUANSITTEEDR NS TDAISTTERS IDCITS TORFI NCETW C OYUORRTK
-------------------------------------------------------X
JOSE SANCHEZ AND ANTONIO
MEJIA PALACIO,,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiffs, 16-CV-2064 (DRH)(ARL)
-against-

FIRST CLASS HOME IMPROVEMENT, LLC,
FIRST CLASS ROOFING, INC.,
OCEANSIDE FIRST CLASS ROOFING, INC.,
and ETHAN SAGE (a/k/a JESUS MANUEL
TORRES CANDELARIA, a/k/a JESUS TORRES),

Defendants.
-------------------------------------------------------X

Presently before the Court is the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Arlene
R. Lindsay, dated May 9, 2019 (“R & R”), recommending that plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees
and costs pursuant to New York Labor Law §§ 663(1) and 198 be denied with leave to renew based
only on the work performed in connection with the successful wage notice claim. In essence, Judge
Lindsay reasoned that because plaintiffs failed to prevail on their FLSA or state labor law overtime
claims, the claims against First Class Roofing, Inc. and one of their two wage notice claims, a
substantial reduction should be made for their lack of success and further that the successful and
unsuccessful claims are not inextricably intertwined.
Plaintiffs have filed objections to the R & R. The purpose of this Memorandum is to address
those objections. For the reasons set forth below, the Court declines to adopt the recommendation
of Judge Lindsay and awards Plaintiffs a total of $47,281.11 in attorneys’ fees and costs.
BACKGROUND
I. The Claims Asserted
Plaintiffs Jose Sanchez ("Sanchez") and Antonio Mejia, Palacio ("Palacio"),
commenced this action on April 26, 2016 against Oceanside First Class Roofing, Inc.
("Oceanside") and Ethan Sage ("Sage") to recover unpaid overtime compensation pursuant to
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., the New York Labor Law
("NYLL") Articles 6 and 19, and the New York Codes, Rules, and Regulations 142-2.2. They also
asserted claims pursuant to NYLL § 195(1) and (3) alleging that defendants had failed to furnish
them with wage notices and wage statements. Thereafter plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, on
consent, joining First Class Home Improvement, LLC and First Class Roofing, Inc. as defendants.
II. The Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law
A bench trial was held on November 26, 27, and 28, 2017 to determine the merits of the
plaintiffs' contentions. By Memorandum and Order dated August 28, 2018, familiarity with which
is presumed, the Court set forth its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as required by Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 52. In that decision, the claims against First Class Roofing, Inc.
were dismissed as they were not pursued at trial. With respect to the remaining defendants, the
Court found that the plaintiffs' federal and state overtime claims were without merit, finding their
testimony regarding same unworthy of belief and contrary to all the other trial evidence on that
point. It rejected, however, defendants’ claim that plaintiffs were independent contractors; it found
the evidence was overwhelming that plaintiffs were employees and further that defendant Sage was
an employer in his individual capacity. Addressing the claim under New York Labor Law §§ 195(1)
and (3), the Court noted that defendants admitted that they had failed to provide the plaintiffs with
the wage notice and wage statement required by those sections. With respect to the wage notice

required by §195(1), the Court found the penalty provisions inapplicable as plaintiffs commenced
working for defendants before April 9, 2011. The penalty provision for failure to provide wage
statements pursuant to §195(3) was applicable resulting in the maximum statutory award available
to each of them, i.e., $5000 to Sanchez and $2500 to Palacio.
III. The Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
On September 10, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs seeking
$108,500.00 in attorneys’ fees and $6,340.86 in costs. The motion was referred to Judge Lindsay
for Report and Recommendation.
IV. Judge Lindsay’s R&R
In her May 9, 2019 Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”), Judge Lindsay notes that
when a party is entitled to fees, a court calculates the “ ‘presumptively reasonable fee’ by the
lodestar method, which entails determining the ‘number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate’” and set forth the factors to be considered in that
determination. (R&R at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).) She goes on to state that “the most

critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained
and that a prevailing party is “not entitled to a fee award for unsuccessful claims that were based on
different facts and different legal theories.” (Id. at 6.) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Applying that precept, she reasoned that “a substantial reduction must be made for the
plaintiffs’ lack of success” because the plaintiffs did not prevail on their overtime claims and their
wage notice claim. Moreover, she did not find that the successful and unsuccessful claims are
inextricably intertwined as “plaintiffs could have independently sought damages relating to
defendants’ undisputed failure to provide wage notices.” Accordingly, she recommended “that the
motion for attorneys’ fees and costs be denied with leave to renew based only on the work

performed in connection with the successful wage notice claim.”
V. Plaintiff’s Objections
Plaintiff’s timely filed objections to the R &R, arguing that Judge Lindsay erred in
determining that the successful §195(3) claim were not inextricably intertwined with their claim for
unpaid overtime by failing to consider the numerous overlapping issues and failed to sufficiently
consider and apply relevant case law governing an award of attorneys’ fees and costs.1
DISCUSSION
I. Governing Law – Attorneys’ Fees
As noted above, Plaintiffs did not prevail on their FLSA and state law claims for overtime;
they only prevailed on their wage statement claims under the New York Labor Law § 195(3). Thus,
Plaintiff’s claim for attorneys’ fees is to be determined in accordance with New York Law.
New York follows the American Rule whereby each party bears its own attorneys’ fees
unless an award of fees is authorized by agreement between the parties, statute, or court rule. See,
e.g., Hooper Assoc., Ltd. V. AGS Computers, Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 487, 491 (N.Y. 1989). Here, the

relevant statutory provision for an award of attorneys’ fees is N.Y. Labor Law § 198 (1-d). That
statute provides in pertinent part: “If any employee is not provided a statement or statements as
required by subdivision three of section one hundred ninety-five of this article, he or she shall
recover in a civil action damages of two hundred fifty dollars for each work day that the violations
occurred or continue to occur, but not to exceed a total of five thousand dollars, together with costs
and reasonable attorney's fees.” (emphasis added).
The foregoing language mandates an award of attorneys’ fees whenever an employee
succeeds on a claim for wage statements.2 This is in contrast to the language in subsection 1-b

1 Plaintiff asserts that Judge Lindsay erred in limiting her analysis to §195(1), a statute not at issue. However, it is
appears that in referring to “wage notice claim,” Judge Lindsay was referring to §195(3), albeit using imprecise
language.
2 The Court is aware of the decision in O’Donnell v. JEF Golf Corp., -- N.Y.S. 3d --, 2019 WL 2528630 (3d Dept.
June 20, 2019. Therein, the court upheld the lower court’s finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to overtime
compensation and rejected his claim that he was entitled to counsel fees based on the lower court’s finding that the
defendants had failed to provide a wage statement notice as required by Labor Law § 195(3) on the grounds he was
not a prevailing party. The court stated: “Plaintiff alleged four distinct claims against defendants – they failed to pay
him overtime compensation, they failed to pay him spread of hours wages, they failed to provide him with wage
notice and wage statements, and they failed to reimburse expenses. Although plaintiff requested damages totaling
approximately $171,000, he was awarded only a total of $2,500 on his claim that defendants failed to provide him a
wage statement. As such, plaintiff was not successful to the central relief sought and thus was not a prevailing
party.” The cases cited by the O’Donnell court, however, did not involve claims under N.Y. Labor Law 195(3) but
which provides that an employee “may recover . . . costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. N.Y. Labor
Law § 198(1-b).
New York courts, like federal courts, use the lodestar method to determine the
presumptively reasonable attorneys’ fees. See Gamero v. Koodo Sushi corp., 328 F. Supp. 3d 165,
172 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). While “New York courts have stated that, as a general rule, they will rarely
find reasonable an award to a plaintiff that exceeds the amount involved in the litigation,” F.H.
Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 810 F.2d 1250, 1264 (2d Cir.1987), attorney's fees need
not be proportional where an award of fees is needed to attract counsel or where the statute at issue
vindicates important rights. See, e.g, Riordin v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 47, 54 (2d
Cir.1992); Diaz v. Paragon Motors of Woodside Inc. , 2007 WL 2903920 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)

Podhorecki v. Lauer's Furniture Stores, Inc., 201 A.D.2d 947, 607 N.Y.S.2d 818 (4th Dep't 1994)
(“There is no bright [ ] line rule that a fee award [pursuant to New York General Business Law §
396] . . . must be proportional to the amount at issue . . . .) For example, in FLSA cases the
attorney's fees need not be proportional to the damages plaintiffs recover, because the award of
attorney's fees in such cases encourages the vindication of Congressionally identified policies and
rights. See, e.g., Tucker v. City of N.Y., 704 F. Supp. 2d 347, 359 n. 10 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“[S]ettled
case law [is] that the setting of statutory [attorneys'] fees does not require proportionality between
the plaintiff's recovery and the amount of the fee award.”) Adorno v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 685
F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y.2010) (“The courts have rejected a per se proportionality rule, i.e.,

proportionally linking the prevailing party's attorneys' fees to the degree of monetary success
achieved.” ); Baird v. Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, 219 F.Supp.2d 510, 519–20 & n. 7

rather claims involving breach of contract. While decisions of intermediate court are “helpful indicators of how the
state’s highest court would rule,” such decisions are not binding on the federal courts. DeBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d
102, 112 (2d Cir. 2005). Here the language of § 198(1-d) is mandatory. In another case involving the New York
Labor Law, albeit § 191-c, the Fourth Department, in apparent conflict with its holding in O’Donnell, found an
award of attorneys’ fees mandated in case where the plaintiff had only partial success given that the statue provides
attorneys’ fees “shall” be awarded. In view of the foregoing, the decision in O’Donnell is not persuasive.
(S.D.N.Y.2002) (“[A] limited monetary recovery does not preclude a substantial attorneys' fee
award, for there is no requirement of proportionality .”).
The lodestar figure is determined by multiplying the number of hours reasonably
expended on a case by a reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433
(1983); see also Luciano v. Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1997). [T]he ‘lodestar . . .
creates a ‘presumptively reasonable fee.’” Millea v. Metro-N. R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d
Cir. 2011) (citing Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Assoc. v. Cnty. of Albany, 522
F.3d 182, 183 (2d Cir. 2008); Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550) (“[T]he lodestar figure includes most, if
not all, of the relevant factors constituting a ‘reasonable’ attorney’s fee . . . .”) (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that “the lodestar method produces an

award that roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing attorney would have received if he or
she had been representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a comparable case.” Id.
at 551. In calculating the lodestar amount, courts will take into account case-specific factors to
help determine reasonableness of both the hourly rate and the number of hours expended. The
factors include:
the complexity and difficulty of the case, the available expertise and capacity of
the client’s other counsel (if any), the resources required to prosecute the case
effectively (taking into account the resources being marshaled on the other side
but not endorsing scorched earth tactics), the timing demands of the case, whether
an attorney might have an interest (independent of that of his client) in achieving
the ends of the litigation or might initiate the representation himself, whether an
attorney might have initially acted pro bono (such that a client might be aware
that the attorney expected low or non-existent remuneration), and other returns
(such as reputation etc,) that an attorney might expect from the representation.

Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cty. of Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 184 (2d Cir.
2007).
“In fixing the lodestar a court may exclude any hours spent on severable claims. But
where . . . the plaintiff’s claims “involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal
theories and therefore not severable, attorney’s fees may be awarded for unsuccessful claims as
well as successful ones.” Green v. Torres, 361 F.3d 96, 98 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). However, that claims may be intertwined does not preclude a court
from considering the degree of success obtained by a plaintiff.” See id. (“Although full fees may
be awarded to a partially prevailing plaintiff when the underlying claims are intertwined, the
court retains substantial discretion to take into account the specific procedural history and facts
of each case.”); Gamero, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 177; Echevarria v. Insight Medical P.C., 102 F.
Supp. 3d 511 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2015).
“The burden is on the party seeking attorney’s fees to submit sufficient evidence to
support the hours worked and the rates claimed.” Hugee v. Kimso Apartments, LLC, 852 F. Supp.

2d 281, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). “A request for an award of
attorneys' fees must be supported by contemporaneous time records that describe with
specificity, by attorney, the nature of the work done, the hours expended, and the dates on which
the work was performed. In making a fee determination, district courts have broad discretion,
using their experience with the case, as well as their experience with the practice of law, to
assess the reasonableness of the hours spent and the rates charged in a given case.” Trustees of
Building Trades Educational Benefit Fund v. Pegasus Electric, Inc., 2019 WL 245457, at *6
(E.D.N.Y., 2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see N.Y. State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1154 (2d Cir. 1983) (An application for

attorneys' fees must be “accompanied by contemporaneous time records indicating, for each
attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.”)
II. Analysis of Claim for Attorney’s Fees
A. Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims Were Intertwined
Plaintiffs’ principle objection to the R &R is its conclusion that the claim on which they
succeeded, viz., the wage statement claim, was not intertwined with their unsuccessful claims for
overtime compensation. Plaintiffs point out, among other things, that all the claims required them
to prove that they were employees and that defendant Sage (in addition to the corporate
defendants) was an employer. Because, at the very least, all of plaintiffs’ claims required them to
prove that they were employees of both Defendants.
In order to determine whether claims are intertwined, courts look at whether they are
based on a “common core of facts,” “related legal theories,” or “require essentially the same

proof.” Kerin v. U. S. Postal Serv.¸ 218 F.3d 185, 194 (2d Cir. 2000).
New York Labor Law § 195(3) requires that an employer provide to employees, with
each payment of wages, a statement covering certain specified items and § 198(1-d) provides for
statutory damages for an employee who does not receive such a statement. Similarly, as
explained in this Court’s finding of facts and conclusions of law, overtime claims under both the
FLSA and the New York Labor Law require that a plaintiff prove, inter alia, that he is an
employee. (DE 38 at p. 4-5 (reported at 2018 WL 4100490, at *2).) Indeed, whether Plaintiffs
were employee or independent contractor was the “threshold issue” vis a vis the overtime claims.
Id. at 3. Moreover, “Defendants acknowledged that they did not furnish the Plaintiffs with [the

wage statement] based on their avowed belief that Sanchez and Palacio were independent
contractors.” (Id. at 4-5.) Given that both the successful claim and the unsuccessful claims
required Plaintiffs to prove that they were employees (as opposed to independent contractors) the
claims are intertwined.
Accordingly, the Court agrees that Judge Lindsay erred in holding (1) that the successful
claim was not intertwined with the unsuccessful claims and (2) that therefore plaintiff should
resubmit a fee application based solely on the work performed in connection with the successful
wage notice claim. Having upheld this objection to the R & R, the Court shall proceed to
determine the amount of fees and costs to be awarded.
B. Reasonableness of Rates
In determining reasonable hourly rates, the Court considers this Circuit’s adherence to the
“forum rule,” which states that a district court should generally use the prevailing hourly rates in
the district where it sits. See Simmons v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d 170, 175-76 (2d. Cir.
2009). “Prevailing rates for experienced attorneys in the Eastern District of New York range

from approximately $300 to $400 per hour,” although some judges have recognized rates in this
district of $300-$450 per hour for a partner. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. M.E.S., Inc., 2018 WL
2766139, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018); see generally Leevson v. Aqualife USA Inc., 770 Fd.
App’x 577, 583 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order finding district court in the E.D.N.Y. acted
within its discretion in finding a rate of $400.00 reasonable.); Konits v. Karahalis, 409 F. App'x
418, 422-23 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order affirming a district court decision holding that the
prevailing rates for experienced attorneys in the Eastern District of New York range from
approximately $300 to $400 per hour). Here, Mr. Reilly seeks an hourly rate of $450 per hour
and Mr. Williams seeks a rate of $275.

The Court begins with Mr. Reilly, who has extensive experience in this area of law. As
set forth in his affirmation, the courts in this District have awarded Mr. Reilly a rate of $300 per
hour. (See DE 42-7 at p. 3.) While his firm may bill him at $450 an hour, as one court has noted
this is at the high end of the acceptable range and is the maximum rate for senior law firm
attorneys in FLSA cases. See Gamero, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 174, n.6. Here, given that this case was
not complicated, and considering the hourly rate set in other cases for Mr. Reilly, the Court finds
$300 to be an appropriate rate.3
Having so reduced the rate for Mr. Reilly, a substantial reduction in the $275 sought for
Mr. Williams is appropriate given that he has considerably less experience than Mr. Reilly.
Rates in this district for senior associates range from $200-$300, while rates for more junior
associates range from $100-$200 per hour. According to his declaration, Mr. Williams was
admitted to practice in New York in 2015 and has “appeared as an attorney for mostly employees
and a few employers in 62 [unidentified] cases since 2016.” (DE 42-8 at pp. 1-2.) Based on the
limited information provided, a rate of $150 for Mt. Williams is reasonable. Cf. Cabrera v.
Schafer, 2017 WL 9512409, * 11 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2017).

C. Reasonableness of Hours Billed
In awarding attorneys’ fees, a court must review whether counsel billed a reasonable
number of hours. To determine the reasonableness of the hours spent on the litigation, the court
must make “a conscientious and detailed inquiry into the validity of the representations that a
certain number of hours were usefully and reasonably expended.” Maldonado v. La Nueva
Rampa, Inc., 2012 WL 1669341, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012) (quoting Lundav v. City of
Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994) ). The “critical inquiry is ‘whether, at the time the work
was performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.’” Id.
(quoting Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) ). The court evaluates the

contemporaneous records for reasonableness, see Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, in light of its own
experience and knowledge of the demands of the action. See Clarke v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146,
1153 (2d Cir. 1992); Carey, 626 F.3d at 1148. Although the court should not evaluate each
challenged entry in isolation, the entry cannot be so vague as to bar the court from being able to

3 The Court also notes that Mr. Reilly does not identify himself as a partner in his firm.
decipher its meaning in the context in which it appears. See Kirsch v. Fleet St., Ltd., 148 F.3d
149, 172 (2d Cir. 1998); Ursa Minor Ltd. v. Aon Fin. Prods., Inc., 2001 WL 1842042, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2001). The court may apply an across the board reduction for vague entries
or for entries reflecting duplicative, inefficient, or unnecessary work. See, e.g., Kirsch, 148 F.3d
at 172 (upholding a district court’s decision to reduce the fee award by 20% for vague entries
like “staff conference,” “work on motion,” and “letter to court”); Allende v. Unitech Design, Inc.,
783 F. Supp. 2d 509, 515 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011) (reducing the total award by 7% in light of
duplicative billing for conferences, and excessive time spent on certain projects); Top Banana,
L.L.C. v. Dom’s Wholesale & Retail Ctr., Inc., 2008 WL 4925020 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10,
2008) (reducing the award by 5% “to take into account attorney hours billed for the performance

of paralegal-type work, as well as duplicative charges.”); Trs. of the Bricklayers v. Helmer–
Cronin Constr., Inc., 2005 WL 3789085, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2005) (reducing the total
number of hours billed by 20% where a majority of the entries consisted of vague statements
such as, “Research,” “Telephone call with client,” “Study and Review file,” and “Letter to
Silkey”). There is, however, no per se rule that use of multiple attorneys by a prevailing party is
unreasonable. See Williamsburg Fair Housing Comm. v. Ross-Rodney Hous., 599 F. Supp. 509,
518 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Seigal v. Merrick, 619 F.2d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1980) (explaining that a
prevailing party’s decision to send more than one attorney to a deposition or to assist and observe
during trial does not bar it from collecting fees).

Having set for the basic principles regarding reasonableness of hours billed, the Court
shall now proceed to evaluate the reasonableness of the number of hours billed.
According to the material submitted, Mr. Williams spent 169.4 hours on this case, with two
of those hours for travel time and Mr. Reilly spent a total of 139.7 hours, 3 of which were for travel.
Defendants challenge the number of hours billed in two respects. First, they argue that Plaintiff’s
limited success warrants at least a significant reduction in hours, if not a total denial of fees.
Second, they claim that the 21.7 hours spent by Mr. Reilly preparing the fee application and notice
of taxation of costs is clearly excessive.
Taking the latter object first, the number of hours preparing the fee application does seem to
be high given the submission and therefore the Court will eliminate 5 hours from Mr. Reilly time.
Having reviewed the time records submitted, the Court finds a further reduction is warranted for
duplicity and excessiveness and the like. For example, Mr. Williams billed for “printing” and
“serving” initial disclosure, work that should be performed by a paralegal or secretary. In another
entry, he billed one hour to draft a letter seeking an adjournment and filing it on ECF, which is both
excessive and work that could be performed by a non-lawyer. Overall a ten percent reduction in the

number of hours billed by Mr. Williams is appropriate. Thus, the hours sought are reduced to 134.7
for Mr. Reilly and 152.5 for Mr. Williams. At the rates of $300 and $150 respectively, this would
set a total fee award of $62,985.00.4
What is left is the issue of whether a reduction should be made given the limited success
achieved by Plaintiffs. It is to this issue that that the Court now turns.
D. Reducing the Award Based on Limited Success
As noted above, that successful claims are intertwined with unsuccessful claims does not
preclude an across the board reduction. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (“If . . .
a plaintiff has achieved only partial or limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.”); Green, 361
F.3d at 99.

4 This amount was calculated as follows: 131.7 hours at $300 plus 3 hours of travel at $150 = $39,960.00 for Mr.
Reilly and 152.5 hours at $150 plus 2 hours of travel at $75 =$23,025.00 for Mr. Williams.
Here, a further reduction of 35% is warranted. In reaching this conclusion, the Court has
given some consideration to the enormous disparity between the damages sought ($146,263.00 (see
DE 35-2)) and the damages awarded ($7,500.00). The principle reason, however, for the reduction
rests in the following conclusions contained in the Court’s Findings of Facts and Conclusions (DE
38): (1) the evidence of the hours they worked was “concocted” (id. at 18); (2) the inadequacy of
their evidence was “rooted in the unbelievable character of much of the evidence present ed by
plaintiff’s concerning Sanchez’s starting and ending times and Palacio’s proof as to the latter” (id.
at 20); and (3) finding each plaintiffs’ testimony fell into the category of “deliberating proffering
false information in an effort to bogusly create or inflate an overtime claim” (id. at 24). Such a
subversion of the trial process warrants the foregoing reduction. See Gamero, 328 F. Supp. 3d at

178.
In sum, the Court finds that a reasonable attorney’s fees for this matter is $40,940.25.
III. Costs
Plaintiffs also seek an award of disbursements and costs in the amount of $6,340.86. The
items for which costs are sought are filing and service fees, deposition and trial transcript costs, and
interpreter fees. Appropriate documentation for each expenditure has been submitted. The items
sought are recoverable, see, e.g., Gamero, 328 F. Supp. 3d at 178; Cabrera, 2017 WL 9512309*11,
and the amounts for each are reasonable. The Court awards the full amount of costs sought.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is

granted to the extent that Plaintiffs are awarded $40,940.25 in attorneys’ fees plus $6,340.86 in
costs for a total award of 47,281.11.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: Central Islip, New York s/ Denis R. Hurley
September 23, 2019 Denis R. Hurley
United States District Judge

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10303099. Public record. Not legal advice.