# MITE v. BRAY

> District Court, D. New Jersey · March 28, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10295798

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 28, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

RICHARD L. MITE, HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS
Plaintiff,
¥. Civil Action
JAY BRAY, ef al, No. 22-6665 (SMW-AMD)
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

Richard L, Mite, pro se Harold L. Ixofman, Esquire
128 Woodland Avenue McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce LLC
Pleasantville, NJ 08232 485 Route 1 South
Building F, Suite 300
Iselin, NJ 08830
Counsel for Defendants Jay Bray, Michelle
Gallegos, and Mr, Cooper, doing business as
Nation Star Mortgage, LLC!
WILLIAMS, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court by way of Defendants Jay Bray (“Bray”), Michelle
Gallegos (“Gallegos”), and Nationstar Mortgage LLC’s (“Nationstar”) (collectively, the
“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) Plaintiff Richard L, Mite’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint,
which Plaintiff appears to oppose by way of an Amended Complaint.? ECF No. 10. For the reasons

Defense counsel states that Defendant “Nationstar Mortgage LLC” is improperly named “Mr, Cooper d/b/a/
Nationstar Mortgage LLC, Jay Bray and Michelle Gallegos” in the instant action. ECF No, 8-1 at 2, As the Court does
not, in this instance, address the substantive claims against Jay Bray, Michelle Gallegos, and Mr, Cooper, doing
business as Nation Star Mortgage LLC, the Court addresses the instant Motion to Dismiss as it relates to all three
defendants, In reviewing the record in this matter, the Court will refer to “Nation Star Mortgage, LLC” as “Nationstar
Mortgage LLC.” ECF Nos. 8-1, 8-4,
? Plaintiff appears to have filed an Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) which states,
in pertinent part:

that follow, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED. The Court grants Plaintiff until April 29, 2024, to
properly serve Defendants.

1) On July 30, 2018, Plaintiff executed a promissory note in favor of Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as nominee for Greentree Mortgage Company, L.P. and its
successors and/or assignees (the “Lender”) in exchange for a loan in the amount of $35,612.00,
which was secured by a mortgage (the “Mortgage’”) on property located in Pleasantville, New
Jersey. Declaration of Harold L. Kofman, Esq. (“Kofman Decl,”) {2 at Ex. A, ECF No. 8-3. The
note contained an agreement stating, in part, that the Lender

may... in the case of payment defaults, require immediate payment in full of all sums
secured by this Security Instrument if:
(i) Borrower defaults by failing to pay in full any monthly payment required by this
Security Instrument prior to or on the due date of the next monthly payment, or
(ii) Borrower defaults by failing, for a period of thirty days, to perform any other
obligations contained in this Security Instrument.
Id. Following an assignment of the Mortgage in March 2019, Nationstar became the holder of the
note and Mortgage. /d. 43 at Ex. B, ECF No. 8-4.

(1) A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course no later than:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a
responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (D, whichever
is earlier.
(2) In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the
court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.
Here, Plaintiff has not complied with Rule 15(a) as he did not file his amended pleading 21 days after service of
Defendants’ Motion. Defendants’ Motion was filed on August 9, 2023, and Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on
September 21, 2023, 43 days later, In addition, he did not file the Amended Complaint with Defendants’ written
consent or leave from this Court. While the Court affords certain procedural flexibilities to pro se litigants, there are
limits to that flexibility. See Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 Gd Cir. 2013). Pro se litigants
“cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other fitigants.” Jd. Accordingly,
in addressing the instant motion, the Court will not consider Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

2) In a September 2019 mortgage billing statement sent to Plaintiff, Nationstar stated
that Plaintiff could mail to a Dallas, Texas address a “Qualified Written Request”? pursuant to
“RESPA™ regarding the servicing of Plaintiff's loan, including any errors with respect to the loan
or information requests. Id. { 4 at Ex. C, ECF No, 8-5. On March 10, 2022, Plaintiff sent a letter
to the Dallas address expressing his refusal to make any further payments on his mortgage loan
“pursuant to 15 USC 1692(c),” claiming he had received “threatening letters of pre-foreclosure
without [his] consent.” 45 at Ex. D, ECF No. 8-6. He further demanded payment of $10,000 □
and title to his property, Jd, A few weeks later, on March 26, 2022, Plaintiff sent a second letter to
Nationstar’ wherein he rejected a modification agreement that had been offered by Nationstar and
requested that he be “refunded on the alleged debt and for [his] account to be zeroed out.” fd. | 6
at Ex, E, ECF No. 8-7. On November 4, 2022, Nationstar sent a letter to Plaintiff notifying him of
his default on the Mortgage and stating that Plaintiff was required to pay $6,574.68 to cure the
default. fd. | 8 at Ex. G, ECF No. 8-9. On November 9, 2022, Nationstar sent a letter to Plaintiff
notifying him that his mortgage was referred to foreclosure, to which Plaintiff responded with a
letter stating he was “willing to pay off’ his account but requested “documentary evidence”
regarding his account. Compl. at Exs. G,H, ECF No, 1-1.

3) On November 17, 2022, Plaintiff initiated the instant action, alleging Nationstar
was negligent in failing to provide him with options to avoid foreclosure, failed to disburse “tax

3 The billing statement defines a “Qualified Written Request” or “QWR” as “written correspondence (other than notice
on a payment coupon or other payment medium supplied by the servicer) that includes, or otherwise enables the
servicer to identify, the name and account of the borrower, and includes a statement of the reasons that the borrower
believes the account is in error, if applicable, or that provides sufficient detail to the servicer regarding information
relating to the servicing of the loan sought by the borrower,” Jd. § 4 at Ex. C, ECF No. 8-5.
4“RESPA” is not defined on the billing statement, but the Court notes the acronym is used to refer to the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, [2 U.S.C. § 2607.
5 Plaintiff sent this correspondence to a Coppell, Texas address, which is the return address listed on Plaintiff's
September 2019 mortgage billing statement. /d. { 4 at Ex. C, ECF No, 8-5.

payments, proceeds, and interest,” threatened to foreclose “on [his] property without [Plaintiff's]
consent,” and violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, ef seg. See
Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff states a “notice of dispute” was reported to Bray but it is unclear how
Gallegos is implicated in the instant action.° Compl., ECF No. 1. A few days later, on November
21, 2022, the Clerk of Court issued a summons to be served on Defendants, ECF No, 4.

4) On February 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a submission on the docket titled
“Acknowledgment of Service,” in which he stated Defendants “and it’s [rjegistered [a]gent” were
served with a copy of the summons and Complaint by certified mail. ECF No. 5. On April 28,
2023, Plaintiff filed a second “Acknowledgement of Service” again stating Defendants were
served by certified mail. ECF No. 6. In this second submission, Plaintiff attached certified mail
receipts for the service he effectuated on Nationstar and Gallegos and a return receipt and mail
tracking history for the service effectuated on Bray. Jd. The certified mail receipts and return
receipt demonstrate Plaintiffs attempt to mail the summons and Complaint to each of Defendants
using the same Dallas, Texas address noted on his September 2019 billing statement. □□□
Thereafter, this Court issued a Notice of Call for dismissal pursuant to Local Civil Rule 41.1{a)
and Defendants filed the instant Motion. ECF Nos. 7, 8. Plaintiffhas not made any other attempts
to serve Defendants. ECF No. 8-1 at 5,

5) “Before a federal court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the
procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied. ‘[S]ervice of summons is the
procedure by which a court having venue and jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit asserts

6 Defendants state Bray is the president of Nationstar. ECF No. 8-1 at 4, Kofman Decl. at Ex. F, ECF No. 8-8. Plaintiff
attached to his Complaint a correspondence he received from Nationstar which identifies Gallegos as a loan specialist.
Compl. at Ex. E, ECF No, 1-1. While Plaintiff's allegations as they relate to Gallegos are unclear from his Complaint,
the Court, at this juncture, limits its analysis to service of process.

jurisdiction over the person of the party served.’” Omni Cap. Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff □ Co., Ltd.,
484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 US.
438, 444-45 (1946)). When a plaintiff fails to serve a defendant with a summons and complaint in
accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the action may be dismissed under
Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction or under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of
process. See Mathies vy. Silver, 266 F. App’x 138, 140 (3d Cir, 2008); McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of
Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 194 Gd Cir. 1998). Plaintiff, the party responsible for effecting
service, has the burden of demonstrating the validity of service. Grand Ent. Grp., Ltd. v. Star
Media Sales, inc., 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993). Courts liberally construe the pleadings and
complaints of pro se plaintiffs, granting pro se litigants some degree of leniency, see Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), but they must ultimately comply with the same rules that apply to
all litigants, see supra n.2. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, names three defendants in the instant action

— Nationstar, a limited liability company (“LLC”), and Bray and Gallegos, individual defendants.
The Court, in turn, addresses service of process on an LLC, service of process on an individual,
and the validity of Plaintiffs service of process on each of the Defendants.

6) As Nationstar is an LLC, the Court evaluates service of process under the applicable
federal and state rules for an LLC. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h)(1), an LLC, when
served in the United States, must be served either (1) “in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1)
for serving an individual” or (2) “by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an
officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to
receive service of process and — if the agent is one authorized by statute and the statute so requires
— by also mailing a copy of each to the defendant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(h)(1)(A), (B); see Dante v.

Schwartz, No. 20-1047, 2023 WL 4420287, at *1 (D.N.J. July 10, 2023). Rule 4 prohibits service
of a summons and complaint by a party. See Fed. R. Civ, P. 4{c).

7) Here, it appears Plaintiff sent a copy of the summons and Complaint to Nationstar
by certified mail, as the record contains a copy of the mail receipt. Plaintiff also represents the
summons and Complaint was delivered to Nationstar on November 21, 2022, However, service by
a party is expressly prohibited by Rule 4. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c). Moreover, service by mail,
alone, is insufficient to effectuate service in accordance with Rule 4(h), See Metile v. First Union
Bank, 279 F. Supp. 2d. 598, 602 (D.N.J. 2003). The rule also requires personal delivery of a
copy of the summons and complaint to an “officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process,” Fed. R. Civ. P, 4(h)(1)(B).
The record does not indicate an officer, managing or general agent, or any other agent of Nationstar
that is authorized to receive service of process received the summons and Complaint by way of
personal delivery. While Plaintiff indicates services was made on a “registered agent,” he fails to
establish who that individual is and whether that individual can accept service on behalf of
Nationstar. Accordingly, Plaintiff's attempt to effectuate service upon Nationstar does not meet
the requirements under Rules 4(c) or 4(h)(1).

8) In addition to serving an LLC by personal service upon an officer or agent and by
mail, Rule 4(h) allows a party to serve an LLC by effecting service in a manner prescribed by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(1). The rule requires effecting service pursuant to the law “in
the state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). As
this Court is located in New Jersey and Plaintiff appears to attempt to serve Nationstar in Texas,
service of an LLC under New Jersey or Texas law governs service of Nationstar.

9) Under New Jersey Rule 4:4-4(a)(6), service upon an LLC may be performed by
personal service upon “any officer, director, trustee or managing or general agent, or any person
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on behalf of the corporation, or
on a person at the registered office of the corporation in charge thereof.” See Dante, 2023 WL
4420287, at *2. Furthermore, the New Jersey Rules prohibit that service be effectuated by an
individual that has a direct interest in the litigation, instead requiring that service be completed by
a sheriff, a person specially appointed by the court, a plaintiffs attorney or the attorney’s agent,
or by any other competent individual. N.J. Rule 4:4-3(a). As explained above, Plaintiff represents
a copy of the summons and Complaint was served to Nationstar and its registered agent by certified
mail, Plaintiff does not establish in the record before this Court that personal service was made to
a statutorily authorized officer or agent of Nationstar.’ Finally, it appears Plaintiff himself
effectuated service, which is expressly prohibited under the New Jersey Rules. Accordingly,
Plaintiff's attempt to effectuate service upon Nationstar does not meet the requirements under New
Jersey law,

10) Texas law provides that “[flor the purpose of service of process, notice, or demand

... each manager of a manager-managed domestic or foreign [LLC] and each member of a
member-managed domestic or foreign [LLC] is an agent of that [LLC].” Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code
Ann. § 5.255. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 106, service must be completed by in-
person service or mail in the following manner, unless the citation or court order directs otherwise:
“(1) delivering to the defendant, in person, a copy of the citation, showing the delivery date, and
of the petition; or (2) mailing to the defendant by registered or certified mail, return receipt

7 Alternatively, Plaintiff does not assert “by affidavit satisfying the requirements of [N.J. R. 4:4-5(b)] that despite
diligent effort and inquiry personal service cannot be made in accordance with paragraph (a) of this rule,” and that
Plaintiff therefore mailed a copy of the summons and Complaint pursuant to the requirements under New Jersey
Rule 4:4-4(b)(1)(C).

requested, a copy of the citation and of the petition.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 106. Texas Rule 103 states
that service may only be made by persons authorized by law or court order who are not “a party to
or interested in the outcome of a suit.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 103. Texas Rule 103 further states that
“[slervice by registered or certified mail and citation by publication must, if requested, be made
by the clerk of the court in which the case is pending.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 103. Here, Plaintiff has not
served Nationstar pursuant to the requirements under Texas law. Plaintiff does not appear to have
effectuated in-person delivery of the summons and Complaint to Nationstar, Rather, it appears he
attempted to serve Nationstar himself by certified mail, which is explicitly prohibited under Texas
law, instead of requesting that the Clerk of Court of this District, where the instant action is
currently pending, effectuate service. Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to meet the service
requirements under the Texas law.

11) Next, as to serving Bray and Gallegos, the Court looks to the service requirements
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e), which establishes the methods for effecting service
upon individual defendants. Under Rule 4(e), individuals may be served “{1) personally, (2) by
leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode
with someone of suitable age who resides there, (3) by delivering a copy of the summons and
complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or law to receive service of process, or (4)
following the state law where the Court is located or where service is made for serving a
summons.” See Fanor y, Univ, Hosp., No. 16-320, 2016 WL 4728104, at *2 (D.N_J. Sept. 9, 2016).
As this Court is located in New Jersey and it appears Plaintiff is attempting to serve Bray and
Gallegos in Texas, service of an individual defendant under New Jersey or Texas law governs
service of Bray and Gallegos pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).

12) As New Jersey Rule 4:4-4(a) mirrors Rule 4(e) regarding service of process of
individual defendants, see Fanor, 2016 WL 4728104, at *2, the following analysis applies to
service made under the Rule 4 and New Jersey law. Here, the record does not reflect that Plaintiff
attempted to effectuate service on either Bray or Gallegos personally, that Plaintiff left a copy of
the summons and Complaint at Bray or Gallegos’ “usual place of abode with someone of suitable
age who resides there,” or that Plaintiff delivered a copy of the summons and Complaint to an
agent authorized by appointment or law to receive service of process for Bray or Gallegos. Plaintiff
represents Bray and Gallegos and their registered agents were served with copies of the summons
and Complaint by certified mail to the Dallas, Texas address listed on his September 2019 billing
statement, which is an address of Nationstar. Service at a defendant’s workplace does not satisfy
Rule 4(e) or New Jersey Rule 4:4-4(a), See Fanor, 2016 WL 4728104, at *2 (collecting cases).
Furthermore, Plaintiff states the “registered agent” of Bray and Gallegos was served but does not
identify the agents or establish that the agents could accept service on behalf of either Bray or
Gallegos. In addition, the return receipt for the summons and Complaint mailed to Bray indicates
that “Jeffrey Kobow” accepted delivery. It is unclear to the Court who Jeffrey Kobow is and
whether he is an agent authorized to receive service of process for Bray. Finally, it appears Plaintiff
himself effectuated service. As previously stated, service effectuated by a party or someone who
has a direct interest in the litigation is prohibited under the federal rules and New Jersey law.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements under Federal Rule 4(e) or New Jersey
law for service of process on Bray and Gallegos.

13) Under the Texas Rule 106(a), service of an individual defendant may be
accomplished by: “(1) delivering to the defendant, in person, a copy of the citation, showing the
delivery date, and of the petition; or (2) mailing to the defendant by registered or certified mail,

return receipt requested, a copy of the citation and of the petition.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 106(a). If “the
citation was served by registered or certified mail as authorized by Rule 106, the return by the
officer or authorized person must also contain the return receipt with the addressee’s signature,”
Tex. R. Civ. P. 107(c). Accordingly, “if the return receipt is not signed by the addressee, the service
of process is defective.” Keefon y. Carrasco, 53 8,W.3d 13, 19 (Tex. App. — San Antonio 2001);
see also Ayika y. Sutton, 378 F. App’x 432, 434 (Sth Cir. 2010). As stated previously, Texas Rule
103 provides that service may only be made by persons authorized by law or court order who are
not a party or have an interest in the outcome of the suit. Tex. R. Civ, P. 103,

14) —_-Here, Plaintiffs attempt to serve Bray and Gallegos by certified mail does not meet
the requirements for service under Texas law. It appears Plaintiff himself attempted to serve Bray
and Gallegos by certified mail, which is expressly prohibited under Texas Rule 103. Moreover,
Plaintiff did not submit a return receipt with either of their signatures. Instead, Plaintiff only
submitted a return receipt for Bray with the signature “Jeffrey Kobow.” Plaintiff did not submit to
this Court a return receipt for Gallegos and, therefore, this Court is unable to determine whether
Gallegos signed the return receipt for the summons and Complaint mailed to her. Accordingly,
Plaintiff has not satisfied the requirements under Texas law for service of process on Bray and
Gallegos.
15) Notwithstanding the requirements for completing service of process, Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(mn) provides a time limit for effectuating service. Rule 4(m) states:

Ifa defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court - on motion
or on its own after notice to the plaintiff — must dismiss the action without prejudice against
that defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff
shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an
appropriate period.

10

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Here, Plaintiff has failed to complete service of process on Defendants within
90 days of the filing of the Complaint. Plaintiff filed the Complaint on November 17, 2022. A
copy of the summons and Complaint appears to have been received by Bray on November 21,
2022, albeit an improper method of effecting service under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and New Jersey and Texas law, Plaintiff represents Defendants were served on November 21, 2022
but, as discussed above, the record before this Court does not establish that Defendants were served
properly. To date, it has been 498 days since Plaintiff filed the Complaint, long past the 90-day
requirement outlined in Rule 4(m). Plaintiff does not clearly dispute that he failed to properly serve
Defendants within 90 days of filing his complaint. Rather, as previously noted, Plaintiff presents
certified mail receipts for the service effectuated on Nationstar and Gallegos and a return receipt
and mail tracking history for the service effectuated on Bray. ECF No. 6.

16) The Court must conduct a two-part analysis in determining whether to extend time
under Rule 4(m), Davis v. Samuels, 962 F.3d 105, 116 (3d Cir. 2020). First, the Court determines
“whether good cause exists for a plaintiffs failure to effect timely service.” Id. Second, if good
cause exists, the Court must grant an extension of time to serve process. /d. If good cause does not
exist, the Court must consider, in its discretion, whether it should grant an extension of time. Jd,

17) In determining whether good cause exists for extending time for Plaintiff to serve
process, the Third Circuit equates “good cause” under Rule 4(m) with “excusable neglect” under
Rule 6(b), which requires “a demonstration of good faith on the part of the party seeking an
enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance within the time specified in the rules,”
Sunoco v. Mid-Atl. Region Retailer Compliance Cir., No. 10-4941, 2011 WL 4810915, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 7, 2011) (quoting MCT Telecomm. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097
(3d Cir. 1995)). A finding of good cause is generally based on the plaintiffs reason for delay.
11

Witasick v. Estes, No. 11-3895, 2012 WL 3075988, at *2 (D.N.J. July 30, 2012). In determining
whether good cause exists, the Court may consider the “(1) reasonableness of plaintiff's efforts to
serve[,] (2) prejudice to the defendant by lack of timely service[,] and (3) whether plaintiff moved
for an enlargement of time to serve.” MC Telecomm. Corp., 71 F.3d at 1097. The “good cause”
requirement of Rule 4(m) protects “diligent plaintiffs who, though making every effort to comply
with the dictates of the rule, nonetheless exceed [the limit for service of process].” Green □□□
Humphrey Elevator & Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 880 Gd Cir. 1987).

18} Here, the Court finds good cause to extend time for Plaintiff to complete service of
process despite the fact that Plaintiff's attempts, to date, have not been compliant with Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While Plainttff fails to provide a basis for failing to properly
serve Defendants within 90 days of filing his Complaint, Plaintiff, who brings this action pro se,
has nonetheless demonstrated his attempts to serve Defendants. Plaintiff submitted two filings on
the docket in which he represents Defendants were served copies of the summons and Complaint
by certified mail. Plaintiff further provided certified mail receipts for the service effectuated on
Nationstar and Gallegos and a return receipt and mail tracking history for the service effectuated
on Bray. It appears Plaintiff did not move for an enlargement of time to serve because he thought
he properly served Defendants in the first instance. Moreover, Defendants have not argued that
they would be prejudiced by Plaintiffs lack of timely service. Lastly, the Court gives Plaintiff
greater leeway as a pro se litigant. In light of these circumstances, the Court finds good cause
warrants an extension of time to serve process.

19) As Plaintiff has failed to effectuate proper service of the summons and Complaint
on Defendants, the Court does not, in this instance, address Defendants’ additional arguments with
respect to the legal deficiency of Plaintiffs claims.

12

ORDER

ITIS this aay of March, 2024, hereby

ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 8] is DENIED without
prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall properly serve Defendants by April 29, 2024; and it is
further

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall serve a copy of this Opinion and Order on
Plaintiff via regular U.S. mail.

mB
AKAREN M. WILLIAMS
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

13

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10295798. Public record. Not legal advice.