# Murphy v. City of Farmington

> District Court, D. New Mexico · May 12, 2021

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10281471

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Mexico
- **Decided:** May 12, 2021
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10281471

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “Weigel was subjected to such pressure for a significant period after it was clear that the pressure was unnecessary to restrain him”
- discussing research into “breathing problems created by pressure on the back and placement in a prone position, especially when an individual is in a state of ‘excited delirium’”

## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

DENNIS MURPHY, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of DANIEL TURNER, deceased,
and WALTER and TAMARA TURNER,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. CIV 19-0639 RB/JFR

THE CITY OF FARMINGTON, and JAMES
PRINCE, JAMES MOORE, ZACK WOOD, and
JESSE GRIGGS, in their individual capacities,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Late one night in 2018, dispatch for the Farmington, New Mexico Police Department
(FPD) broadcast a call for medical assistance. The subject, Daniel Turner, was suspected to be
under the influence of drugs, acting in an aggressive manner to his parents, and engaging in self-
harming behavior. Officers James Prince, Zack Wood, Mark Moore,1 and Sergeant Jesse Griggs
responded to the call. Dash camera video evidence shows that the officers handcuffed Daniel on
his stomach 3 minutes and 25 seconds into the incident. Shortly thereafter, Griggs stated that the
officers had control of the situation. When Daniel continued to struggle in this prone position,
however, the officers put pressure on his extremities for another three minutes. Approximately one
minute after Daniel stopped moving, the officers discovered that he had stopped breathing and
began to unhandcuff him, turn him over, and check for a pulse. Officers began CPR, and
paramedics continued lifesaving measures when they arrived, but they were unsuccessful.
Daniel’s parents and his personal representative, Dennis Murphy, have brought federal and

1 Moore is incorrectly identified in the Complaint as James Moore. (See Doc. 51 at 1.)
state claims against the officers and the City of Farmington. The officers move for summary

judgment on qualified immunity grounds on Count I: the claim for excessive force under the Fourth
Amendment. Plaintiffs have not shown that clearly established law put officers on notice that it
would violate an individual’s constitutional rights if officers kept a person handcuffed in a prone
position for at least three minutes, under circumstances where the person may be under the
influence of drugs and is actively struggling or resisting but does not pose an obvious threat to
others. Accordingly, the Court finds the officers are entitled to qualified immunity and will grant
the motion.
I. Statement of Facts2
A. Defendants’ Encounter with Daniel
On June 27, 2018, Walter Turner called 911 to get help for his son, Daniel. (See Doc. 1

(Compl.) ¶¶ 14–15; see also Doc. 63-11 at 1.) “Walter informed dispatch that . . . Daniel was
running through the streets and banging his head on the ground.” (Compl. ¶ 15.) FPD officers were
dispatched to an address “in reference to an [Emergency Medical Services (EMS)] assist.” (Doc.
63-5 at 1; see also Doc. 63-2 at 14:25–15:2.) In an EMS assist or “medical assist” call, officers
respond “to ensure the safety of fire and medic personnel and to make sure that [the] scene is
secure for them.” (Doc. 63-7 at 39:1–5.) Prince was the first to arrive on scene and understood that
Daniel may have been fighting or struggling with Walter, was possibly on methamphetamines, and
might “need to go to the hospital.” (Docs. 63-2 at 14:25–15:2; 63-9 at 1.)
Prince’s dash and lapel cameras both recorded the incident.3 (See Docs. 51-C; 63-3.) When

2 In accordance with summary judgment standards, the Court recites all admissible facts in a light most favorable to
Plaintiffs. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see also Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005). The facts are
undisputed unless noted.

3 The Court finds that the dash camera video provides a clearer picture of the incident. (See Doc. 51-C.)
Prince arrived, Daniel’s parents were on either side of him. (See Doc. 51-C at 1:16.) Walter was

on the phone, and it appears that the Turners were helping Daniel get up. (See id.) Prince got out
of the car. (Id. at 1:26.) Daniel appears to push or grab his mother (Tamara), and Walter said,
“Stop! Leave your mom alone.” (Id. at 1:27–29.) Daniel fell straight backward, landing hard on
the pavement. (Id. at 1:31.) Daniel began to bang his head on the ground. (Id. at 1:37.) Prince
informed dispatch that Daniel was hitting his head on the ground and confirmed that medical
personnel were responding. (Id. at 1:41.) The Turners told Daniel to stop and placed a towel under
his head. (Id. at 1:42–48.) Prince approached to get more information. (See Doc. 63-2 at 18:2–15.)
Prince knelt next to Daniel and introduced himself. (Doc. 51-C at 1:52–2:05.) Daniel
struggled and flailed his arms and legs; his mother repeatedly asked him to stop. (Id.) Daniel lifted
his head and upper torso off the ground and began to bang them onto the pavement. (Id. at 2:11.)

Daniel grabbed at Walter and Walter responded, “don’t grab my foot.” (Id. at 2:16.)
The Turners and Prince tried to control Daniel’s movements. (Id. at 2:19.) Prince’s intent
was “to make sure [Daniel] stay[ed] as close to the ground as possible,” so he could not injure his
head from banging it or falling again. (See Doc. 63:2 at 21:14–24.) Walter was on Daniel’s right
side, Tamara was at Daniel’s feet, and Prince was on his left side with his back to the dash camera.
(Doc. 51-C at 2:25.) Daniel was on his back, scooting and struggling in apparent resistance. (Id.)
Prince said, “I’m here to help you,” and “it’s ok, bud.” (Id. at 2:34–36.) Prince tried to get hold of
Daniel’s right arm, but Daniel flailed and his arm moved quickly toward Prince’s mid-section. (Id.
at 2:36–37.) As a result, Prince leaned or was pushed backward, then Prince hit Daniel three times
in or around his head in quick succession. (Id. at 2:36–39.) Walter yells, “stop, stop, stop!” (Id. at
2:38.) Prince said, “don’t grab that man—he grabbed my fucking taser, man.”4 (Id. at 2:40–42.)

Walter responded, “don’t punch him in the face!” (Id. at 2:48.) Prince later described these hits as
“a distraction technique[,]” which is used “to distract somebody so that they stop doing
something.” (Doc. 63-2 at 28:7–9.) Prince testified that although Daniel was conscious at this time,
it appeared that Daniel was under the influence of a substance and was not completely alert. (Id.
at 26:1–8.)
Griggs, who was the supervisor on duty that night, ran onto the scene immediately after
Prince administered the distraction technique. (Doc. 51-C at 2:47; see also Doc. 63-7 at 40:10–
13.) Griggs testified that he understood from dispatch that “Daniel was under the influence of
something, possibly on meth.” (Doc. 63-7 at 40:14–17.) Griggs also recalls dispatch conveyed
additional information “that Daniel was being aggressive and was pushing and pulling [Walter].”

(Id. at 40:21–24.) Griggs had the impression that “there was a lot of commotion, . . . like there was
an active fight going on between Daniel and Walter, and possibly even the mother.” (Id. at 41:4–
7.) He also testified that he heard Prince say that Daniel grabbed at his taser. (See id. at 52:6–10.)
Griggs stepped in to assist Prince and the Turners. (Doc. 51-C at 2:50.) Moore arrived on
scene. (Id. at 2:55.) Moore heard from dispatch that there was a struggle between Daniel and
Walter “and that Daniel was attempting self-harm by hitting his head on the ground.” (Doc. 63-8
at 38:23–39:1.) The three officers and the Turners rolled Daniel onto his stomach. (Doc. 51-C at
3:02.) The officers maneuvered Daniel’s arms, and Moore started to handcuff him. (Id. at 3:07–
21.) At some point, Griggs “positioned [his] right knee diagonally across Daniel’s right shoulder
toward his lower back, applying minimal weight.” (Doc. 63-5 at 2.) Daniel struggled while he was

4 Plaintiffs purport to deny that Mr. Turner grabbed Prince’s taser (see Doc. 63 at 2), but they agree that Mr. Turner
flailed his arms (see id. (citing Doc. 51-3 at 1:06–13)) and do not deny that Prince had the impression that Mr. Turner
grabbed his taser (see id.).
being handcuffed, and one of the officers said, “stop man, just relax for a second, ok?” (Doc. 51-

C at 3:14.) Daniel, now in a prone, facedown position, kicked his feet, audibly hitting them against
the pavement. (Id. at 3:20.) Moore finished handcuffing Daniel. (Id. at 3:25.) Daniel’s struggles
decreased but did not stop completely. (See id. at 3:25–48.) Moore and Griggs stood up.5 (Id. at
3:25–35.) Griggs briefly spoke to the Turners, and they moved away. (Id. at 3:38–46.) Prince tried
to pin Daniel’s right leg up toward his buttock for up to 11 seconds, and Daniel’s struggles
noticeably increased. (Id. at 3:49–4:00.) The officers tried to calm him, saying, “Daniel, hey bud,
just breathe. Hold on man, hold on.” (Id. at 3:51–53.) Daniel struggled more, and Prince and Moore
held either arm to restrict his movement. (Id. at 4:01–10.) Daniel audibly banged his head on the
pavement again. (Id. at 4:11.)
Wood arrived on the scene. (Id. at 4:14.) Wood had information from dispatch that Daniel

“was starting to get violent with [Walter]” and had run from him. (Doc. 63-4 at 23:2–10.) Prince
asked Wood to hold Daniel’s feet up. (Doc. 51-C at 4:14–15.) Wood briefly tried to get control of
Daniel’s legs, but Daniel kicked and flailed and Wood was unable to control his legs in that
manner. (Id. at 4:17–21; see also Doc. 63-10 at 1.) Griggs testified that he directed Wood to “just
let him kick, . . . he’s not gonna hurt anybody. We have control.” (Doc. 63-7 at 68:11–13.) The
four officers applied downward pressure to Daniel’s extremities: Prince had a shin across Daniel’s
right arm; Griggs put his right knee on Daniel’s left arm; Wood put his shin across Daniel’s right
leg; and Moore held Daniel’s left leg. (See Docs. 51-C at 4:30; 63-2 at 34:2-3; 63-10 at 1; 63-8 at
41:2–8.) Prince testified that he did not need to put body weight on Daniel, as there were four
officers there to control him. (Doc. 63-2 at 43:2–17.) Each officer described Daniel’s struggles as

“resistance to” or “trying to get free” from their attempts to subdue him. (See Docs. 63-2 at 38:22–

5 Griggs remained in a standing position, not touching Daniel, until about 4:26. (See Doc. 51-C.)
39:3 (Prince); 63-7 at 69:4–7 (Griggs); 63-8 at 40:14–18 (Moore); 63-10 at 1 (Wood).)

Officers reassured Daniel that “Hey bud, it’s ok, just breathe. Breathe, ok? We’ve got
paramedics coming to help you, ok?” (Doc. 51-C at 4:31–36.) Daniel continued to occasionally
move his body and hit his head on the ground. (See, e.g., 4:36–51.) One or two officers had a hand
near Daniel’s head and/or shoulders, presumably to prevent him from hitting his head too hard.
(See id.) Officers reassured him, saying, “Daniel, keep breathing, ok? Just relax.” (Id. at 4:45–50.)
An officer asked, “can you breathe?” (Id. at 4:50.) Daniel repeatedly lifted his head and shoulders
off the ground but brought his head down with less and less force. (Id. at 4:50–5:15.) Griggs asked
Daniel, “Daniel, hey man, did you take something or what’s going on? Can you talk?” (Id. at 5:05–
12.) Daniel ceased all movement. (Id. at 5:21.) Griggs requested an expedited response from the
medics, stating “he is having a manic episode.” (Id. at 5:25–32.) Griggs said, “take pressure off of

him, see if we can let him breathe,” and the officers immediately leaned back from Daniel. (Id. at
5:36–38.) Griggs raised Daniel’s left arm and shoulder, and someone said, “keep breathing, man,
hey, keep on breathing, ok?” (Id. at 5:39–44.)
The officers conversed and attempted to communicate with Daniel, and Griggs shone his
flashlight into Daniel’s face. (Id. at 5:50–6:19.) The following statements are clear from the video:
“Excited delirium?”6 (Id. at 5:58.) “Oh yeah.” (Id. at 5:59.) “Daniel, Daniel.” (Id. at 6:08.) “Should
we turn him?” (Id. at 6:09.) “Turn him over.” (Id.at 6:11.) “Stay with us Daniel.” (Id. at 6:14.) “Is
he still breathing?” (Id. at 6:18.) “Get him out of cuffs.” (Id. at 6:19.)
Once the officers suspected Daniel had stopped breathing, they immediately worked to

6 Prince testified that he felt Daniel “fight with us and fight with us, . . . like resisting us[,]” then there was a “sudden
stoppage of everything”; Prince felt “a brief . . . relief for us because he had stopped fighting with us.” (See Doc. 63-
2 at 46:17–47:13.) Once Griggs said, “excited delirium,” the officers “realized . . . what’s going on” and removed the
handcuffs. (Id. at 47:9–12.)
remove the handcuffs. (Id. at 6:20–38.) Someone said: “Just make sure we’ve got control of his

arms.” (Id. at 6:27–28.) Dispatch confirmed that Daniel had stopped breathing. (Id. at 6:37–38.)
The officers turned Daniel over to his back. (Id. at 6:45–49.) Griggs shone his light at Daniel and
the officers confirmed that his lips had turned blue. (Id. at 6:53–57.) Prince began chest
compressions. (Id. at 7:03.) Wood and Moore tried to open Daniel’s airway. (Id. at 7:13–30.) The
officers checked to see if Daniel had started breathing and repositioned Daniel’s head. (Id. at 7:43–
57.) Prince and later Moore continued chest compressions. (Id. at 7:58.) Paramedics and fire
department personnel eventually took over life saving measures. (Id. at 9:35.) Daniel was
pronounced dead at the scene. (See, e.g., id. at 33:00.) The parties’ experts agree that Daniel died
as the result of a cardiac arrest. (See, e.g., Docs. 33-3 at 2; 61-2 at 7.)
There is no evidence that any officer suspected Daniel of having a weapon during the

relevant timeframe. (See, e.g., Docs. 63-2 at 22:21–23:25 (Prince); 63-4 at 40:22–41:1 (Wood);
63-7 at 58:21–23 (Griggs); 63-8 at 51:16–19 (Moore).) All four officers testified that they noticed
Daniel was obese. (See Docs. 63-2 at 32:2–18 (Prince); 63-4 at 37:5–7 (Wood); 63-7 at 68:21–23
(Griggs); 63-8 at 42:6–10 (Moore).) Prince and Griggs also noticed Daniel was sweating profusely
and had dilated eyes. (See, e.g., Docs. 63-2 at 32:2–18 (Prince); 63-7 at 66:13–27 (Griggs).)
B. The OMI Report and Expert Testimony
The Office of the Medical Investigator (OMI) issued a Death Investigation Summary
Report. (See Doc. 51-F.) The OMI Report states that Daniel “had a past medical history of alcohol
and drug abuse, obesity, and sleep apnea.” (Id. at 2.)
Other autopsy findings included an enlarged heart (commonly associated with high
blood pressure and/or methamphetamine abuse), and fatty changes of the liver
(commonly associated with alcohol abuse).

Toxicology testing of blood revealed the presence of methamphetamine. No
alcohol was present.

Methamphetamine use is a risk factor for experiencing life-threatening, abnormal
heart rhythms, particularly in the setting of other cardiac risk factors such as an
enlarged heart. The physical restraint applied by police officers, and the decedent’s
prone position (face down; limits one’s ability to adequately breath[e]) while being
restrained would have contributed to the decedent’s physiologic stress and are listed
as contributory conditions; therefore, the manner of death is best described as
homicide.

(Id.) The OMI Report concluded:
Cause of Death
Toxic effects of methamphetamine

Other significant Contributory Conditions
Physical Restraint

Manner of Death
Homicide

(Id. at 1.)
The parties have submitted dueling expert reports. Defendants’ expert, Gary M. Vilke,
M.D., opines that the officers’ actions in attempting “to control and restrain [Daniel] did not cause
or contribute to his cardiac arrest.” (Doc. 33-3 at 2.) He further opines that “[p]lacing [Daniel] in
a ‘recovery position’ would not have prevented his sudden cardiac arrest and death.” (Id.) Finally,
Dr. Vilke does not believe “that the weight of the officers could significantly contribute to a
positional asphyxia condition.” (Id. (quotation marks omitted).)
Plaintiffs disagree with Dr. Vilke’s opinions and submit the opinions of expert witness
John Stein, M.D. (See Doc. 63-6.) Dr. Stein opines that the officers’ actions did contribute to
Daniel’s death: by holding him in a prone position, Daniel was unable to adequately exhale carbon
dioxide, leading to “excessive lactic acid production and . . . acidosis in his bloodstream[,]” which
eventually caused the cardiac arrest. (See id. at 66:6–17.) Dr. Stein opines that, “but for the minutes
of restraint, Daniel would not have died” (id. at 66:22–25), regardless of whether the officers put

additional weight on him (see Doc. 61-2 at 8). Dr. Stein also believes that if Daniel had “been
turned to his side, on to his back or had he been sat up, there is a very high likelihood he would
either have regained the ability to balance his acidosis, or at least he would have survived long
enough for” paramedics to provide medical interventions. (Id. at 9.)
C. Officer Training
Farmington police officers are trained regarding “recovery positions.” (See Doc. 63-12 at
15:11–15.) When a subject must be put into a prone position while being handcuffed due to
resistance, officers are trained to move them to a recovery position once they have stopped resisting
and it is safe to do so. (Id. at 17:12–18:18.) Training does not “specifically delineate” what it means
to “stop resisting,” as it depends on the totality of the circumstances. (See id. at 19:1–7.) Sergeant

Nicholas Bloomfield, who testified regarding FPD training, stated that the involved officer decides
when a subject has stopped resisting based on his or her subjective knowledge of the situation. (Id.
at 19:7–15.) Bloomfield testified that training does not dictate “what exact techniques [officers]
can or cannot do” in a situation where a subject is actively resisting. (See id. at 22:2–8.)
All four officers were aware of the concerns of positional asphyxia, and particularly the
risks involved in restraining a subject in a facedown position for an extended period of time. (See
Docs. 63-2 at 6:8–18 (Prince: “being “facedown for an extended period of time . . . could [cause]
potential issues”); 63-4 at 7:20–9:2 (Wood: acknowledging that in positional asphyxia training,
the facedown position is discussed); 63-7 at 18:21–25 (Griggs: “positional asphyxiation is
something . . . to be concerned about as far as the position that somebody is place that would

restrain their ability to breathe”); 63-8 at 14:9–15 (Moore: relating that officers are trained not to
keep subjects in a facedown stabilization “position for an extended amount of time”).) Griggs also
knew that an overweight individual may be more likely “to suffer from positional asphyxia . . . .”

(Doc. 63-7 at 20:24–21:5; see also Doc. 63-6 (Stein Depo.) at 68:20–25 (noting that “obesity also
adds additional stress when placed in the prone position”).) Still, Griggs testified that he might
apply pressure to a subject in a prone position if the person is “tensing up, pulling their hand away,”
or otherwise actively resisting. (See Docs. 63-7 at 27:7–12.) Moore testified that he’d been trained
not to keep a subject in a facedown stabilization “position for an extended amount of time[,]” but
instead “to roll someone onto their side or . . . back . . . when the scene is secure” or when “[it is]
safe enough to do so . . . .” (Doc. 63-8 at 14:9–15:1.)
FPD officers receive minimal training on excited delirium twice a year. (See, e.g., Docs.
63-2 at 8:10–12; 63-7 at 33:21–25; see also Doc. 63-11 at 3.) Sergeant Guy Postlewait completed
the Use of Force review for the Internal Affairs report and “recommended refresher training . . .

related to excited delirium.” (Doc. 63-11 at 3.) Postlewait noticed that the face down stabilization
method taught to FPD officers “provides the most tactically advantageous and safest way to reduce
the likelihood for injury to officers and/or subjects.” (Id.) He “recommended instructing officers
to transition all subjects from the face down stabilization position into a recovery position once
handcuffs have been applied, and when it is safe to do so.” (Id.)
II. Legal Standards
A. Standard for Motions for Summary Judgment
“Summary judgment is proper if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Halley v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 2236, 1143 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing

McCoy v. Meyers, 887 F.3d 1034, 1044 (10th Cir. 2018)). “The movant bears the initial burden of
‘show[ing] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’” Tanner
v. San Juan Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 864 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1106 (D.N.M. 2012) (quoting Bacchus

Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991)) (citing Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). “Once the movant meets this burden, rule 56 requires the non-
moving party to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (citing
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986)). A party
cannot “avoid summary judgment by repeating conclusory opinions, allegations unsupported by
specific facts, or speculation.” Id. (quotation and citations omitted). Instead, the non-moving party
must come forward with “sufficient evidence on which the factfinder could reasonably find” in
their favor. Id. (citations omitted). Evidence that is “merely colorable,” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249,
or consists only of “[u]nsubstantiated allegations[,]” McCoy, 887 F.3d at 1044, is insufficient.
B. Qualified Immunity Standard

The Court reviews summary judgment motions based on a qualified immunity defense
somewhat differently. See Halley, 902 F.3d at 1144. “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity
at summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that: (1) the defendant violated a
constitutional right and (2) the constitutional right was clearly established.” Id. (quoting Koch v.
City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2011)). “A constitutional right is clearly
established if it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what
he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)). “A
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point or the weight of authority from other courts can
clearly establish a right.” Id. (citation omitted). “Generally, ‘existing precedent must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate’ to clearly establish a right.” Id. (quoting

Redmond v. Crowther, 882 F.3d 927, 935 (10th Cir. 2018)). “The question is not whether a ‘broad
general proposition’ was clearly established, but ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct
[was] clearly established.’” Id. (quoting Redmond, 882 F.3d at 935) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
“If, and only if, the plaintiff meets this two-part test does a defendant then bear the
traditional burden of the movant for summary judgment . . . .” Id. (quoting Koch, 660 F.3d at
1238). And while the “Court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as
the nonmoving party, ‘a plaintiff’s version of the facts must find support in the record.’” Koch,
660 F.3d at 1238 (quoting Thomson v. Salt Lake Cty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2009)). If
the plaintiff’s “version of the facts is ‘blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable
jury could believe it,’ then [the Court] ‘should not adopt that version of the facts.’” Halley, 902
F.3d at 1144 (quoting Thomson, 584 F.3d at 1312).
The Court may address the qualified immunity analysis in any order. See Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). In fact, where a court is “firmly convinced the law is not
clearly established” and the “constitutional violation question is so factbound that the decision
provides little guidance for future cases[,]” it is prudent to proceed directly to the clearly
established prong of the analysis. See Tanner, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (quoting Kerns v. Bader,
663 F.3d 1173, 1180–81 (10th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted)).
III. Analysis

Plaintiffs bring a Fourth Amendment claim against the four officers for excessive force.
(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 60–71.) Plaintiffs argue that Daniel’s death was preventable and was “caused by [the
officers’] unreasonable seizure of Daniel based on their use of a face-down positional restraint
technique as they placed Daniel in handcuffs and on his stomach and then applied pressure to his
upper and lower body parts . . . .”7 (Id. ¶ 63.) Plaintiffs also assert that Griggs, “as the ranking
supervisor on scene[,]” had a duty to prevent the other officers from unreasonably seizing Daniel.8

(Id. ¶ 64.) The officers move for summary judgment on Count I and argue that they are entitled to
qualified immunity. (See Doc. 51.) They assert that their seizure of Daniel was objectively
reasonable, and even if there was a constitutional violation, no clearly established law put them on
notice that their conduct was illegal. (Id. at 13–19.)
Plaintiffs do not argue that Prince’s “distraction strikes” or the officers’ initial restraint of
Daniel was excessive. (See Doc. 63 at 27.) Instead, they contend that the officers’ “continued use
of force after [Daniel] was handcuffed and thus subdued, i.e., the post-restraint use of force, while
he remained pinned face down in a prone position,” violated Daniel’s constitutional rights. (See
id.) Plaintiffs argue that once the officers put Daniel in a prone position and handcuffed him, he

“was effectively subdued . . . .” (Id. at 25.) They assert that the officers kept Daniel subdued in this
prone position for “3 minutes and 42 seconds, until” Griggs noticed that Daniel was not breathing.
(See id.) Daniel clearly posed a threat to himself or others before he was handcuffed, and the Court
finds that no officer used excessive force before this point. Daniel was harming himself, there was
information that he had been aggressive toward his parents, and Prince was under the impression
that Daniel had grabbed for Prince’s taser. Further, Daniel actively resisted the officers’ attempts
to subdue and handcuff him.
Once Moore handcuffed Daniel, however, there is a 23 second stretch from 3:25–48 in
which Daniel had calmed down enough that both Griggs and Moore stood up, and Griggs spoke

7 Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court will assume throughout this opinion that the
prone restraint contributed to Daniel’s death.

8 Plaintiffs do not, however, bring a claim against Griggs in his supervisory capacity. (See Compl. at 1; ¶¶ 60–71.)
They also acknowledge that Count I is only brought against the individual officers and not the City. (Doc. 51 at 36.)
to Daniel’s parents, who moved away from the group. At 3:49, although Daniel was not actively

kicking, Prince tried to pin his right leg to his buttock, and Daniel’s struggles noticeably increased.
Prince and Moore put pressure on Daniel’s arms. Griggs stood and observed. Wood arrived on
scene and tried to pin Daniel’s legs, but Griggs directed him to “just let [Daniel] kick . . . he’s not
gonna hurt anybody. We have control.” Daniel continued to bang his head and struggle. Griggs
watched until approximately 4:26, when the four officers moved in to pin Daniel’s extremities.
They spoke calmly and reassured Daniel. Daniel’s struggles lessened until he stopped moving
completely at 5:21. Over the next 58 seconds, the officers talked to each other, tried to
communicate with Daniel, and realized Daniel was not breathing before one of them said, “Get
him out of cuffs.” For purposes of this Opinion, the Court focuses its inquiry from 3:25 onward.
In the end, the Court determines that there was no clearly established law that would have put the

officers on notice that their conduct violated Daniel’s constitutional rights and finds that the
officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
A. The right at issue was not clearly established.

Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Daniel’s Fourth Amendment right was clearly established
at the time of the arrest. “Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority
from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.” Weigel v. Broad, 544
F.3d 1143, 1153 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). “The plaintiff is not required to show,
however, that the very act in question previously was held unlawful in order to establish an absence
of qualified immunity.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, the Court must determine whether a
reasonable officer would have known that keeping a handcuffed person in a prone position for at
least three minutes, under circumstances where the person may be under the influence of drugs
and is actively struggling or resisting but does not pose an obvious threat to others, would violate

that person’s constitutional rights.
1. Existing caselaw is distinguishable.
Plaintiffs argue that existing precedent regarding “post-restraint uses of force,” while not
directly on point, was sufficient to put the officers on notice that their conduct was
unconstitutional, particularly because the officers knew that Daniel was likely on drugs. (See Doc.
63 at 18–36.) Before turning to the relevant authority, however, the Court finds it helpful to look
at the facts of this case under the Graham reasonableness balancing test. See Graham v. Connor,
490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
Graham v. Connor
Courts analyze “claims of excessive force in the context of arrests . . . under the Fourth

Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard . . . .” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204–05
(2001), receded from on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (quotation
omitted). “A ‘court assesses the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, acknowledging that the officer may be forced to make split-second
judgments in certain difficult circumstances.’” Marquez v. City of Albuquerque, 399 F.3d 1216,
1220 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1314 (10th Cir. 2002)).
The Supreme Court in Graham articulated factors that courts must “consider in assessing whether
the force used was reasonable[, which] include: the alleged crime’s severity, the degree of potential
threat that the suspect poses to an officer’s safety and to others’ safety, and the suspect’s efforts to
resist or evade arrest.” Marquez, 399 F.3d at 1220 (citation omitted).

Severity of Crime: All four officers were aware that Daniel was acting in an “aggressive”
or “violent” manner and may have been involved in a physical altercation with one or both of his
parents. Plaintiffs assert that if Daniel was to be arrested, the charge would have been, at most, a
misdemeanor.9 (See Doc. 63 at 24–25.) The Court agrees. Defendants do not assert that they

considered felony charges. (See Doc. 81 at 17.) Instead, they only intended to take Daniel “into
protective custody for medical evaluation and treatment since he was hurting himself.” (Id.) The
Tenth Circuit noted in Lee v. Tucker that “the first Graham factor may weigh against the use of
significant force if the crime at issue is a misdemeanor.” 904 F.3d 1145, 1149–50 (10th Cir. 2018)
(citations omitted) (finding that officer used excessive force where he “repeatedly appl[ied] a Taser
without warning, despite the fact that Lee was not resisting officers and had not been advised that
he was being detained”).
Plaintiffs acknowledge that at the beginning of the incident, Prince perceived that Daniel
grabbed at Prince’s taser. (See Doc. 63 at 27.) Plaintiffs argue that, viewing the facts in a light

most favorable to them, “Daniel was not grabbing for the officer’s weapon, but flailing his arms
to readjust his body because he was trying to breathe.” (Id.) This argument is unpersuasive for two
reasons. First, Daniel was still on his back when Prince perceived that Daniel grabbed at his taser,
and Plaintiffs do not offer evidence to show that Daniel had problems breathing while lying on his
back. Second, while the Court agrees that it is more likely that Daniel was flailing rather than
trying to grab the taser, Plaintiffs have not denied that it was Prince’s impression that Daniel
attempted to grab the taser. (See Doc. 63 at 2; see also supra at 3 n.4.) Consequently, because both
Prince and Griggs may have understood that Daniel grabbed for Prince’s taser, at least two of the
four officers had knowledge that elevated the situation beyond a possible misdemeanor domestic

9 In New Mexico, assault against a household member is a petty misdemeanor, see N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-3-12, and
battery against a household member is a misdemeanor, see id. § 30-3-15. The Court agrees that Defendants have not
established facts to support a finding that Daniel could have been arrested for felony domestic assault or battery. See,
e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-3-13–14, 30-3-16.
violence charge. See, e.g., Gianetti v. City of Stillwater, 216 F. App’x 756, 758–63 (10th Cir. 2007)

(where officers arrested subject for attempting to allude police after a minor traffic offense, Tenth
Circuit observed that it was appropriate to consider both “the minor nature of Ms. Giannetti’s
original offense” together with the fact that she later hit an officer during the jail’s intake process,
which resulted in the officers’ increased use of force).
Degree of Threat: The second Graham factor examines “whether the suspect pose[d] an
immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197, 1215 (10th
Cir. 2017) (quotation and emphasis omitted), and “is undoubtedly the most important and fact
intensive factor in determining the objective reasonableness of an officer’s use of force,” id. at
1216 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the Court agrees that Daniel posed a sufficient
threat such that the officers’ use of force up to the point when he was handcuffed was objectively

reasonable.
Plaintiffs argue, though, that after he was handcuffed, Daniel was “effectively subdued”
and “no longer anything more than a ‘minimal safety threat’ to the officers.” (Doc. 63 at 28.) They
point to Griggs’s direction to Wood to “let [Daniel] kick . . . . We have control.”10 (See id.)
Construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a jury could find that the officers’
concerns about any threat to themselves or others had largely subsided after Daniel was
handcuffed. Griggs and Moore stood up, and Griggs continued to stand for approximately one
minute. Griggs told Wood to let Daniel kick because the officers were in control. Even when the
officers pinned Daniel’s extremities, they continued to talk in calm, soothing voices, their concern
focused on Daniel’s well-being.

10 The Court notes, however, that it was not entirely clear to the officers that Daniel was completely subdued even
after he’d stopped moving. After they decided to remove the handcuffs someone said, “[j]ust make sure we’ve got
control of his arms.” (Doc. 51-C at 6:27–28.)
Active Resistance or Attempts to Flee: Under the third factor, the Court considers

whether the suspect resisted arrest or attempted to flee. McCoy, 887 F.3d at 1051. The Tenth
Circuit has “consistently concluded that a suspect’s initial resistance does not justify the
continuation of force once the resistance ceases.” Id. (gathering cases). Plaintiffs argue that Daniel
was not resisting but was struggling to breathe. (See Doc. 63 at 30–31.) All four officers were
trained on the risks of positional asphyxia, particularly the danger of asphyxia to a suspect placed
in a prone position for an extended period of time. At least Griggs knew that obesity is also a risk
factor.
They also assert, but do not fully develop an argument, that the officers knew Daniel was
suffering from a diminished capacity, which has also been shown to be a risk factor for positional
asphyxia in some circumstances.11 (See id. at 23–24, 30–31.) See also Cruz v. City of Laramie,

239 F.3d 1182, 1189 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing research into “breathing problems created by
pressure on the back and placement in a prone position, especially when an individual is in a state
of ‘excited delirium’”). It is true that Prince and Griggs had information that Daniel may have been
on drugs. Even with the benefit of repeated, attentive viewing of the video evidence, however, the
Court is hard-pressed to differentiate between Daniel’s earlier resistance to being handcuffed and
his later struggles to breathe.
FPD officers are further trained to move a subject from a prone position to a recovery
position once the subject has stopped resisting and it is safe to do so. As their training does not
specify what it means for a subject to “stop resisting,” a reasonable officer may or may not have
turned Daniel under these circumstances.

11 It does not appear from the evidence submitted here that FPD officers are specifically trained to recognize that
excited delirium may increase the risk of positional asphyxiation. (See, e.g., Doc. 63-12 at 23:6–25:8.) Instead, officers
are simply trained to summon medical personnel in cases of excited delirium. (See id.)
On balance, the Graham factors do not strongly point to a finding that the officers did or

did not violate Daniel’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force. The Court turns now
to the authority on which Plaintiffs rely.
McCoy v. Meyers
In McCoy, officers seized a suspect in an armed hostage situation, knocked him
unconscious, handcuffed his arms, and zip-tied his legs. See 887 F.3d at 1038. When the suspect
“regained consciousness, the officers resumed striking him and” restrained him such that he was
rendered “unconscious a second time.” Id. The Tenth Circuit utilized the Graham factors and
found that because McCoy posed no threat and had stopped resisting arrest, there were facts
sufficient to show a Fourth Amendment violation. See id. at 1050–51. Moreover, the court
determined that clearly established law would have put the officers on notice that their post-

restraint use of force on a subdued arrestee was unconstitutional. Id. at 1052–53.
The officers here did not employ such violent force against Daniel, and they did not zip-tie
his legs. Further, there was no evidence that McCoy continued struggling or ever engaged in self-
harmful behavior, as was the case here. See id. at 1040–42. For these reasons, McCoy does not
provide clearly established law under these circumstances.
McCowan v. Morales
In McCowan, an obviously inebriated suspect (McCowan) told the arresting officer that he
had a neck and shoulder injury that would impair his ability to pass a sobriety test. 945 F.3d 1276,
1280 (10th Cir. 2019). McCowan failed the test and the officer arrested him, handcuffed him, and
put him in the back of his police car. Id. The officer did not buckle McCowan into the car and took

him on a “rough ride” to the police station, injuring him. Id. The McCowan court relied on McCoy
in analyzing the facts, finding that the officer employed a “gratuitous use of force against . . . a
fully compliant and subdued misdemeanant arrestee . . . who posed no threat to anyone.” Id. at

1283–84. Again, the facts in this incident are distinguishable, as Daniel was never fully subdued.
McCowan would provide notice to the officers here.
Weigel v. Broad
In Weigel v. Broad, two troopers and a bystander used force to restrain Weigel, who “fought
vigorously” and repeatedly tried to “take the troopers’ weapons and evade handcuffing.” See 544
F.3d at 1148. Eventually, one trooper left the scene to warm his hands at his car, after he
determined that Weigel no longer posed a safety risk. Id. at 1149, 1152. Although “Weigel was
under control,” the second trooper and the bystander continued to put weight on Weigel’s back
and legs for three more minutes. Id. at 1152–53. Weigel suffered positional asphyxia and died. Id.
at 1149. The Tenth Circuit found that the use of force after Weigel was handcuffed was

unreasonable. Id. at 1152–53. It observed that the troopers did not “claim that once Mr. Weigel
was handcuffed and his legs were bound, he still would pose a threat to the officers, the public, or
himself unless he was maintained on his stomach with pressure imposed on his upper back.” Id. at
1152. Weigel, too, is inapposite, as the officers here did not bind Daniel’s legs or put pressure on
his back, which was of primary concern there. See id. (finding that “Weigel was subjected to such
pressure for a significant period after it was clear that the pressure was unnecessary to restrain
him”).
Emmett v. Armstrong
The officer in Emmett v. Armstrong responded to a call regarding a fight involving Emmett.
973 F.3d 1127, 1131 (10th Cir. 2020). When the officer saw Emmett leaving the scene, he

commanded him to stop, and Emmett ran. Id. The officer chased Emmett and tackled him. Id.
Emmett, on his back on the ground, “became visibly relaxed, and he made no further movements
indicating an attempt to run or fight back.” Id. The officer told Emmett to roll over. Id. Emmett

laughed and did not comply. Id. The officer “said, ‘You’re going to get TASE’d!’ and immediately
tased Emmett in the abdomen for a single, five-second taser cycle.’” Id. “Approximately ten
seconds had elapsed from the time [the officer] tackled Emmett to the time he tased Emmett.” Id.
In analyzing the second Graham factor, the Tenth Circuit looked at whether the officer was “in
danger at the precise moment that [he] used force.” Id. at 1136. By tackling Emmett, the officer
“had effectively neutralized any safety concerns arising from Emmett’s flight.” Id. “Thus, the only
‘immediate threat’ to safety was that arising from Emmett himself.” Id.
The circumstances here are different, both in the type of force used and in the resistance of
the subjects. Here, of course, the officers did not tase a relaxed, laughing suspect; they pinned a
suspect who had been aggressive and who continued to try to harm himself throughout the

encounter. Moreover, Daniel, unlike Emmett, was still struggling and arguably actively resisting
the officers’ attempts to subdue him.
Casey v. City of Federal Heights
Similarly, in Casey, where officers tackled, tased, and beat an individual who had taken a
file out of a courthouse, the Tenth Circuit “held that it was unreasonable for an officer to use force
against a non-violent misdemeanant suspect who was not resisting, fleeing, or dangerous.” See
McCowan, 945 F.3d at 1288 (discussing Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1279–83
(10th Cir. 2007)). As discussed above, Daniel had been aggressive and self-harming and struggled
throughout the incident; thus Casey is distinguishable.
Cruz v. City of Laramie, Wyoming

Finally, Plaintiffs rely on Cruz to argue that the law was clearly established that officers
must use “less restrictive means for physical restraint” if they have knowledge that the arrestee has
diminished capacity.12 (Doc. 63 at 22 (quoting Cruz, 239 F.3d at 1188).) In Cruz, officers

encountered Cruz running naked, yelling, and kicking. 239 F.3d at 1186. Cruz tried to get past the
officers, and they wrestled him to the ground and handcuffed him in a prone position. Id. Another
officer tied Cruz’s ankles together to stop him from kicking, and there was evidence that the
officers then fastened his ankles to his wrists, effectively “hog-tying” him. Id. The Tenth Circuit,
noting the “known dangers of the hog-tie restraint[,] . . . especially in instances involving
individuals of diminished capacity[,]” found that the officers used excessive force. Id. at 1188–89.
Thus, when the Tenth Circuit determined that officers must use “less restrictive means for physical
restraint[,]” id. at 1188, it was referring specifically to the hog-tie technique, which was not used
here.
Plaintiffs assert that when the officers bent Daniel’s legs toward his buttocks “for a period

of time,” he was hog-tied. (Doc. 63 at 29.) The Court disagrees. Prince pinned Daniel’s right leg
to his buttock for, at most, 11 seconds. Wood never succeeded in pinning Daniel’s feet to his
buttocks. Plaintiffs offer no authority to support a finding that pinning one foot up for up to 11
seconds is equivalent to using a hog-tie restraint. Moreover, the research that the Tenth Circuit
discussed in Cruz “detail[ed] the breathing problems created by pressure on the back and
placement in a prone position, especially when an individual is in a state of ‘excited delirium.’”
239 F.3d at 1189 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not argue that the officers put excessive pressure
on Daniel’s back after he was handcuffed. (See Doc. 63.) Cruz does not, therefore, provide the

12 Plaintiffs filed a notice to alert the Court of a case from the Fifth Circuit that is similar to Cruz. (See Doc. 94.) In
Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, No. 17-51031, 2021 WL 1574046, at *1, 13 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 2021), the Fifth Circuit
found that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where they essentially hog-tied a suspect who “was not
resisting, posed no immediate safety threat, and” may have been on drugs. Officers also applied pressure to the
suspect’s back, neck, and legs while he was bound. See id. at *3, 6. Aguirre is distinguishable for the same reasons
that Cruz is.
“clearly established” law that Plaintiffs had hoped. Cf. Sarnella v. Kuhns, No. 18-CV-00779-PAB-

NYW, 2019 WL 1112388, at *1–3 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2019) (finding that where deputies knew
suspect suffered from mental health condition and forcefully handcuffed him in prone position,
resulting in suspect’s death, Cruz and Weigel were “insufficiently analogous” to supply clearly
established law because the deputies in Sarnella neither hog-tied the suspect nor put pressure on
his back).
In sum, Plaintiffs fail to offer authority13 that would put officers on notice that their conduct
under these circumstances violated Daniel’s constitutional right to be free from excessive force.
2. A “salient facts” analysis does not change the Court’s decision.
Plaintiffs urge the Court to employ a “salient facts” analysis—to identify the “specific
essential facts” that will align with existing caselaw to put officers on notice of clearly established

law. (See Doc. 63 at 19–20 (discussing McCowan, 945 F.3d at 1283–84).) In McCowan, the Tenth
Circuit noted the following essential facts: “(1) the gratuitous use of force against (2) a fully
compliant and subdued misdemeanant arrestee (3) who posed no threat to anyone.” 945 F.3d at
1284. Plaintiffs assert that the salient facts here are:
1) Daniel was at most a misdemeanant.
2) Daniel was unarmed.
3) The officers were aware of Daniel’s diminished capacity.
4) The officers had training on excited delirium and positional asphyxia, of which
Daniel exhibited the classic signs, . . . which counseled them to get him off his belly
as soon as he was no longer a threat.
5) Daniel was handcuffed behind his back, and after being handcuffed, he was kept
secured by the four Defendant Officers at his shoulders and legs, either being held
in place or pinned with weight from all of the officers, in a face-down prone
stabilization position.

13 Plaintiffs rely on several cases—McCoy, McCowan, Emmett, and Aguirre among them—that were decided after the
events occurred here. Plaintiffs argue that these cases and others are on point because they rely on preexisting law to
find that the officers had notice that their conduct would violate the suspects’ constitutional rights. (See Doc. 96 at 2.)
The Court finds that the authority Plaintiffs rely on is sufficiently dissimilar that it cannot serve as “clearly established
law,” whether it was decided before or after this incident.
6) After Daniel was handcuffed, he was no longer a sufficient threat, or at some
point after he was handcuffed he became no longer a threat, to the officers or to
anybody else that justified the continued use of force holding or pinning him face
down to the ground.

(Doc. 63 at 35 (citations omitted).) The Court finds, however, that these facts are not enough to
put a reasonable officer on notice that actions taken here would violate Daniel’s constitutional
rights. The cases Plaintiffs rely on are too dissimilar to provide clearly established law where the
officers neither hog-tied Daniel nor put pressure on his back, and where Daniel continued to
struggle/resist for most of the encounter. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity. See
McCoy, 887 F.3d at 1048 (choosing, in its discretion, to “skip prong one of the qualified immunity
analysis because” plaintiff failed “to show clearly established law” on the issue of the
constitutional violation) (citation omitted).
B. Because the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim, it declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims and will dismiss
the lawsuit.

Plaintiffs brought claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act for wrongful death and
loss of consortium against Defendants. (See Compl.) “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), ‘[t]he district
courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Sabeerin v. Fassler, No. 1:16-
CV-00497 JCH-LF, 2021 WL 1227726, at *8 (D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2021). “If federal claims are
dismissed before trial, leaving only issues of state law, the federal court should decline the exercise
of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.” Id. (quoting Bauchman for Bauchman v.
W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 549 (10th Cir. 1997)) (citing Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City
Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When all federal claims have been dismissed,
the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state
claims.”)). Because the Court grants summary judgment to the officers and dismisses the only
federal claim at issue and the remaining claims are based entirely on state law, dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ claims for wrongful death and loss of consortium is proper. See id. “Plaintiffs will not
be prejudiced by the dismissal of their state-law claims because 28 U.S.C. 1367(d) tolls the statute
of limitations on those claims during the pendency of the federal proceeding plus 30 days beyond
the dismissal.” See id.
THEREFORE,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I of the
Complaint (Doc. 51) is GRANTED. The officers are entitled to summary judgment on the basis
of qualified immunity on Count I (Excessive Force under the Fourth Amendment) and this claim
is dismissed;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Hearing (Doc. 83), Motion to Strike
(Doc. 89), and Motion to Strike (Doc. 95) are DENIED AS MOOT;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that because the Court declines to exercise supplemental
Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment on Count HI of the Complaint (Doc. 48) is DENIED AS MOOT and Plaintiffs’
remaining claims (Count II and Count III) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

ROBERT C/BRACK
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10281471. Public record. Not legal advice.