# Ortiz v. Mora

> District Court, D. New Mexico · December 10, 2019

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10279329

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Mexico
- **Decided:** December 10, 2019
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10279329

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- declining to address issue, and instead holding that qualified immunity shielded officer who fired his weapon at a car full of people because the law was unclearly established as to whether a passenger could be seized

## Opinion text

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

SHAWNTAY ORTIZ, individually and on
behalf of L.J., her minor son, and as the Personal
Representative of MARTIN JIM, deceased,

Plaintiff,
v. No. 1:18-cv-00713-JCH-KRS
JOSHUA MORA, in his individual capacity,
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF
BERNALILLO COUNTY, and MANUEL
GONZALES, III, Bernalillo County Sheriff,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In the aftermath of a car pursuit, Bernalillo County Deputy Sheriff Joshua Mora opened
fire on the fleeing vehicle, killing both its driver, Isaac Padilla, and passenger, Martin Jim. Jim’s
surviving partner and minor child brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, contending that Mora
unreasonably seized Jim by firing his gun when the chase had ended, the vehicle was stationary
against a curb, damaged, and barricaded by two police cars. According to Mora, however, he
shot at the vehicle after Padilla revved the engine, threatening the life of a nearby police officer.
After considering Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983
excessive force claim (ECF No. 25), the Court holds that a reasonable jury could conclude that
Deputy Mora acted unreasonably. However, Mora violated no clearly established law and
therefore is entitled to qualified immunity. The Court also holds that Plaintiff’s Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(d) motion for additional discovery (ECF No. 37) is granted and the Defendants’ second filed
summary judgment motion (ECF No. 26) is denied without prejudice.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Most of the events of this case were recorded by a thermal imaging infrared camera
attached to a police helicopter, which is entirely soundless and in many instances blurry. Other
events were recorded from police officers’ belt tapes and a traffic camera. Consequently, the
Court describes the facts “in the light depicted by the videotape,” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
381 (2007), while recognizing that any gaps or uncertainties left by the video are construed in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff as the summary judgment nonmovant. See Carabajal v. City of
Cheyenne, Wyoming, 847 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2017) (where video evidence does not
capture all that occurred the court “continues to view the evidence in the light most favorable to
[the plaintiff].”) Facts are also provided by deposition testimony, affidavits, post-shooting
reports, and other evidence presented. 1
On November 17, 2017 around 3:45 a.m., police dispatch reported that a police helicopter
using thermal imaging was tracking a stolen white Dodge pickup truck in southeast
Albuquerque. Defs.’ Undisputed Fact (UF) ¶¶ 2-4, ECF No. 25. The truck exited Interstate 40
and pulled into a gas station near an intersection off the interstate. Id. ¶ 5. Albuquerque Police

Officer Pete Tartaglia pulled into the gas station and switched on his emergency lights. UF ¶ 6.
As Officer Tartaglia exited his police car, the Dodge drove off. Id. ¶ 7. The Dodge then
drove to a nearby neighborhood, hitting a traffic cone and driving in the wrong lane of travel as it
did so. UF ¶ 8. As the vehicle stopped on a neighborhood street, an individual exited from the
driver’s side, and then the vehicle fled once more. Id. ¶¶ 8-9; Cordova Aff. ¶ 4, ECF No. 25-4.

1 Defendants put forward 78 proposed undisputed material facts. For purposes of the summary
judgment motion only, Plaintiff conceded the first 55, describing them as “largely immaterial”
background facts having no relevance to the precise moment Mora used deadly force. However,
an “analysis of both the moments before the shots were fired and the prior interactions between
the officer and the subject,” is relevant to the reasonableness assessment. Latits v. Phillips, 878
F.3d 541, 548 (6th Cir. 2017). Therefore, the Court will describe and analyze the events leading
up to Mora’s use of deadly force.
Police promptly apprehended the individual, and Deputy Mora heard over dispatch that the
person had a gun. UF ¶ 10.
For the next seven minutes, from about 4:00 to 4:07 a.m., the Dodge wound its way
through city streets, heading towards Albuquerque’s westside. Id. ¶¶ 11-14. As it did so, the
vehicle passed through at least 18 major intersections with traffic lights without stopping.2 Id. ¶¶

11, 13-14. Bernalillo County Sheriff Deputy Sergio Cordova had taken position near the
intersection of Montaño Road and Fourth Street, anticipating the Dodge’s approach. Cordova
Aff. ¶ 7. As the truck turned onto Montaño, Deputy Cordova covertly followed it, watching the
Dodge flicker its headlights on and off and speed past another car. Id. ¶ 17; UF ¶ 17. As the
Dodge continued its westbound travel on Montaño, it ran a red-light and traveled with its
headlights off. Id. ¶ 19.
As Deputy Cordova maintained his covert pursuit of the Dodge onto Unser Boulevard,
other officers set up tire spikes at other locations. Id. ¶ 22. At about 4:14 a.m., the Dodge
approached, but avoided, one set of spike strips. Id. ¶ 23. Hearing this, Deputy Mora attempted to

set up a spike strip near the intersection of Unser and Ladera Drive. Id. ¶ 24; Defs.’ Ex. A, ECF
No. 29-1. But as he was unwinding the strip, the Dodge “barrel[led] towards [him]” from his left
and he and could hear the “roar of the engine, the whine, the RPMs [] continued and the sound to
get higher and higher,” so he “thr[ew]” the strip, retreated, and watched as the Dodge
maneuvered to avoid the spikes. Id. The police helicopter continued tracking the Dodge’s course,
broadcasting to officers that the vehicle was speeding through a neighborhood in the wrong lane
of traffic and with its headlights off. UFs ¶¶ 29-30.

2 The parties do not say whether the traffic lights at each of these major intersections were green
or red when the Dodge encountered them and thus whether Padilla disregarded them. Moreover,
throughout the entire chase, the helicopter video shows the Dodge traveling down mainly empty
roads, encountering very few other vehicles.
Deputy Mora watched the Dodge run a stop sign as it turned onto Ladera and head
toward Ouray Road, where officers had set up another set of tire spikes. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33. Although
Deputy Mora heard over the radio that the Dodge had hit the spikes, the truck continued its
course, speeding past another motorist while driving in the middle of Ouray Road and kicking up
debris. Id. ¶¶ 33-35.

In their separate police cars with the sirens on, Deputies Cordova and Chavez gave chase,
pursuing the Dodge as it turned onto a frontage road, drove over a median and through several
large plastic pylons, sparks emitting from one of its wheels. Chavez Aff. ¶ 36, ECF No. 25-5;
UFs ¶¶ 36-38. The Dodge then drove south into the northbound lanes of traffic on Coors with its
headlights off, forcing at least one other motorist to swerve. Id. ¶¶ 39-41. At this point, Deputy
Mora believed that the driver of the Dodge had committed the felony of aggravated assault with
a deadly weapon. Id. ¶ 42.
Deputy Chavez then attempted a Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT), a ramming
maneuver to make the driver abruptly “spin out” so the driver loses control and stops. Chavez

Aff. ¶¶ 45-47. The deputy’s PIT was unsuccessful, though, and the Dodge continued its pursuit
in the wrong lanes on Coors. Id. ¶ 47. Deputy Chavez, who was himself in the wrong lanes of
travel at this point as he pursued the Dodge, noticed oncoming motorist vehicles, so he backed-
off to give motorists room to safely maneuver their vehicles. Id. ¶ 49. The Dodge fled into a
residential area and Deputy Chavez continued his chase, ramming the Dodge in another PIT on a
residential street, but Chavez ended up disabling his own police car in the process, bringing his
pursuit to a halt. Id. ¶¶ 51-55.
Deputy Cordova continued to pursue the Dodge though. UF ¶ 49. The fleeing vehicle ran
a stop sign, nearly colliding head-on with another motorist headed east on Hanover Road. Id. ¶
51. As the Dodge attempted to exit the residential area and get back onto Coors, Deputy Cordova
attempted a third PIT. Id. ¶ 52. The Dodge momentarily fishtailed, but Padilla regained control,
drove north in the southbound lanes on Coors, and then drove over the median to gain passage
into the southbound lanes. Id. ¶ 53.
Seconds later, Deputy Cordova successfully rammed the Dodge in a fourth PIT near the

intersection of Coors and Glenrio. Id. ¶ 54. The Dodge spun-out and came to a standstill in the
northwest corner of the intersection, its front wheels abutted against a curb. Id. ¶ 55; Pl.’s Ex.
1B, ECF No. 35-1. The area where the Dodge stood still appears to be a large, vacant tract.
Helicopter footage does not show the presence of passing pedestrians or members of the public.
A post-shooting photograph of the truck shows the front driver’s wheel obliterated, the tire rim
exposed. Pl.’s Ex. 1C, ECF No. 35-1.
After the Dodge came to a standstill, Sergeant Gaitan came on the scene in his police
sedan. Id. ¶ 58. Gaitan pulled in front of the Dodge at an angle and “up against the bumper of the
[Dodge],” to “prevent the [Dodge] from driving forward.” Pl.’s Additional Undisputed Material

Facts ¶¶ A, B (AUF). Cordova, too, blocked the Dodge’s path with his police SUV, also
positioning his SUV at an angle and near the Dodge’s front bumper. Id. ¶ C; Defs.’ UF ¶¶ 58, 60.
This arrangement blocked the Dodge behind the police vehicles so that the Dodge could not
easily flee, although nothing stopped the Dodge’s backward travel.
As for Deputy Mora, he parked his car at a distance away from the Dodge. Defs.’ UF ¶¶
56-57. He then approached the Dodge on foot, pointed his handgun-mounted light at the driver
and ordered Padilla to put his hands up because Padilla was “reaching down” toward the center
console. UF ¶ 59; ECF No. 29-1 at 11. Padilla did not obey, although it is unknown whether
Padilla heard the commands, and it is undisputed that no gun was found in the vehicle. Id. at 11-
12; Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 6 n.2. Deputy Cordova had exited his police SUV by this point, drew his
firearm, and used his open driver’s door as cover. Pl.’s AUF ¶ E. Cordova was also commanding
Padilla to put his hands up, and he also saw Padilla reach for something on the truck’s floor.
Cordova Aff. ¶¶ 64-66.
As Mora stood roughly adjacent to the driver’s side of the Dodge, he heard the Dodge’s

engine revving, leading Mora to believe that Padilla was hitting the accelerator to flee. Id. ¶ 66.
Sergeant Gaitan stood behind the barrier formed by the police cars angled against the Dodge’s
front. In a post-shooting interview, Mora described what occurred next as follows:
Deputy Gaitan was out of his unit and I could see Deputy Gaitan in my peripheral
vision to the left and knew that he was directly in the path of the truck, uh, it was
at that same time, as all this was unfolding, that the driver punched the gas as far
as he could and it was just a constant whine, it was just [] he was actively trying
to put the truck into gear. The gear shift was up here at the right side of the
steering wheel, he was moving it up and down. Uh, I was, I was scared that if he
got that vehicle into gear Deputy Gaitan would be ran [sic] over.

ECF No. 29-1. Mora shot seven rounds at the vehicle, killing both Padilla and Mr. Jim,
who was a backseat passenger. UF ¶¶ 72, 75. Mora did not know of Jim’s presence. Id. ¶ 76.
Almost immediately, the Dodge reversed away from the officers in an uncontrolled loop as
Padilla’s lifeless foot remained on the accelerator before finally came to a stop. Pl.’s Resp. Br. ¶
5. The time it took for Mora to exit his police vehicle, run towards the site, yell demands, and
finishing firing his weapons occurred within about 18 seconds.
Deputy Cordova said that he heard the sound of the Dodge’s revving engine at the time
Mora fired the shots. Defs.’ UF ¶ 73. In an affidavit, he said that “if the revving sound coming
from the truck turned into forward movement, either myself or Sgt. Gaitan could have been
seriously injured or killed by the truck.” Cordova Aff. ¶ 69. Similarly, Gaitan said in an affidavit
that as Padilla revved the engine he was located “directly in the truck’s path of travel behind my
unit, which sat significantly lower than the stolen truck” and that he believed Padilla “was going
to ram through my unit and through me,” because of Padilla’s prior conduct and revving his
engine. Gaitan Aff., ECF No. 25-7 ¶¶ 35-56. However, when Cordova was asked why he did not
fire his weapon at the Dodge, Cordova answered that he “did not have a threat that [he] needed
to fire [his] firearm.” Pl.’s AUF ¶ F. Likewise, when Sergeant Gaitan the same question he

answered that he “was either slow to react or acting on training and experience.” Id. ¶ G.
Under Plaintiff’s version of the story, Gaitan was not directly in the truck’s path of travel,
as Mora claims. Gaitan could not have been struck by the Dodge, Plaintiff says, because the two
police cars behind which Gaitan stood made the Dodge’s forward travel impossible. Plaintiff
does not dispute that Padilla revved the Dodge’s engine at the time Mora fired the fatal shots.
However, Plaintiff contends that a reasonable jury could conclude that Mora should have known
that the Dodge posed no risk when it was stationary behind the police cars, its front wheels
against a curb with one of its tires obliterated, and no officers were behind the truck, its only
escape route. Plaintiff further contends that a jury could conclude that Mora overreacted given

Deputy Cordova’s statement that he did not perceive a need to shoot and Sergeant Gaitan’s
statement – despite being the most imperiled officer – that he did not shoot because either he was
slow to react or acting on training and experience.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 8, 2018, Plaintiff filed a five-count amended complaint in federal court
against Deputy Mora, the Board of County Commissioners of Bernalillo County, and Bernalillo
County Sheriff Manuel Gonzales, III, alleging claims for relief under federal and state-law.
Plaintiff brought a § 1983 excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment against Deputy
Mora (Count I); a municipal liability or “Monell3 claim” against the County (Count II); a
supervisory liability claim against Sheriff Gonzales (Count III); and state-law loss-of-consortium
claims asserted by Mr. Jim’s partner, Shawntay Ortiz (Count IV), and the couple’s minor son,
L.J. (Count V).
With only limited discovery conducted, Defendants filed two motions for summary

judgment: the current motion targeting Plaintiff’s § 1983 excessive force claim (Count I), and
one targeting Plaintiff’s § 1983-claims against the County and Sheriff on theories of municipal
and supervisory liability (Counts II and III). Plaintiff filed no response to the latter motion.
Instead, Plaintiff moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), asking the Court to deny or defer ruling on
that motion and requested time for additional discovery to present facts to oppose the summary
judgment motion.
Plaintiff tells the Court that she took depositions of three current and former BCSO
officers in a related state-court case. Some testimony from at least one of these officers paints a
picture of Deputy Mora as violent and lacking impulse control, Plaintiff says. For instance,

Leonard Armijo, Deputy Mora’s police academy instructor, testified that Mora was a failure in
the police academy, and Plaintiff suggests that he nonetheless gained his position through family
nepotism because his father, Rudy Mora, is the undersheriff of BCSO. Mora was initially denied
entry into the police academy the first time he applied because he failed a polygraph. Once he
finally did gain admission, Plaintiff says he exhibited aggressive behavior as a cadet. Armijo
testified that Mora failed a nonuse of force prisoner transport role-playing exercise because he
put the actor on the hood of a car and then slammed him onto pavement. Likewise, in another

3 Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
role-playing exercise that Armijo did not witness but heard about, Mora struck the actor in the
head with such force that she had a concussion.
Armijo also testified that Mora did not take Armijo’s driving class seriously. One day
Armijo even removed Mora from the driving course because of his care-free attitude. Following
a lunch break, Sheriff Gonzales and Undersheriff Rudy Mora showed up at the driving track.

Armijo testified that this had never happened in Armijo’s nine-years of teaching the driving
class. Armijo told Undersheriff Mora that his son and other cadets were “fucking around,” in his
driving course and that in Armijo’s experience “some people make it, some people don’t,”
referring to passing the class. ECF No. 37-2 21:14-17. At first Undersheriff Mora responded
nonchalantly, “they will pass.” Id. at 21:18-19 Armijo repeated that some cadets pass, some do
not. In a louder tone, the undersheriff repeated, “well, they will pass.” Id. 21:25. This exchange
continued once more. Armijo told Undersheriff Mora that his son had to listen to the trainers, and
the undersheriff responded “well, they will pass,” before turning and walking away. Id. at 22:15.
Riled by this exchange, Armijo voluntarily removed himself as Mora’s instructor.

Plaintiff also submitted internal correspondence from Captain Andi Taylor, the South
Area Commander, Field Services Division regarding an “Early Warning Alert” for Deputy Mora
that Taylor investigated. ECF No. 37-1. According to Taylor, Mora’s involvement in four
vehicle pursuits triggered the Early Warning Alert. Taylor ultimately concluded that that he “had
no cause for concern,” regarding Mora’s involvement in those pursuits. Id. However, Taylor did
write that Mora “could slow down and use verbal de-escalation techniques rather than going
hands on.” Id.
In addition to these depositions and internal correspondence, Plaintiff says in her Rule
56(d) motion that there is likely “much, much more” evidence concerning Mora’s record, and
that Mora’s alleged acquisition of his job through nepotism and allegedly troublesome
performance as a cadet and deputy is relevant to her Monell claim. ECF No. 37 at 2.
Defendants point out that they have already turned over to Plaintiff relevant evidence in
the state case. For example, Plaintiff sought production of complaints filed against Deputy Mora,
to which Defendants had no responsive documents. In their initial disclosures, Defendants also

provided Plaintiff Mora’s BCSO training certificates.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “allows an injured person to
seek damages against an individual who has violated his or her federal rights while acting under
color of state law.” Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 459 (10th Cir. 2013).
“Section 1983 creates no substantive civil rights, only a procedural mechanism for enforcing
them.” Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 1547, 1552 (10th Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). “In defending against § 1983 claims like the ones at

issue here, an official may plead an affirmative defense of qualified immunity.” Maresca v.
Bernalillo Cty., 804 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2015).
In reviewing a summary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, the court views
the evidence “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650,
657 (2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “Because of the underlying purposes of qualified
immunity, [the Tenth Circuit] review[s] summary judgment orders deciding qualified immunity
questions differently from other summary judgment decisions.” Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124,
1128 (10th Cir. 2001). “When a defendant asserts qualified immunity at summary judgment, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must clear two hurdles in order to defeat the defendant’s
motion.” Riggins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009). That burden requires a
plaintiff to show that the state official “(1) [] violated a federal statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) the unlawfulness of [the official’s] conduct was clearly established at the time.” District
of Columbia v. Wesby, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (internal quotations and
citations omitted).

“[The district court] may decide ‘which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case.’” Quinn v.
Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009)). “[I]f the plaintiff fails to establish either prong of the two-pronged qualified-immunity
standard, the defendant prevails on the defense.” A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1134–35 (10th
Cir. 2016) (citing Felders ex rel. Smedley v. Malcom, 755 F.3d 870, 877–78 (10th Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he record must clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has satisfied his heavy two-part burden;
otherwise, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). In considering whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the district

court “considers only the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers.” White v. Pauly, ––
– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (per curiam). A government official can claim qualified
immunity even if the official was mistaken about the facts or the law. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at
231.
B. Excessive Force Claim
To state an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, the Plaintiff must show
that (1) a “seizure” occurred and (2) the seizure was “unreasonable.”4 Bella v. Chamberlain, 24

4 The parties dispute whether Jim was “seized” in the first place. Defendants say that Jim was the
unintentional victim of Mora’s otherwise intentional shooting at the Dodge. The majority of
federal circuits have ruled that a passenger shot by an officer during the course of a vehicle chase
F.3d 1251, 1255 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989)).
“[A]pprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure ....” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7
(1985). Because Defendants have invoked the qualified immunity defense, Plaintiffs must also
show that objectively reasonable officers could not have thought the force used was
constitutionally permissible, in other words, they violated clearly established law. Cortez v.

McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1128 (10th Cir. 2007).
Claims of excessive force are analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard of the
Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-97 (1989). The reasonableness of the
officer’s belief as to the appropriate level of force should be judged from the perspective of an
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. at 396. Among the factors
that courts should consider in determining whether a police officer applied excessive force are
(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and (3) whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to
evade arrest by flight. Id. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from

the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Id. Further, “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense,

is “seized.” See Davenport v. Borough of Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 279 (3rd Cir. 2017)
(collecting cases). Apparently the Tenth Circuit has acknowledged, but not decided the issue. See
Carabajal, 847 F.3d at 1212 (declining to address issue, and instead holding that qualified
immunity shielded officer who fired his weapon at a car full of people because the law was
unclearly established as to whether a passenger could be seized). But in Carabajal, the Tenth
Circuit also suggested that if an officer reasonably seized the driver of a car, then it “follows”
that any seizure of a passenger is also reasonable. See id. at 1214. Thus, the starting point for the
Court’s analysis is whether Mora acted reasonably. If so, it follows that any seizure of Jim was
reasonable.
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation.” Id. at 396-97.5
“Deadly force is such force that create[s] a substantial risk of causing death or serious
bodily harm.” Thomson v. Salt Lake Cnty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1313 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation and
quotation omitted). The use of deadly force is considered reasonable “only if a reasonable officer

in Defendants’ position would have had probable cause to believe that there was a threat of
serious physical harm to themselves or to others.” Id. (quoting Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan
v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008) (emphases in original). In assessing the degree of
threat the suspect poses to the officer, the Tenth Circuit has identified factors that include, but are
not limited to: “(1) whether the officers ordered the suspect to drop his weapon, and the suspect’s
compliance with police commands; (2) whether any hostile motions were made with the weapon
towards the officers; (3) the distance separating the officers and the suspect; and (4) the manifest
intentions of the suspect.” Estate of Larsen, 511 F.3d at 1260. These four factors and the three
factors set forth in Graham cannot be applied mechanically, the district court “must still slosh

our way through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness,’” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383
(2007). Lastly, “if threatened by [a] weapon (which may include a vehicle attempting to run over
an officer), an officer may use deadly force.” Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d 655, 664 (10th Cir.
2010).
i. Constitutional Right

5 In the Tenth Circuit, “[t]he reasonableness of the use of force depends not only on whether the
officers were in danger at the precise moment that they used force, but also on whether the
officers own reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to
use such force.” Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 415 (10th Cir. 2004) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). In this case, neither party argued that Mora created the need to use
force and therefore the Court lacks legal analysis to consider this component.
Deputy Mora and Defendants claim that Mora’s use of force against Jim—shooting him
seven times after the Dodge came to a standstill—was objectively reasonable because Padilla
had just led officers on a lengthy, dangerous flight and when Mora shot the car Padilla was
revving the engine with Gaitan standing in the car’s direct path of travel. Plaintiff contends that
Mora shot the Dodge only after the truck had clearly become disabled behind two police cars and
no longer posed a threat. The Court concludes that the differing accounts present a genuine
question of fact and that, at this stage, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which the
trier of fact could find the existence of a constitutional violation.
Turning to the Graham factors, the first factor weighs in the Defendants’ favor. Mora had

ample probable cause to believe that Padilla committed the crime of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon during the chase. Crimes committed during the course of an encounter can justify
deadly force. This factor firmly weighs in the Defendants’ favor.
The second and third Graham factors—whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to
the safety of the officers or the public, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest—must
be analyzed at the “precise” moment that Mora officer used force. Durastanti, 607 F.3d at 666.
There is no doubt that Padilla was evading the officers until his truck spun-out, so the third factor
weighs in favor of the Defendants.
The heart of this case lies at the second factor—immediacy of harm. This factor is a
much closer call. Defendants vigorously argue that Padilla’s prior reckless conduct reasonably

led Mora to believe that the chase had not ended by the time Mora fired. They describe the
imminent need for force because Padilla:
Fled from law enforcement for approximately twenty eight minutes across
Albuquerque metropolitan area. In particular, Padilla drove at a high rate of
speed, he turned his headlights off at times, and he did not obey traffic signals.
After three sets of spike strips, two narrowly avoided head-on collisions with
civilian motorists, wrong way travel on residential streets and major
thoroughfares, three unsuccessful [PITs] and one successful PIT, Padilla was
stopped. Nonetheless, Padilla refused to put his hands up and he attempted to flee
once again by flooring the gas pedal on his stolen truck while the front bumper of
a full-size truck was feet away from two [deputies].

ECF No. 25 at 1-2 (numbers omitted).

In support of their arguments, both parties discuss the Supreme Court’s decision in
Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014). In that case, a police officer stopped Rickard’s car
because a headlight was out. Id. at 768. The officer asked Rickard to step out of the car because
he appeared nervous and could not produce a driver’s license, but instead Rickard sped-off and
led police on a high-speed chase. Id. at 768-69. Eventually, Rickard’s car hit a police cruiser,
causing Rickard’s car to spin-out in a parking lot, where it hit another police cruiser. Id. at 769.
“Now in danger of being cornered” by police cruisers, Rickard put his car in reverse to try to
escape. Id. Rickard’s car “made contact with” yet a third police cruiser, and Rickard’s “tires
started spinning,” and the car rocked back-and-forth, suggesting Rickard was flooring the gas
pedal “even though his bumper was flush against a police cruiser.” Id. at 770. At that point—and
even though Rickard’s car “came temporarily to a near standstill,” id. at 776—an officer fired
three shots into his car. Id. at 770. Rickard “then reversed in a 180 degree arc and maneuvered
onto another street, forcing [another officer] to step to his right to avoid the vehicle.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Then, after Rickard’s car had passed the officer and “continued
fleeing,” officers “fired 12 shots toward Rickard’s car, bringing the total number of shots fired
during th[e] incident to 15.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In analyzing the first-prong of the qualified immunity inquiry, the Supreme Court held
that the officers reasonably used deadly force to end the chase. “Rickard’s outrageously reckless
driving,” included speeding over 100 miles per hour over five minutes and passing more than
two dozen other vehicles, forcing the cars to alter course. Id. at 776. Even though Rickard’s car
“came temporarily to a near standstill,” when it hit a police cruiser, “that did not end the chase,”
because within three seconds Rickard “resumed maneuvering” his car. Id. When the officer fired
the first three shots, the only thing “a reasonable police officer could have concluded was that
Rickard was intent on resuming his flight and that, if he was allowed to do so, he would once

again pose a deadly threat for others on the road.” Id. at 777. As for firing the other volley of 12
shots after Rickard had maneuvered past officers and continued fleeing, the Supreme Court held
that officers acted reasonable because over the “10-second span when all the shots were fired,
Rickard never abandoned his attempt to flee.” Id.
Defendants are no doubt correct that Padilla had engaged in a reckless flight using the
Dodge, and that Padilla’s prior dangerous flight matters in assessing the reasonableness of his
conduct. Padilla drove with his headlights intermittently off, traveled numerous times in the
wrong lanes of travel on a major thoroughfare and residential streets, hopped a median, and
forced at least one motorist to swerve to avoid the Dodge. Given Padilla’s prior flight and

revving the engine, Mora reasonably could believe that he was still using the car as a deadly
weapon. “It is well-settled that vehicles may be used as weapons and that such use ‘may allow
the use of deadly force,’’ Durastanti, 607 F.3d at 665, 671. But the threat of harm to the officers
or the public must be “actual and imminent” to “shift the calculus in the direction of
reasonableness.” Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2009). Moreover,
“circumstances may change within seconds eliminating the justification for deadly force.”
Durastanti, 607 F.3d at 666.
The Court finds that even under Plumhoff there is a genuine issue of material fact about
whether an officer on the scene would have perceived the need to use deadly force at the time
Mora did. On one hand, the summary judgment evidentiary record shows that Mora reasonably
could have concluded that Padilla’s flight was not over after the truck came to a standstill. It is
undisputed that Padilla was revving the engine. The police helicopter video shows what appears
to be a plume of debris, suggesting that the Dodge’s wheels were spinning throughout the
encounter. Padilla looked deranged during the encounter and Mora watched him moving the gear

shift despite police commands to put his hands up. Padilla was trying to put the Dodge into four-
wheel drive, which suggests he was trying to gain traction to move the vehicle. Just like in
Plumhoff, Padilla’s car collided with a police car and came to a standstill with Sergeant Gaitan’s
police car “up against the bumper of the [Dodge],” along with Cordova’s car. Padilla, like
Rickard, spun his tires and floored the gas pedal. And importantly, Gaitan was feet from the
truck and within its projected path of travel. All three officers said in affidavits or post-shooting
reports that they feared that either Cordova or Gaitan could have been seriously injured or killed
by the truck.
On the other hand, however, the evidentiary record contains important facts that set this

case apart from Plumhoff. The first difference has to do with temporal factors. In Plumhoff, after
Rickard’s car came to a standstill for three seconds, Rickard floored the gas pedal so that his tires
spun and then managed to break free from the police car he hit, reverse, and drive away. Id. at
776-77. Officers fired three shots while Rickard was trying to break free of the police car, and
the remaining 12 shots as Rickard drove away. Id. at 770. Here, by contrast, the Dodge was
stopped for roughly 18-seconds (the time it took for the Dodge to come to a standstill, Mora to
run towards the truck, and finish firing his weapon) whereas in Plumhoff, Rickard’s car stopped
for only three seconds. Rickard broke free of police cars and resumed flight; here, Padilla did not
because two police vehicles made Padilla’s forward travel impossible. The Dodge did not move
the entire 18-seconds. Even though an 18-second standstill may not be significantly greater than
a three-second standstill, “circumstances may change within seconds eliminating the justification
for deadly force.” Durastanti, 607 F.3d at 666. A reasonable jury could conclude that the longer
timeframe sets this case apart from fleeing vehicular suspects in Plumhoff and other cases
focusing on temporal factors. See e.g. Lytle v. Bexar Cty., Tex., 560 F.3d 404, 414 (5th Cir. 2009)

(interval of “anywhere from three to ten seconds, perhaps even more,” that it took for fleeing
suspect to reverse towards the officer and then flee away affected reasonableness of officer’s
firing at the fleeing vehicle); Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1282-83 (11th Cir. 2002)
(where fleeing driver was cornered by police in a cul-de-sac with his car pointed towards a curb,
for “at most, a very few seconds” and the officer fired shots “within a moment” of the vehicle
stopping, it was reasonable to believe that the chase was ongoing given that the suspect remained
in car with the engine running and disobeyed police commands to exit his car.)
The second difference has to do with the Dodge’s position behind two police cars, a curb,
and with a tire rim was exposed and the officers’ proximity to the Dodge. In Plumhoff one officer

was close enough to Rickard’s vehicle that he pounded his gun on the window as Rickard floored
the accelerator, and another officer had to step to avoid Rickard’s vehicle once he regained
flight. 572 U.S. at 769-70. Here, in contrast, at the time Mora opened fire, officers were on the
other side of the police cars that blocked the Dodge’s forward path. Defendants contend that a
reasonable officer in Mora’s position would reasonably believe that the barricade had not ended
the chase given Padilla’s prior flight, revving engine, and disregard of police commands – and
that Padilla was about to run over Gaitan as he stood in the Dodge’s path and Mora had seconds
to react. However, the Court must draw inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. Accordingly, the Court
assumes that Padilla’s spinning of the wheels, revving the engine, and efforts with the gear shift
evince Padilla’s attempt to reverse the truck into an empty, vacant dirt lot which shows no police,
pedestrians or members of the public. Also drawing inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, her evidence
shows Cordova did not fire his weapon because he “did not have a threat that [he] needed to fire
[his] firearm.” Pl.’s AUF ¶ F. Likewise, Gaitan – the more imperiled officer – did not fire his
weapon, saying he was uncertain whether he was “slow to react or acting and reacting on

training or experience.” Id. ¶ G.
Plaintiff’s evidence sufficiently distinguishes this case from those cases where officers
stood directly in a fleeing vehicle’s path with mere seconds to react. For example, in the Tenth
Circuit’s case Thomas v. Durastanti, 607 F.3d at 659, plain-clothes agents in an unmarked
vehicle called in a uniformed officer to pull over a suspicious Lincoln. Id. at 660. The Lincoln
pulled into a gas station at about the same time that the agents entered the parking lot and
partially blocked the driveway that was the Lincoln’s most obvious escape route. Id. At the same
time, a state trooper responded and pulled into the gas station and parked behind the Lincoln. Id.
Soon after, the following events occurred:

In an effort to get away, Mr. Smith began to drive the Lincoln out of the parking
lot, maneuvering around the ATF agents’ SUV, which was partially blocking the
Lincoln’s path. Agent Thompson, who was approaching the driver’s side of the
Lincoln, had to move out of the way of the Lincoln; as he did so, Agent
Thompson hit the Lincoln’s front passenger window with the butt of his weapon,
trying to break the glass. Agent Durastanti proceeded from the driver’s side of the
agents’ SUV toward the rear of that vehicle and into the path of the Lincoln as it
headed around the agents' SUV toward the parking lot exit. Agent Durastanti
would testify later that he was concerned that Agent Thompson was in distress,
that the Lincoln was coming directly at him and his objective was to stop the
Lincoln. Agent Durastanti fired several shots at the driver. The Lincoln,
nevertheless, continued out of the parking lot, hitting Agent Durastanti, who
rolled off its hood, landed on his feet, turned around and then fired two more
shots at the back of the Lincoln as it proceeded down the street away from the
Valero station.... Ultimately, the Lincoln stopped a few blocks away. Mr. Smith
had been shot in the head; Mr. Thomas had suffered a gunshot wound to his leg.
607 F.3d at 661 (internal citation omitted). Concerning the first round of gunshots, the Tenth
Circuit held that Agent Durastanti’s acted objectively reasonable because the driver was
advancing towards Durastanti and placed him in harm’s way with mere seconds to react. Id. at
665-66.
The Tenth Circuit relied heavily on Durastanti in the 2017 case Carabajal v. City of

Cheyenne, 847 F.3d 1203 to likewise conclude that an officer reasonably fired at a driver who
slowly moved his car mere feet towards the officer after the officer had told the driver to not start
the car engine. In that case, Carabajal drove the speed limit and used his turn signals during a
police chase before finally stopping after driving six-blocks. Id. at 1207. The pursuing officer
told Carabajal to not run and to keep his hands visibly out of the car windows. Id. Carabajal
momentarily opened his door and put his foot outside of the car, but then got back in the car and
shut the door. Id. at 1208.
At the same time, a backup officer arrived at the scene, stood in front of Carabajal’s car,
and shouted “Don’t start or I’ll shoot,” as he aimed his gun at the car. Id. Despite this warning,

the car slowly moved towards the officer. Id. Three seconds later, the officer fired two rounds
directly at Carabajal. Id. The vehicle continued to “roll forward” so slowly that the officer was
able to put his foot on the bumper to try to stop its forward movement. Id. In analyzing the first
prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the court concluded that the officer acted reasonably.
Id. at 1209. Carabajal’s “equivocal compliance with police directives,” included eluding police
for six-blocks, getting out of his car but then back in, and the car moving forward despite the
officer’s warning and the officer was not “required to stand down and hope for the best.” Id. at
1210. Durastanti and Carabajal involved suspects driving directly towards officers, whereas
here Plaintiff’s evidence raises a triable issue of fact concerning the immediacy of harm posed to
the officers.
Finally, the Court turns to a case that Plaintiff cites to show that Mora acted
unreasonably, Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2009). On appeal, the limited
question before the Tenth Circuit was whether the potential risk to third parties created by a

fleeing suspect’s previous reckless driving was alone sufficient to justify the officer’s shooting
him. Id. at 1187-88. The officer stipulated that he was not imperiled and that no innocent
bystanders were in the area. Id. The Tenth Circuit, while recognizing that an officer may use
deadly force to apprehend a fleeing felon who poses grave threat of harm to officers or others,
held that this “does not mean that any risk of physical harm to others, no matter how slight,
would justify any application of force, no matter how certain to cause death.” Id. at 1190. “When
an officer employs such a level of force that death is nearly certain, he must do so based on more
than the general dangers posed by reckless driving.” Id. “[T]he general risks” or “risk of future
harm” to motorists created by the driver’s reckless flight were insufficient to justify the shooting

because no other motorists were, in fact, in the area and motorists who happened to come along
could have avoided an accident. Id.
However, the Tenth Circuit said in the following paragraph that
The threat to the officers themselves—if actual and imminent—could of course
shift the calculus in the direction of reasonableness. If a reasonable officer in
Officer Aragon’s position would have feared for his life or the life of his fellow
officers, then on one side of the scales would sit not only the potential (even if
distant) risk to any motorist who might wander along, but also the very immediate
risk of death to the pursuing officers. The urgency of terminating the chase would
increase and the balance would tip in the officers’ favor. The use of deadly
force—even of the level nearly certain to cause death—would likely be justified.
Here, however, the threat to the officers is a disputed fact, and for purposes of the
summary judgment motion the district court explicitly assumed the officers to be
in no immediate danger.
Id.
Cordova does not conclusively establish that Deputy Mora acted unreasonably. First, as
noted earlier, the only question on appeal was “whether the potential risk to third parties created
by Mr. Cordova’s driving was alone sufficient to justify Officer Aragon’s shooting him.” Id. at
1188. This description alone sets Cordova apart since this case involves more than the general

risk of reckless driving posed to a motoring public. And whereas in Cordova the parties agreed
that the officers were not imperiled, here the parties heavily dispute the immediacy of the danger
posed to Gaitan at the time Mora opened fire. The Cordova court conceded that if a reasonable
officer could have feared for his life or those of other officers, those facts could shift the
calculus. See id. Although it is a close call, there are genuine issues of material fact about
whether an objectively reasonable officer would have perceived that the chase was ongoing and
that officers were imperiled, and therefore a jury could conclude that Deputy Mora’s firing at the
Dodge was objectively unreasonable.
ii. Clearly Established Law

Despite this conclusion, Mora is entitled to summary judgment on the ground that he did
not violate clearly established law. “Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct
‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. at 551–52 (2017) (quoting Mullenix v.
Luna, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam)). Although “a general constitutional rule already
identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in
question, even though ‘the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful,”’
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)), “[f]or a right to be clearly established there must be Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court
precedent close enough on point to make the unlawfulness of the officers’ actions apparent.”
Mascorro v. Billings, 656 F.3d 1198, 1208 (10th Cir.2011). “[T]he dispositive question is
‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established,’” Mullenix, 136 S.Ct. at
308 (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)), and “[t]he inquiry ‘must be
undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” id.

(quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per curiam)). It bears noting that in the
context of excessive force cases involving car chases, the Supreme Court has “‘never found the
use of deadly force in connection with a dangerous car chase to violate the Fourth Amendment,
let alone to be a basis for denying qualified immunity’ where an officer reasonably believed he
or others were in danger.” Johnson v. Peay, 704 F. App’x 738, 743 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Mullenix, 136 S.Ct. at 310).
It appears that Plaintiff cites to the Supreme Court’s decision in Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. at 11, to show that the law was clearly established at the time of the incident. She quotes
and emphasizes the following language: “A police officer may not seize an unarmed,

nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.” However, the Plaintiff describes the right at too
general a level. The “clearly established” inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific
context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 198. “Such
specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where the Court has
recognized that ‘[i]t is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal
doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.’”
Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205).
Plaintiff has not cited, and the Court has not found, caselaw establishing that an officer
may not shoot a driver who dangerously flees from police and who, once momentarily
apprehended, revs his engine at an officer positioned behind patrol cars that are in the fleeing
vehicle’s projected path. If anything, Supreme Court precedent indicates the opposite. The
Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Plumhoff v. Rickard establishes that as of November 2017, the
date of the events in question, it was not clearly established that an officer must refrain from
using deadly force to terminate a dangerous chase where the driver continues to push down on

the car’s accelerator even though the car may have come to a temporary stop. Accordingly, the
Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count I.
C. Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) Motion
As noted earlier, Plaintiff filed no response to Defendants’ separate summary judgment
motion on Count II, Plaintiff’s Monell and supervisory liability claims. Instead, she moved under
Rule 56(d), which allows a court to deny or defer considering a motion for summary judgment
where the “nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot
present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). “In this circuit, a party
seeking to defer a ruling on summary judgment under Rule 56([d]) must provide an affidavit

“explain[ing] why facts precluding summary judgment cannot be presented.” Valley Forge Ins.
Co. v. Health Care Mgmt. Partners, Ltd., 616 F.3d 1086, 1096 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). “This includes identifying (1) the probable facts not available,
(2) why those facts cannot be presented currently, (3) what steps have been taken to obtain these
facts, and (4) how additional time will enable [the party] to obtain those facts and rebut the
motion for summary judgment.” Id.
To better contextualize Plaintiff’s Rule 56(d) motion, it makes sense to briefly state the
legal standards for Plaintiff’s municipal and supervisory liability claims. “A § 1983 suit against a
municipality for the actions of its police officers requires proof that (1) an officer committed a
constitutional violation and (2) a municipal policy or custom was the moving force behind the
constitutional deprivation that occurred.” Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d
1255, 1264 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). To establish municipal liability under § 1983,
Plaintiff must prove a constitutional violation by the individual officer. See id. (“without the
predicate constitutional harm inflicted by an officer, no municipal liability exists.”) (citing City

of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986)). “A challenged practice may be deemed an
official policy or custom for § 1983 municipal-liability purposes if it is a formally promulgated
policy, a well-settled custom or practice, a final decision by a municipal policymaker, or
deliberately indifferent training or supervision.” Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police
Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2013). To proceed with a municipal liability claim, “the
plaintiff must show that a policymaker, which could be the chief of police, among others, was
deliberately indifferent.” Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278, 1289 (10th Cir. 2000).
Against Sheriff Gonzales, Plaintiff’s claim of direct supervisory liability requires proof of
the sheriff’s “direct personal responsibility” for the claimed deprivation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional right. See Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1327 (10th Cir. 2010) (emphases in
original). Plaintiff “must show an ‘affirmative link’ between the supervisor and the constitutional
violation,” Schneider, 717 F.3d at 767, which requires proof of three interrelated elements: “(1)
the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued
operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with
the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Dodds v.
Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010).
Here, Defendants contend that in the parallel state-court case the parties conducted
“significant” discovery, including taking depositions of the three officers whose testimony
Plaintiff relies on in support of her Rule 56(d) motion. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has these
three depositions at hand, and that Plaintiff therefore fails to make use of information already
available to her. Defendants also complain that Plaintiff’s discovery request lacks specificity
since she does not list requests for product or interrogatories.
The Court concludes that the affidavit filed by Plaintiff’s lawyer satisfies the Valley

Forge requirements. He requests on Plaintiff’s behalf discovery of Mora’s “personnel records,
including records of his prior incidents of use of force and vehicle pursuits,” and a BCSO
spreadsheet that would compile Mora’s vehicle pursuits. ECF No. 37-1 at 2. Plaintiff also seeks
to depose Captain Taylor and Lieutenant Lori Carillo, the two officers who initiated the Early
Warning Alert review. Given what Plaintiff has learned from Leonard Armijo and Ryan Tafoya
about Mora’s alleged violence as a cadet and later as a deputy, Plaintiff contends that the
discovery she requires will support her claims for municipal and supervisory liability,
specifically “that Defendants were deliberately indifferent in the supervision and training of
[Mora].” Id. Given that a jury could reasonably conclude that Mora’s conduct violated the Fourth

Amendment, Plaintiff’s municipal and supervisory liability claims remain actionable. Plaintiff is
entitled to seek discovery as set forth in Mr. Bregman’s affidavit. The parties will meet with
United States Magistrate Judge Kevin R. Sweazea to arrange case scheduling.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
 Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 1: Dismissal of Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Claim [ECF No. 25] is GRANTED and that
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Joshua Mora in his individual capacity is
DISMISSED with prejudice;
e § Plaintiff’s Motion to Deny or Defer Ruling on County Defendants’ Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment No. II [ECF No. 37] is GRANTED;
e Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. II: Dismissal of
Plaintiff's Municipal Liability (Policies, Customs, Patterns, and Practices), Failure
to Train, and Supervisory Liability Claims [ECF No. 26] is DENIED without
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

ie United States District Court Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10279329. Public record. Not legal advice.