# ALFORD v. PLUMERI

> District Court, D. New Jersey · June 11, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10278888

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** June 11, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10278888

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that detention pursuant to a detainer constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure where but for the detainer, the plaintiff would have been released

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

CHARLES EARL ALFORD, :
: CIV. NO. 23-20440 (RMB-EAP)
Plaintiff :
:
v. : OPINION
:
SAMUEL J. PLUMERI, et al., :
:
Defendants :
____________________________________
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the civil rights complaint under § 42
U.S.C. 1983, as supplemented, (Compl., Dkt. Nos. 1, 3, 5, 6) by Pro Se Plaintiff
Charles Earl Alford, who was a prisoner confined at South Woods State Prison in
Bridgeton, New Jersey when he submitted the complaint. Plaintiff’s original
application to proceed without prepayment of the filing fees under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a) (“IFP application”) was incomplete. Therefore, the Court administratively
terminated this matter. (Order, Dkt. No. 7.) Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated and
has submitted an IFP application in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), which
establishes his financial eligibility to proceed without payment of the filing fee.
Therefore, the Court will reopen this matter, grant the IFP application, and file the
complaint, as supplemented. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s complaint
is dismissed without prejudice.
I. SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
When a person is granted IFP status, courts must review the complaint and

sua sponte dismiss any claims that are: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seek monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Courts, however, must
liberally construe pleadings by pro se plaintiffs. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is the same as that for dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120,
122 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)
II. DISCUSSION

A. The Complaint
Plaintiff’s complaint arises out of his arrest on April 18, 2022, in Pennsauken
Township, New Jersey for firearm and controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”)
offenses, his subsequent revocation of parole on December 14, 2022, prior to
2
disposition of his criminal charges, and the New Jersey State Parole Board’s
(“NJSPB”) denial of his parole application on July 7, 2023. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1;
Suppl. Compl., Dkt. No. 3.) Plaintiff has named the following defendants in his

complaint:
• Samuel J. Plumeri (“Plumeri”), Chairman (“NJSPB”);

• Township of Pennsauken, New Jersey (“Pennsauken”)
• Lieutenant Kevin Keys (“Keys”), NJSPB
• Eric Shenk (“Shenk”), NJSPB
• Robert Goodale (“Goodale”), NJSPB
• Shawn Murphy (“Murphy”), NJSPB
• James Jefferson (“Jefferson”), NJSPB

• Ronald H. Cathel III (“Cathel”), NJSPB
• Trudy Steinhart (“Steinhart”), NJSPB
• Kerry Cody (“Cody”), NJSPB
• Lexxus Matos (“Matos”), Police Officer, Pennsauken, New Jersey

• John Doe NJSPB Members
Because Plaintiff sues the NJSPB Defendants for damages, the Court construes
his § 1983 claims as brought against them in their individual capacities.
1. Plaintiff’s Arrest
Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his complaint. On April 18, 2022,

3
Patrolman Anthony Rodriguez of the Pennsauken Police Department lied in his
police report to establish probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest. Specifically,
Rodriguez stated that he spoke to a witness who said Plaintiff had a gun, and that he

and his fellow officer, Lexuus Matos, witnessed Plaintiff running with a backpack.
The backpack was later found to contain a firearm and CDS. Rodriguez said
Plaintiff asked him for items which were found in the backpack. Rodriguez lied
when he said the incident was recorded on his body camera. Matos disagreed with
Rodriguez’s description of the events leading to Plaintiff’s arrest, but he failed to

intervene by not reporting Rodriguez to a superior.
Plaintiff further alleges Matos attempted to coerce him into admitting his
ownership of the firearm and CDS, and when this failed, she asked Plaintiff to sign a
property release form. Outside of his presence, Matos then handwrote “backpack”
and “laptop computer” on the release form, for the purpose of incriminating

Plaintiff. Rodriguez and Matos failed to lodge the backpack into evidence.
Instead, they released the backpack when Plaintiff was admitted to Camden County
Jail, to make it look like Plaintiff had ownership. Rodriguez used his false police
report to obtain Plaintiff’s arrest warrant. Rodriguez then lied about the incident
before a grand jury. Rodriguez repeated his lies at Plaintiff’s parole hearing.

Plaintiff was confined due to the criminal charges initiated by Rodriguez.
Plaintiff alleges that the Township of Pennsauken’s failure to discipline the
wrongful conduct of its police officers in the past and its lack of police training
4
caused Rodriguez and Matos to frame him and falsely arrest him for possession of a
firearm and CDS. Plaintiff complained to Detective Anthony Angelone of the
Internal Affairs Department, who failed to investigate the incident. Plaintiff was

unable to obtain the alleged body camera footage of his arrest.
2. Plaintiff’s Parole Revocation
On the day of his arrest on April 18, 2022, Plaintiff was serving a five-year
term of mandatory parole supervision. On April 19, 2022, Plaintiff’s parole officer,

Erik Shenk, learned that Plaintiff was arrested on charges of possession of a firearm
and CDS. The next day, Parole Officer Lieutenant Keys issued a parole warrant for
Plaintiff, who was confined in Camden County Jail on pending criminal charges.
The parole warrant caused a detainer to be placed against Plaintiff’s release on bail.
NJSPB has a policy not to revoke parolees’ supervision while their related charges

are pending in Court. According to the complaint, although there are “exceptions
for parole officers to self[-]issue warrants without Full Board approval … Keys
misrepresented facts in his report in order to meet the exception’s requirement.”
Plaintiff alleges Keys “allowed his bias against ex convicted citizens to corrupt his
actions,” and he assumed Plaintiff’s guilt on the new charges. Thus, Plaintiff alleges

Keys lied in his report by finding that Plaintiff was a danger to the public, and he lied
about the presence of immediate emergency circumstances for issuance of an
immediate parole warrant. Plaintiff does not allege any further facts concerning the
content of Keys’ report. Shenk signed off on the parole violator warrant. As a
5
result of the detainer, the Honorable Timothy T. Booth, New Jersey Superior Court
Judge, denied Plaintiff pretrial release on the criminal charges.
On June 1, 2022, Plaintiff attended an initial parole revocation hearing.

Hearing Officer Shawn Murphy presided over the hearing. Plaintiff was not
permitted to face his accuser, arresting officer Rodriguez. Crediting Keys’ charges
in the parole violator warrant, Murphy found sufficient evidence that Plaintiff
violated supervision conditions 11, 12, and 13:
(11). Refrain from owning or possessing any [] firearm,
as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1f, for any purpose;

(12). Refrain from owning or possessing any weapon
enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1r[;]

(13). Refrain from the purchase, use, possession,
distribution, or administration of any narcotic drug,
controlled dangerous substance … except prescribed by a
physician.

(Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 34; See N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:71-6.4.)

On June 8, 2022, NJSPB Members Robert Goodale and James Jefferson
conducted a Parole Board meeting regarding Plaintiff’s initial parole revocation.
Goodale and Jefferson upheld the parole warrant. This caused Plaintiff’s continued
detention. Plaintiff attended his final parole revocation hearing on November 27,
2022, by video conference from South Woods State Prison. Hearing Officer Ronald
H. Cathel, III presided over the hearing. Cathel found Plaintiff guilty of violating
parole conditions and 11 and 12. Thus, Plaintiff served a 15-month technical
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violation term of imprisonment for possession of a firearm.
On December 14, 2022, NJSPB Members Trudy Steinhardt and Kerri Cody
participated in a Parole Board meeting where they affirmed Plaintiff’s guilt on parole

conditions 11 and 12. Plaintiff alleges Steinhardt and Cody planned secretly to
deprive him of remaining free on parole supervision while his criminal case was
pending in court. Steinhardt failed to intervene when Cody voted to revoke
Plaintiff’s parole.
Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal. On April 26, 2023, unknown NJSPB

Members participated in a full Parole Board appeal, where they conspired with each
other to revoke Plaintiff’s parole while his criminal charges were pending in court.
In the meantime, on June 21, 2023, Assistant Prosecutor MacFeeters of the Camden
County Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the criminal charges against Plaintiff.
3. Plaintiff’s Parole Hearing

On July 7, 2023, Plaintiff attended a Parole Panel hearing from South Woods
State Prison. NJSPB Members Goodale and “John Doe” conspired to deny
Plaintiff parole based on lies including: (1) claiming Plaintiff misrepresented facts to
manipulate them into granting parole; (2) accusing Plaintiff of denying the offense of

conviction; (3) accusing Plaintiff of having pending criminal charges, although the
charges had been dismissed on June 21, 2023. John Doe failed to intervene when
Goodale denied Plaintiff parole on unconstitutional grounds. Together, they
conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional right to parole when there was no
7
basis for denial. The hearing was presided over by NJSPB Members Jefferson and
“John Doe.” They used “non administrative codes” including: “lack of insight
into criminal behavior, “risk assessment evaluation,” and “insufficient problem

resolution” to deny parole. These non-administrative codes “did not undergo the
procedure of the Administrative Procedure Act.” The Board issued Plaintiff an 18-
month parole denial. In his supplemental complaint (Dkt. No. 3), Plaintiff alleges
that on July 7, 2023, NJSPB Members John Doe and Robert Goodale retaliated
against him by denying parole because he sued their superior, Samuel J. Plumeri, in

Civil Action No. 23-1821(RM[B]).1
In summary, Plaintiff’s grievances are that (1) he was framed for possession of
a firearm and CDS, which constituted a violation of his parole conditions and state
law; (2) rather than waiting for disposition on the state criminal charges, as per
NJSPB policy, Plaintiff’s parole officer reported the criminal charges to another

parole officer who, in turn, improperly used an emergency exception to self-issue a
parole violator warrant without full Board approval. The remaining NJSPB
Defendants, based on their belief in the false allegations in the arrest warrant and

1 The Court takes judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) that on or about
March 30, 2023, in Civil Action 23-1821(RMB) (D.N.J.), Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking habeas relief on the parole warrant at issue
here. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case when he was released from his parole
violation sentence on November 3, 2023. Plaintiff had not exhausted his state court
appeals prior to bringing his habeas petition. (Civ. Action 23-1821, Dkt. Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5.)

8
parole warrant, placed a detainer on Plaintiff, preventing his release on bail pending
the criminal charges. Ultimately, the NJSPB revoked his parole for possession of a
firearm, although the state charges were ultimately dismissed. Plaintiff alleges he

was not permitted to confront his accuser, Rodriguez, at the “probable cause”
hearing.2 Plaintiff also challenges the NJSPB’s subsequent denial of parole,
premised on consideration of factors that did not undergo rulemaking procedures
under the Administrative Procedure Act.
4. Legal Claims Asserted in the Complaint

Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 For his claims against
Chairman Plumeri, Plaintiff alleges supervisory liability based on an unlawful
custom of permitting parole revocations for firearm and drug possession prior to
adjudication of the related criminal charges, a custom which caused his subordinates

Keys, Murphy, Goodale, Jefferson, Cathel, Steinhardt and Cody to violate his rights
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff also challenges the
constitutionality of parole conditions 11, 12, and 13.
Plaintiff alleges the following legal claims against the remaining defendants:

2 See Compl. ¶ 31, Dkt. No. 1. The Court assumes Plaintiff is referring to the preliminary
revocation hearing.

3 Although some of Plaintiff’s claims sound in common law tort as well as under § 1983,
Plaintiff has not specifically invoked state common law. This Court has not construed the
complaint to contain parallel state law claims because Plaintiff has not alleged that he filed a
notice of claim under N.J.S.A. 59:8:8, a prerequisite to bringing state tort claims against a
public entity or public employees in court.
9
(1) Keys—false imprisonment, substantive due process, procedural abuse, abuse of
process, and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (2) Murphy—false
imprisonment, procedural abuse, procedural due process; (3) Goodale and

Jefferson—false imprisonment, procedural abuse, civil conspiracy, failure to
intervene; (4) Goodale— § 1985(3) conspiracy, First Amendment retaliation; (5)
Cathel—false imprisonment, procedural abuse, procedural due process; (6)
Steinhardt—false imprisonment, civil conspiracy, failure to intervene; (7) Cody—
civil conspiracy, failure to intervene; (8) John Doe NJSPB Member—false

imprisonment, civil conspiracy, failure to intervene, § 1985(3) conspiracy, First
Amendment retaliation; (9) Shenk—civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (10)
Pennsauken—supervisory liability for violation of Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments based on lack of training and discipline of police officers; (10)
Rodriguez—false arrest and false imprisonment, abuse of process, substantive due

process; (11) Matos—failure to intervene, civil conspiracy.
5. Relief Sought in the Complaint
For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages and
declaratory judgment. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 34-37, Dkt. Nos. 3, 5, 6.)

B. Analysis of Claims
1. Legal Standard: Due Process Protections for Revocation of
Parole

“[A] parolee has no constitutional right to release on bail before a parole
10
revocation hearing.” Moss v. Pennsylvania, 838 F. App'x 702, 707 (3d Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) (citing Luther v. Molina, 627 F.2d 71, 76 n.10 (7th Cir. 1980)). Parole
revocation “deprives an individual … only of the conditional liberty properly

dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 480 (1972). Because parole revocation is not part of a criminal
prosecution, the due process required is limited. Id. “The first stage [of parole
revocation] occurs when the parolee is arrested and detained, usually at the direction

of his parole officer.” Id. at 485. At this stage, a preliminary hearing should be
held “as promptly as convenient after arrest.” Id. The hearing requirement is “not
triggered when the warrant is placed as a detainer at an institution where the ...
parolee is already in custody awaiting disposal of an intervening charge or serving a
sentence for a crime committed while on supervised release.” Singleton v.

Superintendent Camp Hill SCI, 747 F. App'x 89, 93 (3d Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(quoting United States v. Wickham, 618 F.2d 1307, 1309, n.3 (9th Cir. 1979)). Rather,
the duty to provide a hearing arises only when the parolee “is taken into custody as a
parole violator by execution of the warrant,” because “execution of the warrant and
custody under that warrant [is] the operative event triggering any loss of liberty

attendant upon parole revocation.” Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87 (1976)
(alteration added).
At the preliminary hearing, the determination of “whether there is probable
cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts
11
that would constitute a violation of parole conditions” … “should be made by
someone not directly involved in the case” and may be handled by administrative
officers. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 486. Additionally,

the parolee should be given notice that the hearing will
take place and that its purpose is to determine whether
there is probable cause to believe he has committed a
parole violation. The notice should state what parole
violations have been alleged. At the hearing the parolee
may appear and speak in his own behalf; he may bring
letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant
information to the hearing officer. On request of the
parolee, person who has given adverse information on
which parole revocation is to be based is to be made
available for questioning in his presence.

Id. at 486–87.

The hearing officer has the duty to summarize the evidence and the parolee’s
responses, and determine, based on the information before him, whether there is
probable cause to hold the parolee for a final decision by the parole board. Id. at
487.
To comport with due process, the second stage of parole revocation must
provide an opportunity for a second hearing, if desired by the parolee, “prior to the
final decision on revocation by the parole authority.” Id. at 487-88. The minimum
requirements of due process at the final revocation hearing include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c)
opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
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specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body
such as a traditional parole board, members of which need
not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking parole.

Id. at 488–89. The limited right to confront adverse witnesses stems from the Due
Process Clause, “not from the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.”
United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 343 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli), 411
U.S. 778, 782 (1973)).
Pertinent here, in New Jersey, a parole officer may issue a parole violator
warrant as follows:
(d) If an emergency exists and if the individual(s)
authorized to issue warrants [described in subsections b,
and c of the regulation] are not available, a parole officer
may issue a warrant pending review by the individual(s)
authorized to issue warrants…

1. When a warrant is issued pursuant to (d) above,
the individual(s) authorized to issue warrants …
shall review the basis for the issuance of such
warrant within 48 hours of the issuance of the
warrant.

2. If such individual determines that the issuance of
the warrant is not necessary, the warrant shall be
immediately withdrawn.

N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:71-7.2(d).4

4 Plaintiff’s allegation that this New Jersey regulation is based on an erroneous
interpretation of a New Jersey statute fails to state a constitutional or federal law claim
under § 1983.
13
2. Legal Standard: Due Process Protections for Release on Parole
There is no protected liberty interest in release on parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates

of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 11 (1979); Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233,
235-36 (3d Cir. 1980). Nonetheless, once a State adopts a parole system, a decision
by a parole board cannot be arbitrary and capricious or based on constitutionally
impermissible reasons, “such as race, religion or the exercise of free speech rights.”
Block, 631 F.2d at 236-37 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)); Holmes v.

Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (substantive due process applies to parole
release decisions “only when a parole board considers a factor that shocks the
conscience”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
3. Absolute Immunity of Parole Officers and Officials
Parole officers and officials are entitled to absolute immunity for their

“adjudicatory duties.” Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 775 (3d Cir. 1989).
Therefore, hearing examiners are entitled to absolute immunity for presiding over
hearings. Id. at 776. Conducting parole interviews and determining whether to
grant parole are also adjudicatory duties. Keller v. PA Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 240 F.
App'x 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). When parole officers’ actions are taken

under their administrative, executive or investigative duties, they are entitled only to
qualified immunity. Wilson, 878 F.2d at 775. Investigating parole violations and
initiating criminal actions are examples of executive and investigative duties. Id.

14
Plaintiff sued Defendants Murphy,5 Goodale, Jefferson, Cathel, Steinhardt,
Cody and John Doe NJSPB Member based solely on their adjudicatory roles in his
parole revocation and subsequent denial of parole. They are absolutely immune

from Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for damages, with the exception of Plaintiff’s First
Amendment Retaliation claims against NJSPB Members Goodale and John Doe,
addressed below. The § 1983 claims for damages against these defendants in their
individual capacities will be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s claims against
Plumeri are based on his supervisory liability over these defendants. Therefore,

Plumeri is also entitled to absolute immunity based on his subordinates’ adjudicatory
actions, and the § 1983 claims for damages against Plumeri in his individual capacity
will be dismissed with prejudice.
4. First Amendment Retaliation Claims Against Goodale and John
Doe

In his supplemental complaint, Plaintiff alleges NJSPB members Goodale and
John Doe retaliated against him for suing Chairman Plumeri in Civil Action No. 23-
1821(RMB) (D.N.J.) (Dkt. No. 3.) Civil Action No. 23-1821 is a petition for writ
of habeas corpus where Petitioner challenged his parole violator warrant. See supra

5 Plaintiff alleged Murphy denied his right to procedural due process by not permitting him
to face his accuser, Anthony Rodriguez, at the initial parole revocation proceeding.
Executing the duties of a parole hearing examiner “is plainly an adjudicatory function”
entitled to absolute immunity from a § 1983 suit for damages. Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d
281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986).

15
n. 1. The elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 are that:
“(1) [the plaintiff] engaged in ‘constitutionally protected conduct,’ (2) the defendant
engaged in ‘retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from

exercising his constitutional rights,’ and (3) ‘a causal link [existed] between the
constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.’” Baloga v. Pittston
Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (Palardy v. Township of Millburn, 906
F.3d 76, 80–81 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 296 (3d

Cir. 2006)).
The proper respondent to a petition for writ of habeas corpus is usually “the
person having custody of the person detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. In the case of a
habeas challenge to a state parole board decision, the chairman of the parole board is
a proper respondent. See, e.g., Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236 (3d. Cir. 2002),

Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). Thus, Chairman Plumeri was named as
the respondent simply because he was the person having legal custody over Plaintiff
in a habeas proceeding; he was not alleged to have personal liability for his conduct.
Therefore, it is not plausible that Goodale and John Doe would retaliate against
Plaintiff on behalf of Plumeri. Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims

against Goodale and John Doe will be dismissed without prejudice.
5. Section 1983 Claims Against Keys and Shenk

Plaintiff brings claims of false imprisonment, substantive due process,
procedural abuse, abuse of process, and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
16
against Parole Officer Keys, who issued a parole violator warrant against Plaintiff
after Plaintiff’s parole officer, Eric Shenk, reported Plaintiff’s arrest for possession of
a firearm and CDS. “[T]he constitutionality of arrests by state officials is governed

by the Fourth Amendment rather than due process analysis.” Berg v. Cnty. of
Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Therefore, the Court
will address Plaintiff’s claim of false imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment
rather than substantive due process.
“A person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes only if he is detained by

means intentionally applied to terminate his freedom of movement.” Id. Here, the
parole violator warrant was intended to cause a detainer to be placed against
Plaintiff’s release, pending disposition of his criminal charges. Based on Plaintiff’s
allegation that he would have been released on bail but for the detainer, he has

sufficiently alleged the detainer constituted a seizure. See, e.g., Davila v. United States,
247 F. Supp. 3d 650, 662 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (holding that detention pursuant to a
detainer constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure where but for the detainer, the
plaintiff would have been released) (citations omitted).
To state a false imprisonment claim, not only must a plaintiff allege facts

indicating a Fourth Amendment seizure, he must also allege the defendant lacked
probable cause. Plaintiff alleges Keys lied about the existence of emergency
circumstances for the parole violator warrant. Apart from Plaintiff’s disagreement
with Keys’ conclusion that Plaintiff posed a danger to the public, Plaintiff has not
17
clearly alleged what Keys said that was untrue. Whether Keys had probable cause
to issue the parole violator warrant depends on the facts and circumstances within
Keys’ knowledge at the time, and Plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts for the

Court to analyze this claim. See, e.g., Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480,
483 (3d Cir. 1995) (defining standard for probable cause to arrest) (citing United States
v. Cruz, 910 F.2d 1072, 1076 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 208 n. 9 (1979)).

Plaintiff also asserts claims of procedural abuse and abuse of process against
Keys. This Court is unaware of any common law tort in New Jersey for
“procedural abuse.” Thus, the Court construes “procedural abuse” as a procedural
due process claim. Apart from his disagreement with Keys’ conclusion that
emergency circumstances existed for issuance of the parole violator warrant, Plaintiff

has not alleged that he was deprived of a recognized procedural due process
protection in connection with the issuance of the parole violator warrant.
Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s “procedural abuse” claim without
prejudice.
Turning to Plaintiff’s abuse of process claim against Keys, under New Jersey

law, “a section 1983 claim for malicious abuse of process lies where ‘prosecution is
initiated legitimately and thereafter is used for a purpose other than that intended by
the law.’” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 n. 17 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Jennings v.
Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1217 (3d Cir. 1977)). A necessary element of a New Jersey
18
malicious abuse of process claim is an ulterior motive for the use of legal process.
Simone v. Golden Nugget Hotel & Casino, 844 F.2d 1031, 1038 (3d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff
fails to state a claim of abuse of process because he has not pled facts establishing

that Keys had an ulterior motive beyond obtaining a parole violator warrant. This
claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges Keys and Shenk conspired to deprive him of his rights
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). “Section 1985(3) permits an action to be
brought by one injured by a conspiracy formed ‘for the purpose of depriving, either

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.’” Farber v. City of
Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). To state a
claim, a plaintiff must allege facts establishing: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose

of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3)
an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is injured in his person
or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Id.
(citing United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983) (citing

Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102–03)). Plaintiff has not alleged the elements of such a claim
in a non-conclusory manner. Therefore, the conspiracy claims against Keys and
Shenk under § 1985(3) will be dismissed without prejudice.
6. Constitutional Challenge to Parole Conditions
19
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief6 on his constitutional challenges to parole
conditions 11 and 12. Plaintiff’s parole conditions 11 and 12 are general conditions
of parole pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-123.59(b)(1)(a), which provides, in

pertinent part:
Each parolee shall agree, as evidenced by his signature to
abide by specific conditions of parole established by the
appropriate board panel which shall be enumerated in
writing in a certificate of parole and shall be given to the
parolee upon release. Such conditions shall include,
among other things, a requirement that the parolee
conduct himself in society in compliance with all laws and
refrain from committing any crime, a requirement that the
parolee will not own or possess any firearm as defined in
subsection f. of N.J.S.2C:39-1 or any other weapon
enumerated in subsection r. of N.J.S.2C:39-1, a
requirement that the parolee refrain from the unlawful use,
or the possession or distribution of a controlled dangerous
substance, controlled substance analog or imitation
controlled dangerous substance as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-
2 and N.J.S.2C:35-11….

Plaintiff contends that when parole is revoked on conditions 11 and 12, which
may also constitute the basis for criminal charges pending against the parolee, the
parolee is stripped of his constitutional right to the presumption of innocence on his
criminal charges. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 33.) Plaintiff alleges that “the Board
do[es] not honor acquittals, dismissals and exonerations. The Board[] states that its

6 After Plaintiff was released from confinement on his parole violator sentence, he altered
his claims for prospective injunctive relief to claims for declaratory relief. (Letter, Dkt. No.
5.)

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rulings can contradict Criminal Court rulings.” (Id. at 34.)
The Supreme Court has held “the revocation of parole is not part of a criminal
prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding

does not apply to parole revocations.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480. Parole
revocations do not equate to criminal prosecutions “in any sense.” Id. at 489. This
is because parole “[r]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent

on observance of special parole restrictions.” Id. at 480. For these reasons,
[a] parole board may revoke parole on the basis of an
offense that violates the conditions of parole even if the
parolee is never criminally charged with the offense, or if
he is acquitted or the charges are dismissed before trial. All
that is required is the revocation be based on the board's
independent, properly conducted procedures. See Robinson
v. Benson, 570 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.1978); United States v.
Chambers, 429 F.2d 410, 411–12 (3d Cir.1970). See also
Mullen v. U.S. Parole Commission, 756 F.2d 74 (9th
Cir.1985) (dismissal of criminal charges based on lack of
prosecutorial merit does not bar the USPC's independent
finding of a parole violation); U.S. ex rel Carrasquillo v.
Thomas, 677 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.1982) (dismissal of criminal
charges does not bar parole revocation based on the same
conduct); Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1303–07 (9th
Cir.1977) (collateral estoppel does not bar parole
revocation notwithstanding parolee's acquittal on criminal
charges). “Ordinarily, probation may be revoked on the
basis of conduct which falls short of criminal conduct.”
Chambers, 429 F.2d at 411 (citing Burns v. United States, 287
U.S. 216 (1932)).

Bryant v. Jenkins, No. CIV. 05-4469 (JBS), 2006 WL 1373182, at *3 (D.N.J. May 15,
2006); see also Villarreal v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 985 F.2d 835, 839 (5th Cir. 1993)
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(internal quotations and citations omitted) (“A criminal prosecution—governed by
the reasonable doubt standard—and a parole revocation hearing are two very
different proceedings. In the latter, the Government's burden of proof is considerably

less.”)) Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 challenging his parole
conditions 11 and 12.
The Court also construes the following allegations in the complaint as a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim:
Parolees that are charged for weapons or a controlled
dangerous substance face[] Parole revocation while their
cases pend[] in Court. On the other hand, parolees that
are charged with non[-]criminal possession offenses
maintain[] their due process right to not have their Parole
supervision revoked while their criminal offense[s] pend[]
in Court.

(Compl., Dkt. No. 1 at 36.) Persons are “similarly situated” for purposes of an
equal protection claim when “they are alike in all relevant aspects.” Castaneira v.
Potteiger, 621 F. App'x 116, 121 (3d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Startzell v. City of
Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir.2008)). Plaintiff has not alleged that he was
treated differently from a person similarly-situated to himself—to wit—a parolee
charged with illegal weapon and CDS possession. This claim will be dismissed
without prejudice.
7. Abuse of Process Claim against Rodriguez
To state a claim of abuse of process under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the
defendant had an ulterior motive that was “neither warranted nor authorized by the
22
process.” Phillips v. New Jersey Transit, No. CV 19-13427, 2022 WL 462089, at *8
(D.N.J. Feb. 14, 2022) (quoting Cluver v. Borough of Sayreville, No. 10-3173, 2013 WL
394030, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2013), aff'd, 557 F. App'x 180 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting

Ash v. Cohn, 194 A. 174, 176 (N.J. 1937)). Plaintiff alleges Rodriguez lied to a
judicial officer to obtain an arrest warrant and then lied to a prosecutor during a
grand jury hearing to obtain his indictment. Thus, Plaintiff concluded, “Patrolman
Anthony Rodriguez, abused the process of his office with the intentions of unlawful

gain.” This allegation is wholly conclusory, Plaintiff has not alleged what ulterior
motive Rodriguez had for the arrest. Therefore, the abuse of process claim under §
1983 will be dismissed without prejudice.
8. Substantive Due Process Claim against Rodriguez
“If a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such

as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard
appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due
process.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1715, 140
L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998) (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272, n. 7 (1997)).
Plaintiff’s allegation of false imprisonment against Rodriguez is covered by the

Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim will be
analyzed under the more specific constitutional standard for false arrest and false
imprisonment under the Fourth Amendment. The substantive due process claim
against Rodriguez will be dismissed with prejudice, because amendment of this claim
23
is futile where the claim is governed by another constitutional amendment.
9. False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims Against Rodriguez

Plaintiff alleges Rodriguez arrested him for illegal possession of a firearm and
CDS based on his lie that a witness told him Plaintiff had a gun in his backpack.
Plaintiff also contests Rodriguez’s statement that he and Matos saw Plaintiff running
with a backpack, which was later found to contain a firearm and CDS.
Additionally, Rodriguez said the incident was captured on body camera footage,

which Plaintiff alleges is a lie because Plaintiff was unable to obtain the footage.
To determine whether a plaintiff alleged a plausible claim of false arrest and
false imprisonment, the Court must look at the facts and circumstances within
Rodriguez’s knowledge at the time of the arrest to determine whether Plaintiff has
adequately alleged lack of probable cause. Taking as true Plaintiff’s allegation that

there was no witness who reported to Rodriguez that Plaintiff had a gun in his
backpack, it is not clear how the encounter with Rodriguez and Matos began or how
it unfolded and ended in Plaintiff’s arrest. To state a claim in an amended
complaint, Plaintiff should allege the circumstances within Rodriguez’s knowledge
leading up to the arrest, the who, what, where, why and how the arrest came about.

The Court will dismiss the false arrest and false imprisonment claims under § 1983
against Rodriguez without prejudice.
10. Failure to Intervene Claim Against Matos
Plaintiff alleges Police Officer Matos failed to intervene when Rodriguez
24
falsely arrested and imprisoned him for possession of a firearm and CDS.
Generally, the elements of a failure to intervene claim are that a police officer either
refused or failed to intervene when a constitutional violation took place in his

presence. Ekwunife v. City of Philadelphia, 756 F. App'x 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2018) (per
curiam) (citing Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff’s
failure to intervene claim will be dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiff has
failed to allege sufficient facts to state an underlying false arrest or false
imprisonment claim under § 1983 against Rodriguez.

11. Civil Conspiracy Claim Against Matos
“To prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that
persons acting under color of state law ‘reached an understanding’ to deprive him of
his constitutional rights.” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 293–94 (3d

Cir. 2018) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970)). Plaintiff
has failed to allege sufficient facts concerning his arrest to establish that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a conspiracy
claim under § 1983, and the claim will be dismissed without prejudice.
12. Municipal Liability for False Arrest and False Imprisonment

Plaintiff alleges the Township of Pennsauken’s failure to train and discipline
its police officers caused Rodriguez and Matos to falsely arrest and imprison him.
Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish false arrest. Even if Plaintiff is
able to state a false arrest/imprisonment claim against Rodriguez in an amended
25
complaint, a municipality’s failure to train police officers “‘serve[s] as [a] basis for §
1983 liability only where [it] ... amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the police come into contact.’” Est. of Roman v. City of Newark

(“Roman”), 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 388, (1989) (alterations added and footnote omitted in Roman). In this
context, deliberate indifference may be pled by showing: “(1) municipal
policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation[;] (2) the

situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling[;] and (3)
the wrong choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional
rights.” Id. (quoting Doe v. Luzerne County, 660 F.3d 169, 180 (3d Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted in Roman) (quoting Carter v. City of Philadelphia,
181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)). To state a failure to train claim, a plaintiff must

allege a “deficiency in a training program” that is “closely related to the alleged
constitutional injury.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 109 (3d Cir. 2019). Plaintiff’s
failure to train claim is conclusory because he has not identified any particular
deficiency in Pennsauken’s police training, nor has Plaintiff alleged facts indicating a
history of police officers in Pennsauken framing and falsely arresting its citizens.

Plaintiff also alleges that Pennsauken’s failure to discipline corrupt officers in
the past caused Rodriguez and Matos to falsely arrest and imprison him. In support
of this claim, Plaintiff alleges only that an officer in the Internal Affairs Department
ignored his complaint. Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a claim of municipal
26
liability under § 1983, and the Court will dismiss the claims against Pennsauken
without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above: (1) Plaintiff’s IFP application will be
granted; (2) Plumeri, Murphy, Goodale, Jefferson, Cathel, Steinhardt, Cody and
John Doe(s) NJSPB Member have absolute immunity in their individual capacities
from Plaintiff’s § 1983 and § 1985(3) damages claims, and these claims will be

dismissed with prejudice, with the exception of Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claims against Goodale and John Doe, which will be dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim; Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against all NJSPB
Members based the constitutionality of parole conditions 11 and 12 will be dismissed
with prejudice for failure to state a claim; Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims of false arrest and

false imprisonment against Rodriguez in his individual capacity will be dismissed
without prejudice; Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim of substantive due process against
Rodriguez in his individual capacity will be dismissed with prejudice; Plaintiff’s §
1983 failure to intervene and civil conspiracy claims against Matos in his individual
capacity will be dismissed without prejudice; Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the

Township of Pennsauken for failure to train and discipline Rodriguez and Matos will
be dismissed without prejudice.

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An appropriate order follows.

DATE: June 10, 2024 s/Renée Marie Bumb
Renée Marie Bumb
Chief United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10278888. Public record. Not legal advice.