# JACKSON v. SEIFRIED

> District Court, D. New Jersey · April 30, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10278604

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** April 30, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10278604

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that the plaintiffs’ vague allegation that “funding is insufficient to meet their needs” could not support their Title II claim
- noting that a party must “state a claim under Title II of the ADA[] in satisfaction of the first Georgia requirement”
- holding that “an injunction to cure past injuries . . . cannot be fairly characterized as prospective”

## Opinion text

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOEY WENDELL JACKSON,

Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 20-17410 (GC) (JBD)
v.
Civil Action No. 22-05106 (GC) (JBD)

JONATHON SEIFRIED, Assistant
OPINION
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department
of Human Services, in his official capacity,

Defendant.

CASTNER, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon motion of Defendant Jonathan Seifried, the
assistant commissioner of the Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD) within the New
Jersey Department of Human Services, to dismiss Plaintiff Joey Wendell Jackson’s Second
Consolidated Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
(ECF Nos. 437, 445.) Jackson opposed, and Seifried replied. (ECF Nos. 463, 472.) The Court
has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the motion without oral argument
pursuant to Rule 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and other
good cause shown, Seifried’s motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
For a detailed recitation of the factual background and past amendments to the complaints,
see the Court’s previous opinion at ECF No. 430 or Jackson v. Seifried, Civ. No. 20-17410, 2023
WL 4627815 (D.N.J. July 19, 2023).
Jackson’s last complaint asserted claims for substantive and procedural due process
violations of Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2)(A)),
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132; and breach of a consent order entered as part of the parties’ resolution of a previous
action. (ECF No. 295.)1 Jackson sought monetary damages and equitable relief. (Id. at 11.2)

The Court granted Seifried’s motion to dismiss that complaint. See Jackson, 2023 WL
4627815, at *10. In so ruling, the Court found that Medicaid Act § 1396n(c)(2)(A) afforded
Jackson a private right of action; and Jackson could bring a § 1983 claim for prospective, injunctive
relief against Seifried in his official capacity; but Jackson’s allegations of de minimis
infringements and inconveniences in receiving home and community-based services could not give
rise to a Medicaid Act claim. Id. at *4-7. For his Title II claim, Jackson did not allege facts
supporting the third and fourth elements necessary to state such claim—that he was deprived
services, programs, or activities because of his disability. Id. at *8-9. As for his Consent Order
claim, Jackson could not state a plausible claim without demonstrating that Seifried had actually

reduced services for Jackson. Id. at *10. The Court gave Jackson an opportunity to amend his
complaint to cure these deficiencies. (ECF No. 431.)
Jackson timely amended. The Second Consolidated Complaint reasserts claims for due
process violations of the Medicaid Act, through § 1983 (Count One); violations of Title II (Count
Two); and breach of the Consent Order (Count Three). (ECF No. 437.) Jackson seeks monetary

1 Jackson also asserted a claim for violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 10:6-2(c), though he later agreed that claim may be dismissed. (ECF No. 336 at 17 n.3.)

2 Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the
Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.
damages for his Title II claim and equitable relief for his Medicaid Act and Consent Order claims.
(ECF No. 463 at 15.) Seifried’s motion to dismiss followed.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(1)—Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Rule 12(b)(1) encompasses dismissals for “lack of jurisdiction due to Eleventh Amendment

immunity.” Nemeth v. Office of the Clerk of the N.J. Superior Court, Civ. No. 19-16809, 2020
WL 2537754, at *2 (D.N.J. May 19, 2020). State sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment “is a jurisdictional bar which deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Wright v. New Jersey/Dep’t of Educ., 115 F. Supp. 3d 490, 494 (D.N.J. 2015). Once a challenge
to jurisdiction is raised under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate the
existence of subject-matter jurisdiction. See McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281,
286 (3d Cir. 2006).
B. Rule 12(b)(6)—Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, courts

“accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff, and assess whether the complaint and the exhibits attached to it ‘contain enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Wilson v. USI Ins. Serv. LLC, 57 F.4th 131,
140 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Watters v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of Scranton, 975 F.3d 406, 412 (3d
Cir. 2020)). “A claim is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 178 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Mammana v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
934 F.3d 368, 372 (3d Cir. 2019)). When assessing the factual allegations in a complaint, courts
“disregard legal conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action that are supported
only by mere conclusory statements.” Wilson, 57 F.4th at 140 (citing Oakwood Lab’ys LLC v.
Thanoo, 999 F.3d 892, 904 (3d Cir. 2021)). The defendant bringing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion bears
the burden of “showing that a complaint fails to state a claim.” In re Plavix Mktg., Sales Pracs. &
Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 974 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d
333, 349 (3d Cir. 2016)).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 1983 & Medicaid Act Claim (Count One)
Seifried argues that Jackson’s § 1983 claim still alleges only de minimis infringements,
which cannot support his Medicaid Act claim; does not articulate how certain services fall short
of an adequate standard; and does not establish an actual reduction in services. (ECF No. 445-1
at 21-22.)
Section 1983 claims have two essential elements: (1) “the conduct complained of was
committed by a person acting under color of state law,” and (2) “the conduct deprived the plaintiff
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “Rather than conferring
any substantive rights, section 1983 ‘provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred.’” Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 757 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Albright v.
Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)).
Jackson asserts federal rights under the Medicaid Act and relevant federal regulations.3
According to the regulations interpreting Medicaid Act § 1396n(c)(2)(A), “[h]ome and

3 For a discussion on the Medicaid Act’s implied provision of a private cause of action
enforceable under § 1983, see Jackson, 2023 WL 4627815, at *3-5.
community-based programs”—such as Jackson’s—“must have . . . the following qualities . . .
based on the needs of the individual as indicated in their person-centered service plan”:
(1) “include[s] opportunities to seek employment and work in competitive
integrated settings, engage in community life, [and] control personal
resources”;

(2) “[e]nsures an individual’s rights of privacy, dignity and respect, and freedom
from coercion and restraint”;

(3) “[o]ptimizes . . . individual initiative, autonomy, and independence in making
life choices”; and

(4) “[f]acilitates individual choice regarding services and supports, and who
provides them.”

[42 C.F.R. § 441.301(c)(4)(i), (iii), (iv), (v).]
Jackson argues that he alleges more than de minimis violations of these qualities.4 The
Court disagrees in part and agrees in part.
Starting with employment, community life, and personal resources, Jackson alleges the
following:
 “although [Jackson’s] ISP indicates that he is to be provided opportunities to
sample jobs in the community, his support coordinator” (i) “threatened to reduce
his hours of support because Mr. Jackson recently obtained employment at a fast
food restaurant,” and (ii) “had not equipped him with the skills to stay in the job”
(ECF No. 472 at 24 (citing ECF No. 437 ¶¶ 40, 45; Compl. Ex. B));

 “[a]lthough Mr. Jackson’s ISP notes his religious ‘support needs,’ Mr. Jackson is
not provided an adequate budget to attend church services, which affects his
emotional wellbeing” (ECF No. 437 ¶ 47); and

 “although [Jackson] has a ‘low-functioning’ girlfriend in Somerset County, New
Jersey, he ‘does not get to see’ her” (ECF No. 472 at 24-25 (citing ECF No. 437 ¶
50)).

4 Jackson asks the Court to reconsider its previous finding that to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion in the § 1983 context, his Medicaid Act claim must allege more than “de minimis
infringements and inconveniences in receiving home and community-based services.” (ECF No.
463 at 27-28.) Jackson, 2023 WL 4627815, at *5. The Court has considered Jackson’s arguments
on this point and sees no reason to disturb its finding.
As the Court previously ruled, the alleged threat of service reduction cannot support
Jackson’s Medicaid Act claim. See Jackson, 2023 WL 4627815, at *7 (“Plaintiff does not contend
that his access to the necessary services was in fact revoked despite his allegations of threats to
take away the supports and the assigned car.”). To the extent that Jackson implies that his support
coordinator’s plan to “[r]eview” Jackson’s “supervision needs” given his new employment was
designed to discourage him from sampling jobs in the community, the Court cannot draw that
inference as “more than [a] mere possibility” based on the present allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Jackson does not allege facts causally connecting his new employment
and the review, nor does he show that a review of his “supervision needs” implies a reduction in

the necessary services that he will receive.
Next, Jackson’s allegation regarding his girlfriend does not cover the first element of a §
1983 claim: identifying the conduct that deprived Jackson of his right to engage in community life
by seeing his girlfriend. (See ECF No. 437 ¶ 50 (alleging only that Jackson “does not get to see”
his girlfriend).) So that allegation cannot support his Medicaid Act claim.
Jackson’s church-budget allegation, however, survives a motion to dismiss. Since the
Court’s previous ruling, which questioned whether “attendance of church services” was included
in his ISP,5 Jackson clarified that his “ISP notes his religious ‘support needs,’” yet an inadequate
budget prevents him from attending church services, which affects his emotional wellbeing.
(Compare ECF No. 295 ¶ 41 (alleging only that “Jackson is not provided an adequate budget to

attend church services”), with ECF No. 437 ¶ 47 (“Although Mr. Jackson’s ISP notes his religious

5 See Jackson, 2023 WL 4627815, at *7 (“[T]he Court is not an appropriate authority to
decide whether Plaintiff’s budget should be adjusted to include attendance of church services . . . ,
which do not appear to have been . . . included in his Service Plan.” (citing ECF No. 295 ¶ 45).)
‘support needs,’ Mr. Jackson is not provided an adequate budget to attend church services . . . .”).)
The allegation plausibly shows that Jackson is not receiving a service that he is supposed to receive
under his ISP. The Court finds that allegation, when viewed in the best light for Jackson, clears
the bar at this stage. C.f. Gattuso v. New Jersey Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 881 F. Supp. 2d 639, 649
(D.N.J. 2012) (finding that the plaintiffs’ vague allegation that “funding is insufficient to meet

their needs” could not support their Title II claim).
Likewise, as to his job-skills allegation, Jackson made curative amendments since the
Court ruled that even if he is entitled to receive employment-training services,6 he had “not
allege[d] or attempt[ed] to explain how the services” provided to him “fall short of an adequate
standard.” Jackson, 2023 WL 4627815, at *7. (Compare ECF No. 295 ¶ 40 (alleging that
“services of . . . coaching to obtain adequate employment . . . are not being adequately provided
to” Jackson), with ECF No. 437 ¶ 45 (alleging that “Jackson requires coaching in order to obtain
and retain adequate employment” but that Jackson’s “support coordinator (under the auspices of
DDD) had not equipped [Jackson] with the skills to stay in the job”).) The allegations sufficiently

imply that Jackson is not receiving job-skills services to which he is entitled under his service plan.
Next, for his rights of privacy and freedom from coercion and restraint, Jackson alleges
the following:
 “staff have filed excessive numbers of incident reports about Mr. Jackson that Mr.
Jackson contends are not factually accurate” (ECF No. 437 ¶ 52);

 “a police report indicates that Mr. Jackson told an officer that in October 2022, a
staff member of Mr. Jackson’s support coordinator told him ‘You don’t know who
I am’ and pushed him” (id. ¶ 55); and

6 To be sure, at least one court in this Circuit has rejected that a state cannot be liable under
the Medicaid Act for denying “discretionary” services to a plaintiff. See Cohen v. Chester Cnty.
Dep’t of Mental Health/Intell. Disabilities Servs., Civ. No. 15-5285, 2016 WL 3031719, at *8 n.11
(E.D. Pa. May 25, 2016).
 Jackson “was once restrained by a staffer named ‘Eric’” (id. ¶ 56).

Even if these alleged violations are sufficient to support a Medicaid Act claim, they do not
support Jackson’s claim for relief. Though the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution “generally bars suits against states in federal court without their consent,” “[a]
plaintiff can avoid that bar by naming a state official in a suit for prospective declaratory or
injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law.” Lara v. Comm’r Pennsylvania
State Police, 91 F.4th 122, 139 n.25 (3d Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). Jackson’s claim for relief
misses both elements—prospective, injunctive relief and a continuing violation of federal law.
Jackson’s allegations of physical confrontations vaguely describe only two isolated, past
incidents—not the ongoing violation of federal law that is necessary to assert a § 1983 claim. In
fact, none of the above allegations, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Jackson,
plausibly implies that Jackson’s home and community-based settings continue to deprive him of
his freedom from coercion and restraint. See Fehr v. Callahan, Civ. No. 21-11146, 2023 WL
3180314, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 29, 2023) (“That Plaintiff suffers some ongoing consequences from

those completed violations . . . does not change the fact that the violations of federal law alleged
in this case were completed prior to the filing of the amended complaint.”). These incidents are
past injuries that cannot be remedied with prospective, injunctive relief. See Merritts v. Richards,
62 F.4th 764, 772 (3d Cir. 2023) (holding that “an injunction to cure past injuries . . . cannot be
fairly characterized as prospective”); Jackson, 2023 WL 4627815, at *5 (noting that state officials
may be sued in their official capacities for prospective, injunctive relief (citing Blanciak v.
Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698 (3d Cir. 1996))).
As to individual initiative, autonomy, and independence in making life choices, Jackson
alleges the following:
 “there have been threats to take away a car assigned for his use and make
transportation available for Mr. Jackson only on an ad hoc basis” (ECF No. 472 at
25 (citing ECF No. 437 ¶ 41)); and

 Jackson’s “ISP does not provide him with the services of a therapist” “to help him
cope with anger issues,” a “speech therapist” to help with his “challenges
articulating words,” or “training on how to cook meals” (ECF No. 472 at 25; ECF
No. 437 ¶¶ 42-44).

Again, Jackson cannot sustain his claim based on threats of service reduction, as opposed
to actual service reduction. As to the services that his “ISP does not provide him,” Jackson still
does not allege that his ISP contemplates such services. Indeed, Jackson has amended little since
the Court ruled that his alleged right to these services was “conclusory” and, even if he is entitled
to receive these services, he had “not allege[d] or attempt[ed] to explain how the services” provided
to him “fall short of an adequate standard.” Jackson, 2023 WL 4627815, at *7. (Compare ECF
No. 295 ¶ 40 (“Jackson requires the services of a therapist (to help him cope with anger issues),
speech therapist, [and] training on how to cook meals . . . . These services are not being adequately
provided to Mr. Jackson.”), with ECF No. 437 ¶¶ 42-44 (summarized above).) Because Jackson
did not cure the previously identified pleading deficiencies, the Court renders the same ruling here.
Finally, individual choice concerning services and supports, and who provides them,
Jackson alleges the following:
 “Jackson’s current living arrangements lack a washer and dryer” (ECF No. 437 ¶
48); and

 “staff (among other things) routinely fail to return his calls or hang up on him, have
challenges communicating with him, are rotated so frequently they have little
experience meeting his particular needs, have not dealt adequately with his impulse
control and medical challenges, have failed to meet his needs vis-à-vis his CPAP
machine, gossip about, harass, and verbally abuse him, and fall asleep while on
duty (or avoid him by staying in the bathroom or attending to their phone)” (ECF
No. 472 at 25 (citing ECF No. 437 ¶¶ 51, 53-54, 57-61, 63-65, 67- 69, 71)).
Jackson’s washer-dryer allegation has not meaningfully changed since the Court ruled that
allegation concerns “inconveniences amount[ing] to de minimis infringements on [Jackson]’s
autonomy or privacy.” Jackson, 2023 WL 4627815, at *7. (Compare 295 ¶ 43 (“Jackson’s current
living arrangements lack a washer and dryer.”), with ECF No. 437 ¶ 48 (“Although Mr. Jackson’s
ISP indicates that he can dress independently, Mr. Jackson’s current living arrangements lack a

washer and dryer.”).) The Court therefore keeps with its previous ruling.
In sum, as to all of Jackson’s allegations but those concerning his ISP provision of religious
support and job-skills training, Jackson still does not state a viable § 1983 claim enforcing
Medicaid Act rights. Jackson’s claim based on religious-support and job-skills services may
proceed. As for his other bases, to the extent that Jackson can cure the above-noted deficiencies,
he may move for leave to amend the complaint.
B. Title II Claim (Count Two)
Seifried argues that Jackson’s Title II claim is both barred by sovereign immunity and
insufficiently pled. (ECF No. 445-1 at 31-38.)

The Eleventh Amendment “imposes a jurisdictional bar against individuals” suing “a state
official in his or her official capacity.” Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 227 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). “Eleventh Amendment immunity
. . . is subject to three primary exceptions: (1) congressional abrogation, (2) waiver by the state,
and (3) suits against individual state officers for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief to
end an ongoing violation of federal law.” Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess, 297 F.3d
310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002).
Jackson invokes only the first exception—congressional abrogation.7 For Title II and
Fourteenth Amendment claims like Jackson’s, courts analyze on a “claim-by-claim” basis whether
Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity under the three-part test set forth in United
States v. Georgia8: “(1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what
extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such

misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s
purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.”
Geness v. Admin. Off. of Pennsylvania Cts., 974 F.3d 263, 270, 273 n.9 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006)).
The first Georgia prong requires the plaintiff to state a Title II claim. See id. at 273 (noting
that a party must “state a claim under Title II of the ADA[] in satisfaction of the first Georgia
requirement”); see also Baxter v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 661 F. App’x 754, 756 (3d Cir.
2016) (“We do not reach the constitutional issue unless and until it is decided that the plaintiff has
made out a valid Title II claim.” (citing Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159; Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate

Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 553 (3d Cir. 2007))). To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, the
plaintiff must establish that “(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was
excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his disability.”
Geness, 974 F.3d at 273 (citation omitted). Seifried challenges Jackson’s Title II claim only as to
the third and fourth elements. (ECF No. 445-1 at 33.)

7 As noted above, Jackson made clear that he seeks monetary damages for his Title II claim
and equitable relief for his Medicaid Act and Consent Order claims. (See ECF No. 463 at 15.)

8 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006). The parties agree that the Georgia test applies here. (ECF No.
445-1 at 31-38; ECF No. 463 at 15-21.)
For Jackson’s Title II claim, the Complaint alleges that Seifried “is excluding or
threatening to exclude” Jackson “from the benefits of the services, programs, and activities of”
DDD. (ECF No. 437 ¶ 6.) The Complaint alleges the following ways in which DDD staff actually
failed to provide—as opposed to merely threatened not to provide—Jackson with services or treat
him with dignity and respect:

 “[A] police report indicates that Mr. Jackson told an officer that in October 2022, a
staff member of Mr. Jackson’s support coordinator told him ‘You don’t know who
I am’ and pushed him; that staff member has since been relocated.” (ECF No. 437
¶ 55.)

 “Per Mr. Jackson’s [individualized service plan (ISP)], staff is supposed to watch
him while he shaves to make sure he does not cut himself, but staff sometimes do
not do so.” (Id. ¶ 60.)

 “Staff have not adequately checked to confirm that Mr. Jackson (who requires the
use of a CPAP machine) continues to breathe at night.” (Id. ¶ 61.)

 “Per Mr. Jackson’s ISP, staff are supposed to assist him with cleaning his CPAP
machine to prevent harmful germs and bacteria from developing. However, the
staff do not help him clean his CPAP machine; he attempts to clean it himself, but
he ‘doesn’t see that well.’” (Id. ¶ 62.)

 “At one point, staff failed to accurately identify a bug bite on Mr. Jackson’s leg.”
(Id. ¶ 63 (citing ECF No. 420).)

 “Staff are verbally abusive to Mr. Jackson (e.g., ‘Shut your trap.’). Although Mr.
Jackson has reported these incidents, staff continue to verbally abuse Mr. Jackson.”
(Id. ¶ 64.)

 “Staff also gossip and ‘talk junk’ about Mr. Jackson in front of others.” (Id. ¶ 65.)

 “Staff regularly suggests that Mr. Jackson seeks the affection of certain staff
members (which is untrue) and get upset when Mr. Jackson engages in
conversations with others when out in the community. These actions on the part of
staff are hurtful to Mr. Jackson and cause him to suffer from increased stress.” (Id.
¶ 66.)

 “Staff often fall asleep while on duty. Although Mr. Jackson has reported these
incidents, staff continue to fall asleep while on duty. As Mr. Jackson has stated,
while they are sleeping, ‘anything could happen; my heart could stop.’” (Id. ¶ 67;
see also Compl. Ex. C.)
 “At other times, staff stay in the bathroom ‘for hours at a time,’ per Mr. Jackson,
rather than staffing him as they should.” (ECF No. 437 ¶ 68.)

 “Staff sometimes attend to their phone rather than Mr. Jackson.” (Id. ¶ 69; see also
Compl. Ex. D.)

 “Staff often interfere with Mr. Jackson watching television.” (ECF No. 437 ¶ 71.)

As “a necessary first step,” the Court must identify DDD’s “services, programs, or
activities” at issue in Jackson’s Title II claim. See Geness, 974 F.3d at 275 (“Identifying AOPC’s
‘services, programs, or activities’ at the foundation of Geness’s Title II claim is a necessary first
step to determining whether his claim is cognizable.”). “[T]he phrase ‘service, program, or
activity’ under Title II . . . is ‘extremely broad in scope and includes anything a public entity
does.’” Id. (quoting Furgess v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2019)).
The only “services, programs, or activities” that Jackson identifies are DDD staff’s (1)
monitoring him while he shaves and (2) assisting him with cleaning his CPAP machine. (See ECF
No. 437 ¶¶ 60 (shaving allegation), 62 (CPAP allegation).) The Court finds—and Seifried does
not appear to contest—that those are in fact “services, programs, or activities” of DDD. The
remaining allegations, when viewed in a light most favorable to Jackson, perhaps fall within the
“subjected to discrimination” phrase in Title II—“a catch-all phrase that prohibits all
discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context.” Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170,
180 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1085 (11th Cir. 2007)).
All told, these allegations fall within the ambit of the third Title II element.
The Court next analyzes the fourth element—Jackson’s theory of causation. Jackson
alleges that because of his intellectual disabilities and psychiatric conditions, he lacks impulse
control, “which can cause him to seem annoying to others.” (ECF No. 463 at 17 (citing ECF No.
437 ¶ 91).) For instance, Jackson “repeatedly contacts DDD offices to complain about his
treatment (so often that they recognize his voice), frequently changes his support coordinator, and
has a difficult relationship with the staff assigned to provide him services”—all of which, though
perhaps “annoying,” are manifestations of Jackson’s disabilities. (Id. (quoting ECF No. 437 ¶¶
88-90).) But because of their “annoying” nature, Jackson’s complaints about serious issues with
services for his intellectual disabilities are not taken seriously by DDD staff, who instead allegedly

“disparage him in front of others,” “are verbally abusive toward him,” “have pushed him,” or just
“leav[e] him alone.” (ECF No. 437 ¶¶ 72-73, 92.)
The Court finds that under the ADA’s less demanding but-for standard, Jackson
sufficiently alleges a causal connection between his psychiatric disabilities and DDD’s provision
of inadequate services. See Furgess, 933 F.3d at 291 n.25 (“[T]he ADA only requires but-for
causation.” (citing CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229, 236 n.11 (3d Cir. 2013))).
Seifried’s contrary argument is unpersuasive at this stage. Seifried cites Daley v. Koch9
for the proposition that “poor impulse control” is not a qualifying disability under Title II. (ECF
No. 472 at 17.) But Daley addressed whether a police department, in rejecting the plaintiff’s

employment application because of his “poor judgment, irresponsible behavior and poor impulse
control,” regarded the plaintiff as having impairments qualifying as handicaps under the
Rehabilitation Act. 892 F.2d at 214-15. The court held that the police department had not so
regarded, because the plaintiff’s traits were not impairments qualifying as handicaps under the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 215. And the Daley plaintiff, unlike Jackson, “was not diagnosed as
having any particular psychological disease or disorder” and “demonstrated no ‘undue anxiety,
thought disorder or underlying psychosis.’” Id. at 214. That distinction is important, as Jackson

9 892 F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1989).
asserts that his diagnosed psychiatric disabilities caused his poor impulse control, which annoyed
DDD staff such that they deprived him of “services, programs, or activities.”10
The Court therefore finds that Jackson states a Title II claim and satisfies the first Georgia
prong.
The second Georgia prong requires the Court to analyze to what extent the alleged

misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause has a procedural and substantive component. Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs., Inc. v.
Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012). Jackson asserts violations of both
components. (ECF No. 463 at 20.)
A non-legislative11 substantive due process claim has two elements: (1) “the particular
interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause,” and (2) “the government’s
deprivation of that protected interest shocks the conscience.” Chainey v. St., 523 F.3d 200, 219

(3d Cir. 2008); see Affinity Healthcare Grp. Voorhees, LLC v. Twp. of Voorhees, Civ. No. 22-
2769, 2024 WL 195471, at *6 n.23 (3d Cir. Jan. 18, 2024) (noting that “‘only the most egregious

10 To pursue monetary damages under the ADA, as Jackson does here, a plaintiff “must also
sufficiently allege that the public entity intentionally discriminated against him or her.” Geness,
974 F.3d at 274 n.11 (citing Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181). Sufficiently alleging intentional
discrimination requires the plaintiff to “allege at least ‘deliberate indifference,’ which requires ‘(1)
knowledge that a federally protected right is substantially likely to be violated . . . and (2) failure
to act despite that knowledge.’” Id. (quoting Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181). Viewing the allegations
in a light most favorable to Jackson, and minding that Seifried makes no contrary argument, the
Court infers that DDD staff had the knowledge necessary for Jackson to show deliberate
indifference at this stage.

11 Substantive due process can relate to legislative action or non-legislative action. See
Connection Training Servs. v. City of Philadelphia, 358 F. App’x 315, 319 (3d Cir. 2009)
(explaining the difference). Jackson’s claim concerns non-legislative action.
official conduct’ shocks the conscience” (quoting United Artists Theatre Cir., Inc. v. Twp. of
Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir. 2003))). Whether a property interest is protected by
the concept of substantive due process “depends on whether that interest is ‘fundamental’ under
the United States Constitution.” Wilson v. Altman, 807 F. App’x 172, 176 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting
Nicholas v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 2000)). So far, the only protected

property interest that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recognized as
fundamental involved ownership of real property. Id. (citing Nicholas, 227 F.3d at 141); see also
Gelormini v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. No. 23-4006, 2024 WL 1640985, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16,
2024) (same).
Jackson asserts a fundamental property interest in the “right to continue to receive the home
and community-based care for his intellectual disabilities and medical needs that is essential for
his continued wellbeing under 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(2).” (ECF No. 463 at 20.) This right to
Medicaid benefits, of course, does not involve real property. And Jackson does not cite authority
stating that for substantive due process purposes, his asserted interest in continuing to receive

Medicaid benefits is fundamental under the United States Constitution. The Court therefore finds
that Jackson does not assert a substantive due process right.
To state a claim for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that (1) he was deprived of an individual interest included within the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection of “life, liberty, or property,” and (2) the procedures available to him did not provide
“due process of law.” Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Jackson alleges that he was deprived of due process by DDD staff’s “fail[ing] to write up
his incident reports” and “routinely hanging up on him.” (ECF No. 437 ¶¶ 51, 53.) From these
allegations—which, again, the Court views in a light most favorable to Jackson—the Court infers
that DDD staff’s alleged disregard of Jackson’s complaints deprived him of his ISP services. See
Odi v. Alexander, Civ. No. 15-4903, 2018 WL 1071928, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2018)
(recognizing the procedural due process property interest in Medicaid benefits).
Seifried did not address whether Jackson’s asserted property interest is actionable under

the Fourteenth Amendment, or whether the procedures available to Jackson provided due process
of law. (See ECF No. 472 at 18.) So at this stage, the Court assumes that Jackson’s asserted
interest is actionable, without prejudice to Seifried’s right to argue otherwise later. In
consequence, the second Georgia prong is satisfied, and the Court need not consider the third
Georgia prong. See Snider v. Pennsylvania DOC, 505 F. Supp. 3d 360, 410 (M.D. Pa. 2020).
Therefore, Jackson’s Title II claim against Seifried may proceed.
C. Consent Order Claim (Count Three)
Finally, Seifried argues that Jackson does not state a viable breach of the Consent Order,
because “DDD has not actually reduced any services for” Jackson. (ECF No. 445-1 at 29.) In

ruling that Jackson’s last complaint was deficient, the Court found that Jackson had “not refer[red]
to his Service Plan in connection with any of his claims”; “d[id] not list any specific support
services from his Service Plan that are no longer provided to him” or “assert that [Seifried]
arbitrarily changed his Service Plan”; and did not show that his “access to the agreed-upon services
. . . [was] in fact reduced or revoked.” Jackson, 2023 WL 4627815, at *10. Since then—as detailed
above—Jackson made curative amendments such that he now sufficiently alleges that DDD staff
actually deprived him of certain ISP services. Therefore, Jackson’s Consent Order claim may
proceed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and other good cause shown, Seifried’s motion to dismiss
Jackson’s Complaint is DENIED. An appropriate Order follows.

Dated: April 20 2024 )
RGE CASTNER
TED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10278604. Public record. Not legal advice.