# WAITERS v. REPUBLIC BANK

> District Court, D. New Jersey · May 2, 2024

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10278577

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** May 2, 2024
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW
JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE

CASSANDRA WAITERS, CYLE
BURNETT, VICKIE BURNETT-
WILLIAMS,
Civil No. 24-5728 (RMB-MJS)
Plaintiffs,
OPINION
v.

REPUBLIC BANK, CHERRY HILL
POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Defendants.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon the filing of a Complaint and
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) by pro se plaintiff Cassandra Waiters.
The IFP application establishes Ms. Waiters’ financial eligibility to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee and will be granted. Her co-plaintiffs, Cyle Burnett, and
Vickie Burnet-Williams (together with Ms. Waiters, “Plaintiffs”) did not complete
their own IFP applications. They must do so for the Court to determine whether each
of the Plaintiffs are economically eligible to proceed on an IFP basis. Johnson v. Camden
Cnty. Warden, 2023 WL 2238110, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2023) (under 28 U.S.C. §
1915, “each plaintiff must submit a complete application to proceed in forma pauperis
if he desires the complaint to be filed on his behalf”); see also Hickson v. Mauro, 2011
WL 6001088, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2011) (“Although Section 1915 refers to
‘prisoners’, federal courts apply Section 1915 to non-prisoner IFP applications.”).
Accordingly, the Court will administratively terminate Mr. Burnett and Ms. Vickie
Burnet-Williams from this case pending receipt of their own IFP applications.1

I. SCREENING FOR DISMISSAL
When a person files a complaint and is granted IFP status, 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) requires courts to review the complaint and dismiss claims that are: (1)
frivolous or malicious; (2) fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3)
seek monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Courts,

however, must liberally construe pleadings that are filed pro se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a
claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is the same as that for dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122
(3d Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

1 Because the allegations in the Complaint are the same with respect to each of the
three plaintiffs, the Court cautions that submission of IFP applications by Mr. Burnett
and Ms. Vickie Burnet-Williams will likely result in the dismissal of theirs claims on
the same grounds that the Court articulates below in this Opinion.
Pro se complaints are to be “liberally construed” and are “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007). Although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, “pro se litigants still

must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Owens v. Armstrong,
171 F.Supp.3d 316, 328 (D.N.J. 2016) (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704
F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)). Thus, pro se litigants are not exempt from complying
with federal pleading standards. See Thakar v. Tan, 372 F.App'x 325, 328 (3d Cir.

2010).
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs bring this action against Republic Bank (“Republic”) and the Cherry
Hill Police Department for violations of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
[Docket No. 1 at 2, 7; Docket No. 1-1.]2 They seek $9 million in damages. [Docket
No. 1 at 7; Docket No. 1-1.]

Plaintiffs allege that they were pulled over by two officers of the Cherry Hill
Police Department. [Docket No. 1 at 4.] The pulled-over vehicle belongs to Ms.
Burnett-Williams who commutes to and from work with Ms. Waiters and Mr. Burnett
every day. [Id. at 4–5.] The officers informed Plaintiffs that they had received a report
from a nearby Cherry Hill branch of Republic—across the street from Ms. Waiters’s

place of work—regarding a suspicious vehicle matching the description of Ms.
Burnett-Williams’. [Id.] The officers told Plaintiffs that Republic noticed the vehicle

2 The Court refers to page numbers in the Complaint and Ms. Waiters’s IFP
application according to the electronically stamped CM/ECF header.
parked in its parking lot for the past few days and expressed concerns about Plaintiffs’
planning a bank robbery. [Id. at 5.]
Plaintiffs responded to the officers denying that the vehicle had been parked at

the bank for the past few days. [Id.] They admit, however, that Ms. Waiters has an
account at Republic and that, one day before the traffic stop, Ms. Burnett-Williams
made a stop at the Cherry Hill branch of Republic during the morning commute so
that Ms. Waiters could check her account balance to see if she had sufficient funds to
pay Ms. Burnett-Williams for gas. [Id. at 5.] Ms. Waiters did not have sufficient funds

at that time and asked Ms. Burnett-Williams if she would drive her back to the bank
at lunch, assuming that sufficient funds would be available by then. [Id.] Ms. Burnett-
Williams and Ms. Waiters returned to the bank at lunch time, but Ms. Waiters’ funds
had not been deposited. [Id.] The two women then left the bank. [Id.]

The officers informed Plaintiffs at the conclusion of the stop that they were not
receiving a ticket or being charged with any crime, but that Plaintiffs were not to return
to the Cherry Hill branch of Republic. [Id. at 4.] After the stop, Plaintiffs went to the
Cherry Hill Police Department to request a copy of the officers’ incident report. [Id.]
They received the incident report weeks later and allege that the report contained

several errors including that Plaintiffs repeatedly parked in the Republic lot in the days
preceding the traffic stop.
III. ANALYSIS
Title II of the Civil Rights Act prevents discrimination by places of public
accommodation. It provides that:
“[a]ll persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of
any place of public accommodation [] without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.”

42 U.S.C. § 2000a; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 245 (1964).
A Title II claim requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that she (1) is a member of a
protected class; (2) attempted to contract for services and afford herself the full benefits
and enjoyment of a public accommodation; (3) was denied the full benefits or
enjoyment of a public accommodation; and (4) such services were available to
similarly situated persons outside her protected class who received full benefits or were
treated better. Anderson v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, 2024 WL 1363468, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 29, 2024) (citing Shumate v. Twin Tier Hosp., LLC, 655 F. Supp. 2d 521, 537 (M.D.
Pa. 2009)). There is no monetary relief available under Title II. The only remedy
available under Title II is a civil action for preventive relief, such as an injunction. See
Livingstone v. Hugo Boss Store, Atl. City, NJ, 2021 WL 3910149, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 1,
2021) (citing Three Rivers Center for Independent Living v. Housing Authority of City, 382

F.3d 412, 420 (3d Cir. 2004)). Additionally, before bringing a claim under Title II, a
plaintiff, pursuant to Section 2000a-3(c), “must first notify [a] state or local
government entity authorized to grant relief from the alleged discrimination or to
institute criminal proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(c). No civil action may be brought
under Title II before thirty days after written notice of the matter to the appropriate

state or local entity.” Livingstone, 2021 WL 3910149, at *5 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-
3(c)). Compliance with Section 2000a-3(c) is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite
and “a Title II plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she has satisfied the notice
requirement before a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s
claim.” Livingstone, 2021 WL 3910149, at *5; Shulick v. United Airlines, 2012 WL

315483, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2012) (collecting cases).
Ms. Waiters’s claim is without merit and must be dismissed. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989) (permitting court to dismiss claims proceeding in forma
pauperis where they are “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory”). First,

Section 2000a plainly requires that a Title II plaintiff must be a member of a protected
class. There are no such allegations here. The Complaint generally alleges
discrimination, [see Docket No. 1 at 7], but without mention of any protected
characteristics of any of Ms. Waiters (her co-plaintiffs for that matter). 42 U.S.C. §
2000a(a) (listing “race, color, religion, or national origin” as protected classes under

the statute).
Second, a place of “public accommodation” under Title II is limited to any
establishment either affecting interstate commerce or supported by state action that
falls into one of the following categories:
(1) lodging for transient guests located within a building with more than
five rooms for rent; (2) a facility principally engaged in selling food for
consumption on the premises, including such facilities located within
retail establishments and gasoline stations; (3) any place of exhibition or
entertainment; (4) any establishment located within an establishment
falling into one of the first three categories, and which holds itself out as
serving patrons of that establishment; or (5) any establishment that
contains a covered establishment, and which holds itself out as serving
patrons of that covered establishment.
Akyar v. TD Bank US Holding Co., 2018 WL 4356734, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2018);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b). Title II’s list of covered establishments is comprehensive
and “excludes from its coverage those categories of establishments not listed.” Denny

v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 431 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Congress has clearly
delineated those entities that fall within Title II’s ambit, and [courts] are not at liberty
to go beyond what it has plainly enacted.”); Castillo v. Receptionist for Cathy Polcinik,
2016 WL 4124057, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2016) (similar). Banks are not enumerated

establishments qualifying as public accommodations under the plain text of Title II.
See Jarvis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2022 WL 1663568, at *3 (D. Md. May 25, 2022)
(banks are not places of public accommodation within Title II’s ambit); Pullins v. Bank,
2020 WL 1450560, at *4 (M.D. La. Mar. 25, 2020); Akyar v. TD Bank US Holding Co.,
No. 18-CV-379 (VSB), 2018 WL 4356734, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2018) (collecting

cases). Therefore, Ms. Waiters cannot show that she was denied the full benefits or
enjoyment of a public accommodation because a bank is not a public accommodation
under Title II.
Third, even if banks were places of public accommodation, Ms. Waiters has not
pleaded compliance with Title II’s thirty-day state notice requirement. 42 U.S.C. §

2000a-3(c). Section 2000a-3(c)’s notice requirement applies here because she alleges
Title II discrimination in New Jersey, a state which has an established government
entity to address claims of discrimination. See Livingstone, 2021 WL 3910149, at *6.
Without providing such notice as outlined in the statute, the Court is without
jurisdiction to consider her Title II claim.
Finally, Ms. Waiters’s Title II claim fails based on the monetary relief sought.
Scott v. Police & Fire Fed. Credit Union, 2022 WL 17547279, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2022)
(dismissing pro se plaintiff’s Title II claim with prejudice for seeking compensatory

damages); Livingstone, 2021 WL 3910149, at *6 (same). As explained above, a Title II
plaintiff cannot seek damages under Title II other than for attorney’s fees. See
Livingstone, 2021 WL 3910149, at *5 (citing Newman, 390 U.S. at 400); 42 U.S.C. §
2000a-3. The exclusive means of redress under Title II is non-monetary injunctive

relief. Id. The complaint’s demand for a whopping $9 million in damages for emotional
distress, humiliation, and feelings of anxiety and shame is foreclosed by Title II. Scott,
2022 WL 17547279, at *3 (“Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint is warranted because it
asserts a theory of recovery that is not just implausible, but indeed impossible under
Title II.”).

Dismissal of the sole Title II count as to Ms. Waiters will be with prejudice.
Because banks are not places of public accommodation under Title II, amendment of
her claim would be futile. Scott, 2022 WL 17547279, at *3 (dismissal of pro se Title II
count was with prejudice because further amendment would be futile); Livingston, 2021
WL 3910149, at *6 (same).

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Ms. Waiters’ IFP
application, and the Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Ms.
Waiters. The Court will ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATE Mr. Burnett and
Ms. Burnet-Williams from this action pending receipt of their applications to proceed
IFP. An appropriate Order follows.

May 2, 2024 s/Renée Marie Bumb
Date RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10278577. Public record. Not legal advice.