# STEVENS v. MERCER COUNTY CORRECTIONS CENTER

> District Court, D. New Jersey · August 18, 2023

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10277363

## Case

- **Court:** District Court, D. New Jersey
- **Decided:** August 18, 2023
- **Opinion:** 100trialcourt
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10277363

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the Constitution mandates that prison officials satisfy inmates’ “basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety”
- stating the elements of a § 1985(2) claim regarding a conspiracy to obstruct justice by intimidating parties, witnesses, or jurors
- explaining that the Constitution mandates that prison officials satisfy inmates’ “basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety”

## Opinion text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CALVIN T. STEVENS, Civil Action No. 22-1306 (RK)
Plaintiff, :
MEMORANDUM OPINION

MERCER COUNTY CORRECTIONS :
CENTER, et al.,
Defendants. :

This matter has been opened to the Court by Calvin T. Stevens’ (“Plaintiff or “Stevens”)
filing of a Complaint asserting civil rights violations arising from his incarceration at Mercer
County Correctional Center (“MCCC”). For the reasons explained below, the Court dismisses
the federal claims pursuant to its screening authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), declines
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims, and provides Plaintiff with leave
to amend to the extent he can cure the deficiencies in his federal claims.
1 RELEVANT BACKGROUND
a. Procedural History
On February 21, 2022, Stevens filed a complaint on behalf of himself and other inmates.
See ECF No. 1. The other inmates signed the Complaint, see id. at 7, but they did not pay the
filing fee or submit individual applications to proceed in forma pauperis. (“IFP application”).
The matter was initially assigned to the Honorable Zahid N. Quraishi, who denied
without prejudice Stevens’ IFP applications on March 21, 2022, and again on June 15, 2022. □

' On March 21, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff’s “Emergency Application to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis Without Account Certification” because Plaintiff failed to explain why he could not
submit a certified account statement. See ECF No. 2. Plaintiff submitted a certified account

ECF Nos. 2, 6. Once Stevens submitted his certified account statement, the Court granted his
IFP application on June 28, 2022. ECF No. 9. The Court noted that the other potential plaintiffs
who signed the Complaint had not submitted IFP applications, and the Court provided them with
30 days to do so. See id. To date, none of other inmates who signed the Complaint have
submitted individual IFP applications. Stevens has submitted two “letter briefs” in support of his
Complaint. See ECF Nos. 11-12. The matter was subsequently transferred to the undersigned
on May 15, 2023. ECF No. 13.
b. The Complaint’s Factual Allegations
Plaintiff has sued MCCC, the Director of Public Safety, the State of New Jersey Fire
Marshall [sic] and Inspectors, the State of New Jersey Department of Public Health, Mercer
County, the State of New Jersey, and unidentified Mercer County Corrections Staff.?, Complaint
at 1. Plaintiff brings his claims for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986. See
Complaint at 2.
Plaintiff provides the following facts in support of his claims for relief:
Plaintiffs [sic] date of incarceration is different but Mr. Stevens
entered the facility on January 23. 2022, and is currently still in
facility breathing in deadly mold, using the mop sink to take
showers, because regular shower has no hot & cold water, the
temperature is still below acceptable standards, leaving all
plaintiffs heat under extreme cold conditions, for days there is no
water leaving fecal matter and urine in the toilet to be smelt [sic],
officers of rank and the classification committee intermixing
people with low court or non violent offenses with individuals with
1% degree or 2™ degree charges like gun etc...officials who know
this county facility is unsafe and hazardous even to a dog still

statement, but it did not cover the entire six-month period, and the Court denied that IFP
application on June 15, 2022. ECF No. 6.
* The Clerk of the Court listed the Office of the Public Defender as a defendant; however, it
appears that this entity is not a defendant in the current lawsuit. Instead, Plaintiff lists this entity
as a defendant in a prior lawsuit. See Complaint at 3. As such, the Court will direct the Clerk of
the Court to terminate this defendant from the docket.

allow it doors to open for human habitation, prior suits against this
facility for unsafe conditions resulted in settlements. This facility
its workers both administrative & correctional negligent in it [sic]
duty to the public and to the administration of public safety.
This Facility’s Handbook is revised in 2019 and prints false
material adding to fraud by publication, material that is not
followed.
The medical staff commits medical malpractice, medication is
issued late, the medical forms for treatment is not being followed
per protocol, even diabetic insulin is being given late, the
individuals claiming to be nurses are unsure of treatment, it is
unsure to plaintiffs if they are properly certified by the state’s
medical school to do the job their [sic] doing.
Complaint at 6.
In Plaintiff's “emergency” IFP application, he also states that “there is no heat (either
ventilation or shower)” and asserts that the lack of heat exacerbates the spread of COVID-19
variants and other illnesses at MCCC. See ECF No. 1-3, Emergency IFP Application at 1.
Plaintiff also complains about a lack of supplies, including a lack of toilet paper for several days.
See id. at 2. Plaintiff also contends that MCCC is overcrowded during the “deadly plague” of
COVID-19 and that there is hazardous “black mold” and “air particulars/pollents” at MCCC. Id.
at 2.
Plaintiff has submitted a “Brief” in support of his Complaint that reiterates and amplifies
his allegations. Plaintiff states that there is black mold in the showers and that the New Jersey
Health Department has determined that “long term exposure” to this black mold is unsafe and
can cause lung failure, cancer, and other serious health problems. Plaintiff further contends that
the black mold spores are so dangerous that houses, apartments, and other structures containing
these spores have been evacuated and deemed uninhabitable. See Brief at 13-14. Plaintiff also
complains about “discolored forms of dust and hazardous materials spewing from all the
vents|.|” fd. at 15.

Plaintiff contends that the State of New Jersey, the Department of Health, and the Fire
Marshal are tasked with ensuring that health and safety regulations are followed, but they have
negligently and willfully failed to oversee MCCC. See id. at 14. In his Brief, Plaintiff states in
passing that Warden Charles Ellis oversees MCCC and contends that Ellis “is fully aware these
detrimental conditions persist on a public hazardous level and this facility is cited to be shut
down by the State.” Jd. at 16,
Plaintiff also contends in his Brief that employees feel unsafe, leading to worker
shortages. /d. at 17. Plaintiff further contends that “superior ranking officers conspire with each
other to deprive us plaintiffs of rights, such as masks, properly issued clothing, shoes, and vital
supplies” at MCCC. Id. Plaintiff asserts that unnamed corrections officers conspire to promote
violence in the facility by placing violent inmates with nonviolent ones and “watch inmates
assault other individuals” due to personal relationships they may have with the inmates or their
family members. /d.
Plaintiff also generally contends that MCCC lacks oversight and that the corrections
officers are not equipped to deal with inmates with mental illness or disabilities, and that
mentally ill and disabled inmates are “intermix[ed]” with other inmates who will harm them. Jd.
at 18. According to Plaintiff, MCCC is known for “inmate on inmate” violence and corrections
officers improperly use pepper spray, mace, and other agents on inmates. Jd.
Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66
to 1321-77 (Apr. 26, 1996) (““PLRA”), district courts must review prisoner complaints when the
prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The PLRA directs
district courts to sua sponte dismiss claims that are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Whether a complaint fails to state a
claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d
236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At this early stage, the Court
accepts facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true, draws all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff's favor, and asks only whether the complaint, liberally construed, contains facts
sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United States, 12 F Ath 366, 374 (3d Cir.
2021) (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 168, 774, 782 (7th Cir. 2015)). The Court does not
credit conclusory allegations. [gbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the
Court construes his allegations liberally. See Higgs v. Ait’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir.
2011).
Hil. DISCUSSION .
The Court liberally construes Plaintiff to assert civil rights violations pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. From the outset, the Court dismisses with prejudice the § 1983 claims against the
State of New Jersey and the New Jersey Department of Public Health for failure to state a claim
for relief because the state and state entities are not “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Will
Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (holding that “a State is not a
person within the meaning of § 1983”). Moreover, a state and its entities are not “persons” that
may be sued under § 1983 regardless of whether the state has waived immunity. See Garcia v.
Richard Stockton Coll. of New Jersey, 210 F. Supp. 2d 545, 549 (D.N.J. 2002) (citing Will, 491

U.S. at 70-71). The Court also dismisses with prejudice the § 1983 claims as to MCCC, as this
entity is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. See Crooks v. Passaic Cnty. Sheriff's
Department/Jail, 2007 WL 923330, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2007) (collecting cases).
The Court next addresses Plaintiff's request to act as a class representative and sue on
behalf of other inmates. It is well established that a pro se litigant who is not an attorney may
not pursue claims on behalf of anyone other than himself. See Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v.
Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1991). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot proceed
with a class action in the absence of counsel. See Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 158-59 (3d
Cir. 2009) (“[W]e do not question the District Court’s conclusion that pro se litigants are
generally not appropriate as class representatives.”); Lewis v. City of Trenton Police Dep't, 175
F, App'x 552, 554 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“Lewis, who is proceeding pro se, may not -
represent a putative class of prisoners.”). And although the Complaint is signed by other
potential plaintiffs, none of these potential plaintiffs submitted the filing fee or individual IFP
applications. As such, Stevens is currently the only plaintiff in this action, and class action status
is denied without prejudice.
In addition to styling his Complaint as a class action, Stevens also impermissibly seeks to
vindicate the constitutional rights of other inmates. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that inmates
are not provided medication on time, particularly diabetic inmates. Plaintiff also contends that
corrections officers are not equipped to deal with mentally ill and disabled inmates and allow
them to be placed with violent offenders. There are no facts in the Complaint, however, to
suggest that Plaintiff is diabetic, mentally ill, and/or disabled.
“lT]hird parties lack standing to bring claims under § 1983 for violations of the
constitutional rights of another.” Norcross v. Town of Hammonton, Civ. No. 04-2536, 2006 WL

1995021, at *1 (D.N.J. July 13, 2006); see also Estate of Andujar by Kincaide v. Cnty. of
Cumberland, No. 1:22-cv-06372(NLH-AMD), 2023 WL 4784214, at *11 (D.N.J. Jul. 27, 2023)
(“Plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims of constitutional violations suffered by inmates and has
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that [plaintiff] suffered a violation of his constitutional
rights). The claims regarding inadequate medical care and reasonable safety are dismissed
without leave to amend to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to bring those claims on behalf of
other inmates.
Moreover, as explained below, Plaintiff fails to provide sufficient facts to suggest that his
own rights to adequate medical care and reasonable safety have been violated. The Constitution
requires “humane conditions of confinement,” including “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and
medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In addition, prison officials “nust
take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Id. (internal quotation mark
omitted) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984); see also Duran v. Merline,
923 F.Supp.2d 702, 719 (D.N.J. 2013) (explaining that the Constitution mandates that prison
officials satisfy inmates’ “basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety”) (citing Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). As a pretrial detainee,
Plaintiffs right to adequate medical care arises under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (Gd Cir.
2003). In order to state a claim for relief, Plaintiff must show a “(1) a serious medical need, and
(2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.” See
Natale, 318 F.3d at 582 (cleaned up). To state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for failure to
protect, an inmate must plead facts that show (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm, (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial

risk to his health and safety, and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused him harm.
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. 834).
Although prison officials can be liable under § 1983 for failing to provide required
medication on time, for placing nonviolent and violent inmates together, and for improperly
using mace or pepper spray on inmates, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts to suggest that
he faces a serious risk of harm due to any of these practices. In addition, Plaintiff does not
provide sufficient facts identifying the medical professionals who failed to provide medication to
him or the corrections officers responsible for placing violent and nonviolent offenders together
and/or for using mace improperly.* Nor does he allege that any corrections staff acted with
deliberate indifference. For these reasons, the Fourteenth Amendment claims premised on the
failure to provide adequate medical care and denial of reasonable safety fail to state a claim for
relief are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the Court’s screening authority under §
1915(e)(2)(B).
Plaintiff also attempts to bring conspiracy claims under §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, against
corrections staff. Plaintiff alleges in a conclusory manner that unnamed corrections staff within

3 Civil rights claims may be asserted against fictitious defendants pursuant to New Jersey’s
fictitious defendant rule, which reads as follows:
In any action, ... if the defendant’s true name is unknown to the
plaintiff, process may issue against the defendant under a fictitious
name, stating it to be fictitious and adding an appropriate
description sufficient for identification.
N.J.R. 4:26-4. “The fictitious party rule may be used only if the plaintiff exercised due diligence
to ascertain the defendant’s true name before and after filing the complaint.” DeRienzo v.
Harvard Industries, Inc., 357 F.3d 348, 353 Gd Cir. 2004) (citing Farrell v. Votator Div. of
Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111, 299 A.2d 394, 396 (1973)). The fictitious name designation also
must have appended to it “an appropriate description sufficient to identify” the defendant. Id.
(quoting Rutkowski v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 209 N.J. Super. 140, 506 A.2d 1302, 1306-07
(1986)). Here, Plaintiff has sued corrections staff in general, but these Defendants are not
sufficiently described or differentiated as required by the fictitious defendant Rule.

MCCC conspire to promote violence among inmates by placing violent and nonviolent offenders
together. In order to demonstrate a conspiracy under § 1983, “a plaintiff must show that two or
more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right “under
color of law.’” Parkway Garage, Ine. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993)
(quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)), abrogated on other grounds by
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, Pa., 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir.
2003). Conclusory allegations of ‘conspiracy’ or ‘concerted action’ will not suffice to allege a
conspiracy. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178-79
(3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a § 1983 conspiracy claimant must assert facts from which a
conspiratorial agreement can be inferred and that conclusory allegations are not sufficient). A
civil rights conspiracy also requires “a predicate federal violation” to “anchor” the claim.
Dondero v. Lower Milford Twp., 431 F. Supp. 3d 590, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2019), aff'd, 5 F.4th 355
(3d Cir. 2021); see also Rink v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, 717 F. App’x 126, 141 (3d Cir.
2017) (“There can be no civil conspiracy to commit an unlawful act under § 1983 where the
plaintiff has not proven a deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right or privilege.”).
Because Plaintiffs allegations of conspiracy are conclusory and because he fails to plead a
predicate violation to anchor the claim, his § 1983 conspiracy claims are dismissed for failure to
state a claim for relief.
Moreover, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts to state conspiracy claims under §§
1985 or 1986. See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]o state a claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: (1) a conspiracy; (2) motivated by a racial or class
based discriminatory animus designed to deprive, directly or indirectly, any person or class of
persons to the equal protection of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) an

injury to person or property or the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States.””); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1206 (3d Cir. 1988) (stating the elements of a §
1985(2) claim regarding a conspiracy to obstruct justice by intimidating parties, witnesses, or
jurors); see also Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 n.5 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[T]o maintain a
cause of action under § 1986, the plaintiffs must show the existence of a § 1985 conspiracy.”).
Because Plaintiff merely lists these statutory provisions without providing supporting facts, his
§§ 1985 and 1986 conspiracy claims are also dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a
claim for relief.
Plaintiff also contends that his living conditions at MCCC, which allegedly include
exposure to hazardous mold, human waste, and extreme temperatures, as well as overcrowding,
and a lack of toilet paper and hot water, violate his constitutional rights. To establish a basis for a
Fourteenth Amendment violation, a pretrial detainee must allege that his conditions of confinement
amount to punishment. Beil v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). “Unconstitutional punishment
typically includes both objective and subjective components.” Stevenson vy. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62,
68 (3d Cir. 2007). “[T]he objective component requires an inquiry into whether the deprivation
was sufficiently serious and the subjective component asks whether the officials acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind.” /d. (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
Only conditions of confinement that “cause [detainees] to endure genuine privations and
hardship over an extended period of time” violate due process. Bell, 441 U.S. at 542. Additionally,
“a ‘particular measure amounts to punishment when there is a showing of express intent to punish
on the part of detention facility officials, when the restriction or condition is not rationally related
to a legitimate non-punitive government purpose, or when the restriction is excessive in light of
that purpose.’” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Stevenson, 495 F.3d at

10

68); Steele v. Cicchi, 855 F.3d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 2017). Courts should consider the totality of the
circumstances in evaluating such a claim. Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 373 (“In evaluating a pretrial
detainee’s claim of unconstitutional punishment, courts must examine the totality of the
circumstances within the institution.”).
Here, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiff's allegations regarding exposure to
mold, extreme temperatures, human waste, and overcrowding are serious enough to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. That analysis turns on the severity and duration of those conditions.’
See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (holding that inmates should not be
“expose[d] to [contaminants] that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future
health”); Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 236 Gd Cir. 2008) (considering the degree of prison
overcrowding that violates the Fourteenth Amendment and finding that pretrial detainees did not
have a clearly-established right to avoid triple-celling or mattresses on the floor); Fontroy v.
Owens, 150 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1998) (considering deliberate indifference claim based on
asbestos exposure in prison); Martin v. Gearhart, 712 F. App’x. 179, 187 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding
that sustained exposure to human waste can state a claim for relief under § 1983 but that exposures
of “limited severity and duration” do not violate the Constitution); Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d
640, 644 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the factors relevant to claims based on low cell
temperature, are “the severity of the cold; its duration; whether the prisoner has alternative means
to protect himself from the cold; the adequacy of such alternatives; as well as whether he must
endure other uncomfortable conditions as well as cold”).

4 Plaintiff submits an amended complaint, he should provide additional facts about the severity
and duration of the conditions he personally endured.
11

Even if some of the conditions and deprivations alleged by Plaintiff are sufficiently severe
and longstanding enough to amount to punishment, Plaintiff fails to plead facts showing that any
of the remaining Defendants acted with deliberate indifference, meaning that they consciously
disregarded a serious risk to his health or safety. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991);
see also Wilson vy, Burks, 423 F. App’x 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (““[T]he official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial harm exists, and
he must also draw that inference.’”) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837); Beers—Capitol v. Whetzel,
256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 2001) (“The knowledge element of deliberate indifference is subjective,
not objective knowledge, meaning that the official must actually be aware of the existence of the
excessive risk; it is not sufficient that the official should have been aware.””). Knowledge may be
shown where the official has actual notice of the risk, Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 67-68 (3d Cir.
1996), or where the risk was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by
prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued
been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have known about it.” Farmer,
511 U.S. at 842.
Here, Plaintiff has sued the Fire Marshal and Director of Public Safety, but his complaint
provides no well-pleaded facts suggesting that these individuals knew about his exposure to
mold, extreme temperatures, human waste, or other unsanitary conditions at MCCC. Instead, his
allegations against these officials appear to be based on respondeat superior, which is not a valid
basis for liability under § 1983. See Parkell y. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff also mentions Warden Charles Ellis in passing in his supporting Brief, but he has not
provided sufficient facts to suggest that Warden Ellis had actual notice of any of the conditions
or that any of the conditions were so pervasive or well-documented that Ellis must have known

12

about them. Because Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts regarding the subjective elements
of deliberate indifference with respect to the Fire Marshal, the Director of Public Safety, or
Warden Ellis, the Court dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims
for failure to state a claim for relief.
Plaintiff may be attempting to assert claims against the County of Mercer, pursuant to
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In that decision, the
Supreme Court recognized that while local government units can be liable under § 1983, “a
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436
U.S. at 691. Thus, a local government cannot be held liable for “an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents.” Id. at 694. A § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two

ways. See Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798-99 (3d Cir. 2019), A plaintiff
may allege that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries,
id. at 798 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694), or that his injuries were caused by a failure or
inadequacy by the municipality that “reflects a deliberate or conscious choice,” see id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir.
2001)); see also Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining that the second
type of Monell claim involves failures to train, supervise, or discipline).
To assert a Monel] claim against the County, Plaintiff would need to provide facts
showing that the County had a relevant policy or custom and that policy or custom was the
moving force behind the constitutional violation or violations. See, e.g., Natale, 318 F.3d at
583-84 (citing Bd. of County Comm rs of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
(1997)). Plaintiff must identify a specific policy or custom of the County that caused the
constitutional violation at issue and must typically allege a pattern of similar past conduct to

13

show that the County was on notice that the policy or custom caused the alleged violation. See,
e.g., Schlaybach v. Berks Heim Nursing & Rehabilitation, 839 F. App’x. 759, 760 (3d Cir. 2021)
(affirming dismissal of Monell claim where Plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that County
hospital had a history of providing inadequate care to nursing home residents after they fall or
was otherwise indifferent to their post-fall medical needs and failed to allege a pattern of prior
incidents evidencing deliberate indifference). Alternatively, Plaintiff could state a Monell claim
by alleging a failure to supervise, train, or discipline, and must provide facts showing that the
failure amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those affected. Forrest,
930 F.3d at 106. Here, Plaintiff has not provided sufficient facts to suggest that a specific policy
or custom of the County caused any violations of his constitutional rights or that the County was
on notice through a pattern of prior violations. Nor has he alleged deliberate indifference by the
County through its failure to train, supervise, or discipline. As such, the Court dismisses without
prejudice the § 1983 claims against the County of Mercer for failure to state a claim for relief.
In addition to his federal claims, Plaintiff may be attempting to assert state law claims for
negligence, medical malpractice, and/or fraud. Where a federal court has original jurisdiction
over certain claims, it also has supplemental jurisdiction over all other related claims that form
part of the “same case or controversy” under Article III of the United States Constitution. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)
(same). Title 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3) provides that district courts “may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction ... if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” See also Kach y. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009) (same). As
relevant here, “where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed
before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state law claims unless

14

considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an
affirmative justification for doing so.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)
(emphasis in original). “Additionally, the federal court should be guided by the goal of avoiding
needless decisions of state law ... both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the
parties.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Here, the Court has dismissed the federal claims at an early
stage and declines supplemental jurisdiction over any potential state law claims at this time.°
For the reasons explained above, the federal claims are dismissed pursuant to the Court’s
screening authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff may submit an amended
complaint within 45 days to the extent he can cure the deficiencies in his Original Complaint. In
this regard, the Court notes that Plaintiff has submitted additional “briefs” in support of his
claims for relief. The Court declines to consider these piecemeal submissions as amendments to
the Original Complaint, and Plaintiff should refrain from making such submissions in the future.
Instead, Plaintiff should submit a single all-inclusive amended complaint within 45 days if he
believes he can cure the deficiencies in some or all of his federal claims.® An appropriate Order
follows.

Robert Kirsch |
United States District Judge

If Plaintiff submits an amended complaint, he is free to reassert his state law claims. If Plaintiff
states one or more federal claims, the Court will address the state law claims at that time.
° [f Plaintiff chooses to submit an amended complaint, that amended complaint will replace his
Original Complaint and should include all the facts Plaintiff wishes the Court to consider.
Plaintiff should not submit a “Brief” in support of his amended complaint. Instead, Plaintiff
should include all his facts in the body of his amended complaint.
15

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/10277363. Public record. Not legal advice.